Shabbat 92a (צב.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge:

But is there not the place of the opening

the seam at the bottom of the wallet

for if he wishes, he can tear it open

he tears it there

and takes

the coins?

And we answer: What are we dealing with here?

With a silver bar.

There is a long piece of silver in the wallet, which he does not acquire until he brings all of it outside.

And we challenge:

But

the prohibitions of Shabbat and theft still do not occur simultaneously.

Since there are

for the wallet

straps

the straps at the bottom of the wallet, with which he ties the wallet, it is possible that the thief

will bring it out

he brings the wallet out

up to its mouth, and it is permitted

and then he can untie the straps,

and take it

and he can acquire the silver bar at that point; therefore, he has already become liable for theft of the silver bar. [

Of course, he is not liable for theft of the wallet itself until he brings the entire wallet outside, as we established above, in the case of a silver bar whose entirety he did not bring outside.

Rather, the Gemara means to say that since the straps do not prevent him from taking the silver bar inside, as immediately upon bringing its mouth outside he can untie the straps, he becomes liable at that point for theft of the silver bar.]

And

if

the straps

of the wallet were still

bound inside

they would remain tied inside, in the private domain; therefore, he would not be liable for carrying on Shabbat either for the wallet or for the silver bar inside it, since they too are considered bound to the private domain. [

The proof is from the case in which he brought the wallet out through its mouth. The Gemara’s challenge is that the beraita states the matter without qualification, including such a case. Ritva.]

For the prohibition of Shabbat would not take effect until he also brought out the straps, which are part of the wallet, and the binding of a vessel is considered a binding?

And we answer: What are we dealing with here?

A case in which there are no straps

for the wallet.

And if you wish, say:

straps,

and

they

are wrapped around it

wrapped around the wallet, so that when the wallet emerges, they too emerge outside. Thus, the prohibitions of Shabbat and theft occur simultaneously.

And Rava likewise said: They taught

that one who carries out a basket is exempt

only with regard to a basket full of cucumbers and pumpkins.

But if it is full of mustard, he is liable.

Apparently, he holds

Rava:

The binding of a vessel is not considered a binding.

Abaye said: Even if it is full of mustard, he is exempt.

Apparently, he holds: The binding of a vessel is considered a binding.

Abaye adopted Rava’s position.

Abaye retracted his statement and agreed with Rava’s position.

Rava adopted Abaye’s position.

Rava, meanwhile, retracted his statement and agreed with Abaye’s position.

And they raised a contradiction between Abaye and Abaye, and between Rava and Rava;

As it was stated: One who carries out produce into the public domain:

Abaye said:

If he carried it out

in his hand, he is liable,

even though his body remains inside, because the binding of his body is not considered a binding.

But if he carried it out

in a vessel,

and part of the vessel remained inside,

he is exempt,

because the binding of a vessel is considered a binding.

And Rava said: With his hand

he is exempt,

because the binding of his body is considered a binding; that is, the hand is drawn after the body, which remains inside.

With a vessel

he is liable,

because the binding of a vessel is not considered a binding.

But this is difficult in light of what we said: Abaye retracted his statement and held that the binding of a vessel is not considered a binding, while Rava retracted his statement and held that it is considered a binding; yet here we learn the opposite?

And we answer:

Reverse

their statements in the dispute concerning one who carries out produce. Abaye held that if he carried it out in his hand he is exempt, and with a vessel he is liable. Rava held that with his hand he is liable, and with a vessel he is exempt.

And we challenge the one who says

that with his hand he is liable:

But did we not learn

at the beginning of our tractate:

The householder extended

who was standing inside

his hand outside

with an object in his hand,

and the poor person took from it

the object,

or the poor person

standing outside gave the object

into it

into the hand of the householder,

and

the householder brought the object inside,

both are exempt,

because neither performed a complete labor: one performed the removal and the other performed the placing.

And if we say that one who carries out an object in his hand is liable, why would the householder not become liable immediately when he extended his hand outside? Rather, we must certainly say that the binding of his body is considered a binding, and one who carries out an object in his hand is exempt. But this is difficult for the one who holds him liable?

And we answer:

There

in the Mishna, the case is when his hand was

above three

handbreadths from the ground. The reason is not the binding of his body; rather, the hand is always considered as though it were outside, but he is exempt because this does not constitute placing, since the hand is suspended in the air.

But

here,

where he is liable when he carries it out in his hand, when his hand is

below three

handbreadths from the ground, the hand is considered to be resting on the ground, and this constitutes placing.

Mishna:

One who carries out an object, whether with his right hand or with his left,

or

in his lap, or on his shoulders, is liable, for this was the burden-bearing of the descendants of Kehat!

He is liable for carrying it on his shoulders, as it is stated: “They shall carry on the shoulder” [and all the labors are derived from the Tabernacle, Rambam]. Carrying with the right or left hand and in one’s lap is a normal manner of carrying out.

One who carries out an object

in an unusual manner

on the back of his hand,

with his foot, with his mouth ,

with his elbow ,

with his ear, with his hair, or in his belt-pouch

a hollow belt that also serves as a wallet,

with its opening downward [

but if its opening is upward, that is a normal manner of carrying out],

between his belt-pouch and his shirt, or in the hem of his shirt

the lower hem,

in his shoe or in his sandal—

he is exempt,

because

he did not carry it out in the manner of those who carry out objects,

in the manner in which people ordinarily carry objects.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: One who carries out a burden above ten handbreadths

in the public domain, holding it in his hand and carrying it through the air more than ten handbreadths above the ground [since the Mishna already taught that he is liable for carrying it on his shoulders]—

is liable,

even though the area above ten handbreadths is not the public domain,

for this was the burden-bearing of the descendants of Kehat!

And from where do we know the burden of the descendants of Kehat

And from where do we know the burden-bearing of the descendants of Kehat

that this was so?

As it is written: “The hangings of the courtyard, and the screen at the entrance of the courtyard, which

were

around the Tabernacle and the altar.”

The altar is juxtaposed to the Tabernacle:

Just as the Tabernacle

its height was

ten cubits, so too the altar

its height was

ten cubits.

And from where do we know regarding the Tabernacle itself

that it was ten cubits high?

As it is written: “Ten cubits is the length of the plank.”

And it is written: “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle.” And Rav said: Moses our teacher spread it! From here you learn

about the

height of the Levites, which was ten cubits!

Presumably, all the Levites were as tall as Moses, whose height was ten cubits , and Moses spread the tent curtains with his hands over the Tabernacle, which was ten cubits high.

And it is an established tradition: Every burden

a burden

that is carried

carried

on poles, one-third is above

one-third of the burden’s height is above the pole

and two-thirds are below

the pole.

Since the descendants of Kehat carried the altar on their shoulders, one-third of it was above their shoulders and two-thirds below their shoulders. It follows that the altar was raised from the ground by almost one-third of ten cubits [ which is the third that was above their shoulders].

It was found,

it emerged,

that it was raised very high

that it was elevated much more than ten handbreadths.

And if you wish, say:

Actually, the Levites were not as tall as Moses, and if so, one cannot derive the matter from the carrying of the altar, for perhaps they were only seven cubits tall, in which case the two-thirds of the altar [approximately seven cubits] below their shoulders reached almost to the ground.

Rather, we derive it

from the Ark, as the Master said: The Ark

its height was

nine

handbreadths,

and the cover

its height was

one handbreadth; here you have ten

handbreadths.

And it is an established tradition: Every burden

a burden

that is carried

carried

on poles—

one-third is above,

two-thirds above the one carrying it,

and two-thirds are below

two-thirds below the shoulder of the one carrying it.

It follows that above ten

handbreadths

the Ark was standing

the Ark.

Even if the Levites had only ordinary stature, namely three cubits, which is eighteen handbreadths, only two-thirds of ten handbreadths of the Ark—six and two-thirds handbreadths—would have been below their shoulders; it would still have been raised more than ten handbreadths above the ground.

And we challenge this formulation:

Let us derive it from Moses,

whose height was ten cubits, like that of the Levites; why should we not learn from the Levites’ carrying of the altar?

And we answer:

Perhaps Moses was different.

For the Master said: The Divine Presence rests only upon one who is wise, mighty, wealthy, and of imposing stature.

Rav said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya: One who carries out a burden on his head on Shabbat

is liable to bring a sin-offering, for this is how the people of Hutzal do so

They would carry containers of water and wine on their heads without holding them with their hands.

And we challenge: And we challenge:

And

if

the people of Hutzal are the majority of the world,

so that everyone is drawn after their practice?

Rather, if it was stated, this is what was stated: Rav said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya: One of the people of Hutzal who carried out a burden on his head on Shabbat is liable, for this is how the people of his city do so.

And we challenge:

Should his individual opinion not be disregarded in relation to all other people?