Shabbat 92a — the Talmud in English

And we object:

but there is the place of the opening

the seam at the edge of the purse

for if he wishes, he can tear it open

he tears there,

and takes

the coins?

And we answer: In what are we dealing here?

In a bar of silver.

There is a long piece of silver in the purse, which he does not acquire until he brings all of it outside.

And we object:

And

still, the prohibition of Shabbat and the theft do not come simultaneously.

Since there are

for the purse

strings,

the straps at the edge of the purse, with which he ties the purse—then it is possible that the thief

brings it out

brings the purse out

up to its mouth, and it is permitted,

and then he can untie the straps,

and take it,

and he can acquire the bar of silver then; therefore, he has already become liable for theft of the bar of silver at that point.

And, of course, he does not become liable for theft of the purse itself until he brings the entire purse outside, as we established above, in the case of a bar of silver whose entirety he did not bring out.

Rather, the Gemara intends to say that since the straps do not prevent him from taking the bar of silver inside, because immediately upon its mouth emerging he can untie the straps, he becomes liable at that point for theft of the bar of silver.

And

if

the strings,

the straps of the purse, are still

bound from within,

they remain tied inside, in the private domain; therefore, he is not liable on account of carrying on Shabbat, neither for the purse nor for the bar of silver inside it, since they too are considered bound to the private domain.

The proof is from the case in which he brought the purse out through its mouth. The Gemara’s objection is that the beraita states the matter anonymously, including in such a case. Ritva.

For the prohibition of Shabbat does not come until he also brings out the strings, which are part of the purse, and the binding of a vessel is considered a binding?

And we answer: In what are we dealing here?

Where there are no strings

for the purse.

And if you wish, say: It has

strings,

and

they are

wrapped around it,

wrapped around the purse, so that when the purse emerges, they too emerge outside. Thus, the prohibition of Shabbat and the theft come simultaneously.

And Rava likewise said: They taught this only

that one who carries out a basket is exempt

in a basket full of cucumbers and gourds.

But if it is full of mustard, he is liable.

Apparently, he holds

Rava:

the binding of a vessel is not considered a binding.

Abaye said: Even if it is full of mustard, he is exempt.

Apparently, he holds: the binding of a vessel is considered a binding.

Abaye adopted Rava’s position.

Abaye retracted his words and agreed with Rava’s position.

Rava adopted Abaye’s position.

Rava, for his part, retracted his words and agreed with Abaye’s position.

And we raise a contradiction from Abaye against Abaye, and from Rava against Rava;

for it was stated: One who carries out produce into the public domain:

Abaye said:

if he carried it out

in his hand, he is liable,

even though his body remains inside, because the binding of his body is not considered a binding.

But if he carried it out

in a vessel,

and part of the vessel remained inside—

he is exempt,

because the binding of a vessel is considered a binding.

And Rava said: With his hand—

he is exempt,

because the binding of his body is considered a binding; that is, the hand is drawn after the body that remains inside.

With a vessel—

he is liable,

because the binding of a vessel is not considered a binding.

And this is difficult concerning what we said: Abaye retracted his words and holds that the binding of a vessel is not considered a binding, while Rava retracted his words and holds that it is considered a binding; yet here we hear the opposite?

And we answer:

Reverse

their positions in the dispute concerning one who carries out produce: Abaye holds that with his hand he is exempt and with a vessel he is liable; while Rava holds that with his hand he is liable and with a vessel he is exempt.

And we object to the one who says

with his hand he is liable:

But we learned

at the beginning of our tractate:

The homeowner extended

who was standing inside

his hand outside,

and there was an object in his hand,

and the poor person took from it

the object,

or he gave

the poor person standing outside gave the object

into it,

into the hand of the homeowner,

and brought it inside,

the homeowner brought the object inside,

both of them are exempt,

because neither of them performed a complete labor: one performed the uprooting and the other performed the placing.

And if we say that one who carries out with his hand is liable, why should the homeowner not become liable immediately when he extended his hand outside? Rather, certainly we say that the binding of the body is considered a binding, and one who carries out with his hand is exempt. But this is difficult for the one who holds him liable?

And we answer:

There,

in the Mishna, it is speaking when his hand is

above three

handbreadths from the ground. The reason is not the binding of his body; rather, the hand is always considered as though it were outside, but the exemption is because this is not placing, since the hand is suspended in the air.

But

here,

where he is liable when he carries out with his hand, when his hand is

below three

handbreadths from the ground, because the hand is considered as resting on the ground, and this is placing.

Mishna:

One who carries out, whether with his right hand or with his left,

or

in his bosom, or on his shoulders, is liable, for this was the burden-bearing of the sons of Kehat!

He is liable for carrying it on his shoulders, as it is stated, “On the shoulder they shall carry.” [All the labors are learned from the Tabernacle, Rambam.] Carrying with the right hand, the left, and in one’s bosom is a manner of carrying out.

One who carries out

in an unusual manner,

on the back of his hand,

with his foot, with his mouth,

with his elbow,

with his ear, with his hair, and in his pouch,

a hollow belt that also serves as a purse,

with its opening downward, [but if its opening is upward, this is a manner of carrying out],

but if its opening faces upward, this is a normal manner of carrying out an object],

between his pouch and his robe, and in the hem of his robe,

the lower edge,

in his shoe, in his sandal—

he is exempt,

because

he did not carry out in the manner of those who carry out,

in the manner in which people ordinarily carry out.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: One who carries out a burden above ten handbreadths

in the public domain, holding it in his hand and transferring it through the air above ten handbreadths from the ground [for carrying it on his shoulders we already learned in the Mishna that he is liable]—

is liable,

even though above ten [handbreadths] is not the public domain,

for this was the burden-bearing of the sons of Kehat!

And from where do we know the burden of the descendants of Kehat

And from where do we know the burden-bearing of the sons of Kehat

that this was so?

For it is written, “

And the hangings of the court, and the screen of the entrance of the court, which

were over the Tabernacle and over the altar round about.”

He compares the altar to the Tabernacle—

just as the Tabernacle

its height was

ten cubits, so too the altar

its height was

ten cubits.

And from where do we know concerning the Tabernacle itself

that it was ten cubits?

For it is written, “Ten cubits is the length of the board.”

And it is written, “And he spread the tent over the Tabernacle.” And Rav said: Moses our teacher spread it! From here you learn

about the

height of the Levites, which was ten cubits!

Presumably, all the Levites were as tall as Moses, who was ten cubits , and Moses spread the tent cloths with his hands over the Tabernacle, which was ten cubits high.

And it is handed down: Every burden

burden

that is raised

carried

on poles, one-third above

a third of the height of the burden is above the pole

and two-thirds below

the pole.

And since the sons of Kehat carried the altar on their shoulders, one-third of it was above their shoulders and two-thirds below their shoulders; it follows that the altar was raised from the ground almost one-third of ten cubits [which is the third that was above their shoulders].

It was found,

it was found,

that it was raised very high,

that it was elevated much more than ten handbreadths.

And if you wish, say:

In truth, the height of the Levites was not like that of Moses; and if so, one cannot learn from the carrying of the altar, for perhaps their height was only seven cubits, and it follows that the two-thirds of the altar [which was approximately seven cubits] below their shoulders reached almost to the ground.

Rather, we learn

from the Ark, for the Master said: The Ark

its height was

nine

handbreadths,

and the cover

its height was

one handbreadth; here there are ten

handbreadths.

And it is handed down: Every burden

burden

that is raised

that is carried

on poles—

one-third above,

two-thirds above the one carrying it,

and two-thirds below

and two-thirds below the shoulder of the one carrying it.

It was found that above ten

handbreadths

the Ark was standing,

the Ark.

Even if the Levites had only ordinary height, namely three cubits, which are eighteen handbreadths, the Ark would have been no lower than two-thirds of ten handbreadths below their shoulders—six handbreadths and two-thirds—and it would still have been raised from the ground more than ten handbreadths.

And we object to this formulation:

And let us learn from Moses,

that the height of the Levites was ten cubits like him; why do we not learn from the carrying of the altar by the Levites?

And we answer:

Perhaps Moses was different.

For the Master said: The Divine Presence rests only upon one who is wise, mighty, wealthy, and of imposing stature.

Rav said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya: One who carries out a burden on his head on Shabbat—

is liable for a sin-offering, for this was what the people of Hutzal did.

They would carry vessels of water and wine on their heads without holding them with their hands.

And we object:

And

do

the people of Hutzal constitute the majority of the world,

that everyone is drawn after them?

Rather, if it was stated, this is what was stated: Rav said in the name of Rabbi Hiyya: One of the people of Hutzal who carried out a burden on his head on Shabbat is liable, for this is what the people of his city do.

And we object:

Should his opinion be nullified before that of all people?