Shabbat 91b — the Talmud in English

Let us say: from the matter of invalidation

to be invalid! b

when it leaves

the Temple courtyard, its measure is

an olive-bulk,

so this removal is significant, since through it the olive-bulk becomes invalid, and one who eats it transgresses a prohibition;

with regard to Shabbat as well

should its removal be considered

an olive-bulk?

Rather, certainly we do not say this reasoning.

And we reject this:

How can these cases be compared!?

What is the comparison?

There, once he took it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard,

immediately

it became invalid through leaving.

But

with regard to Shabbat—

he is not liable until he takes it out into the public domain.

Therefore, the fact that its removal and its invalidation are through leaving does not make it significant with regard to removal on Shabbat.

But

here, Shabbat and impurity—

come together.

For until the olive-bulk comes to rest upon less than an egg-bulk of food, impurity does not take effect upon them; and then he also becomes liable on account of Shabbat.

And it still remains uncertain whether in such a case an olive-bulk suffices also with regard to Shabbat.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he again brought it in, he is liable only according to its measure.

And we inquire about this:

Is it obvious?

For he changed his mind about sowing it, his earlier intention was nullified, and it is like the object of any ordinary person.

And we answer:

Abaye said: Here, with what are we dealing?

With a case in which he did not explicitly change his mind, but

for example, he threw

the seed

into the storehouse

together with his produce,

and its place is recognizable,

as it was not thoroughly mixed.

Lest you say: Since its place is recognizable—

he remains with his original matter,

for it is as though he concealed it there separately, and he still intends to sow it—

it teaches us this: Since he threw it into the storehouse—

he entirely nullified it

from his first intention.

Mishna:

a.

One who carries out foods and places them on the threshold,

the threshold before the house, whose status was that of a karmelit—whether

he returned

himself

and carried them out

to the public domain from the karmelit,

or another person carried them out

a person

else

to the public domain—

is exempt

from a sin-offering

because he did not perform his labor all at once.

For the labor of carrying out consists of uprooting from a domain of liability and placing down in a domain of liability, whereas here he interrupted in the middle by placing it down in a karmelit, which is a domain exempt by Torah law[

b.

A basket

a basket

that is full of produce

and he carried it out from his house,

and placed it on the outer threshold

before the entrance of the house, on the side of the public domain—and the case is one of a threshold whose status is that of the public domain, as will be explained in the Gemara—then,

although most

of the

produce is outside,

since a minority of it remains inside, he is

exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

That is, unless he initially carried out the entire basket at once. The reason for this will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And we inquire about this:

This threshold

of the first clause—

what

is it?

If you say it is a threshold

that is

the public domain,

for example, it is nine handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and many people shoulder loads upon it [see above 8a], why is he

exempt

when he carries out from his house into that threshold—and

does he not carry out from a private domain into the public domain?

Rather, it is a threshold

that is

a private domain,

for example, it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. If so, this is difficult: Why does it state,

“whether he returned

himself

and carried them out, or another person carried them out

a person

else, he is exempt”?

And

does he not carry out

in this second carrying-out

from a private domain into the public domain?

And we answer:

Rather,

we are dealing with

a threshold

that is

a karmelit.

For example, it is from three to nine handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide.

And it teaches us this: The reason

that he is exempt is because

it came to rest

in a karmelit

in the middle.

But if it did not come to rest in a karmelit,

but he merely transferred it through it,

he is liable.

The Mishna is not in accordance with ben Azzai.

For in his view, even if he merely transfers it through a karmelit, he is exempt.

As it was taught: One who carries out from a shop

which is a private domain

to the market square

which is a public domain,

through a portico

a place of platforms in the public domain where the merchants sit, whose status is that of a karmelit because it is not intended for the passage of the public—

is liable,

for he did not place the object down in the middle.

And ben Azzai exempts.

For he holds: “One who walks is like one who comes to rest.” That is, at every step he is considered as though his body comes to rest and is uprooted again; and since the placing down of his body is like the placing down of an object, he has placed it down in a karmelit in the middle.

We learned in the Mishna:

A basket that is full

of produce.

Hezekiah said: They taught

that until he carries out the entire basket he is not liable

only with a basket full of cucumbers and pumpkins,

which are long, and part of each one remains inside.

But if it is full

of grains of

mustard—he

is liable.

For there are grains all of which are outside.

It follows that he holds: The attachment of a vessel is not called an attachment.

We do not say that the vessel attaches what is inside it to the domain in which the vessel is located, and that as long as part of the vessel is inside, it is still considered, with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, as though he had not carried it out.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if it is full of mustard, he is exempt

until he carries all of it out.

It follows that he holds: The attachment of a vessel is called an attachment.

Rabbi Zeira said: The Mishna is precisely not in accordance with Hezekiah, and precisely not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

For with regard to both of them,

it is not precise according to Hezekiah: For it states, “until he carries out the entire basket.”

And we infer:

The reason

that he is liable is specifically where he carried out

the entire basket.

But

if he carried out only

all the produce

and part of the basket remained inside, he is

exempt.

It follows that he holds: The attachment of a vessel is called an attachment.

It is not precise according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: For it states, “Although most of the produce is outside.”

And we infer:

The reason

that he is exempt is because

only

the

most of the produce

is outside.

But

if

all the produce

were outside,

even though the basket is attached from within

since part of the basket remains inside, he is

liable.

It follows that he holds: The attachment of a vessel is not called an attachment.

But is it difficult?

Hezekiah explains it according to his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan explains it according to his reasoning.

Hezekiah explains it according to his reasoning:

This is what it teaches:

“Until he carries out the entire basket.” In what case is this said? With a basket full of cucumbers and pumpkins,

whose length occupies the entire width of the basket, and until he carries out the entire basket, part of the foods themselves still remains inside;

but if it is full of mustard, it is considered as though he carried out the entire basket, and he is liable.

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains it according to his reasoning:

It teaches the case of “not only this, but also that.” And this is what it says:

“Although most of the produce is outside,”

he is exempt,

“and not only most of the produce, but even

if

all

the

produce

is outside, he is

exempt—

until he carries out the entire basket.”

He raised an objection:

It was taught:

One who carries out a peddler’s basket

[to] the outer threshold,

which is a public domain,

although most of the types

of spices

are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

It enters your mind that this is referring to bundles,

that there were bundles and bundles of spices in it. Thus, even when he carries out part of the basket, some of the bundles have already gone out entirely, and nevertheless he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

This is difficult for Hezekiah,

who said that we do not follow the vessel?

And we answer:

Hezekiah could say to you: Here, with what are we dealing? With urnesi.

With bundles of long spice roots that fill the entire basket.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised an objection:

It was taught:

One who steals a purse

a wallet

on Shabbat is liable

for the payments of theft; and although through this theft he becomes liable to stoning for carrying out on Shabbat, nevertheless we do not say that he is exempt from payment because he is faced with a more severe penalty.

For he had already become liable for

the payments of

theft before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat.

For from the moment he lifted the wallet in the owners’ house, he had already become liable for payment, whereas liability for the labor of Shabbat does not come until he carries it out of the house. And the exemption of being faced with a more severe penalty applies only when the two liabilities come at one time.

If he was dragging

the wallet on the ground

and went out

from the house,

he is exempt

from payment

because the prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat come at one time.

Since he did not lift the wallet, he did not acquire it through the acquisition of theft until the time he carried it out of the owners’ house and then he also becomes liable on account of Shabbat.

And if it enters your mind that the attachment of a vessel is called an attachment,

then

the prohibition of theft preceded the prohibition of Shabbat?

For immediately upon carrying out part of the wallet, he acquired the money that was outside, since he could take it out through the opening of the wallet, which was already outside, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat does not come until he carries out the entire wallet.

And we answer:

If he took it out through its opening—

so too.

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he took it out through its bottom,

so that he cannot take out the money until he takes out the entire wallet.