Shabbat 91b (צא:) — the Talmud in English

Let us say that, with regard to becoming disqualified,

to become disqualified b

when it leaves

the Temple courtyard, its measure

is an olive-bulk,

so this act of carrying is significant, as through it the olive-bulk becomes disqualified, and one who eats it violates a prohibition;

with regard to Shabbat as well,

should its carrying be considered

to involve an olive-bulk?

Rather, certainly we do not say this reasoning.

And we reject this:

Can this really be compared!?

What is the comparison?

There, once he takes it outside the wall of the Temple courtyard,

immediately

it becomes disqualified due to leaving.

Whereas

with regard to Shabbat—

he is not liable until he carries it into the public domain.

Therefore, the fact that its carrying and its disqualification are due to leaving does not make it significant with regard to carrying on Shabbat.

But

here, with regard to Shabbat and ritual impurity,

they come together.

For the ritual impurity does not take effect on the food until the olive-bulk comes to rest upon less than an egg-bulk of food. At that point he also becomes liable for Shabbat.

Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether, in such a case, an olive-bulk is sufficient with regard to Shabbat as well.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he then brought it back inside, he is liable only for its measure.

And we raise a difficulty:

Is this not obvious?

For he reconsidered and no longer intended to sow it; his original intention was thereby nullified, and it is like any other object.

And we answer:

Abaye said: Here, with what are we dealing?

He did not explicitly reconsider; rather, it was

for example, that he threw

the seed

into the storehouse

together with his produce, and

its location was discernible,

as it had not become thoroughly mixed in.

Lest you say: Since its location was discernible—

he remains with his original intention,

for it is as though he had stored it there separately, and he still intended to sow it—

it teaches us: Since he threw it into the storehouse—

he completely nullified

his original intention.

Mishna:

a.

One who carries out food and places it on a threshold,

the threshold before the house, which had the status of a karmelit, is exempt

whether he returned

himself

and carried it out

from the karmelit into the public domain,

or whether another person carried it out

to the public domain

instead

from the threshold—

he is exempt

from a sin-offering

because he did not perform his labor all at once.

The labor of carrying consists of removing an object from a domain in which carrying is prohibited and depositing it in another such domain. Here, he interrupted the act in the middle by depositing it in a karmelit, which is a place exempt from liability [at the Torah level.

b.

A basket

or sack

filled with produce

which he carried out from his house

and placed on the outer threshold

before the entrance to the house, on the side of the public domain—and the reference is to a threshold that has the status of the public domain, as will be explained in the Gemara—is exempt

even though most of

the

produce is outside,

since a minority of it remains inside;

he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

That is, unless he initially carried out the entire basket at once. The reason for this will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty:

This threshold

mentioned in the first clause—

what

is it?

If you say it is a threshold

that is

the public domain,

for example, it is nine handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and many people use it to place their burdens [see above, 8a], why is he

exempt

when he carries from his house onto that threshold?

Is he not carrying from a private domain into the public domain?

Rather, if it is a threshold

that is

a private domain,

for example, it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, this too is difficult: Why does it state,

“whether he returned

himself

and carried it out, or whether another person carried it out

by a different person

instead, he is exempt”?

But

is he not carrying

in this second act of carrying

from a private domain into the public domain?

And we answer:

Rather, we are dealing with

we are dealing with

a threshold

that is

a karmelit,

for example, it is more than three and up to nine handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide.

And this teaches us: The reason

that he is exempt is because

it came to rest

in a karmelit

in the middle.

Had it not come to rest in a karmelit,

but he had merely carried it through it,

he would be liable.

The Mishna is not in accordance with ben Azzai.

In his view, even one who merely carries an object through a karmelit is exempt.

As it is taught in a beraita: One who carries out an object from a shop

which is a private domain

to the marketplace

which is a public domain

through a portico,

an area of benches in the public domain where the merchants sit, whose status is that of a karmelit because it is not intended for public passage—

is liable,

since he did not deposit the object in the middle.

But ben Azzai exempts.

For he holds: “One who walks is considered like one who stands.” That is, with every step, a person is considered to have come to rest and then to have been lifted again. Since the resting of his body is comparable to the depositing of an object, he deposited the object in a karmelit in the middle.

We learned in the Mishna:

A basket that is filled

with produce.

Ḥizkiya said: They taught

that he is not liable until he carries out the entire basket

only with regard to a basket filled with cucumbers and pumpkins,

which are long, so that part of each one remains inside.

But if it is filled with grains of

with grains of

mustard—

he is liable,

since some of the grains are entirely outside.

Apparently, he holds: The attachment of a vessel is not considered an attachment.

We do not say that the vessel unites what is inside it with the domain in which the vessel is located, or that as long as part of the vessel remains inside, with regard to carrying on Shabbat it is as though he had not carried out the contents.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even if it is filled with mustard, he is exempt

until he carries out all of it.

Apparently, he holds: The attachment of a vessel is considered an attachment.

Rabbi Zeira said: The Mishna is precisely not in accordance with Ḥizkiya, and it is precisely not in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan.

For both of them,

it is not precise according to Ḥizkiya: For it teaches, “until he carries out the entire basket.”

And we infer:

The reason

that he is liable is specifically when he carries out

the entire basket.

But

if he carries out only

all the produce

while part of the basket remains inside,

he is exempt.

Apparently, he holds: The attachment of a vessel is considered an attachment.

It is not precise according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: For it teaches, “Even though most of the produce is outside.”

And we infer:

The reason

that he is exempt is because

only

the

most of the produce

is outside.

But

if

all the produce

were outside,

even though the basket is attached from within,

as part of the basket remains inside,

he would be liable.

Apparently, he holds: The attachment of a vessel is not considered an attachment.

But is this not difficult?

Ḥizkiya interprets it in accordance with his reasoning, and Rabbi Yoḥanan interprets it in accordance with his reasoning.

Ḥizkiya interprets it in accordance with his reasoning:

This is what it teaches:

“Until he carries out the entire basket.” In what case is this statement said? With regard to a basket filled with cucumbers and pumpkins,

whose length occupies the entire width of the basket, so that until he carries out the entire basket, part of the produce itself still remains inside;

but when it is filled with mustard, it is considered as though he carried out the entire basket, and he is liable.

Rabbi Yoḥanan interprets it in accordance with his reasoning:

It teaches the principle of “not only this, but even that.” And this is what it says:

“Even though most of the produce is outside,”

he is exempt,

and not only when most of the produce is outside, but even

if

all

the

produce

is outside,

he is exempt—

until he carries out the entire basket.

A difficulty was raised:

It is taught in a beraita:

One who carries out a basket belonging to a peddler to

the outer threshold

which is the public domain,

even though most of the types

of spices

are outside, he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

It might have entered your mind that this is referring to bundles,

that there were bundles of spices in it. Thus, even when he carried out part of the basket, some of the bundles had already emerged completely, and nevertheless he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket.

This is difficult for Ḥizkiya,

who says that we do not follow the vessel?

And we answer:

Ḥizkiya could say to you: Here, with what are we dealing? With urnasi,

bundles of long spice roots that fill the entire basket.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye raised an objection:

It is taught in a beraita:

One who steals a purse

or wallet

on Shabbat is liable

to make the payment for the theft. Although through this theft he becomes liable to stoning for carrying on Shabbat, nevertheless we do not say that he is exempt from payment because he is subject to the greater penalty.

For he became liable for

the payment for

the theft before he came to the prohibition of Shabbat.

For from the moment he lifted the wallet in the owner’s house, he became liable for payment, whereas liability for the labor of Shabbat does not take effect until he carries it out of the house. The exemption that applies when one is subject to the greater penalty applies only when the two liabilities take effect simultaneously.

If he was dragging

the wallet along the ground

and went out

from the house,

he is exempt

from payment,

since the prohibition of theft and the prohibition of Shabbat take effect simultaneously.

Since he did not lift the wallet, he did not acquire it through the act of theft until he carried it out of the owner’s house and at that point he also becomes liable for Shabbat.

And if it enters your mind that the attachment of a vessel is considered an attachment,

then

the prohibition of theft would precede the prohibition of Shabbat,

for as soon as part of the wallet is outside, he acquires the money that is outside, since he can remove it through the opening of the wallet, which is already outside, whereas the prohibition of Shabbat does not take effect until he carries out the entire wallet.

And we answer:

If he carried it out through its opening—

so too.

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he carried it out through its bottom,

so that he cannot remove the money until he carries out the entire wallet.