Shabbat 91a — the Talmud in English

Lest you say

since he forgot,

his first thought was entirely nullified,

and here there is neither a thought of storing nor a thought regarding taking it out.

It teaches us this:

Whoever does something

without specification acts according to his original intention!

And the significance of the thought of storing remains in force.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi Meir would make one liable even for taking out a single grain of wheat for sowing.

And we challenge this:

Is it obvious?

For

we learned, “in any amount,”

in the Mishna [regarding one who stores, and the same applies to one who takes out], and an unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir.

And we answer:

Lest you say

that what it teaches,

“in any amount,”

means

to exclude a dried fig,

for one who stores does not require a dried fig, as with other foods, but less than this is sufficient,

yet in any event, until there is an olive-size he is not liable

—.

It teaches us

that he is liable in a truly minimal amount.

Rav Yitzhak, son of Rav Yehuda, challenged him: If so,

that we attach such significance to his דעת that even when he acts without specification we say that he acts according to his original intention,

if he intended to take out his entire house

in one act of taking out, so that now the items are significant to him only when they are all together, would

it also be the case

that we say

that he is not liable until he takes out all of it?

And if he takes it out from the house little by little, he will not be liable?!

And we answer:

There —

his דעת is nullified by the דעת of every person.

Since for everyone an item is significant when it reaches its fixed measure, the individual cannot nullify its significance. This is not so with making an item significant: the individual has the power to do this even when it is not significant for everyone.

We learned in the Mishna:

And every person is liable for it only according to its measure.

The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a general principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored,

which is not fit to be stored because it has no use, or

which people do not store like it,

because it does not have the requisite measure,

and it was made fit for this,

one person deemed it significant

and stored it, and another came and took it out —

the latter becomes liable according to the thought of the former.

From now on, everyone is liable for taking it out.

But the Mishna teaches that only the one who stored it is liable for it.

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: If one took out a dried-fig measure

of types of food

for eating, and reconsidered it

between uprooting and placing, to use it

for sowing,

and placed it.

Alternatively, he took it out for sowing and reconsidered it for eating —

he is liable.

And we raise an objection concerning it:

Is it obvious?

For

go here, there is a measure, and go there, there is a measure.

For there is here a measure both for an item intended for eating, which is a dried-fig measure, and all the more so for an item intended for sowing, whose measure is any amount?

And we answer:

Lest you say, we require

that

the uprooting and the placing be with one thought,

that both of them be either with a thought of eating or with a thought of sowing,

and this is not so.

It teaches us

that even so, he is liable.

Rava raised a question: If one took out half a dried-fig measure for sowing, and it swelled

and reached a dried-fig measure,

and reconsidered it

after the uprooting, to use it

for eating,

and placed it —

what

is the ruling as to becoming liable for it?

If you should say: There,

in the previous law of Rava in the name of Rav Naḥman,

he is liable

even though the uprooting and the placing were not with the same thought,

for go here, there is a measure, and go there, there is a measure,

since from the time of his first thought there was already a measure sufficient also for his second thought, and therefore the uprooting and the placing combine.

But

here, since at the time when he took it out it did not have

yet

a measure

for his second thought of

eating,

the uprooting and the placing do not combine, and

he is not liable.

Or perhaps, since if he had remained silent

and had remained with his first thought

and had not considered another thought concerning it

at the time of placing, he would have

become liable on account of the thought

the first,

of sowing,

for now there is a measure sufficient for the thought of sowing [even if it had not swelled, and all the more so once it swelled],

now also,

when he changed his thought to a thought of eating, he also

becomes liable.

For now there is a measure for eating as well, and this measure is also sufficient for his first thought.

And if you should say: Since if he had remained silent and had not considered it, he would become liable on account of the thought of sowing, now too he becomes liable,

there is still a question:

If one took out a dried-fig measure for eating, and it shrank

to less than a dried-fig measure,

and reconsidered it for sowing —

what is the ruling?

Do we say:

Here, certainly, if he had remained silent

and had remained with the thought of eating until the placing, then

on account of the first thought he would not

have

become liable,

since a dried-fig measure no longer remains?

Or perhaps we follow the present state.

With regard to the present thought, it has a measure,

and he becomes liable?

And if you should say: We follow the present state and he becomes liable,

there is still a question:

If one took out a dried-fig measure for eating, and it shrank, and then swelled again

to a dried-fig measure, and he placed it with a thought of eating —

what is the ruling?

Is there

rejection with regard to Shabbat,

so that since in the middle it decreased below the measure, and had he placed it then he would not have become liable, it follows that at that point it was rejected from liability for a sin-offering and the uprooting was nullified; and even after it swelled and he placed it, he is exempt, since there is placing here without uprooting?

Or is there no rejection with regard to Shabbat?

And we conclude:

Teyku!

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-size of teruma into a

inside

a ritually impure house —

what is the ruling?

And we raise an objection concerning it:

What

is the practical difference?

If with regard to Shabbat

— where he threw it from the public domain into the house, which is a private domain, it is obvious that he is exempt, for

we require a dried-fig measure,

and an olive-size is less than a dried-fig measure?

If with regard to ritual impurity,

to become susceptible to food impurity, then

we require an egg-bulk of foods

in order to become impure, which is more than an olive-size?

And we answer:

Actually, it is dealing with regard to Shabbat

and is speaking

of a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of foods

inside the ritually impure house,

and this

olive-size that he threw landed there and

completes it to an egg-bulk,

and together they receive impurity from the house.

What?

Do we say

since it combines with regard to ritual impurity

through this throwing, it is therefore a significant throwing, and therefore

he is also liable with regard to Shabbat,

as though it were of a dried-fig measure?

Or perhaps, in every matter concerning Shabbat —

do we require a dried-fig measure?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

You learned it

in a beraita:

Abba Shaul says: The measure of the two loaves and the showbread

with regard to taking out on Shabbat is

a dried-fig measure.

And why

is a dried-fig measure required?