Shabbat 91a (צא.) — the Talmud in English

Lest you say

that since he forgot,

his original intention was entirely nullified,

and there is neither an intention of concealment nor an intention regarding the carrying out.

It teaches us:

Anyone who performs an act

without specifying acts according to his original intention!

And the significance of his intention when concealing remains intact.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir would deem one liable even for carrying out a single wheat grain for sowing.

And we object:

Is this obvious?

For

we learned “in any amount”

in the Mishna [with regard to one who concealed an item, and the same applies to one who carries it out], and an unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir’s.

And we answer:

Lest you say

that what it teaches,

“in any amount,”

is

to exclude a dried fig,

meaning that one who conceals an item does not require a dried fig, as with other foods, but less than that is sufficient,

but in any event he is not liable until there is an olive-bulk

of the item.

It teaches us

that he is liable for any amount ממש, literally.

Rav Yitzḥak, son of Rav Yehuda, raised an objection to him: If that is so,

that we attach such significance to his intention that even when he acts without specifying we say that he acts according to his original intention,

if he intended to carry out his entire house

in a single act of carrying, so that now the items are significant to him only when all together, would

we likewise

say

that he is not liable until he carries out all of it?

If he carries it out from the house little by little, would he not be liable?!

And we answer:

There,

his personal opinion is disregarded in relation to that of all other people.

Since, in the view of everyone, an item becomes significant when it reaches its prescribed measure, an individual does not have the power to nullify its significance. By contrast, an individual does have the power to render an item significant even when it is not significant in the view of everyone.

We learned in the Mishna:

But anyone else is liable for it only according to its measure.

The Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Any item that is not fit to be concealed,

that is, it is not suitable to conceal it because it has no use, or

that people do not conceal items like it,

because it does not contain the required measure,

and one person rendered it fit for this purpose,

one person considered it significant

and concealed it, and another came and carried it out—

the latter becomes liable according to the intention of the former.

From this point onward, everyone is liable for carrying it out.

Whereas the Mishna teaches that only the one who concealed it is liable for it.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If one carried out a dried-fig bulk

of types of food

for eating, and reconsidered regarding it

between uprooting and placing, intending to use it

for sowing,

and then placed it,

or alternatively, if he carried it out for sowing and reconsidered regarding it for eating—

he is liable.

And we raise a question:

Is this obvious?

For

in this regard there is a measure, and in that regard there is a measure.

There is here a measure for an item intended for eating, namely a dried-fig bulk, and all the more so for an item intended for sowing, whose measure is any amount?

And we answer:

Lest you say that we require

the

uprooting and placing to be with one intention,

so that both acts must be performed either with the intention of eating or with the intention of sowing,

and here that is not the case.

It teaches us

that even so, he is liable.

Rava raised a dilemma: If one carried out half a dried-fig bulk for sowing, and it swelled

and reached the measure of a dried fig,

and reconsidered regarding it

after uprooting, intending to use it

for eating,

and then placed it—

what

is the halakha: Is he liable for it?

If you say: There,

in the earlier ruling of Rava in the name of Rav Naḥman,

he is liable

even though the uprooting and placing were not performed with the same intention,

because in this regard there is a measure, and in that regard there is a measure,

since from the time of his first intention there was already a measure sufficient for his second intention as well, and therefore the uprooting and placing combine.

But

here, since at the time he carried it out it did not contain

even

a measure

for his second intention, that of

eating,

the uprooting and placing do not combine, and

he is not liable.

Or perhaps, since if he had remained silent

and retained his original intention

and had not conceived another intention regarding it

at the time of placing, he would be

liable on the basis of the intention

of

sowing,

for now there is a measure sufficient for the intention of sowing [even had it not swelled, and all the more so once it swelled],

now too,

when he changed his intention to the intention of eating, he is likewise

liable.

For now there is a measure sufficient for eating as well, and this measure is also sufficient for his original intention.

And if you say: Since if he had remained silent and had not conceived another intention he would be liable on the basis of the intention of sowing, now too he is liable,

there is still another dilemma:

If one carried out a dried-fig bulk for eating, and it shrank

to less than a dried-fig bulk,

and reconsidered regarding it for sowing—

what is the halakha?

Do we say:

Here, certainly, if he had remained silent

and retained the intention of eating until the placing,

he would not be liable on the basis of the initial intention

because it

would not be liable,

since it no longer contains a dried-fig bulk?

Or perhaps we follow its present state,

and with regard to his present intention it contains the required measure,

and he is liable?

And if you say: We follow its present state and he is liable,

there is still another dilemma:

If one carried out a dried-fig bulk for eating, and it shrank, and then swelled again

to the measure of a dried fig, and he placed it with the intention of eating—

what is the halakha?

Apparently, it is difficult: Why did Rava not raise this question also in the preceding case, when it shrank and he changed his intention to sowing? For when it shrank, it was disqualified from the prohibition of Shabbat. It may be answered that the present case is specifically different, because from beginning to end his intention was to eat, and at the time it shrank it had a measure sufficient neither for the first intention nor for the final intention. But when he changed his intention to sowing, since even at the time it shrank it had a measure sufficient for the final intention, it was not considered disqualified. Tosafot, in their commentary beginning “Or,” and the Baal HaMeor wrote that above the case is one where he changed his intention to sowing at the same time as it shrank, and therefore it was not considered disqualified.

Is there

the concept of rejection with regard to Shabbat,

such that since in the interim it fell below the measure, and had he placed it then he would not have been liable, it follows that at that point it was rejected from liability for a sin-offering and the uprooting was nullified; therefore, even after it swelled and he placed it, he is exempt, since there is placing here without uprooting?

Or is there no concept of rejection with regard to Shabbat?

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into

the interior of

an impure house—

what is the halakha?

And we raise a question:

What

is the practical difference?

If it is with regard to Shabbat,

that he threw it from the public domain into the house, which is a private domain, it is obvious that he is exempt, since

we require a dried-fig bulk,

and an olive-bulk is less than a dried-fig bulk.

If it is with regard to ritual impurity,

to become susceptible to food impurity,

we require an egg-bulk of food

in order for it to become impure, which is more than an olive-bulk?

And we answer:

Actually, it is dealing with regard to Shabbat,

and

the case is one where there is less than an egg-bulk of food

inside the impure house,

and this

olive-bulk that he threw landed there and

completes it to an egg-bulk,

and together they become susceptible to impurity from the house.

What is the halakha?

Do we say:

Since it combines with regard to impurity

through this throwing, it is therefore a significant throwing, and

he is likewise liable with regard to Shabbat

as though it contained a dried-fig bulk?

Or perhaps, with regard to everything concerning Shabbat,

we require a dried-fig bulk?

The Rashash raised a difficulty: The entire measure of the size of a dried fig was stated only with regard to human food, whereas here, since the teruma becomes ritually impure—

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

You have learned it

in a beraita:

Abba Shaul says: The measure of the two loaves and the shewbread

with regard to carrying on Shabbat

is a dried-fig bulk.

And why

is a dried-fig bulk required?