Shabbat 8b — the Talmud in English

If

he intended to establish his Shabbat residence

to acquire residence

in the public domain, and he placed his eruv in a pit

that is in the public domain, this is its law:

If the pit was

above ten handbreadths [

as will be explained below], then

his eruv is an eruv.

But if

below ten handbreadths [

as will be explained below],

his eruv is not an eruv.

And Rav Adda bar Mattana analyzes:

what are the circumstances?

What is “above ten,” and what is “below ten”?

If you say,

if it is stated that both in the first clause and in the final clause the case is

of a pit that has [

there are in the entire depth of the pit]

ten

handbreadths, and it is the private domain,

and “above”

“ten” means

that he raised it and placed it there,

that he lifted his eruv and placed it at the upper part of the pit, above ten handbreadths from the bottom of the pit,

and “below”

“ten” means

that he lowered it and placed it there,

he lowered and placed his eruv below in the pit, at a depth of ten handbreadths from the height of the pit, and for that reason his eruv is not an eruv, because “he is in one place [the public domain] and his eruv is in another place [the private domain],” and therefore it is not an eruv, since if he comes to take it and bring it to the place of his residence, he will be found carrying from the private domain to the public domain.

This cannot be explained in this way. For

what difference is there

if he placed it

above,

at the height of the pit, so that his eruv is an eruv,

and what difference is there

if he placed it

below,

at the bottom of the pit, so that his eruv is not an eruv? For the entire pit up to its rim, and even at a height above ten from the bottom of the pit, is the private domain, and in either case he cannot take it out to the public domain, and he cannot acquire residence there, since

“he is in one place, and his eruv is in another place,” is he not!?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that what the beraita said, “if it is above ten, his eruv is an eruv,” refers

to a pit that does not have ten

handbreadths in its depth [and this is “above ten,” since it does not have a depth of ten], which is not the private domain, and it follows that “he and his eruv are in one place.”

And Rav Adda bar Mattana concludes his difficulty from this beraita to Rava, who holds that a depression does not become the public domain, even if it is nine deep and suitable for the use of the many, since use under difficult circumstances is involved, and therefore it is only a place exempt by Torah law, while when the pit is four by four it is a karmelit:

And

it

teaches

in the beraita that if a person acquiring his residence in the public domain places his eruv in a pit in the public domain that is not ten deep,

his eruv is an eruv,

because the place of the pit is considered the public domain and not a karmelit, since if its law were that of a karmelit, and by rabbinic law he could not bring it from the pit to the edge of the pit, by law his eruv should not be an eruv; necessarily, it is the public domain.

Apparently, use under difficult circumstances is called use!

That is to say, rather, necessarily the case here is a pit nine handbreadths deep, and for that reason it is not a karmelit but the public domain, because the many use it under difficult circumstances, which is use sufficient to render the pit the public domain. And this is a difficulty to Rava, who holds that use under difficult circumstances is not called use, and the pit does not become the public domain!?

And the Gemara brings two answers that Rava gave:

Sometimes he answered him,

Rava sometimes answered Rav Adda bar Mattana concerning this difficulty as follows:

He and his eruv are in a karmelit.

That is to say, in fact, a pit whose depth is not ten handbreadths [“below ten”] is not the public domain but a karmelit. However, the beraita is not dealing with a case in which he intended to establish his residence in the public domain at the edge of the pit, but with a case in which he intended to establish his residence in a karmelit. Thus, when he placed it in the pit below ten, he and his eruv are in a karmelit, and he can take it out and bring it, and therefore his eruv is an eruv.

And why does he call it

the tanna of the beraita “intended to establish his residence in the public domain”?

Because it is not the private domain.

That is to say, the tanna’s primary intention is to teach us that he did not intend to establish his residence in the private domain, as the domain of the pit; for in that case his eruv would be an eruv, because “he and his eruv are in one place.” However, it is not specifically the public domain; we are dealing with a karmelit.

And sometimes he answered him,

and at other times Rava answered Rav Adda bar Mattana concerning the difficulty from the beraita according to his position: in fact,

he is in the public domain,

as the plain meaning of the beraita indicates, that he intended to establish his residence in the public domain,

and his eruv is in a karmelit,

because the pit is not considered the public domain but a karmelit. And as for your difficulty, if so, why is his eruv an eruv, since the Sages prohibited bringing the eruv to him, to the public domain in which he intended to acquire residence, since it is forbidden to carry from a karmelit to the public domain? I can say to you

and

according to the method of

Rabbi is

this beraita,

who says: Anything that is on account of shevut,

that is, a rabbinic prohibition on Shabbat, such as carrying from a karmelit to the public domain,

they did not decree against it

to prohibit it during

twilight

at the onset of Shabbat.

Therefore, although the eruv is in a karmelit, during twilight [which is the time of acquiring the eruv] he can bring it to himself in the public domain, and therefore his eruv is an eruv.

And Rava added and said:

And do not say that I am merely rejecting you [

do not say that I am simply fending you off] and that in fact the truth is as implied by the plain meaning of the beraita, that use under difficult circumstances is called use.

Rather, I am speaking precisely to you!

That is to say, according to my position it is necessary that use under difficult circumstances is not called use, and for that reason we must force the meaning of the beraita as I answered you. And the proof that use under difficult circumstances is not called use is from this,

as we learned [

below, 100b]:

If there was a puddle,

a pool of water in the public domain,

and the public domain passes through it,

that is, the many walk through it with their feet when they need to do so for their uses, then

one who throws into it

from a distance of

four cubits is liable,

as is the law of one who throws four cubits in the public domain. And although it is not like the rest of the public domain, through which the many walk regularly, nevertheless, since the many use it by walking, it is the public domain.

And how deep is

the

puddle of water

whose law is that of the public domain and not a karmelit? When the depth of the water is

less than ten handbreadths.

The Mishna repeats and says:

“And a puddle of water in the public domain through which the public domain passes: one who throws four cubits into it is liable.”

And from this Mishna one can prove that “use under difficult circumstances is called use.” For, apparently, the Mishna repeats the same law twice:

Granted, “puddle,” “puddle,” twice,

that is to say, granted that the tanna taught the law of the puddle in the public domain twice, this can be explained as follows:

one

“puddle” comes to teach us that

in the summer

the puddle is considered the public domain,

and one

“puddle” the tanna taught in order to teach us that

in the rainy season

the puddle is considered the public domain.

And it is necessary.

The tanna needs to teach us both the law that in the summer the puddle is considered the public domain and the law that this is so in the rainy season:

For if the tanna had taught us

only

in the summer,

I would say that it is the public domain for this reason:

people are accustomed to cool themselves [

it is the way of people to enter the puddle in order to cool their feet].

But in the rainy season, say no,

the puddle is not the public domain, because then they avoid passing through it.

And if the tanna had taught us

only that

in the rainy season

the puddle is the public domain, I would say that it is the public domain because

since one becomes soiled, one goes down [

because when their feet become soiled in the rainy season, sometimes they descend into the puddle to clean them].

But in the summer, no,

the puddle is not the public domain. Therefore

it is necessary.

The tanna needed to teach us that in every case the puddle is the public domain.

Rather, “walking,” “walking”

twice—why do I need it!?

That is to say, why did the Mishna need to mention that the public domain “passes” through it, implying that the many walk through it with their feet, and in this manner the many use it? It would have been sufficient for it to say in the second clause, “a puddle of water that is in the public domain,” since it would follow automatically from the first clause that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which the many walk there for their needs.

Rather, is it not, infer from it,

that is to say, necessarily the tanna taught “walking” in both clauses in order to teach us that the puddle is the public domain only because it is needed by the many for walking; for although it is walking under difficult circumstances, nevertheless

walking under difficult circumstances is called walking.

But a depression, which the many do not use for walking, but all its use is only to place their objects there and the like, this use is not sufficient to make it the public domain, because

use under difficult circumstances is not called use.

And we conclude: indeed,

infer from it

from this Mishna that use under difficult circumstances is not called use, and a depression in the public domain is not considered the public domain, but a karmelit.

Rav Judah said: This bundle of reeds [

a bundle of long reeds] that a person carried four cubits in the public domain, but did not uproot it all at once from the ground; rather,

he threw it down and raised it, threw it down and raised it [

he raised one end of the bundle, so that the other ends of the reeds remained on the ground, and threw it before him; then again he raised its other end and threw it before him],

he is not liable

for carrying four cubits in the public domain

until he uproots it,

until he uproots the entire bundle at once.

Here the Gemara returns to explain the continuation of the beraita concerning “four domains with respect to Shabbat” mentioned above, 6a:

The Master said

in the final clause of that beraita:

A person stands on the threshold [

the doorway threshold] between the private domain and the public domain, and he is permitted to be

taking

an object

from the homeowner

who is standing in the private domain on its one side,

and likewise giving it to him.

And he can also be

taking from a poor person

who is in the public domain on its other side,

and

likewise

giving it to him.

And the beraita continues and says: “provided that he does not take from the homeowner” who is standing in the public domain “and give to the poor person” who is standing in the private domain. And he should not take “from the poor person and give to the homeowner.” “And if he took” from this one “and gave” to that one, “all three are exempt.”

And we raise a difficulty:

This threshold—what is it?

What domain is it considered?[ ^207]

If you say it is a threshold of the public domain,

that is, the platform between the public domain and an alleyway, which is not three handbreadths higher than the public domain, is not roofed, and is not inside the alleyway but beyond the side-post of the alleyway, and therefore is itself considered the public domain—this cannot be said, because how did we learn

“he takes

a person standing on the threshold

from the homeowner

who is standing in the private domain”!?

He is taking out from the private domain to the public domain,

for he is carrying out from the private domain to the public domain!?

But rather,

perhaps you will say that the intention is a

threshold of the private domain,

such as when the threshold was ten [handbreadths] high and four [handbreadths] wide, or it was roofed, or it was within the side-post enclosure of the alleyway. This too cannot be said, because how did we learn

“he takes

a person standing on the threshold

from the poor person”? He is bringing in from the public domain to the private domain.

For he is bringing in from the public domain to the private domain!?

Rather, [it is] a karmelit isqopah,

for example, it was three [handbreadths] higher than the public domain beside it and was four by four [handbreadths] wide. This too cannot be said, because how did we state

“he takes and gives

to a poor person or to a wealthy person

initially”?

But

in the final analysis, there is at least a prohibition!

For it is prohibited by the enactment of the Sages to bring in and to take out from a karmelit both to the public domain and to the private domain.

Rather,

the case is of an

isqopah

that is

merely a place exempt [from liability]. For example, it does not have

in the area of the isqopah

four by four [handbreadths],

and it is three [handbreadths] higher than the public domain beside it, and it stands between the private domain and the public domain.

And this is like that which, when Rav Dimi came,

when Rav Dimi came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, he

said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

A place

three handbreadths high

that does not have four by four handbreadths

standing between the private domain and the public domain,

is permitted

both for

the members of the private domain and

both for

the members of the public domain to place a burden upon it,

provided that they do not exchange

their burdens between one another. And so too we stated in a beraita: provided that he does not take from the householder and give to the poor person, or from the poor person and give to the householder.

The master said

in the continuation of the beraita:

provided that he does not take

the one standing on the isqopah, as we established that it is a place exempt [from liability],

from the householder and give to the poor person,

or from the poor person and give to the householder. And if he took and gave, all three are exempt [from liability]:

The Gemara had thought to explain that this is why they are exempt, even though the person standing on the isqopah took [an object] out from one domain to another, because he did not take it directly from one domain to another, but transferred it by way of a place exempt [from liability]. And the Torah did not make one liable in such a case; therefore the Gemara asks:

Let us say

that this beraita, which does not make one liable for taking out or bringing in from one domain to another by way of a place exempt [from liability], is

a refutation of Rava,

who makes one liable!?