Shabbat 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

For Rava said: One who carries an object from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits

in the public domain, even though he carried it

by way of above him,

having lifted it from the public domain and carried it above his head, and then placed it at the end of four cubits,

is liable.

And although the air above his head is the air of a “place exempt,” since the public domain extends only up to a height of ten handbreadths, and it follows that he carried it through a “place exempt,” nevertheless he is liable. If so, the same law should apply and one should be liable when carrying an object out from the private domain into the public domain by way of a “place exempt,” whereas the beraita states that he is exempt!?

And we answer:

There,

in Rava’s statement,

the object did not come to rest

while being carried through the place exempt. Consequently, the lifting and placing occurred without an intervening act of placing in the place exempt.

But

here,

when one is standing on the threshold,

the object did come to rest

between the lifting and the placing, in the place exempt, in the hands of the one standing on the threshold.

We learned further above:

Others say: A threshold

serves two domains.

To understand the ensuing discussion, several points must first be introduced: a. A mavוי is an area enclosed on three sides by walls and open on one side to the public domain.

By Torah law it is considered a private domain, but the Sages decreed that one may not carry within it unless one makes a lehi or places a korah at the entrance of the mavוי.

b. The permission to carry when a lehi has been placed at the entrance of the mavוי applies only on the inner side of the lehi, and not in the area alongside the lehi. By contrast, placing a korah permits carrying even beneath it, up to its outer side.

c. The threshold of a mavוי is a raised platform in the form of a step, located at the entrance of a mavוי. Ordinarily, on both sides of the threshold there are two pillars belonging to the fourth wall, and the opening to the public domain is situated there.

d. It might now have been thought that the authorization to carry in this mavוי with its threshold is effected by the two thicknesses of the walls on either side of the mavוי’s threshold, at its fourth side, which is open to the public domain; these are considered lehayim.

And this is what we are saying:

When the

entrance

of the mavוי, located on the inner side of the threshold,

is open

—that is, when the door of the entrance between the mavוי and the threshold is open—the area of the threshold is considered

inside

the mavוי [which has been rendered fit for carrying by virtue of the lehayim], and it is permitted to carry on the threshold as well, as though it were part of the mavוי.

But when the

entrance

on the inner side of the mavוי

is locked,

closed by means of the door, the area of the threshold is considered

outside

the mavוי, and it is prohibited to carry there, since it has no lehi to permit it.

And we raise an objection: How can it be permitted to carry in the area of the threshold when the door of the mavוי is open toward it?

And

is it so that

even though it does not have a

lehi, the area of the threshold

—

it is nevertheless permitted to carry there when the entrance of the mavוי is open toward it?

But didn’t Rav Hama bar Gurya say that Rav said:

The area located

“within the entrance”

of a mavוי [when carrying in the mavוי itself has been permitted by means of the thickness of the pillars of the fourth wall, which is open to the public domain, in accordance with the law of a lehi], i.e., the area of the threshold,

requires another lehi to permit it,

since it is not permitted by means of the inner lehi, as the distinguishing mark of the lehi applies only on its inner side, but not opposite it or on its outer side!?

And if you would say

that here we are dealing with a case

where there is no

area of

four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths in the area of the threshold, and therefore it does not constitute a domain unto itself but is part of the mavוי, so that carrying there is permitted by virtue of the outer side of the lehi.

This cannot be said.

For

didn’t Rav Hama bar Gurya say that Rav said: The area within the entrance

[i.e., the area of the threshold]

even though it does not contain four by four

requires another lehi to permit it

for carrying.

[Since it is not considered a place unto itself, nor is it considered a “place exempt,” despite the fact that it does not contain four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Rather, it joins with the mavוי, to be considered an area containing four by four.

However, despite the fact that the area of the threshold is part of the mavוי, it is not permitted by the lehi that renders the mavוי fit, because the lehi permits only the area of the mavוי located on the inner side of the lehi. Consequently, the inner edge of the lehi permits only the area of the mavוי up to the threshold, but cannot permit the area on the threshold]. And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: Here,

indeed

we are dealing with the threshold of a mavוי,

but the discussion is not concerning permission to carry there by means of a lehi, but by means of a korah. A korah permits carrying even beneath it, up to its outer side, because the distinguishing mark of the korah is on its outer side [according to the one who says that the permission of a korah is due to its serving as a distinguishing mark. And according to the one who says that it is due to its serving as a partition, the partition is considered to extend from the outer side of the korah, as we say: its outer side is as though it descends and seals the entrance of the mavוי].

Here it is appropriate to emphasize that a distinction must be made between two concepts:

a. Permission to carry in a mavוי by means of a korah, according to the opinion that

“a korah

is due to a partition.”

According to this view, the side of the korah facing the public domain is considered as though it descends and seals the mavוי on its fourth side. Likewise, a korah one handbreadth wide is sufficient to permit carrying in the mavוי.

b. “The edge of the

ceiling

descends and seals.”

This law is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, and it applies according to everyone. It concerns a ceiling that is at least four handbreadths wide, in which case the edge of the ceiling is considered as though it were a wall descending and sealing that side.

The prominent distinction between these two concepts concerns the forms of permission they provide.

A korah permits carrying only in a mavוי that possesses all the conditions of a mavוי, including that it be four cubits long and at least four handbreadths wide.

“The edge of the ceiling descends and seals” is stated with regard to a private domain, which it seals as a wall by virtue of a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai; it is also stated in places that do not have the status of a mavוי, as will be explained in the discussion before us.

Here we are dealing with a case in which

half

of the threshold’s area

is roofed

by a korah, which ordinarily is only one handbreadth wide,

and half

is not roofed.

And its roofing

of the half of the area roofed by the korah is

toward the inside

[that is, the inner half of the threshold’s area is roofed, while the outer half is not roofed].

Accordingly, if the

entrance

between the mavוי and the threshold

is open,

the roofed half of the area adjacent to the entrance is considered

inside.

That is, the roofed area joins the mavוי, and the outer side of the korah, which permits carrying in the mavוי, is also the boundary of the permission to carry on the threshold.

But if the

entrance

between the mavוי and the threshold

is locked,

the roofed area of the threshold is not considered part of the mavוי, but is a place unto itself [and then the korah does not seal the mavוי; rather, the door does]. Since it does not contain an area of four handbreadths by four handbreadths, it is not a mavוי, and the korah is ineffective in sealing its outer side. Therefore, the entire area of the threshold is considered

outside,

and it is prohibited to carry there.

The essence of the answer is that when the door is closed, the korah cannot seal the roofed side, because the roofed area does not contain four handbreadths by four handbreadths. It makes no difference whether the threshold is at the entrance of a house or at the entrance of a mavוי; rather, ordinarily the threshold at the entrance of a house has roofing four by four handbreadths, and therefore the Gemara stated that the case concerns the entrance of a mavוי.

Rav Ashi said: Actually, we are dealing with a house threshold

that is roofed, whose roofing is four by four handbreadths,

and

for example, one roofed

the threshold before the house

with two beams

separate from one another. And the case is:

a.

Neither this

one beam

has four

handbreadths,

nor this

second beam

has four

handbreadths.

b.

And between this one and that one

there is no gap of

three

handbreadths, so it can be said that the law of lavud applies, causing them to be regarded as a single ceiling four handbreadths wide.

c.

And a door

stands

in the middle

of the threshold, in the area of the gap between the two beams.

Accordingly, if the

entrance

where the door is

open,

the entire area of the threshold is considered

inside,

because the two beams are considered one roofing, since there is not an area of three handbreadths separating them, and we say that the law of lavud applies, making both of them one ceiling covering an area of four by four handbreadths. In that case, the principle “the edge of the ceiling descends and seals” applies, and it is considered as though the outer edge of the ceiling descends and seals the entire roofed area of the threshold.

But if the

entrance,

located beneath the gap between the two beams,

is locked

by means of the door in the middle, the locked door prevents the two beams from being regarded, by virtue of lavud, as one ceiling four handbreadths wide, since from that point onward the two beams constitute two separate roofings for two areas separated from one another by the locked door.

And since the area beneath the outer beam no longer contains four by four handbreadths, the beam above it cannot seal the outer side under the law of a korah of a mavוי, because there is no area of a mavוי here. Therefore, that area is considered

outside,

and it is prohibited to carry there.

[And the reason we established that the case specifically involves two beams and not a single roofing is that, in the case of a single roofing, closing the door in the middle would not negate the law that the outer edge of the ceiling descends and seals the outer side. The edge of a single ceiling that actually contains four handbreadths, and not four handbreadths created through lavud, seals the outer side despite the door in the middle. Rashi].

We learned further above, continuing the words of “Others”:

And if the

the

threshold

before the house

is ten high and four wide,

it is a domain

unto itself,

and one may not carry to it even from within the house, despite the fact that both the house and the threshold are the private domain of the same person.

And we say:

This supports Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi.

For Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: Rabbi Meir would say

[who is called “Others,” as explained in tractate Horayot]:

Every place where you find two domains that are one domain, such as a pillar

that was within

the private domain,

and it

is ten high and four wide,

and they are akin to “two domains,” since the private domain is low whereas the pillar is high,

it is prohibited to place an object on it

that had been resting in the courtyard of the private domain.

This is a decree due to a mound

ten high and four wide

in the public domain,

which has the status of a private domain; and if one were to place upon it an object that had been in the public domain, one might come to violate the prohibition of carrying an object from the public domain into the private domain.