Shabbat 8a — the Talmud in English

He said

he answered:

Abaye:

Whenever he placed it on any projection whatsoever,

in a private domain, according to everyone,

between the Sages and Rabbi,

they do not disagree, in accordance with Rav Hisda.

Rather, here,

the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, who did not obligate him since it was any projection whatsoever,

with what are we dealing? With a tree standing in a private domain, whose foliage inclines into the public domain, and he threw

an object from the public domain, from a distance of four cubits,

and it came to rest

the object

on its foliage,

on the foliage of the tree that inclines into the public domain, and the branch on which the object came to rest did not have four by four [handbreadths]. By law, Rabbi too should have agreed that he is not liable, since in order to impose liability for placing something in the public domain, a place of four by four [handbreadths] is certainly required. Rather, Rabbi and the Sages disagreed in this:

Rabbi holds

that nevertheless he must be held liable for placing it on the foliage, even though it is only a place of any size whatsoever, because

we say: its foliage is subordinate to its principal trunk.

Since at its principal trunk there are four [handbreadths], placing something on its foliage is considered an important placement even when it is not on a place of four by four. Therefore, even one who places something on foliage in the public domain is considered to have placed it in an important place, despite there not being a place of four [handbreadths] there, even though in the public domain alone placement on a place of four [handbreadths] is required.

And the Sages hold

that since the foliage is merely like any projection whatsoever in the public domain, he is not liable even if he threw it from a distance of four cubits, because

we do not say that its foliage

in the public domain

is subordinate to its principal trunk

which has four [handbreadths], and there is no important placement here in the public domain. a. The prohibition of carrying out from a private domain into a public domain, or of transferring four cubits in the public domain, applies only to objects and not to taking out something considered a “domain” in its own right. For example, one who takes out or transfers a large utensil whose height is ten handbreadths and whose width is four by four handbreadths, which constitutes a “domain in its own right,” is not liable, because the Torah did not impose liability for “taking out domains.”

b. The measure of a utensil considered a private domain in its own right is a square of four handbreadths by four handbreadths. If the utensil was round, it must be possible to inscribe within the circle a square of four handbreadths by four handbreadths [“a square that can be extracted from within a circle”].

c. A square circumscribed by a circle has the diameter of the circle equal to the diagonal of the square. The diagonal of the square is equal to the length of its side plus two-fifths [“every cubit in a square is a cubit and two-fifths on the diagonal”]. According to this calculation, if the private domain had the form of a round area, the diameter of the circle must be five handbreadths and three-fifths of a handbreadth, at minimum, for it to be considered a “private domain.” For with such a diameter one can extract from the circle an equal square of four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Therefore, if there was a round utensil whose height was ten handbreadths, and the diameter of its circle was five handbreadths and three-fifths of a handbreadth, he is exempt for throwing it, because with this measure the utensil itself becomes a “private domain.”

d. The public domain extends only up to ten handbreadths, and its air above ten is an “exempt place,” and one who takes something out there is not liable. Moreover, even if only part of the utensil was in the air of the public domain above ten handbreadths [“part of the utensil being in an exempt place”], he is not liable for it.

Abaye said:

If

a person threw

on Shabbat

a beehive,

which is a round utensil made of a round mat of reeds, and threw it from a private domain

into the public domain,

then even if the beehive was

ten handbreadths high

the measure of a domain in height,

and

however, if it

was not six [handbreadths] wide,

so that its diameter was not

six

handbreadths, it follows that it does not contain a square of four by four handbreadths, and it is not a domain in its own right but is a utensil like all utensils; therefore

he is liable

for taking it out.

But if it was ten handbreadths high, the measure of a domain in height, and also

six [

the width of its diameter

six

handbreadths, the measure of a domain in width, for it contains a square of four by four handbreadths, and it is a domain in its own right, he is

exempt .

Rava said: Even

if

it was not six [handbreadths] wide,

since it was ten handbreadths high, he is

exempt. What is the reason

that he is exempt for it? Because

it is impossible

for the “reed ends” [

the mat from which the beehive is made is woven from reeds, warp and weft. The “warp reeds” have “reed ends,” which are the ends of the reeds, also called “tails,” that are not joined above by means of the “weft reeds” ]]

not to rise above ten

handbreadths of the air of the public domain when the beehive is ten handbreadths high. And since those reed ends protruding above are part of the beehive, it follows that part of the beehive protrudes into an “exempt place,” and in such a case one is not liable for placing the entire utensil in the public domain.

a. We hold that with partitions or walls concerning which the law of “lavud” is said, its meaning is that one extends them or brings them close to something distant from them, until it is less than three handbreadths by any amount.

b. Therefore, one who throws a utensil whose walls face downward can, by the law of “lavud,” regard them as though the walls of the utensil had extended downward. Thus, from the moment the utensil reaches [while it is still in the air] a height of less than three handbreadths above the ground, it is already considered as though it had been placed on the ground. For, as stated, by the law of “lavud,” the matter is considered as though the walls had extended and reached the ground, and it follows that in legal terms the utensil is considered placed on the ground while it is still in the air.

Rava adds and says: Even though one who throws a beehive that is not six handbreadths wide is not exempt on the grounds that “part of it is in an exempt place” unless the beehive was ten handbreadths high, and only because the “reed ends” protrude above ten, all this applies specifically when he threw the beehive in the manner in which it is made to be used, with its bottom downward and its walls upward. But if

he overturned

a beehive that was not six handbreadths wide

onto its mouth,

turning it over so that its opening was below and its bottom above, and threw it in this manner into the public domain, it is not even necessary that the height of the beehive be ten handbreadths in order to exempt him. Rather, even when it is less than this measure, he is exempt because “part of it is in an exempt place,” and without the reed ends. And so Rava said: If the height of the overturned beehive was even

seven handbreadths and something

only, he is still

liable

for placing it in the public domain. For at this measure, when the walls of the overturned beehive reached the air at a height of less than three [handbreadths] from the ground, and the law of lavud applies, the entire beehive was found in the air of the public domain, which was ten [handbreadths high].

But if the height of the overturned beehive was

seven and a half handbreadths [

or even “two somethings”], he is

exempt.

For when the walls of the utensil reached a height of less than three handbreadths from the ground, the beehive was already considered as though it had been placed on the ground by the law of “lavud.” It is only for that moment, which is the moment of the legal placement, that he can be held liable [even though the beehive continued descending downward]. At that moment, the bottom of the overturned beehive was “joined above ten handbreadths,” for at the time of the placement [by the law of lavud] the height of the beehive above was more than seven handbreadths and something. And since “part of it is in an exempt place,” he is exempt. In contrast, if the beehive is only seven handbreadths and something high, then at the time of the legal placement—that is, when the beehive reached a height of less than three handbreadths above the ground—the bottom of the beehive had already left the air above ten handbreadths and entered the air within ten handbreadths of the public domain, and therefore he is liable.

Rav Ashi said: Even

if it was

seven and a half

handbreadths wide, he is

liable. What is the reason?

Because it is impossible to say lavud with the walls of the beehive except when they stand in their ordinary form, and not when inverted downward, because

the walls

of the beehive

are made for their inside.

That is, to use them with their opening upward, and not with their opening downward, because in this manner they do not have the “status of walls,” and we do not say the law of “lavud” with regard to them.

Ulla said: A pillar

high

nine handbreadths,

no less and no more, that stood

in the

public domain,

even if the pillar was not four handbreadths wide,

and the public rested loads upon it [

adjusted the loads of their shoulders upon it],

and threw

an object in the public domain from a distance of four cubits,

and it came to rest upon it

on the pillar, he is not exempt as one who throws onto an exempt place, even though the pillar is three [handbreadths] higher than the public domain and does not contain a place four by four [handbreadths], which everywhere we judge as an “exempt place” according to Torah law; rather, this person is

liable

as one who throws in the public domain itself.

What is the reason?

And the Gemara explains the parameters of the law: For if the pillar was

less than

the height of

three

handbreadths,

the public treads upon it,

and it is considered like the ground; therefore, one who throws and it comes to rest upon it is liable.

But

from

the height of

three

handbreadths

until

the height of

nine

handbreadths, this is not a public domain, for

the public does not tread upon it,

because it is higher than the distance to which a person spreads his feet while taking steps,

and

the public does not rest loads

upon it, because it is not as high as the shoulder. Therefore, it is not a use of the public at all, and it is not like a public domain, but rather it is an “exempt place” according to Torah law.

But when it is

nine

handbreadths high,

the public certainly rests loads

upon it

upon it,

and since it is needed by the public, it is a public domain.

He said:

He asked him

Abaye asked Rav Yosef: A pit

that is

nine

handbreadths deep in the public domain,

what

is its status? Should we say that since people of the public domain place their objects that are in their hands there until they go and return, it follows that the public needs to use it, and therefore it is a public domain? Or perhaps it is an “exempt place” if it is not four [handbreadths] wide, or a karmelit if it is four [handbreadths] wide?

He said:

He answered

him

Rav Yosef to Abaye:

Likewise

the same law applies

with a pit.

Rava said: With a pit, no!

Rather, if it was deep up to three handbreadths, it has the status of a public domain; and from three to ten, it is an “exempt place” if it was not four by four [handbreadths] wide. And it is a karmelit if it was four by four [handbreadths] wide.

What is the reason?

Because

use through duress

is like the use that the people of the public domain make of a pit,

it is not called use.

Rav Adda bar Mattana raised an objection to Rava:

from a beraita that we learned in it: If

his basket was placed in the public domain,

then if it was

ten

handbreadths high

and four

handbreadths wide, it is a private domain in its own right, and

one may not carry either from within it to the public domain, or from the public domain into it.

And if its measure was

less than this

in height or in width—for example, it was less than ten handbreadths high, or even if it was ten handbreadths high but was not four handbreadths wide—

one may carry

to it and from it to the public domain, for it is not a private domain when it is less than this height or this width.

And likewise with a pit,

he explains it and proceeds.

And Rav Adda bar Mattana proves from the beraita:

Is it not

that the words of the beraita, “and likewise with a pit,” refer

to the latter clause?

That is, if the basket was less than this, one may carry. And the same applies to a pit that is less than this: that is, it is not ten [handbreadths] deep, or it is not four [handbreadths] wide; one may carry from the public domain into it. And it follows that a pit less than ten [handbreadths] deep, even though it is four [handbreadths] wide, is not a karmelit so as to prohibit carrying into it from the public domain. And necessarily, the reason is that we are dealing with a pit nine [handbreadths deep], and it has the law of the public domain, and not the law of a karmelit, as Rava said. And this is a difficulty against Rava, who said, “With a pit, no”?!

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained, that “and likewise with a pit” continues the law of the latter clause, “less than this”; rather,

it refers to the first clause,

and this is what it says: A basket ten [handbreadths] high and four [handbreadths] wide in the public domain has the law of a private domain, and likewise a pit in the public domain has the law of a private domain when it is ten [handbreadths] deep and four [handbreadths] wide.

Again,

he raised an objection

Rav Adda bar Mattana to Rava from that which was taught:

A. One who wishes to leave on Shabbat beyond the boundary may place an eruv tehumin at the end of the boundary on the eve of Shabbat, and the matter is considered as though that is the place of his residence, and he may walk from that place in every direction two thousand cubits, the measure of the Shabbat boundary.

B. One of the conditions for placing the eruv is that the person be able to eat it at the time when he acquires his residence, which is twilight at the onset of Shabbat, because through this it is established that the place of his eating is the place of his residence. But if he intended to acquire his residence in one place, and placed his bread in a place from which he cannot take it at twilight and bring it to the place where he intended to acquire his residence, his eruv is not effective for him, and he is called “he and his eruv are in another place.”