Shabbat 7b — the Talmud in English

Rather,

lest you say that Samuel intends to teach us

that there is no

airspace of

the public domain above ten handbreadths

but it is a “makom patur.” This too cannot be said, for

it is the Mishna!

It is a Mishna, and Samuel need not teach us this.

For we learned: One who throws four cubits

in the public domain, and it comes to rest

against

the face of the

wall

in the airspace of the public domain—and this is, for example, where he threw a moist fig that stuck to it: if it comes to rest

above ten handbreadths,

this is

like one who throws in the air,

and he is exempt, for all airspace above ten handbreadths in the public domain is a “makom patur.” And if it comes to rest

below ten handbreadths,

this is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

We have thus learned from this Mishna that the airspace above ten handbreadths in the public domain is a “makom patur,” and Samuel did not need to teach us this law. Necessarily, Samuel did not say that there are no Shabbat domains above ten handbreadths concerning the public domain.

Rather,

necessarily,

he spoke of a karmelit.

Samuel said, “There are no Shabbat matters above ten [handbreadths],” to teach us

that there is no karmelit above ten

handbreadths. And Rav Sheshet intended this law when he said, “And it occupies [space] up to ten.”

And the Sages were lenient with it

The Sages were lenient with a karmelit, since its prohibition is only rabbinic,

[taking] the leniencies of the private domain and the leniencies of the public domain:

The leniencies of the private domain—

that only if there is a place four

by four handbreadths

is it a karmelit

like the private domain, where one who brings into it from the public domain is liable only when it is four by four handbreadths wide.

And if not,

if the karmelit is not four [handbreadths wide],

it is merely a “makom patur,”

as Rav Dimi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

The leniencies of the public domain—

that up to ten handbreadths

is it a karmelit,

as in the public domain, which does not occupy its airspace so as to make one who takes out from the private domain into it liable, or one who transfers four cubits within it liable, except up to ten handbreadths. But

above ten handbreadths it is not a karmelit,

as Rav Sheshet said.

The matter itself: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav Hiyya bar Yosef,,,,

Rav said: A house whose interior is not ten

handbreadths

high, and whose roof

its ceiling

completes it to ten

handbreadths:

On its roof,

since it is ten handbreadths high and four by four handbreadths wide,

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

for it is a private domain, like a fence ten handbreadths high and four [handbreadths] wide. But

inside it,

since it is not ten handbreadths high,

one may not carry in it except within

four

cubits,

for it is a “karmelit.”

Abaye said: And if he hollowed out in it

inside the house, which is very wide, a pit containing

four by four

handbreadths,

and completed it,

within that hollow,

to

a height of

ten

handbreadths, and that hollow is consequently a private domain,

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

even in that place which does not have a height of ten handbreadths.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that it is permitted to carry throughout it? Because

it is,

the rest of the house,

the holes of the private domain

holes in the walls of the private domain that face toward the private domain],

and the holes of the private domain are considered like the private domain.

For it was stated: The holes of the private domain are considered like the private domain.

But

the holes of the public domain [holes in a wall facing the public domain], the amoraim disputed this:

[recesses in a wall facing the public domain] are the subject of a dispute among the amoraim:

Abaye says:

They are considered like the public domain.

Rava says: They are not considered like the public domain.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who say

according to your approach, that you say

the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain, what is different from this, that when Rav Dimi came he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan

[above on page 1]:

It was necessary

the beraita that said “and the karmelit”

only to

include

a corner adjacent to the public domain,

to teach that it has the law of a karmelit,

and

according to your words:

let it be like the holes of the public domain,

which are a public domain and not a karmelit!?

And Abaye answered:

There,

regarding a corner adjacent to the public domain,

its use is not convenient

in that corner. Whereas

here,

regarding the holes of the public domain,

its use is convenient,

and therefore their law is like that of the public domain.

We further challenge Abaye from this:

We learned [100a]

[100a]:

One who throws four cubits

in the public domain and strikes

a wall

standing in the public domain: if he strikes it

above ten handbreadths,

above the surface of the public domain, which is airspace of a “makom patur,” this is

like one who throws

in the air,

and he is exempt.

And if he strikes it

below ten handbreadths,

this is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

And we raised the matter: What does “like one who throws on the ground”

mean? That is, why is he liable,

but it did not come to rest?

The object did not come to rest on the wall; rather, it struck it and immediately returned within four cubits, and this is not resting for which one becomes liable!?

And he said

Rabbi Yohanan

explained

the Mishna:

They taught

it in the case of a moist fig, which sticks to the wall,

that

and this is resting.

And from these words of Rabbi Yohanan we challenge Abaye:

And if it enters your mind that “the holes of the public domain” are considered like the public domain, why do I need

Rabbi Yohanan

to establish it,

to establish the Mishna

with a moist fig

that sticks to the wall?

Let him establish it,

let Rabbi Yohanan establish it

with

a case where he threw

his stone

or

an object, and it came to rest in a hole

in the wall and did not return from there, whose law is that of the public domain because of “the holes of the public domain”!

At times he would answer it

[there were times when Abaye would answer the challenge]:

A stone and an object are different, for they return and come back,

even when they enter a hole, they do not come to rest there; rather, they strike it and bounce backward, and therefore this is not resting.

And

sometimes he changed it [

and at times Abaye would answer ]:

The wall has no opening in it.

That is, the Mishna must necessarily not be discussing a case in which the object came to rest in an opening.

And we explain:

From where

is it necessarily the case that the object did not come to rest in an opening in the wall?

As it teaches in the first clause: “If one threw it above ten handbreadths, it is like one who throws it through the air

and he is exempt.”

And if it enters your mind that the case is of a wall that has an opening in it,

and the object came to rest in the opening, then, when it is above ten handbreadths,

why

is it

like one who throws it through the air,

and he is exempt?

It came to rest in an opening,

and he should be liable for bringing an object from the public domain into the private domain!?

That is, although he cannot be held liable for throwing an object four cubits in the public domain, he should nevertheless be liable for bringing it from the public domain into the private domain, since the opening is ten handbreadths high and is therefore a private domain!?

But if you would say,

perhaps you would say: In fact, our Mishna is discussing a wall that has an opening in it, and the object came to rest there. The reason one is not liable when the opening is above ten handbreadths for throwing into a private domain is that

the Mishna

is discussing a case in which

there are not

in the opening

four by four

handbreadths, and therefore it is not a private domain but an “exempt area,” since a private domain must not be smaller than four by four handbreadths. This cannot be the way to reject the proof, since:

But did not Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rabbi Hiyya:

If one was standing in the public domain and

threw an object above ten handbreadths, and it went and came to rest

on a thick wall

in an opening of any size,

which was not four by four handbreadths,

we have arrived at the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis:

Поскольку рабби Меир считает:

For Rabbi Meir holds

that anything that does not itself have the required measure, but has sufficient thickness and width to be hollowed out and brought to the required measure,

is treated as though it has been hollowed out to complete the measure.

That is, we view it as though it had been hollowed out and brought to the required measure. Accordingly, one is liable for bringing an object from the public domain into the private domain, since the object is considered to have come to rest in an opening four by four handbreadths, and because it is situated at a height of ten handbreadths above the public domain, the opening becomes a private domain.

But the Rabbis hold: One does not hollow out to complete the measure.

Rather, is it not

since an unattributed Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

infer from this

that the Mishna is discussing

a wall that has no opening in it.

For, ordinarily, a wall is four handbreadths wide, and an opening in it is suitable to be hollowed out and completed to four by four handbreadths. Since one is not liable when he throws an object above ten handbreadths for bringing it from the public domain into the private domain, it necessarily follows that the object did not come to rest in an opening. Rather, the Mishna is referring to a moist fig, as Rabbi Yohanan said.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from this

that the Mishna is not discussing an object that came to rest in an opening in the wall.

With regard to the matter itself, Rav Hisda said: If one inserted a pole into a private domain and threw an object

from the public domain

and it came to rest upon it, even if

the pole was

one hundred cubits high,

he is

liable, because a private domain extends upward to the heavens.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Shall we say that Rav Hisda,

who holds one liable when the object comes to rest upon a pole, even though it is not four by four handbreadths wide,

is stating his opinion in accordance with Rabbi,

who likewise holds that it is not necessary for an object to come to rest upon an area four by four handbreadths?

As it was taught in a beraita: If one threw an object

from the public domain into the private domain

and it came to rest upon a projection [

any piece of wood that projects from a wall is called a projection ]

of any size

that is in the private domain:

Rabbi holds him liable,

because he does not require, in a private domain, that the object come to rest upon an area four by four handbreadths.

But the Sages exempt him,

because they require an object to come to rest upon an area four by four handbreadths even in a private domain.