Shabbat 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

you might say that Shmuel intends to teach us

that there is no

airspace of the

public domain above ten

handbreadths, but that it is an “exempt place.” However, this too cannot be said, because

it is a Mishna!

This is a Mishna, and Shmuel would not need to teach us this.

As we learned: One who throws an object four cubits

in the public domain, and it comes to rest

on

the face of

a wall

in the airspace of the public domain—for example, he threw a moist fig that adhered to it—if it comes to rest

above ten handbreadths,

it is

like one who throws in the air,

and he is exempt, since all airspace above ten handbreadths in the public domain is an “exempt place.” And if it comes to rest

below ten handbreadths,

it is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

Thus, we have learned from this Mishna that the airspace above ten handbreadths in the public domain is an “exempt place,” and Shmuel did not need to teach us this law. Necessarily, when Shmuel said that there are no Shabbat domains above ten handbreadths, he was not referring to the public domain.

Rather,

necessarily,

he was referring to a karmelit.

Shmuel said, “There are no [relevant] matters of Shabbat above ten,” in order to teach us

that there is no karmelit above ten

handbreadths. This is the law to which Rav Sheshet referred when he said, “And it extends up to ten.”

And the Sages were lenient concerning it [the Sages were lenient] with regard to a karmelit, since its prohibition is only rabbinic,

adopting the leniencies of a private domain and the leniencies of a public domain:

The leniencies of a private domain—

that only if there is a place four

by four

handbreadths

does it constitute a karmelit,

as with a private domain, where one who brings an object into it from the public domain is liable only when it is four by four handbreadths wide.

But if not,

if the karmelit is not four handbreadths wide,

it is merely an “exempt place,”

as Rav Dimi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan.

The leniencies of a public domain—

that only up to ten handbreadths

does it constitute a karmelit,

as in a public domain, whose airspace does not have the status necessary to make one who removes an object from a private domain into it liable, or one who carries an object within it four cubits liable, except up to ten handbreadths. But

above ten handbreadths it is not a karmelit,

as Rav Sheshet said.

The essential matter: Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said,

Rav said: A house whose interior is not ten

handbreadths high,

but whose roof

[ceiling]

completes it to ten

handbreadths:

On its roof,

since it is ten handbreadths high and four by four handbreadths wide,

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

because it is a private domain, like a fence ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. But

inside it,

since it is not ten handbreadths high,

one may carry there only within

four

cubits,

because it is a karmelit.

Abaye said: And if one hollowed out within it

inside the house, which is very wide, a pit measuring

four by four

handbreadths,

and completed it,

within that hollow,

to

a height of

ten

handbreadths, so that the hollow is a private domain,

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

even in that area that is not ten handbreadths high.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that it is permitted to carry throughout it? Because

the

rest of the house

is recesses of a private domain

[recesses in the walls of a private domain that open toward the private domain],

and recesses of a private domain are considered like a private domain.

As it was stated: Recesses of a private domain are considered like a private domain.

But

recesses of a public domain [recesses in a wall facing the public domain] are the subject of a dispute among the amoraim:

[recesses in a wall facing the public domain] are the subject of a dispute among the amoraim:

Abaye says:

They are considered like a public domain.

Rava says: They are not considered like a public domain.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who say

[according to your approach, that you say]

that recesses of a public domain are considered like a public domain, what is the difference between this and that which, when Rav Dimi came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan

[above, on the first side]:

It was necessary

for the beraita that said, “And a karmelit,”

only to

include

a corner adjacent to the public domain,

to teach that it has the status of a karmelit,

and

according to your words:

let it be like recesses of a public domain,

which have the status of a public domain and not of a karmelit!?

Abaye answered:

There,

in the case of a corner adjacent to the public domain,

its use is inconvenient

in that corner. But

here,

in the case of recesses of a public domain,

its use is convenient,

and therefore they have the status of a public domain.

We further challenge Abaye from that which

we learned

[100a]:

One who throws four cubits

in the public domain and strikes

a wall

standing in the public domain: If it strikes it

above ten handbreadths,

above the surface of the public domain, where the airspace is an “exempt place,” it is

like one who throws

in the air,

and he is exempt.

And if it strikes it

below ten handbreadths,

it is

like one who throws on the ground,

and he is liable.

And we raised a question concerning it: What does “like one who throws on the ground”

mean? That is, why is he liable,

but the object did not come to rest

on the wall; it merely struck it and immediately returned within four cubits, and this is not resting for which one is liable!?

And he said,

Rabbi Yohanan

explained

the Mishna: It was

taught with regard to a moist fig,

which adheres to the wall; it was

taught

in this case, and therefore this is considered resting.

And from these words of Rabbi Yohanan we challenge Abaye:

And if it enters your mind that “recesses of a public domain” are considered like a public domain, why does

Rabbi Yohanan

need to establish it,

to interpret the Mishna,

as referring to a moist fig

that adheres to the wall?

Let him establish it

Rabbi Yohanan should interpret it

as

a case where he threw

a stone [or]

an object, and it came to rest in a recess

in the wall, and did not return from there—so that it has the status of a public domain because of the principle, “recesses of a public domain”!?

At times he answered it [Abaye would sometimes answer the difficulty]:

A stone or an object is different, because it returns and comes back;

even when it enters a recess, it does not come to rest there, but strikes it and bounces back, and therefore this is not considered resting.

A stone or an object is different, because it rebounds and comes out.

Even when it enters a recess, it does not come to rest there; rather, it strikes the recess and bounces backward, and therefore this is not considered resting.

And

sometimes he would alter it [

and at times Abaye would answer]:

In a wall that has no hole.

That is, necessarily, the Mishna is not dealing with a case in which the object came to rest in a hole.

And we explain:

From where—what is the necessity for saying that the object did not come to rest in a hole in the wall?

From what it teaches in the first clause: “If he threw it above ten handbreadths, it is like one who throws it through the air”

and he is exempt.

And if it enters your mind that the case is one of a wall that has a hole,

and the object came to rest in the hole, then, when it is above ten handbreadths,

why

is it

like one who throws it through the air,

and he is exempt?

It came to rest in a hole,

and he should be liable for transferring from the public domain to the private domain!?

That is, although he cannot be held liable for throwing four cubits in the public domain, he should nevertheless be liable for transferring from the public domain to the private domain, since the hole is ten handbreadths high and is therefore a private domain!?

That is, although he cannot be held liable for throwing an object four cubits in the public domain, he should nevertheless be liable for bringing it from the public domain into the private domain, since the opening is ten handbreadths high and is therefore a private domain!?

And should you say—perhaps you will say: In fact, our Mishna is dealing with a wall that has a hole, and the object came to rest in it; and the reason he is not liable when the hole is above ten handbreadths for throwing into a private domain is that the

Mishna

deals with a case

in which it does not have

a hole

four by four

handbreadths, and therefore it is not a private domain but a “place of exemption,” since there is no private domain measuring less than four by four handbreadths.

This cannot be used to reject the question, for:

But did not Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rabbi Hiyya:

If one was standing in the public domain and

threw an object above ten handbreadths, and it proceeded and came to rest

in a thick wall,

in a hole of any size

, which was not four by four handbreadths,

we arrive at the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis:

For Rabbi Meir holds

that anything lacking the requisite measure, where there is sufficient thickness and width to hollow it out and complete the measure,

one hollows out to complete the requisite measure.

That is, we view it as though it had been hollowed out and attained the requisite measure. Therefore, he is liable for transferring from the public domain to the private domain, since the object is considered as though the hole were four by four handbreadths; and since it stands at a height of ten handbreadths above the public domain, the hole becomes a private domain.

But the Rabbis hold: One does not hollow out to complete the requisite measure.

Rather, is it not

since an unattributed Mishna is Rabbi Meir’s,

learn from it

that the Mishna is dealing

with a wall that has no hole.

For, ordinarily, a wall has a width of four handbreadths, and a hole in it is suitable to be hollowed out and completed to four by four handbreadths. From the fact that one is not liable when he throws the object above ten handbreadths for transferring from the public domain to the private domain, it is necessarily the case that the object did not come to rest in a hole, but rather in moist fig paste, as Rabbi Yohanan said.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from it

that the Mishna is not dealing with an object that came to rest in a hole in the wall.

The essential matter: Rav Hisda said: If one fixed a pole in the private domain and threw an object

from the public domain

and it came to rest on it, even if

the pole was

one hundred cubits high,

he is

liable, because the private domain extends up to the heavens.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Shall we say that Rav Hisda,

who holds one liable when the object comes to rest on a pole, even though it is not four by four handbreadths,

spoke in accordance with Rabbi,

who likewise holds that it is unnecessary for the object to come to rest upon a place measuring four by four handbreadths?

As it was taught in a beraita: If one threw an object

from the public domain into the private domain

and it came to rest upon a projecting beam [

any piece of wood that projects from a wall is called a projecting beam]

of any size

that is in the private domain:

Rabbi deems him liable,

because he does not require, in a private domain, that the object come to rest upon a place measuring four handbreadths.

And the Rabbis exempt him,

because they require the object to come to rest upon a place measuring four handbreadths even in a private domain.