Shabbat 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

For example, if it has

in the open field

partitions,

and in a case such as this we learned that it is a private domain with regard to Shabbat.

And

the Mishna comes to teach us that the partitions of the open field, although they were not constructed for residential purposes, are nevertheless partitions, and the open field becomes a private domain, making one who throws an object into it from the public domain liable. Although it is rabbinically prohibited to carry four cubits within it, as in a karmelit.

And

as Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Even though one may not carry four cubits in an area whose size is greater than one hundred by fifty cubits—the area called “two beit se’a,” corresponding to the courtyard of the Tabernacle—and even though it is enclosed by partitions, as long as that area is not adjacent to a house and does not serve the members of the household—that is, it was not “enclosed for residential purposes”—as explained in tractate Eruvin, nevertheless

a kefarf

[a large area enclosed by partitions] that is larger

than two

beit se’a and was not enclosed for residential purposes,

and, for example, it stands outside the city and serves as a wood storehouse,

even

as large as a

kor

[one thousand five hundred cubits by fifty],

and even

as large as two

kor, one who throws into it

from the public domain is

liable,

like one who throws into a fully defined private domain.

What is the reason?

For although its partitions were not constructed for residential purposes, nevertheless, by Torah law

it is a partition,

and therefore it is a fully defined private domain by Torah law,

except that it lacks dwellings.

And the Sages prohibited carrying in it, as in a karmelit, because the Sages were concerned that, since there is no dwelling there, people might come to treat it as a public domain.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Granted, Rav Ashi,

who interpreted the Mishna in tractate Tohorot, which says that an open field is a private domain during the rainy season, in accordance with its plain meaning—that it is indeed a private domain by Torah law, in a case where it has partitions, and by Torah law it is a fully defined private domain, but the Sages prohibited carrying in it as in a karmelit, since its partitions were not constructed for residential purposes—

did not say in accordance with Ulla,

who interpreted the Mishna in Tohorot not in accordance with its plain meaning: The tannai calls the open field a private domain even though it has no partitions, and it is not a private domain by Torah law; his entire intention is merely to say that it is not a public domain.

But Ulla

himself,

what is the reason that he did not say in accordance with his own teaching!?

Why did he not interpret the Mishna there on the basis of his own teaching in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, as Rav Ashi interpreted it—as referring to an area enclosed by partitions, which is a fully defined private domain, except that the Sages prohibited carrying in it according to the law of a karmelit, since the partitions were not constructed for residential purposes!?

And we answer:

Ulla can say to you:

Ulla

if it has

the open field

partitions,

as Rav Ashi interpreted it, then

would it be called an “open field,”

when in fact

it is a “kefarf”!?

It must therefore be that the open field is not enclosed by partitions.

And Rav Ashi

can say to you: It is impossible to interpret the Mishna according to Ulla’s interpretation, that it is not a private domain, since

it teaches “private domain”

in that Mishna; and if it were not enclosed by partitions, the tannai would not have called it a “private domain.”

We learned in a beraita: “But the sea, an open field, a colonnade,

and a karmelit

are neither like a public domain nor like a private domain.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning the wording of the beraita, “and the karmelit”: Does this mean

all of them—

the sea, the open field, and the colonnade—

are also not karmeliyot, so that the tannai adds the karmelit to them?

so that the tanna must add the category of karmelit to them?

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

to explain the beraita in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: It was necessary to mention “

and the karmelit”

only to

add another karmelit, namely,

a corner adjacent to the public domain

[a person set his house farther inward and left part of his property bordering the public domain], and to teach us that this too is a “karmelit” and not a public domain.

For although at times the public is pressed into it and enters inside

[there are times when the public pushes its way in and enters there], nevertheless,

since its use is inconvenient

[it is not convenient there for public use], because people cannot enter there directly along their path, it is not like a public domain but

it is considered like a karmelit.

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

further in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: The area between the posts

in the marketplace [there are posts in the marketplace from which merchants hang their merchandise],

is considered a karmelit,

and not a public domain, even though the marketplace itself is a public domain, since it is a paltaya, which is a public domain.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

although the public treads there

between the posts,

since they cannot walk there directly

[since they cannot move freely there, because the posts are not aligned with one another],

it is considered like a karmelit.

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav Yehuda: A platform before the posts

[before those posts mentioned above there are platforms on which the merchants place their merchandise], and it is four handbreadths wide and three handbreadths high,

is considered a karmelit.

And the Gemara explains:

According to the one who says,

Rabbi Yohanan, that

the area between the posts

is considered a karmelit,

all the more so a platform

is considered a karmelit.

But

according to the one who says,

Rav Yehuda, that

a platform

is considered a karmelit,

it is a platform

that is considered a karmelit because

its use is inconvenient; but the area between the posts, whose use is convenient, is not

considered a karmelit but a public domain.

Another version

explains on another basis that Rav Yehuda agrees that the area between the posts is a public domain:

But the area between the posts, where at times the public treads

[there are times when the public enters there],

is considered like a public domain.

Rabba bar Sheila said in the name of Rav Hisda: A brick

[an ordinary brick is three handbreadths long and three handbreadths wide, while its thickness has no fixed measure] that was

standing upright in the public domain, and one threw

from a distance of four cubits a moist fig or clay,

and smeared it

[stuck it]

onto its face,

the brick, he is

liable,

because the face of the brick is the airspace of the public domain, and therefore he is liable. But if he threw

onto its back,

the upright brick, then, since it is three handbreadths long and three handbreadths wide, when the object comes to rest on the upright brick, it rests on a surface three handbreadths above the surface of the public domain, and this is a “place exempt,” and therefore he is

exempt.

Abaye and Rava both said:

What we said, that the back of the brick is a “place exempt,”

applies when it is three handbreadths high

[and an ordinary brick is like this: its length is three handbreadths, and consequently when it is upright its height is three handbreadths], and because

the public does not tread upon it—

But thorn bushes and prickly bushes

[types of shrubs with thorns] that are in the public domain: their tops are a “place exempt,”

even though they are not three handbreadths high,

because the public does not tread upon them, so as not to be injured.

And Hiyya bar Rav said: Even

on top of

thorn bushes and prickly bushes,

it is a “place exempt” only if they are three handbreadths high, because when they are lower than this, the public treads upon them with its sandals.

But excrement

that is in the public domain

does not

need to be three handbreadths high, since the public does not tread upon it.

And Rav Ashi said: Even excrement

must be three handbreadths high in order to be considered a “place exempt.”

Rabba of the school of Rav

Sheila said: When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: A karmelit is never less than four

by four handbreadths, like a private domain. If it is smaller than this, it is only a “place exempt,” and it is permitted from the outset to remove an object from there to the public domain or to the private domain.

And Rav Sheshet said: And the karmelit extends

the karmelit

up to

a height of

ten

handbreadths, and he proceeds to explain this.

The Gemara discusses this:

What does “and it extends up to ten” mean?

If you say that it means that if there is a partition ten handbreadths high, it is a karmelit, but if there is not, it is not a karmelit

but rather a “place exempt.”

Is that so!?

Can it be said that there is no karmelit unless it has a partition ten handbreadths high!?

For Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house whose interior

has a height of

ten

handbreadths,

and whose roof [

the thickness of its ceiling]

completes it to ten

handbreadths, this is its law:

On its roof—

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

for it is a reshut ha-yahid, like a wall ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide.

But

inside it, one may carry within it only four [

within four]

cubits.

Since inside the house it does not have partitions ten handbreadths high—for the interior space of the house is only nine handbreadths—it is not considered a reshut ha-yahid, but rather is a “karmelit,” and therefore one may not carry four cubits within it.

This clearly indicates the opposite: specifically because it does not have partitions ten handbreadths high, it is a “karmelit.”

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara explains:

What is the meaning of “and extends up to ten

” that Rav Sheshet said?

It is up to ten

handbreadths

that it is a karmelit; above ten handbreadths it is not a karmelit.

That is, an area that is a karmelit because it lacks partitions and is four handbreadths wide bears the status of karmelit only up to a height of ten handbreadths. But the air above ten handbreadths is a “makom patur.” This is analogous to the public domain, whose air extends only up to ten handbreadths, while from that point upward it is a “makom patur.”

And

Rav Sheshet’s statement is

as in the incident when Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: “Sharp one!”

“Do not engage in matters of Shabbat above ten”.

That is, the laws of Shabbat apply up to ten handbreadths; and he proceeds to explain it.

But

for what halakhic purpose [

with regard to which domain did Shmuel say this], if not with regard to a karmelit?

If you say that there is no reshut ha-yahid above ten.

This cannot be said, however, for

Rav Hisda said: If one inserted a pole into a reshut ha-yahid [

presumably, the pole was not four by four handbreadths wide, so that it would itself be a reshut ha-yahid],

and threw

an object from the public domain into the reshut ha-yahid,

and it came to rest upon it, even

if

the pole was

pole was

one hundred cubits high,

this person is

liable,

because a reshut ha-yahid extends up to

the heavens.

If so, Shmuel’s statement cannot be explained as referring to a reshut ha-yahid.