Shabbat 7a — the Talmud in English

For example, when it has

for the plain

partitions,

and in such a case we learned that it is a private domain with regard to Shabbat.

And

the Mishna comes to teach us that the partitions of the plain, although they were not enclosed for residence, are partitions, and the plain becomes a private domain, so as to make one who throws into it from the public domain liable. Although it is rabbinically forbidden to carry in it four cubits, as in a karmelit.

And

as Ulla said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

although it is not permitted to carry four cubits in a place whose area is more than one hundred by fifty cubits [“two seah,” the measure of the courtyard of the Tabernacle], and although it is enclosed by partitions, whenever that place is not adjacent to a house and serves the members of the household [that it is not “enclosed for residence”], as explained in tractate Eruvin, nevertheless

a k​​arpef

[a large place enclosed by partitions] that is larger

than a

two-seah measure and was not enclosed for residence,

and for example, it stands outside the city and serves as a wood storehouse,

and even if

as large as a

kor [

one thousand five hundred cubits by fifty],

and even

as a

two-kor measure, one who throws into it

from the public domain is

liable,

like one who throws into a completely private domain.

What is the reason?

For although its partitions were not enclosed for residence, nevertheless, according to Torah law,

it is a partition,

and therefore it is a completely private domain according to Torah law,

except that it lacks residences.

And the Sages prohibited carrying in it as in a karmelit, because the Sages were concerned that perhaps, since there is no residence there, people would come to confuse it with the public domain.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Granted, Rav Ashi,

who interpreted the Mishna in tractate Toharot that says that a plain is a private domain during the rainy season according to its simple meaning—that it is indeed a private domain according to Torah law, in a case where it has partitions, and according to Torah law it is a completely private domain, except that the Sages prohibited carrying in it as in a karmelit, since its partitions were not enclosed for residence—properly

did not say as Ulla,

who interpreted the Mishna in Toharot not according to its simple meaning: that the tan​​nai calls the plain a private domain even though it has no partitions, and it is not a private domain according to Torah law; his entire intention is to say that it is not a public domain.

But Ulla

himself,

what is the reason that he did not say according to his own teaching!?

Why did he not interpret the Mishna there according to his own teaching in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and as Rav Ashi interpreted it, as enclosed by partitions and a completely private domain, except that the Sages prohibited carrying in it according to the law of a karmelit, since the partitions were not enclosed for residence!?

And we answer:

Ulla can say to you

Ulla:

If it has

for the plain

partitions,

as Rav Ashi interpreted it, would

it be called “a plain,”

when

it is a karpef!?

It must therefore be that the plain is not enclosed by partitions.

And Rav Ashi

can say to you: It is impossible to interpret it as Ulla interprets it, that it is not a private domain, for

it teaches “a private domain”

in that Mishna, and if it were not enclosed by partitions, the tan​​nai would not call it “a private domain.”

We learned in a beraita: But the sea, the plain, and the colonnade

and the karmelit

is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain:

And the Gemara raises a difficulty from the wording of the beraita, “and the karmelit”: Is it so that

all of them,

namely, the sea, the plain, and the colonnade,

are also not karmeliyot,

that the tan​​nai adds the karmelit to them?

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

to explain the beraita in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: “It was necessary

“and the karmelit”

only to

add another karmelit, and this is

a corner adjacent to the public domain [

a person set his house inward and left part of his ground for the public domain], and to teach us that it too is a “karmelit” and not a public domain.

For although at times the public press into it and enter inside it [

at times the public press in and enter there], nevertheless,

since its use is not convenient [

it is not convenient there for the use of the public], because they cannot enter there directly along their path, it is therefore not like a public domain, but

it is considered like a karmelit.

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia

he said

again in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: “The area between the pillars

in the marketplace [there are pillars in the marketplace on which the merchants hang their merchandise],

is treated as a karmelit,

and not as a public domain, although the marketplace itself is a public domain, because this is a paltaya, which is a public domain.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

although the public tramples in it

between the pillars,

since they cannot walk there directly [

since they cannot move there freely, because the pillars are not opposite one another],

it is considered like a karmelit.

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav Yehuda said: “The platform before the pillars

before those pillars mentioned above, there are platforms on which the merchants place their merchandise—and it is four [handbreadths] wide and three handbreadths high

is treated as a karmelit.

And the Gemara explains:

According to the one who says,

Rabbi Yohanan,

“the area between the pillars

is treated as a karmelit,

all the more so the platform

which is treated as a karmelit.

But

according to the one who says,

Rav Yehuda,

“the platform

is treated as a karmelit,

it is the platform

that is treated as a karmelit because

its use is not convenient; but the area between the pillars, whose use is convenient, is not

treated as a karmelit, but as a public domain.

Another version

explains for another reason that Rav Yehuda agrees that the area between the pillars is a public domain:

But the area between the pillars, where at times the public tramples [

at times the public enters there],

is considered like a public domain.

Rabba bar Shila said that Rav Hisda said: “A brick

in general, a brick is three handbreadths in length and width, and its thickness has no fixed measure, which was

standing upright in the public domain, and one threw

from a distance of four cubits a moist fig or clay,

and smeared it [

stuck it]

onto its face

of the brick—he is

liable,

because the face of the brick is the airspace of the public domain, and therefore he is liable. But if he threw

onto its top

of the upright brick, and since its length and width are three handbreadths, it follows that when the object came to rest on the upright brick, it came to rest on a surface three handbreadths above the surface of the public domain, and it is a “place of exemption,” and therefore he is

exempt.

Abaye and Rava both say:

What we said, that the top of the brick is a “place of exemption,”

is when it is three high

handbreadths [and an ordinary brick is like this, its length being three, and consequently when it is upright it is three high], and because

the public does not trample on it—

But thorn bushes and thorn shrubs [

kinds of bushes that have thorns] that are in the public domain—their tops are a “place of exemption,”

even though they are not three high

handbreadths, since the public does not trample on them, so as not to be injured.

And Hiyya bar Rav said: Even

on top of

thorn bushes and thorn shrubs

is a “place of exemption” only if they are three high, because below this height the public tramples them with its sandals.

But excrement

that is in the public domain

does not

need to be three high, since the public does not trample on it.

And Rav Ashi said: Even excrement

must be three high for it to be considered a “place of exemption.”

Rabba of the school of Rav said

Shila: When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: “A karmelit is not less than four

by four handbreadths, like a private domain. And if it is less than this, it is only a “place of exemption,” and it is initially permitted to carry from there to a public domain or to a private domain.

And Rav Sheshet said: “And it occupies

the karmelit

up to

a height of

ten

handbreadths,” and he proceeds to explain it.

And the Gemara discusses:

What does “and it occupies up to ten”

mean? Shall we say that if there is a partition ten [handbreadths high], only then is it a karmelit, and if not, it is not a karmelit

but rather a “place of exemption”?

Is that so!?

Can it possibly be said that there is no karmelit אלא when it has a partition ten [handbreadths high]?

For Rav Giddel said that Rav Hiyya bar Yosef said that Rav said: A house that does not have within it

a height of

ten

handbreadths,

and its roof [

the thickness of its ceiling]

completes it to ten

handbreadths, this is its law:

On its roof—

it is permitted to carry throughout it,

for it is a private domain, like the law of a fence ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide.

But

within it, one may carry in it only within four [

within four]

cubits.

For since within the house it does not have partitions ten handbreadths high, as the interior of the house is only nine handbreadths, it is not considered a private domain, but is a “karmelit”; therefore one may not carry in it four cubits.

It is clearly explained to the contrary: specifically because it does not have partitions ten [handbreadths high], it is a “karmelit.”

Rather,

as a result of this difficulty, the Gemara explains:

What is “and it extends until ten

[handbreadths]” that Rav Sheshet says?

Until ten

handbreadths

is it a karmelit; above ten handbreadths it is not a karmelit.

That is, a place that is a karmelit because it does not have partitions and is four handbreadths wide does not have the status of karmelit אלא up to a height of ten handbreadths. But the air above ten handbreadths is a “place of exemption.” And likewise with a public domain: its air extends only up to ten handbreadths, and from there onward it is a “place of exemption.”

And

Rav Sheshet’s words are

like that which Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: “Sharp one!”

Do not engage in the matters of Shabbat above ten [handbreadths].

That is, the laws of Shabbat are [applicable] up to ten handbreadths, and he proceeds to explain it.

But

for what halakhic purpose [

concerning which domain did Shmuel say this], if not concerning a karmelit?

If you say, that there is no private domain above ten;

it is impossible to say this, for

Rav Hisda said: One drove a pole into a private domain [

and presumably the pole is not four by four handbreadths wide, so that it itself would be a private domain],

and threw

an object from a public domain into a private domain,

and it came to rest upon it, even

if

the pole was

high

one hundred cubits,

this person is

liable,

because a private domain rises up to

the firmament.

And if so, it is impossible to explain Shmuel’s words as referring to a private domain.