Shabbat 78b — the Talmud in English

Erased paper,

which is no longer fit for writing; its measure is greater than that of a tax-collector’s token—

enough to wrap around

the mouth of

a small flask of pelayton,

perfume.

Leather—

enough to make

a case for a

amulet [Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro].

Parchment—

enough to write upon it the small section in the tefillin, which is “Hear, Israel.”

Since parchment is expensive, it is not used for a tax-collector’s token, but only for tefillin and mezuzot; therefore, its measure is greater than that of paper.

Ink—

enough to write two letters.

Sometimes there is benefit in only two letters, such as writing them separately on two parts of a vessel or on two boards, in order to know that they are a pair.

Blue eye-paint,

a dye with which one paints around the eye—

enough to paint

with it

one eye.

Glue—

enough to place on the top of the trap.

Hunters place a small board at the top of a reed and put glue on it, so that the bird will stick to it when it settles there, and they can seize it.

Pitch and sulfur—

enough to make a hole.

A small flask in which quicksilver is placed: its mouth is sealed with pitch or sulfur, and a small hole is left in order to take the quicksilver out through it. [“To make a hole” means to prepare the pitch or sulfur in which the hole is made.]

Wax—

enough to place over the mouth of a small hole

in the stopper of a wine flask.

Clay,

made from crushed whitewash—

enough to make the mouth of a furnace of goldsmiths,

through which the bellows enters.

Rabbi Judah says: enough to make a tripod,

a leg for the place on which the furnace rests, for they would set the furnace upon a stand.

Bran—

enough to place over the mouth of a furnace of goldsmiths.

In a place where there was no charcoal, they refined gold with a fire of bran.

Lime—

enough to plaster the youngest among the girls.

Girls whose hair grew before the proper age, and who were embarrassed by this, would put lime on the hair, and thereby it would fall out.

Rabbi Judah says: enough to make a kalkul.

To lay down the hair of the temple by means of lime.

Rabbi Nehemiah says: enough to plaster undafi.

To place it below the temple, in order to remove the fine hair found there.

Gemara:

And we raised an objection:

A rope too should incur liability

with the small measure that it has

enough to make a patch for a sieve and a sifter,

as with reed-grass. Why did they require for it the greater measure of enough to make a handle for a basket?

And we answer:

Since it damages vessels,

the rope, because it is hard, damages vessels made of wood; therefore

people do not make

a patch for a sieve and a sifter from a rope.

The Sages taught: Palm leaves,

of date-palm fronds—their measure is

enough to make a handle for a wicker basket of Egyptian style,

made from palm shoots.

Palm fiber,

which grows around the palm and climbs and becomes like a garment for it—

Others say [Rabbi Meir, who is mentioned in the language of the Mishna by the name “Others,” according to the Gemara at the end of Tractate Horayot]—

enough to place over the mouth of a small funnel, to filter the wine.

The fiber prevents refuse and sediment from passing with the wine into the vessel.

Grease,

fat or oil —

enough to smear beneath a small aspagin,

a wafer-cake

small.

When it is baked, they first smear with fat the place where it is put in the oven.

And how much

is

its measure

of the aspagin?—

Like a sela.

And we object:

But was it not taught: like a dried fig?

And we resolve:

Both this and that—

they are one measure;

a sela and a dried fig are equal in their size.

And the beraita continues:

Fluff [every soft thing is called fluff, such as cotton, remnants of soft wool, and worn-out garments, Rashi at the beginning of “With What Do We Insulate”]—

enough to make a small ball.

And what is its measure,

the measure of the ball?—

Like a nut.

We learned in the Mishna:

Paper—

enough to write upon it a tax-collector’s token.

A tanna taught: How much

is

a tax-collector’s token?—

Two letters of a tax-collector’s token.

That is, two large letters.

And we juxtapose it:

It was taught:

One who carries blank paper—

if it contains enough to write two letters, he incurs liability; and if not, he is exempt.

It follows that he incurs liability even for two ordinary letters?

And we resolve:

Rav Sheshet said: What are the “two letters”

that the beraita teaches?—

Two letters of a tax-collector’s token.

Rava said: The beraita is saying this: paper containing enough to write

our two letters,

ordinary ones,

and

an additional place for

a place of grip,

that is, together with the margin by which the reader holds it —

this is the measure of ordinary blank paper,

that is, a tax-collector’s token,

on which two large letters are written without margins [because it may be spread over the palm of the hand and he sees with it].

And it follows that the two measures are equal. The meitivi: It was taught: One who carries erased paper or a paid promissory note—

namely, a tax collector’s slip,

on which two large letters are written without margins [because it may be spread across the palm of the hand, and he reads it there].

if its blank margin contains

enough

to write two letters, or

if

all of it contains enough to wrap around the mouth of a small flask of pelayton—

he incurs liability. And if not—

he is exempt.

Granted, according to Rav Sheshet, who said

in the earlier beraita:

What are the two letters?—

Two letters of a tax-collector’s token. Correct!

Here too, it can be explained that its blank margin contains enough to write two letters of a tax-collector’s token.

But according to Rava, who said

there:

two of our letters and

an additional place for

a place of grip, that is, a tax-collector’s token,

it is difficult: for here it cannot be explained in this manner.

For here a place of grip is not needed,

since one can hold it in the place of the erasure or in the place of the writing on the paid promissory note. Necessarily, two small letters alone, fit to be written in the blank space, suffice. If so, the explanation of the two beraitot is not the same?

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

The Sages taught: One who carries a tax-collector’s token—

until he has shown it to the tax collector, he incurs liability. Once he has shown it to the tax collector,

and he no longer needs it—

he is exempt.

Rabbi Judah says: Even once he has shown it to the tax collector, he incurs liability, because he needs it

still.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them?

In what do the Sages and Rabbi Judah disagree, and what need does Rabbi Judah have for it?

Abaye said: There is a difference between them—

the pursuers,

people who run after those who have already paid the tax to the

tax collector,

to the tax collector.

For Rabbi Judah holds that he still guards it in order to show it to those running after people who have passed the tax point, so that they can falsely accuse them of not having paid the tax collector.

And the first tanna holds that he does not guard it; if they run after him, he returns with them to the tax collector himself.

Rava said: A large tax collector and a small tax collector are the difference between them.

Sometimes there are two tax collectors: the large tax collector, who does not himself stand on the bridge, but appoints a small tax collector in his place. The passerby first shows the token to the large tax collector. Rabbi Judah holds that he still guards it in order to show it also to the small tax collector, so that he will let him pass.

But the first tanna holds that he no longer needs it, because the large tax collector gives the passerby a sign with words to say to the small tax collector, and he lets him pass.

Rav Ashi said:

One tax collector is the difference between them.

For Rabbi Judah holds that he guards it

because he needs it to show it to a second tax collector,

at another crossing—not in order to be exempt from the tax there, but

so that he can say to him: “See, I am a man of the tax collector!”

I am a trustworthy and important man, and I do not evade the tax, so that he will not falsely accuse him afterward.

The Sages taught: One who carries a promissory note—

Until he has paid it, he incurs liability,

for carrying it, since he needs it.

Once he has paid it—

he is exempt

for carrying it, since it is no longer useful.

Rabbi Judah says: Even once he has paid it, he incurs liability, because he needs it.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them?

Rav Yosef said:

Whether

it is forbidden to retain a paid promissory note—

that is the difference between them.

The Sages hold: It is forbidden

for the creditor

to retain a paid promissory note

in his possession, as it is stated: “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents” [lest he return and claim it from him, Sema, Hoshen Mishpat, opening remarks to section 57].

Likewise, the debtor does not retain the paid note with him, for fear that it will come into the creditor’s possession and he will return and claim the debt from him.

Therefore, whether the creditor or the debtor carries it, they do not incur liability for it. Even if it has a use, to seal the mouth of a flask, this is not considered, since they do not retain the note in their possession.

The Sages hold: It is forbidden

for a creditor

to retain a repaid promissory note

in his possession, as it is stated: “Do not allow injustice to dwell in your tents” [lest he later claim the debt again, Sema, Choshen Mishpat, opening note to section 57].

Likewise, the debtor does not retain the repaid note, for fear that it may come into the creditor’s possession and he may claim the debt again.

And Rabbi Judah holds: It is permitted

for the creditor to retain a paid promissory note. Therefore, if the creditor carries it, he incurs liability for it, since he needs it to seal the mouth of a flask. Abaye said: Everyone holds that it is forbidden to retain a paid promissory note. And here, they disagree concerning one who admits

the debtor

to

the validity of the

note

issued from the creditor’s possession,

that

he indeed

wrote it,

and the signatures of the witnesses on the note are genuine, but the debtor claims that he has already paid the debt—

whether nevertheless

the creditor

must

himself

validate it,

to prove the authenticity of the signatures, that they were not forged by him [by bringing witnesses who recognize the signatures, or by comparing the signatures with the signatures of the witnesses on other notes], and without his validating the witnesses’ signatures, the debtor is believed to claim that it was paid,

in this

they disagree

the Sages and Rabbi Judah.

to

establish its authenticity,

The first tanna holds:

The debtor

admits regarding the note that

it indeed

is his writing— he still must

the creditor

validate it.

And if the debtor validates it but claims, “I paid the loan recorded in the promissory note,” he is believed.

For only if the note is validated by two witnesses who recognize the handwriting of the witnesses will the debtor not be believed to say, “I paid,” because the creditor will claim: “The note in my hand—what is it doing here?” If you paid, why is the note in my hand?

But when the debtor validates the note through his admission, he is also believed to say concerning it that the debt was paid, by force of: “The mouth that prohibited—it is the mouth that permitted.”

And Rabbi Judah holds: If one admits regarding a note that he wrote it, it need not be validated.

Since the debtor admits that it is not forged, the note is genuine, and the debtor is no longer believed to say, “I paid,” as long as the note is in the creditor’s possession.

For the note in the creditor’s possession, after its validation, has the force of the testimony of two witnesses, and no credibility is considered against two witnesses, not even the credibility of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

And what does “until he has paid it” and “once he has paid it”

that the beraita teaches mean?

But when the debtor himself validates the note through his admission, he is also considered credible to say that the debt recorded in it has been repaid, by virtue of the principle that “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

But Rabbi Yehuda holds: A note whose writing the debtor admits to does not need to be established as authentic.

Since the debtor admits that it is not forged, the note is authentic, and the debtor is no longer considered credible to say, “I repaid it,” as long as the note is in the creditor’s possession.

The note in the creditor’s possession, once its authenticity has been established, has the force of the testimony of two witnesses, and no claim of credibility is accepted against the testimony of two witnesses—not even the claim based on the principle that “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

And what does “until he has repaid it” and “once he has repaid it”

mean, as stated in the beraita?