Shabbat 78b (עח:) — the Talmud in English

Erased paper,

which is no longer fit for writing, its measure is greater than that of a tax collector’s token—

enough to wrap around

the mouth of

a small flask of paletum

, perfume.

Leather—

enough to make

a holder for a

amulet

Rav Ovadia of Bartenura].

Parchment—

enough to write upon it the small passage in the phylacteries, namely, “Hear, O Israel.”

Since parchment is expensive, it is not used for a tax collector’s token, but only for phylacteries and mezuzot; therefore, its measure is greater than that of paper.

Ink—

enough to write two letters.

Sometimes two letters alone are useful, such as when they are written separately on two parts of a vessel, or on two boards, in order to know that they belong together.

Eye makeup,

a substance with which one paints around the eye—

enough to apply makeup to

one

eye.

Glue—

enough to place on the top of a bird trap.

Hunters place a small board at the top of a reed and put glue on it, so that a bird will stick to it when it settles there, enabling them to capture it.

Pitch and sulfur—

enough to make a hole.

A small flask in which quicksilver is placed is sealed at its mouth with pitch or sulfur, leaving a small hole through which the quicksilver can be removed [and “to make a hole” means to prepare the pitch or sulfur in which the hole is made].

Wax—

enough to place over the mouth of a small hole

in the stopper of a wine flask.

Pottery clay,

made from crushed bricks—

enough to make the opening of a goldsmith’s crucible,

through which the bellows enter.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Enough to make a tripod,

a leg for the base of the crucible, upon which the crucible would be placed.

Bran—

enough to place over the opening of a goldsmith’s crucible.

Where charcoal was unavailable, goldsmiths would refine gold using a fire of bran.

Lime—

enough to depilate a young girl.

Girls who grew hair before the appropriate age and were embarrassed by it would place lime on the hair, causing it to fall out.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Enough to make a side lock,

to lay down the hair at the temple by means of lime.

Rabbi Neḥemya says: Enough to depilate the under-temple area.

To place it below the temple, in order to remove the fine hair found there.

Gemara:

And we raised the following question:

The same should apply to rope: It should render one liable

for a smaller measure, one that is

enough to make a loop for a sieve or a sifter,

as with rushes. Why, then, was a larger measure required, enough to make a handle for a basket?

And we answer:

Since it damages a vessel,

because rope, being hard, mars wooden utensils, therefore

people do not make

a loop for a sieve or sifter from rope.

The Sages taught: Palm leaves

from date-palm fronds, their measure is

enough to make a handle for an Egyptian woven basket,

which is made from palm shoots.

Palm fiber,

which grows around the palm tree, climbs up it, and becomes like a garment for it,

others say [

Rabbi Meir, who is referred to in the Mishna by the term “others,” as stated by the Gemara at the end of tractate Horayot]—

enough to place over the mouth of a small funnel, to filter wine.

The fiber prevents refuse and sediment from passing with the wine into the vessel.

Grease,

fat or oil —

enough to grease beneath a small

flat cake

of the asfagin type.

When it is baked, the place where it will be set in the oven is first smeared with fat.

And how much

is

its measure,

the measure of the asfagin?—

Like a sela.

And we challenge this:

But was it not taught: Like a dried fig?

And we answer:

Both this and that—

it is one measure;

a sela and a dried fig are equal in size.

And the beraita continues:

Fluff [

anything soft is called fluff, such as cotton, soft wool remnants, or worn-out clothing, according to Rashi at the beginning of chapter “With What May One Insulate”]—

enough to make a small ball.

And what is its measure,

the measure of the ball?—

Like a walnut.

We learned in the Mishna:

Paper—

enough to write a tax collector’s token upon it.

The tanna taught: How much

is

a tax collector’s token?—

Two letters of a tax collector’s token.

That is, two large letters.

But we raise a contradiction:

It was taught in a beraita:

One who carries a blank sheet of paper—

if it has enough to write two letters, he is liable; and if not, he is exempt.

It follows that he is liable even for two ordinary letters.

And we answer:

Rav Sheshet said: What does “two letters”

that is stated in the beraita mean?—

Two letters of a tax collector’s token.

Rava said:

The beraita means as follows: Paper that has enough to write

two ordinary letters,

ordinary ones,

and

additional space for

a place to hold it,

that is, together with the margin by which the reader holds it, — this is the measure of ordinary blank paper,

namely, a tax collector’s token,

on which two large letters are written without a margin [because it may be spread across the palm of the hand, and he reads from it].

It follows that the two measures are equal.

Meytivi:

It was taught in a beraita:

One who carries erased paper or a discharged promissory note—

if its blank margin has

a space

to write two letters, or

if

the entire sheet has enough to wrap around the mouth of a small flask of paletum—

he is liable. But if not—

he is exempt.

Granted, according to Rav Sheshet, who said

in the earlier beraita,

what does “two letters” mean?—

Two letters of a tax collector’s token. This works well!

Here too, it can be explained that its blank margin has enough space to write two letters of a tax collector’s token.

But according to Rava, who said

there

two ordinary letters and

additional space for

a place to hold it, namely, a tax collector’s token,

there is a difficulty, for it cannot be explained that way here.

For here no place to hold it is necessary,

since one can hold it by the erased area or by the written area of the discharged promissory note. Necessarily, two small letters alone, suitable for being written in the blank margin, suffice. If so, the explanation of the two beraitot is not the same.

And we conclude:

The difficulty remains unresolved!

The Sages taught: One who carries a tax collector’s token—

until

he has shown it to the tax collector, he is liable. Once he has shown it to the tax collector,

and no longer needs it—

he is exempt.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he has shown it to the tax collector, he is liable, because he still needs it

for further use.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them?

In what do the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and what need does Rabbi Yehuda maintain that he still has for it?

Abaye said: The difference between them is

those who pursue,

people who run after those who have already paid the tax to the

tax collector,

the tax collector.

Rabbi Yehuda holds that he still safeguards it in order to show it to those pursuing people who have passed through the checkpoint, so that they will not falsely accuse them of failing to pay the tax collector.

The first tanna holds that he does not safeguard it; if they pursue him, he returns with them to the tax collector himself.

Rava said: The difference between them is a large tax collector and a small tax collector.

Sometimes there are two tax collectors: the large tax collector, who does not stand at the bridge himself but appoints a small tax collector in his place. The passerby first shows the token to the large tax collector. Rabbi Yehuda holds that he still safeguards it in order to show it also to the small tax collector, so that the latter will allow him to pass.

The first tanna, however, holds that he no longer needs it, because the large tax collector gives the passerby a sign or message to convey to the small tax collector, who will then allow him to pass.

Rav Ashi said:

With

one tax collector

the difference between them is as follows. Rabbi Yehuda holds that he safeguards it

because he needs to show it to a second

tax collector at another crossing—not in order to be exempt from the tax there, but

because he says to him: “See that I am a tax collector’s man!”

That is, I am a trustworthy and important person, and I do not evade the tax, so that he will not falsely accuse him afterward.

The Sages taught: One who carries a promissory note—

Until he has paid it, he is liable

for carrying it, since he needs it.

Once he has paid it—

he is exempt

for carrying it, since it is no longer useful.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even once he has paid it, he is liable, because he still needs it.

And we explain:

What is the difference between them?

Rav Yosef said:

Whether

it is forbidden to retain a discharged promissory note—

that is the difference between them.

The Rabbis hold: It is forbidden

for the lender

to retain a discharged promissory note

in his possession, as it is stated: “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents” [lest he later sue him again; Sema, Hoshen Mishpat, beginning of section 57].

Likewise, the borrower does not retain the discharged promissory note, lest it reach the lender’s hands and he sue him again.

Therefore, whether the lender or the borrower carries it, neither is liable for it. Even if it can be used to seal the mouth of a flask, this is not taken into account, since they do not retain the note in their possession.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: It is permitted

for the lender

to retain a discharged promissory note.

Therefore, if the lender carries it, he is liable, since he needs it to seal the mouth of his flask.

Abaye said: Everyone

agrees that

it is forbidden to retain a discharged promissory note.

And here, they disagree with regard to one who acknowledges

the borrower

the

validity of the

promissory note

produced by the lender,

that

it indeed is

his writing,

and that the witnesses’ signatures on the note are genuine, but the borrower claims that he has already repaid the debt—

whether, nevertheless, the lender

needs

to

validate it,

to establish himself that the signatures were not forged by him [by bringing witnesses who recognize the signatures, or by comparing the signatures with those of the witnesses on other documents], and without his validating the witnesses’ signatures, the borrower would be believed when claiming that the debt was paid—

over this

they disagree,

the Rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda.

The first tanna holds:

The borrower

acknowledges the promissory note that

it indeed is

his writing—

he still

needs

the lender to

validate it.

If the lender validates it, but the borrower claims, “I paid the loan recorded in the promissory note,” he is believed.

Only if the note is validated by two witnesses who recognize the signatures of the witnesses will the borrower not be believed when he says, “I paid,” because the lender can claim: “If the debt was paid, why is the note in my possession?”

But when the borrower validates the note through his acknowledgment, he is also believed to say that the debt recorded in it has been paid, by virtue of the principle: “The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

And Rabbi Yehuda holds: One who acknowledges a promissory note that he wrote need not validate it.

Since the borrower acknowledges that it is not forged, the note is genuine, and the borrower is no longer believed to say, “I paid,” so long as the note remains in the lender’s possession.

For the note in the lender’s possession, once validated, has the force of the testimony of two witnesses, and no claim of credibility is considered against the testimony of two witnesses—not even the credibility arising from the principle, “The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

And what does “until he has paid it” and “once he has paid it”

that is stated in the beraita mean?