Shabbat 76a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said: This

Mishna—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

For it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a general principle: Everything

that is

not fit

to be considered worthy

of being stored away, and people do not store away the like of it.

And it became fit for this

for one person, who considered it important

and stored it away.

And another person came and carried it out—

this one becomes liable through the thought of that one!

For because of that person who considered it important and stored it away, everyone is liable for carrying it out.

But the Mishna teaches that only the one who stored it away is liable for it, whereas all other people are exempt.

Mishna:

The Mishna begins to explain the measure of various things with regard to liability for carrying out:

One who carries out straw,

its measure is

as much as fills a cow’s mouth.

For straw is food for a cow, and therefore its measure was determined with reference to it, as one is not liable until he carries out straw in the measure that a cow can fill its mouth.

One who carries out

bean stalks,

which are straw of types of legumes, its measure is

as much as fills a camel’s mouth.

For it is larger than a cow’s mouth. But one who carries out bean stalks as much as fills a cow’s mouth is not liable, since they are not fit for a cow’s food.

One who carries out

a sheaf,

straw of ears of grain [see Tosafot, beginning of chapter Kirah, the difference between straw and chaff]—

as much as fills a lamb’s mouth,

which is larger than a kid’s mouth [below]. For the sheaf is not fit for a kid’s food, and therefore its measure is determined with reference to a lamb.

Herbs,

which are softer and fit both for a lamb and for a kid, one is liable for them even with the smaller measure of

as much as fills a kid’s mouth.

Leaves of garlic and leaves of onions,

if they are

moist,

which are fit only for human food their measure is—

as a dried fig

[a dried fig]. For this is the measure of all human food for all the labors of Shabbat.

And if they are

dry,

which are fit even for a kid’s food, their measure is—

as much as fills the kid’s mouth,

which is less than a dried fig.

And

all these

do not combine with one another

to complete a full measure. For example, if he carried out less than a cow’s-mouthful of straw, and the bean stalks complete the lacking measure, he is not liable,

because their measures are not equal.

And the Gemara explains that only the bean stalks, whose measure is greater than that of straw, do not combine to complete straw to a full cow’s-mouthful. But conversely, straw, whose measure is smaller than that of bean stalks, completes bean stalks to a full camel’s-mouthful.

Gemara:

And we explain:

What are bean stalks?

Rav Yehuda said: Straw of types of legumes.

When Rav Dimi came, he said:

The amoraim disagree concerning a person

who carries out a cow’s-mouthful of straw,

with the intention of feeding it

to a camel.

For this measure is insufficient to fill the camel’s mouth:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt.

In the evening,

in the evening,

Rabbi Yohanan said this,

that he is liable. But

in the morning

in the morning,

he retracted his position,

he retracted what he had said when he made him liable, and said that he is exempt.

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yohanan acted well

Rabbi Yohanan

by retracting,

for he retracted what he had said when he made him liable.

For it is not fit,

this measure of a cow’s-mouthful

for a camel.

Abaye said to him: On the contrary, as at first

as Rabbi Yohanan initially said, that he is liable,

is more reasonable.

For it is fit

the quantity he carried out

for a cow.

And it is consequently an important measure. And although he carried it out for the needs of a camel, its measure does not thereby cease to be a measure!

Rather, when Ravin came, he said: One who carries out a cow’s-mouthful of straw for

the needs of

a camel—

everyone agrees that he is liable.

For, as stated, it has a measure, and it is included in “fit to be stored away, and people store away the like of it.”

When they disagree

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish,

is concerning one who carries out a cow’s-mouthful of bean stalks

in order to feed it

to a cow.

And it was stated conversely: Rabbi Yohanan said: He is exempt.

Reish Lakish said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is exempt,

because bean stalks are not fit for a cow’s eating except with difficulty,

and eating with difficulty is not called eating.

And therefore it is impossible to determine [the measure] by the measure of a cow’s eating, even though he carried it out for a cow, but one must determine [it] by the measure of a camel’s eating, whose way it is to eat bean stalks, and with less than a camel’s-mouthful he is exempt.

And

Reish Lakish said: He is liable,

for

eating with difficulty is called eating.

Therefore, although if he carried out the bean stalks without specification, he requires the measure of a camel’s eating, since their primary designation is for a camel, once he carried them out for a cow, the measure of a cow’s eating suffices, for they are eaten by a cow with difficulty.

We learned in the Mishna:

A sheaf, as much as fills a lamb’s mouth.

And we object:

But it was taught:

A sheaf,

as a dried fig?

And we answer:

This and that—

are one measure.

For a lamb’s-mouthful is equivalent to a dried fig.

We learned in the Mishna:

Leaves of garlic and leaves of onions, moist—

as a dried fig, and dry—

as much as fills the kid’s mouth,

and they do not combine with one another because their measures are not equal.

Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said: They do not combine with the more stringent one among them.

An item whose measure is larger, which is the lenient one, does not combine to complete the more stringent one, namely, the one whose measure is smaller than it, for it is [the lenient one] less important than it.

For example, bean stalks do not combine with straw to complete a cow’s-mouthful.

But they combine for the more lenient one among them.

The more stringent item, which is more important, combines to complete the lenient one, which is less important.

For example, the more stringent straw combines with the lenient bean stalks to complete a camel’s-mouthful.

And we consider this:

And

for

all

the things

whose measures are not equal—

do they combine

at all? For even the more stringent with the lenient do not combine where their measures are not equal?!

And the proof is:

But we learned

in tractate Kelim:

A garment

becomes impure with midras impurity when it has

three

handbreadths

by three

handbreadths, for then it is fit for reclining; if he designated it for reclining and a man afflicted with flux reclined upon it, it becomes a primary source of impurity because of midras impurity [and if it is less than this, it has only contact impurity, provided that it has three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths].

And a sack,

which is made from goat hair, its measure for imparting impurity [whether midras impurity or any other impurity, and likewise all those mentioned below] is

four by four

handbreadths.

And leather—

with

five by five.

And a mat,

a fabric made of reeds—with

six by six.

And it was taught concerning it: The garment,

whose measure is three handbreadths,

and the sack,

whose measure is four, combine. For the garment completes the measure of the sack, so that if there are four handbreadths from both of them together, it receives impurity [and not conversely, that the sack combines to complete the garment to three handbreadths, for only the more stringent combines with the lenient, and not the lenient with the more stringent].

And likewise

the sack and the leather,

and likewise

the leather and the mat—

combine with one another.

And specifically in the order stated, since they resemble one another in their nature and are fit to be joined with one another. But the garment, the leather, the sack, and the mat do not combine with one another, since they are not fit to be joined together, and one who joins them—his opinion is nullified in relation to all people.

And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that they combine? Because

they are fit to become impure with mishkav.

For if he cut pieces from two [in the order stated] and joined them together in order to make a patch for a donkey’s saddlecloth, this piece receives midras impurity if it has one handbreadth by one handbreadth, as though it consisted of one handbreadth by one handbreadth from each type alone [for this is the measure when it was designated for a patch].

And the reason for the matter is that people are not particular that the patch be composed of two types. And since we find that two types are used together for the same purpose, therefore they combine for midras impurity [in accordance with the explanation of Maharam].

And we infer:

The reason

that they combine is because

they are fit to become impure

together with

a seat.

For they can serve together as a donkey’s saddlecloth that becomes impure with the impurity of a seat.

But

if

they are not fit to become impure

together with the impurity of

a seat,

that is, were it not for this reason,

they would not

combine, even the more stringent with the lenient.

If so, how did Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina say with regard to Shabbat that they do combine?