Shabbat 76a (עו.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Elazar said: This

Mishna

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a general principle: Anything

that

is not fit

and is not considered important enough

to store, and people do not store items like it.

But it became fit for this purpose

for one person who deemed it important

and stored it.

And another person came and carried it out—

the latter becomes liable on account of the former’s intention!

Since it was because of that person, who deemed it important and stored it, that everyone is liable for carrying it out.

Whereas the Mishna teaches that only the one who stored it is liable for carrying it out, while all other people are exempt.

Mishna:

The Mishna begins to explain the measures for various items with regard to liability for carrying them out:

One who carries out straw,

its measure is

as much as would fill a cow’s mouth.

Straw is food for a cow, and therefore its measure was determined with reference to a cow: one is not liable until he carries out straw in an amount sufficient to fill the cow’s mouth.

One who carries out

bean straw,

which is straw from leguminous plants, its measure is

as much as would fill a camel’s mouth.

A camel’s mouth is larger than a cow’s mouth. But one who carries out bean straw in an amount sufficient to fill a cow’s mouth is not liable, since it is not fit as food for a cow.

One who carries out

a sheaf,

stalks of grain [see Tosafot, the beginning of chapter “Bameh Madlikin,” for the distinction between stalks and straw]—

as much as would fill a lamb’s mouth,

which is more than the mouth of a kid goat [mentioned below]. Since the sheaf is not fit as food for a kid goat, its measure is determined with reference to a lamb.

Herbs,

which are softer and are fit both for a lamb and for a kid goat, render one liable even in the smaller measure of

as much as would fill a kid goat’s mouth.

Garlic leaves and onion leaves,

if they are

moist,

which means that they are fit only as human food their measure is

that of a dried fig [

a dried fig]. This is the measure for all human food with regard to all the labors of Shabbat.

And if they are

dry,

which means that they are also fit as food for a kid goat, their measure is

as much as would fill a kid goat’s mouth,

which is less than the measure of a dried fig.

And

all these items

do not combine with one another

to make up a complete measure. For example, if one carried out less than enough straw to fill a cow’s mouth, and the bean straw completed the deficient measure, he is not liable,

because their measures are not equal.

The Gemara explains that only bean straw, whose measure is larger than that of ordinary straw, does not combine with straw to complete the measure of a cow’s mouth. But conversely, ordinary straw, whose measure is smaller than that of bean straw, completes bean straw to the measure of a camel’s mouth.

Gemara:

And we explain:

What is bean straw?

Rav Yehuda said: Straw from leguminous plants.

When Rav Dimi came, he said:

The amoraim disagreed concerning one

who carries out straw in an amount sufficient to fill a cow’s mouth,

in order to feed it

to a camel.

This measure is insufficient to fill a camel’s mouth:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable.

Resh Lakish said: He is exempt.

In the evening,

at night,

Rabbi Yohanan said thus,

that he is liable. But

in the morning,

in the morning,

he retracted his opinion,

withdrew from his ruling that he was liable and said that he is exempt.

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Yohanan acted properly

in

retracting,

withdrawing from his ruling that he was liable.

For it is not fit,

this measure of enough to fill a cow’s mouth is not fit

for a camel.

Abaye said to him: On the contrary, the initial ruling

as Rabbi Yohanan initially said, that he is liable,

is more reasonable.

For it is fit—

the amount that he carried out is fit

for a cow.

It is therefore a significant measure. Although he carried it out for the needs of a camel, its measure does not thereby cease to be significant!

Rather, when Ravin came, he said: With regard to one who carries out straw in an amount sufficient to fill a cow’s mouth for the

purpose of

a camel—

everyone agrees that he is liable.

For, as stated, it contains the requisite measure, and it is included in the category of “fit to be stored, and people store items like it.”

They disagree

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish

with regard to one who carries out bean straw in an amount sufficient to fill a cow’s mouth

in order to feed it

to a cow.

And it was stated conversely: Rabbi Yohanan said: He is exempt.

Resh Lakish said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rabbi Yohanan said that he is exempt,

because bean straw is not fit for a cow to eat except with difficulty,

and eating with difficulty is not considered eating.

Therefore, one cannot determine its measure according to the amount eaten by a cow, even though he carried it out for the cow’s needs. Rather, its measure must be determined according to the amount eaten by a camel, which ordinarily eats bean straw; and if he carried out less than enough to fill a camel’s mouth, he is exempt.

And

Resh Lakish said that he is liable,

because

eating with difficulty is considered eating.

Therefore, although when one carries out bean straw without specifying a purpose, he requires the measure of a camel’s eating, since it is primarily intended for a camel, once he carries it out for the needs of a cow, the amount eaten by a cow suffices, since it is eaten by a cow with difficulty.

We learned in the Mishna:

A sheaf, as much as would fill a lamb’s mouth.

And we raise an objection:

But wasn’t it taught:

A sheaf

the measure of a dried fig?

And we answer:

Both this and that—

they are one measure.

The amount that fills a lamb’s mouth is the measure of a dried fig.

We learned in the Mishna:

Moist garlic leaves and onion leaves—

the measure of a dried fig; and dry leaves—

as much as would fill a kid goat’s mouth,

and they do not combine with one another because their measures are not equal.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: They do not combine to reach the more stringent of them.

An item whose measure is larger, which is the lenient one, does not combine to complete the more stringent measure, meaning the item whose measure is smaller, since it is [the lenient one] less significant than it.

For example, bean straw does not combine with ordinary straw to complete the measure of a cow’s mouth.

But they do combine to reach the more lenient of them.

The more stringent item, which is more significant, combines to complete the lenient item, which is less significant.

For example, ordinary straw, the more stringent item, combines with bean straw, the lenient item, to complete the measure of a camel’s mouth.

And we raise a question about this:

And

if

all

the items

whose measures are not equal—

do they combine

at all? Yet even the more stringent item does not combine with the lenient one when their measures are not equal?!

And the proof is as follows:

But didn’t we learn

in tractate Kelim:

A garment

becomes impure with tum’at midras when it measures

three

handbreadths

by three

handbreadths, since it is then fit for reclining; if one designated it for reclining and a person with a discharge reclined upon it, it becomes an av hatum’a on account of tum’at midras [and if it is smaller than this, it has only the impurity of contact, provided that it measures three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths].

And a sack,

which is made from goat hair, its measure for transmitting impurity [whether tum’at midras or any other impurity, and likewise for all the items listed below] is

four by four

handbreadths.

And leather—

the measure is

five by five.

And a mat,

a woven item made of reeds, is

six by six.

And it was taught with regard to it: A garment,

whose measure is three handbreadths,

and a sack,

whose measure is four, combine. The garment completes the measure of the sack, so that if together they measure four handbreadths, they are susceptible to impurity [but not conversely: the sack does not combine to complete the garment to three handbreadths, since only the more stringent combines with the lenient, and not the lenient with the more stringent].

And likewise,

the sack and the leather,

and likewise

the leather and the mat—

combine with one another.

This applies specifically in the order stated, since they are similar in their nature and fit to be joined to one another. But the garment, the leather, the sack, and the mat do not combine with one another, since they are not fit to be joined together, and one who joins them has an aberrant opinion that is disregarded in relation to all people.

And Rabbi Shimon said: What is the reason

that they combine? Because

they are fit to become impure with the impurity of a seat.

If one cut pieces from two [in the order stated] and joined them together in order to make a patch for a donkey’s saddle, this piece becomes impure with tum’at midras if it measures one handbreadth by one handbreadth, as though it had consisted of one handbreadth by one handbreadth from each individual type [as this is the measure when it is designated as a patch].

The reason for this is that people are not particular that a patch be composed of two different types. Since we find that two types are used together for the same purpose, they therefore combine with regard to tum’at midras [according to the explanation of the Maharam].

And we infer:

The reason

that they combine is because

they are fit to become impure

together with the impurity of a

seat.

They can serve together as a donkey’s saddle that becomes impure with the impurity of a seat.

But

if

they are not fit to become impure

together with the impurity of a

seat,

that is, were it not for this reason,

they would not

combine, not even the more stringent with the lenient.

If so, how could Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina say with regard to Shabbat that they do combine?