Shabbat 75b — the Talmud in English

And we raised this objection to Rav: Is it only

because of dyeing that there is liability,

while

because of taking a life there is no liability? Is this so? Surely taking a life is also a labor, just as they killed the rams, the tachashim, and the chilazon.

Yet surely taking a life is also a labor, just as they slaughtered the rams, the taḥashim, and the sky-blue snail.

And we answer:

say

that this is what Rav said: One who slaughters is liable

also because of dyeing. And the practical difference is that if he slaughtered unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings.

The practical difference is that if he slaughtered unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. [ [A0012]]And according to this, what the Mishna counted slaughtering as a labor in its own right is also resolved, since it is not included in dyeing, which was performed with the wool in the construction of the Tabernacle.]

And according to this, what the Mishna counted slaughtering as a labor in its own right is also resolved, for it is not included in dyeing mentioned among the labors of wool.

Rav said: The matter that I said, that one who slaughters is liable also because of dyeing—

that one who slaughters is liable also because of dyeing—

let me add a reason to it:

I will add a reason to it,

so that later generations should not come

so that the later generations should not come

and mock

and ridicule

me. For it is seemingly difficult concerning what I said, that one who slaughters is liable because of dyeing:

For it would seem that there is reason to wonder about my statement that one who slaughters is liable because of dyeing:

Dyeing

through slaughtering—

in what does he derive satisfaction from it? What need does he have for dyeing the meat?

What need does he have for dyeing the meat?

And I said:

It is pleasing

to him

that it become filled,

that it be dyed

the place of slaughter

with

blood, so that people will see it, and know from the fresh red color that the animal was slaughtered today,

and from the fresh red color they will know that the animal was slaughtered that day,

and come to buy

and purchase

from him.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who salts it and one who tans it.

And we raised an objection:

Is this salting and this tanning? For salting is itself needed for tanning, so why were they counted as two primary labors?

For salting is also needed for tanning; why, then, were they counted as two primary labors?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish both say: Remove

remove

one of them, for indeed there is no need to count them as two,

for indeed there is no need to count them as two,

and insert in its place the labor of

in its place the labor of

marking out, which is marking the place where one wishes to write or cut in a straight manner. And this is what they did in the Tabernacle when cutting the hides.

which is marking the place where one wishes to write or cut in a straight line. This is what they did in the Tabernacle when cutting the hides.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who salts meat is liable because of tanning.

Rava said: There is no tanning with foodstuffs! [And it is forbidden by rabbinic decree. Tosafot, s.v. “There is no tanning.”]

Но по постановлению мудрецов это запрещено. Тосафот, комментарий «Эйн».]

Rav Ashi said: And even Rabba bar Rav Huna,

who holds one liable for salting meat,

said this

this

only when he needs it in a place where he needs salted meat

in a place where he needs the salted meat

for the road, when he is setting out on a journey; and then he salts it with much salt in order to preserve the meat, and this is a form of tanning for which there is liability.

when he is setting out on a journey and salts the meat heavily in order to preserve it; this is a form of tanning for which one is liable.

But

if he salts

for

the need of

the house, ordinary salting of meat at home—

ordinary salting of meat at home—

a person does not make his food wood! A person does not salt his food, the meat needed for the food of his household and not for preservation, until it hardens like wood. And less than this is not tanning.

A person does not salt the food he needs for his household’s consumption, rather than for preservation, until it becomes as hard as wood. Anything less than this is not tanning.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who smooths it and one who cuts it.

Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: One who rubs between the pillars of a colonnade, which is made with windows between pillar and pillar, and smooths the bottom of the window so that it will be smooth and convenient to lean upon—

of a portico, which has openings between each pair of pillars, and smooths the bottom surface of the opening so that it will be smooth and comfortable to lean upon—

is liable because of smoothing.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: Rav Ashi told me three things in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

1.

One who scrapes,

rubs

the ends of poles to sharpen them, and is particular that they all be of uniform size,

to sharpen them, taking care that they all be of uniform size,

on Shabbat is liable because of cutting.

2.

One who smooths a plaster on Shabbat,

smooths the salve upon the bandage—

is liable because of smoothing.

So it seemingly appears that this is the explanation. But in the words of the commentators and decisors we did not find an explicit reference to the salve, and there are expressions in their words that indicate that the matter concerns smoothing the bandage itself; and this requires examination: what does he smooth, and how does he smooth it?

3.

One who hews a stone on Shabbat,

who smooths it after it has been quarried—

is liable because of striking with the hammer,

for this is the completion of its labor.

Rabbi Shimon ben Kisama said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: One who forms

a design on a vessel

for ornament [on a complete vessel, intended for a design to be added to it]],

and one who blows in a glass vessel,

he blows with a bellows into hot molten glass and makes a vessel from it—

is liable because of striking with the hammer.

Rabbi Yehuda said: One who removes threads from garments,

who removes protruding threads from the fabric that remained as a result of a knot made there, or removes straw and splinters that became inserted into the cloth during weaving—

is liable because of striking with the hammer.

And this applies

specifically

when he is particular about them,

that they should not remain in the fabric.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who writes two letters.

The Sages taught: If one wrote one large letter, and in its place there is enough room

for

writing two

two ordinary letters—

he is exempt. Since he did not write two letters as was done in the Tabernacle, where they wrote one letter on this board and the second on the other board to indicate that it was its mate.

Since he did not write two letters as was done in the Tabernacle, where they wrote one letter on this board and the second on the adjacent board to indicate that it was its counterpart.

But if

he erased one large letter, and in its place there is enough room to write two—

he is liable! For the importance of the labor of erasing lies in preparing a place for writing two letters, and here there is indeed a place for two letters.

For the significance of the labor of erasing lies in preparing a place for writing two letters, and here there is indeed room for two letters.

Rabbi Menaḥem son of Rabbi Yosei said: And this is a stringency in erasing over writing! And it teaches us that the first Tanna is Rabbi Menaḥem son of Rabbi Yosei.

And it teaches us that the anonymous first tanna is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who builds, and one who demolishes, one who extinguishes, one who kindles, and one who strikes with the hammer.

Rabba and Rabbi Zeira both say: Everything that contains completion of a labor—

one is liable because of striking with the hammer.

We learned in the conclusion of the Mishna: Behold,

these are the primary labors.

And we explain: That which it teaches

“these”—

to exclude

the view of Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds one liable for a derivative in the place of a primary labor,

two sin-offerings.

For we already said above [73b] that the number stated by our Mishna is to know how many sin-offerings he is liable for. And the conclusion comes to teach us that if he performed these primary labors and also performed derivatives along with them, he is not liable to bring separate sin-offerings for them; rather, he brings one offering that atones for the primary labor and all its derivatives.

Rashi’s language here and at the beginning of tractate Bava Kamma seemingly indicates that according to the Rabbis, one who performs a primary labor and its derivatives brings an offering only for the primary labor, and not for its derivatives. But this is extremely puzzling, for the derivative too is a sin that entails an offering; it is merely that it can be atoned for together with the primary labor through the same offering.

However, examination of Rashi’s language on page 6b, s.v. “is liable,” proves that Rashi’s intention is to say that the derivative does not entail a separate offering when he performs it in one period of unawareness together with the primary labor; but certainly it must be atoned for through an offering together with the primary labor.

We learned in the Mishna: “These are the primary labors,”

forty less one.

And we explain why the Tanna repeated and taught the number of labors after he had already taught it at the beginning:

To exclude the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

For it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda adds one who beats,

who strikes the warp threads with a rod in order to straighten them,

and

the

one who tightens,

who strikes the overly stretched weft threads so that they loosen and fit well into the woven fabric.

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

One who beats—

he is included in stretching the warp! For the function of one who beats and of one who stretches the warp is arranging the warp threads.

The essence of both beating and stretching the warp is arranging the warp threads.

One who tightens—

he is included in weaving! For tightening is part of the labor of weaving.

Adjusting is part of the labor of weaving.

And this is not similar to winnowing, selecting, and sifting above [73b], which are counted as three primary labors, even though the essence of all three is improving food by separating the waste from it.

Because they are divided into three actions, performed in three stages and in three states of the food and the waste, one after the other.

Winnowing is performed first with straw, separating it from the kernels by means of the wind. Selecting is performed afterward with clumps of earth and stones mixed among the grain kernels, removing them with his hands from the mixture. And sifting is performed afterward, once the grain has been ground and become flour, sifting it in a sieve from the husks of the grain kernels.

See Rashi here; and the Ritva wrote, based on Rashi in the Mishna [73a], that the distinction is that winnowing is by means of the wind, selecting is by hand, and sifting is with a sieve.

Mishna:

And they stated another general principle:

Everything that is fit to be stored,

something fit to store and preserve because it serves a human need,

and people store the like of it,

which has a measure on account of which most people consider it significant and are accustomed to store it,

and he carried it out on Shabbat

from one domain to another unwittingly—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it,

even if a wealthy person carried it out, for whom the matter is not significant [and below the measures for all types of things will be explained].

And every

thing

that is not fit

significant

to store, and people do not store the like of it, and he carried it out on Shabbat—

he is not liable

for carrying it out

except the one who stores it. That person for whom the thing is dear and significant, to the point that he stores it, only he is liable if he carries it out. But another person who carries it out is not liable for it, for with regard to him it is not a labor.

Only that person, to whom the item is dear and significant enough that he stores it, is liable if he carries it out. But another person who carries it out is not liable for it, since for him it is not a labor.

Gemara:

And we explain:

“Everything that is fit to be stored,”

which it teaches—

to exclude what?

Rav Pappa said: To exclude menstrual blood,

which people do not store.

Mar Ukva said: To exclude the wood of an asheira,

the wood of a tree that was worshipped as idolatry.

And we explain:

The one who says menstrual blood, all the more so the wood of an asheira

which people do not store, since it is forbidden to derive benefit from it, repulsive, and one is obligated to destroy it from the world.

And

the one who says the wood of an asheira

holds that specifically the wood of an asheira is not stored.

But one stores menstrual blood for a cat

a cat, so that it will eat it.

And the other

holds:

Since it causes weakness,

causing weakness, for one who feeds human blood to a cat becomes weakened as a result, therefore

he does not store it.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: This

which is taught in the Mishna, that concerning an item that has a measure on account of which most people store it, everyone is liable for carrying it out, even a wealthy person who does not consider it significant because of its small measure—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

For if it were Rabbi Shimon, he said: [below, in the Mishna, 76b]

далее, в Мишне на странице 76б]

they stated all these measures

which are taught below, for which there is liability at those measures

only for those who store them,

only. That is, only ordinary people, who are accustomed to store at this measure, are liable for it. But a wealthy person, who is not accustomed to store it, is not liable for it except at a larger measure.

We learned in the Mishna:

And everything that is not fit to be stored.