Shabbat 75b (עה:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised an objection to Rav: Is it so that only

because of dyeing, there is no liability

but

because of taking a life there is no liability?

Yet surely taking a life is also a labor, just as they slaughtered the rams, the taḥashim, and the sky-blue snail.

And we resolve it:

Say

that this is what Rav said: One who slaughters is liable

also because of dyeing.

The practical difference is that if he slaughtered unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And according to this, what the Mishna counted slaughtering as a labor in its own right is also resolved, since it is not included in dyeing, which was performed with the wool in the construction of the Tabernacle.]

Rav said:

that one who slaughters is liable also because of dyeing—

let me add a point

and give a reason for it,

so that later generations will not come

and

mock

and ridicule

me.

For it would seem that there is reason to wonder about my statement that one who slaughters is liable because of dyeing:

Dyeing

through slaughtering—

what benefit does he derive from it?

What need does he have for dyeing the meat?

And I said: It is

satisfactory

to him

that it become colored,

that

the place of slaughter

become colored

with blood, so that people will see it,

and from the fresh red color they will know that the animal was slaughtered that day,

and they will come and buy

and purchase

from him.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who salts it and tans it.

And we raised a difficulty:

Is salting it not the same as tanning it?

For salting is also needed for tanning; why, then, were they counted as two primary labors?

And we resolve it:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both say: Remove

one

of them,

for indeed there is no need to count them as two,

and insert

in its place the labor of

marking,

which is marking the place where one wishes to write or cut in a straight line. This is what they did in the Tabernacle when cutting the hides.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: One who salts meat is liable because of tanning.

Rava said: There is no tanning with regard to food! But it is prohibited by rabbinic decree. Tosafot, s.v. Ein.]

Rav Ashi said: And even Rabba bar Rav Huna,

who holds one liable for salting meat,

said

this

only when he needs it

in a place where he needs salted meat

for the road,

when he is setting out on a journey and salts the meat heavily in order to preserve it; this is a form of tanning for which one is liable.

But

if he salts it

for

the purpose of

the house,

the ordinary salting of meat at home—

a person does not turn his food into wood!

A person does not salt the food he needs for his household’s consumption, rather than for preservation, until it becomes as hard as wood. Anything less than this is not tanning.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who scrapes it and cuts it.

Rabbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina said: One who scrapes between the pillars,

of a portico, which has openings between each pair of pillars, and smooths the bottom surface of the opening so that it will be smooth and comfortable to lean upon—

is liable because of scraping smooth.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: Rav Ashi told me three things in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

1.

One who scrapes,

rubs

the ends of stakes

to sharpen them, taking care that they all be of uniform size,

on Shabbat is liable because of cutting.

2.

One who spreads an ointment on a dressing on Shabbat,

smooths the ointment on the bandage—

is liable because of scraping smooth. This is seemingly the straightforward interpretation. However, in the words of the commentators and decisors we have not found an explicit reference to ointment; some of their formulations indicate that the subject is smoothing the dressing itself. This requires examination: what exactly is he smoothing, and how is he smoothing it.]

3.

One who chisels a stone on Shabbat,

smoothing it after it has been quarried—

is liable because of striking with a hammer,

for this is the completion of its labor.

Rabbi Shimon ben Kisama said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: One who carves

a design on a vessel

for decorative purposes [on a complete vessel intended for the addition of such a design],

and one who blows on glassware,

blowing with a bellows into hot molten glass and making a vessel from it—

is liable because of striking with a hammer.

Rabbi Yehuda said: One who removes protruding threads from garments,

removing from the fabric threads that protrude as a result of a knot made there, or removing straw and splinters that became embedded in the fabric during weaving—

is liable because of striking with a hammer.

And this applies

specifically

when he is particular about them,

not to leave them in the fabric.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who writes two letters.

The Sages taught: If one wrote one large letter, and in its place there is room

to

write two

ordinary letters—

he is exempt.

Since he did not write two letters as was done in the Tabernacle, where they wrote one letter on this board and the second on the adjacent board to indicate that it was its counterpart.

But if

he erased one large letter, and in its place there is room to write two—

he is liable!

For the significance of the labor of erasing lies in preparing a place for writing two letters, and here there is indeed room for two letters.

Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei, said: And this is a stringency of erasing over writing!

And it teaches us that the anonymous first tanna is Rabbi Menaḥem, son of Rabbi Yosei.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who builds, and one who demolishes; one who extinguishes, and one who kindles; and one who strikes with a hammer.

Rabba and Rabbi Zeira both say: Anything in which there is completion of a labor—

one is liable because of striking with a hammer.

We learned in the conclusion of the Mishna:

These are the primary labors.

And we explain: The fact that it teaches

“these”

excludes

the view of Rabbi Eliezer,

who holds one liable for a derivative in addition to a primary labor,

bringing two sin-offerings.

For we already said above [73b] that the number stated by our Mishna is to indicate how many sin-offerings one is liable to bring. The conclusion teaches us that if one performed these primary labors and also performed their derivatives, he does not bring separate sin-offerings for them; rather, he brings one offering that atones for the primary labor and all its derivatives. Rashi’s wording here and at the beginning of tractate Bava Kamma seemingly indicates that, according to the Rabbis, one who performs a primary labor and its derivatives brings an offering only for the primary labor, and not for its derivatives. But this is extremely puzzling, for a derivative is also a sin that makes one liable to bring an offering; it is simply capable of being atoned for together with the primary labor by means of the same offering.

However, examination of Rashi’s wording on 6b, s.v. Ḥayav, proves that Rashi means to say that the derivative does not independently require an offering when one performs it together with the primary labor in a single lapse of awareness. Certainly, however, it must be atoned for through an offering together with the primary labor.]

We learned in the Mishna: These are the primary labors,

thirty-nine.

And we explain why the tanna repeated the number of the labors after already stating it at the beginning:

To exclude the view of Rabbi Yehuda.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds the one who beats,

who strikes the warp threads with a rod to straighten them,

and

the

one who adjusts,

who strikes the overly taut weft threads so that they loosen and become properly integrated into the fabric.

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Yehuda:

Beating—

it is included in stretching the warp!

The essence of both beating and stretching the warp is arranging the warp threads.

Adjusting—

it is included in weaving!

Adjusting is part of the labor of weaving.

This is not comparable to winnowing, selecting, and sifting mentioned above [73b], which are counted as three primary labors even though the essence of all three is improving food by separating its refuse from it,

because they are different kinds of actions, performed in three stages, in three different states of the food and refuse, and one after the other.

At first, winnowing is performed with the straw, separating it from the kernels by means of the wind. Then selecting is performed with the clods of earth and stones mixed among the grain kernels, which he removes by hand from the mixture. Then sifting is performed after the grain has been ground into flour, sifting it through a sieve to remove the husks of the grain kernels.

See Rashi here. The Ritva wrote, based on Rashi’s commentary on the Mishna [73a], that the distinction is that winnowing is done by means of the wind, selecting by hand, and sifting with a sieve.

Mishna:

And they stated another general principle:

Anything fit to be stored,

something suitable to store and preserve because it serves a human need,

and people store its like,

meaning that it possesses a measure because of which most people consider it significant and are accustomed to store it,

and one carried it out on Shabbat

from one domain to another unwittingly—

he is liable to bring a sin-offering for it,

even if the person who carried it out was wealthy and did not consider the item significant [the measures for all types of objects will be explained below].

And any

thing

that is not fit

to be considered significant

to be stored, and people do not store its like, and one carried it out on Shabbat—

he is not liable

for carrying it out

unless he was the one who stored it.

Only that person, to whom the item is dear and significant enough that he stores it, is liable if he carries it out. But another person who carries it out is not liable for it, since for him it is not a labor.

Gemara:

And we explain:

Anything fit to be stored,

as it teaches—

to exclude what?

Rav Pappa said: To exclude menstrual blood,

which people do not store.

Mar Ukva said: To exclude wood from an Ashera,

the wood of a tree worshipped as an object of idolatry.

And we explain:

The one who says menstrual blood, all the more so wood from an Ashera,

which people do not store, since it is forbidden to derive benefit from and is repulsive, and one is required to destroy it from the world.

And

the one who says wood from an Ashera

holds that it is specifically wood from an Ashera that people do not store.

But one stores menstrual blood for a cat a cat], so that it will eat it.

And the other

holds:

Since it weakens,

meaning that it causes weakness, because feeding human blood to a cat causes it to become weak, therefore

he does not store it.

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: This

statement in the Mishna, that when an object possesses a measure that most people store because of its significance, everyone is liable for carrying it out, even a wealthy person who does not consider it significant because of its small measure—

is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

For if it were Rabbi Shimon, he said: below, in the Mishna on 76b]

They stated all these measures

that are taught below, for which one is liable

only with regard to those who store them

alone. That is, only ordinary people, who are accustomed to store an object in this measure, are liable for it. But a wealthy person, who is not accustomed to store it, is not liable for it unless he carries out a larger measure.

We learned in the Mishna:

And anything that is not fit to be stored.