Shabbat 75a (עה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rabba and Rabbi Zeira both say:

For in the case of a curtain in which a derana had fallen—

a worm had made a small hole in it—

one may tear it

above and below the hole so that folds will not form from the stitching,

and stitch it.

Rav Zutra bar Toviyya said that Rav said

three statements concerning three different matters:

Rav Zutra heard these three statements from Rav together, and therefore transmitted them in this manner, although there is no connection among them.

a.

One who stretches a sewing thread on Shabbat,

in a sewn garment in which the sewing thread has loosened and the two parts of the garment have become slightly separated, and he stretches the two ends of the thread in order to tighten the stitching,

is liable to bring a sin-offering,

since this is the normal manner of sewing the garment.

b.

And one who studies

even

one matter from a magosh,

a sectarian who is devoted to idolatry—even if he studies a matter of Torah from him—

is liable to death,

because he may be drawn by him toward idolatry.

c.

And one who knows how to calculate the seasons and the constellations,

who knows how to calculate, on the basis of the constellations, the seasons of the year—for example, whether the year will be rainy or hot—

but does not calculate

[i.e., does not make the calculations]—

it is prohibited to speak of him,

to praise him, as the Gemara will explain the reason below.

“Magoshta”

mentioned throughout the Talmud—who is he?

There is a dispute concerning it between

Rav and Shmuel.

One says: a sorcerer,

a magician.

And one says: a sectarian,

who is devoted to idolatry, constantly blasphemes the Name, and incites people to idolatry.

And we say:

It can be conclusively determined,

that

Rav

is the one

who says: a sectarian!

For Rav Zutra bar Toviyya said that Rav said: One who studies one matter from a magosh is liable to death.

For if it enters your mind

that a magosh is

a sorcerer,

a magician, why would it be prohibited to study sorcery from him? And

doesn’t the verse state

with regard to a sorcerer,

“You shall not learn to do”,

and we expound: It is specifically in order to perform sorcery that it is prohibited to study sorcery,

but you may study in order to understand

and to instruct,

so that if a false prophet comes and performs a sign or wonder, you will know that he is a sorcerer.

Rather, certainly

it can be conclusively determined

that according to Rav a magosh is a sectarian. Therefore, it is prohibited to study anything from him, since all his words are words of idolatry, and one must distance oneself from him so as not to be drawn by him toward idolatry.

Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said in the name of bar Kappara: Whoever knows how to calculate the seasons and the constellations but does not calculate them, concerning him the verse says: “They do not behold the work of the Lord, nor have they seen the work of His hands.”

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yonatan said: From where is it derived that it is a mitzva for a person to calculate the seasons and the constellations?

As it is stated: “You shall safeguard and perform them, for that is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations.”

Which

is

wisdom and understanding that is in the eyes of the nations?

You must say: This is the calculation of the seasons and the constellations!

For it is wisdom recognizable to all, which can be demonstrated: One says, on the basis of the calculation of the constellations, that this year will be rainy or hot, and the prediction comes true.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who traps a deer.

The Sages taught: One who traps a ḥilazon and wounds it,

squeezing its blood for the purpose of producing the blue or purple dye from it—

is liable for only one

transgression, on account of trapping.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable for two.

For Rabbi Yehuda would say: Wounding

is included in threshing,

since extracting blood from the fish is essentially similar to separating kernels from grain.

They said to him,

the Sages:

Wounding is not included in threshing!

Rava said: What is the reason of the Sages?

They hold: There is no threshing except with regard to produce of the ground!

And we raise an objection:

Why should he not also be liable on account of taking a life?

For he also kills the ḥilazon when he extracts its blood.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

What are we dealing with here?

He wounded it

after it had

died.

Rava said: You may even say that he wounded it while it was alive;

he is nevertheless not liable on account of taking a life, because

he is “engaged in an unintended act” with regard to taking a life

[the expression “engaged in an unintended act” is borrowed here, and its meaning in this context is that he does not intend to kill it; rather, he is engaged in extracting its blood, and it dies as a result].

And we challenge this:

But Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes

who says that an unintentional act is permitted,

in a case of “cutting off its head and it will not die”,

which is prohibited [for if one says: I will cut off the head of this animal on Shabbat and I do not want it to die, since it is impossible for it not to die, this is considered as though he intended it. Rashi, Sukkah 33b].

And here too, it is certainly the case that the ḥilazon will die, so there is no permission on the basis of “he does not intend it”?

[As stated, the expression “engaged in an unintended act” used by the Gemara here does not mean “engaged in an unintended act” in its usual sense, but rather “he does not intend it.”]

And we answer:

Here it is different,

as he does not intend to kill it,

for the more life there is in the ḥilazon

the better it is,

the more—

he prefers it!

It is preferable for him that the fish remain alive, and he takes care to prevent it from dying in his hands while he extracts its blood,

so that its dye will be improved.

The blood of a living ḥilazon is clearer than the blood of a dead one.

Therefore, even if the fish dies in his hand, he is not liable for taking a life, since he is “engaged in an unintended act” with regard to killing it: He wants and takes care that it should not die. And that Rabbi Shimon holds one liable in a case of “cutting off its head” applies specifically when he does not care whether the prohibited labor is performed, although he does not intend it. But here, he does not want the fish to die. [And see Ramban, who wrote that in every case of “cutting off its head” whose consequences are unfavorable to him, all agree that he is not liable for it.]

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who slaughters it.

And we raise an objection:

Slaughters—

on account of what is he liable?

Where was the labor of slaughtering present in the Tabernacle? For they did not specifically need to slaughter the red-dyed rams and the taḥashim in order to use their hides; rather, they could have strangled them.

And we answer:

Rav said: On account of dyeing,

as the flesh at the site of slaughtering becomes colored with the blood of slaughtering, and dyeing is a primary category of prohibited labor that was performed in the Tabernacle. [The Gemara will later explain Rav’s statement, since dyeing was already enumerated above among the labors performed with wool.]

And Shmuel said: On account of taking a life,

meaning that the labor of slaughtering mentioned in the Mishna does not specifically mean “slaughtering,” but rather the taking of life involved in it. This indeed took place in the Tabernacle, as they took the lives of the taḥashim and the red-dyed rams.