Shabbat 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

And we raised an objection:

the enumeration

by which the tanna enumerated the thirty-nine labors—

why do I need it?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yohanan said:

to teach you

that if he performed

all the labors of Shabbat

in a single lapse of awareness—

he is liable

a sin-offering

for each and every one.

This is so that we should not mistakenly think that, since the sin involved in performing each and every labor is “desecration of Shabbat,” it is like someone who repeatedly committed the same sin during a single lapse of awareness, in which case he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. Therefore, the tanna also taught us the enumeration of the labors in the Mishna, to teach us that each labor requires a separate offering.

And the tanna stated the number of the thirty-nine labors rather than simply saying that the labors are distinguished with regard to the offerings, as merely a mnemonic, so that one will know how many sin-offerings one who forgot all the laws of Shabbat is liable to bring [Rashi above, 69a. And above, on page 6b, Rashi added that according to Rabbi Yohanan, the tanna intended to teach through the enumeration of thirty-nine that it is impossible to be liable for more than this number of sin-offerings, because the other labors are derivatives of these primary categories and do not entail an additional offering].

We learned in the Mishna:

One who sows and one who plows.

And we raised an objection: Why did the tanna list sowing first?

Granted,

it is true that he

begins with what Rabbi begins with:

one plows first, and only afterward sows. If so,

let him teach

the labor of

plowing

first,

and afterward

let him teach the labor of

sowing?

And we answer:

The tanna

of the Mishna

is speaking of the Land of Israel,

whose soil is harder than that of Babylonia.

They sowed first,

as they sow first,

and afterward plowed.

For in addition to the initial plowing before sowing, they plow again after sowing. Since the soil of the Land of Israel is hard, it is impossible to cover the seeds without additional plowing, which turns the seeds into the soil.

And the tanna came to teach us that this second plowing as well falls within the labor of plowing and is not considered the labor of sowing. He listed it after sowing, because this is the manner of the second plowing: It is performed after sowing.

The tanna taught: One who sows, and one who prunes,

cutting branches of a tree so that the tree will grow and develop better,

and one who plants, and one who layers,

bending the tip of a branch and covering it with earth, whereupon the branch takes root in the earth and produces another plant from it,

and one who grafts

a branch of one tree onto another tree—

all of them are one labor.

The essential nature of all these labors is to bring about growth.

And we raised an objection:

What does this teach us?

What difference is there whether they are one labor or whether each one is a labor in its own right?

And we answer:

This teaches us

that if he performed them during a single lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. And as we learned at the beginning of our chapter:

One who performs many labors

that are all

of the nature of one labor—

is liable to bring only one.

Rav Aḥa said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rabbi Ami said: One who prunes—

is liable on account of planting,

as it is a derivative of the labor of planting.

And one who plants

himself,

and

likewise

one who layers, and

likewise

one who grafts—

is liable on account of sowing!

That is, planting, layering, and grafting themselves are considered “of the nature of primary categories,” like the primary category of sowing. Sowing is a primary category with regard to seeds, whereas these are primary categories with regard to trees.

And we raised an objection: Is it so that layering and grafting are liable only

on account of sowing, but not

because of any other category—that

on account of planting they are not

liable?! Surely they are more similar to planting, and it should have been said that they are primary categories like planting.

And we answer:

Say: They are liable even on account of sowing!

As stated, they are primary categories with regard to trees, analogous to sowing, for this is the equivalent of sowing with regard to trees.

And Rabbi Ami came to teach us that not only when he performed them together with planting, but even when he performed them together with sowing, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering.

And the novel point is that layering and grafting are not considered derivatives of a derivative of sowing, for which one would be liable separately; rather, they are of the nature of a primary category of sowing.

According to the Ritva and the Ran [in Rashi’s view], Rabbi Ami introduced a very substantial novel point.

Since pruning is a derivative of planting, whereas planting is considered of the nature of a primary category of sowing—for sowing is a primary category with regard to seeds, and planting is a primary category with regard to trees—therefore, only if one performs the labor of sowing, the labor of planting, and the labor of pruning together is he liable to bring only one sin-offering. Since the labor of planting, which lies between sowing and pruning, joins all three of them into one atonement.

But if he performs only the labor of sowing, without performing the labor of planting, and also performs the labor of pruning, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. For the offering brought for sowing cannot atone for pruning, since pruning is not its derivative.

It follows that an increase in the number of labors [when he performs all three and does not perform only two, sowing and pruning] reduces the number of sin-offerings.

Rav Kahana said:

The

one who prunes and needs the wood,

who, in addition to intending to improve the tree, needs the tree branches for fuel—

is liable to bring two,

two sin-offerings:

one on account of cutting, and one on account of pruning,

which is a derivative of planting. But if he does not need the branches, he does not transgress the prohibition of cutting with regard to them.

Rav Yosef said: One who cuts alfalfa,

cuts grass, which is customarily cut three times a month, and grows anew after each cutting—

is liable to bring two:

one on account of cutting,

for he cuts it for use as animal fodder,

and one on account of planting,

because through cutting it he causes it to grow anew.

Abaye said: One who cuts silka,

pulls up spinach—

is liable to bring two.

One on account of cutting, and one on account of sowing,

because it grows again.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who plows.

The tanna taught: One who plows, one who digs, and one who makes a furrow,

making a furrow in the ground—

all of them are one labor,

for their function is to soften the soil [and all of them are “of the nature of the primary category” of plowing; Rambam, chapter 7, halakha 2], and he is liable to bring only one offering for them.

Rav Sheshet said: If one had a mound,

a small heap of earth,

and removed it:

If this was

in a house—he is

liable on account of building,

as he leveled and improved the surface of the ground.

But if he did this

in a field—he is

liable on account of plowing,

as he thereby prepared the soil for sowing by softening it.

Rava said: If one had a pit and filled it in,

sealing it with earth:

In a house—he is

liable on account of building,

as he repaired the floor of his house.

In a field—he is

liable on account of plowing,

because the earth with which he filled the pit is soft and suitable for sowing, and by leveling the spot with the rest of the field, he makes it suitable for sowing there.

Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a pit

in a house

on Shabbat, and does not need

the pit itself,

but rather

his need is

for its earth,

to use the earth to cover excrement—

is exempt for it.

And even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose,

and there would have been room to hold him liable on account of building even though he is not doing it for the purpose of repairing the house, here he is exempt.

For

that principle applies

when Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable even if he is not performing the labor for its own purpose, in a case where

he improves

through his labor.

But

this one,

who digs a pit in a house and does not need the pit—

is causing damage

to the house, and there is no labor of building here at all.

Rabbi Abba did not come to teach us that Rabbi Yehuda exempts one who causes damage, because it is an anonymous Mishna that all those who cause damage are exempt. Furthermore, why would it have been necessary to teach us this specifically in a case where he performs a labor not needed for its own purpose?

Rather, it appears that Rabbi Abba came to teach us that although making a pit in a house is not intrinsically defined as an act of damage—for if he needs the pit, it is considered a repair of the house, and he is liable for it on account of building—nevertheless, here, since he does not need this repair in the house, but it is damage from his perspective, we take into account the damage as it affects him and exempt him.

And the novel point applies even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says that one is liable for a labor whose purpose he does not need. For according to him, there would have been room to regard the repair made in the house as the labor of building, despite the fact that the person making the pit does not need this repair, since it is in fact a repair of the house. Nevertheless, he is considered one who causes damage, because whether the act is defined as repairing the house or damaging it depends on the benefit of the owner of the house, and not on the act of repair in itself.

And it is possible that for this reason Rashi stated that the case concerns one who digs in a house and not in a field. For in a field it would be considered an improvement through plowing even if he himself does not desire this improvement, since every act of digging a pit in a field is defined as plowing, which prepares the ground for sowing, even if from the perspective of the owner of the field it is damage.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who harvests.

The tanna taught: One who harvests

grain,

one who gathers grapes,

grapes,

one who gathers dates,

pulling off dates,

one who gathers olives,

pulling off olives,

and one who gathers figs,

pulling off figs—

all of them are one labor [and all are primary categories; Rambam, chapter 7, halakha 4].

and all are primary categories; Rambam, chapter 7, halakha 4].

Rav Pappa said: One who throws a clod at a date palm,

throwing a clod of earth at a date palm, so that the clod strikes the cluster of dates hanging from the palm,

and

as a result of its striking the cluster of dates,

it causes

them to fall from it,

dates—he

is

liable to bring two

sin-offerings:

one on account of detaching,

which is a derivative of harvesting,

and one on account of threshing,

which is a derivative of threshing.

For just as in threshing, the thresher separates the kernels of grain from the ears, so too this person, who strikes the cluster of dates by throwing a clod of earth, separates the dates from the cluster in which they are found.

Rav Ashi said: This is not the usual manner of detaching, and this is not the usual manner of separating!

The usual manner is to pick the dates by hand or with an implement, and not by throwing a clod of earth at them. A labor performed in an unusual manner, that is, through a deviation from the ordinary method, does not entail liability.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who gathers.

Rava said: One who gathers salt

from the saltworks,

gathering salt from the saltworks [where seawater collects and evaporates, leaving the salt]—

is liable on account of gathering,

as this resembles gathering the ears of grain in the field.

Abaye said: Gathering applies only to produce of the ground,

and salt is not produce of the ground.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who threshes.

The tanna taught: One who threshes, and one who beats,

separating flax from its stalks,

and one who beats out

performing a similar action with cotton—

all of them are one labor.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who winnows, one who selects, one who grinds, and one who sifts.

And we raised an objection:

Winnowing is the same as selecting, and selecting is the same as

sifting,

for seemingly all of them are one labor, whose essential nature is to separate the waste from the food. If so, why were they enumerated as three separate primary categories of labor?