Shabbat 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

Rava concludes from this as proof that if one intended to cut something detached but cut something attached, he is exempt:

Rather, is it not

the phrase “the other mitzvot” in the beginning and at the end does not refer to the same matter. For

the beginning,

the statement that “Shabbat is more stringent than the other mitzvot” refers to

an idolater,

as we established above: one who slaughtered an animal, poured wine, or offered incense for idolatry.

And the end,

the statement that “the other mitzvot are more stringent than Shabbat” refers to

the other mitzvot,

and not to idolatry.

And we explain the end of the baraita:

And “he erred without intending” with regard to the other mitzvot

for which he is liable—

what are the circumstances?

For example, there was a piece of forbidden fat before him,

as he thought that

the fat before him

was permitted fat, and he ate it

and it is called “without intending” because he did not intend to eat forbidden fat].

This is not so with regard to Shabbat, for which he is exempt

if a similar situation occurred. For example,

if he intended to cut something detached but cut something attached,

which is

exempt—

because this is mitasek.

But with regard to eating forbidden fat, he is liable even when he is mitasek, as we hold: “One who is occupied with forbidden fats or forbidden sexual relations is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he derives benefit”

.

It is thus explained in the baraita in accordance with Rava’s statement, that if one intended to cut something detached but cut something attached, he is exempt.

And

Abaye

would say to you:

“He erred without intending”

with regard to the other mitzvot is not as we established it—that he thought forbidden fat was permitted fat and therefore ate it. Rather,

what are the circumstances?

In a case where congealed forbidden fat was before him,

and he thought it was spittle, and did not know at all that it was food,

and swallowed it,

so it turns out that he did not intend to eat at all, since spittle is not fit for eating; only the term “swallowing” applies to it, as it is written in Job: “Until I swallow my spittle.”

Similarly, the statement that the baraita teaches,

“This is not so with regard to Shabbat, for which he is exempt,”

means

that he intended to lift something detached but cut something attached,

for only then is he

exempt

because he was mitasek, as he had no intention whatsoever of cutting.

But if he intended to cut something detached but cut something attached—

he is liable,

since this is not included in the category of mitasek.”

It was stated: If one intended to throw

an object in the public domain

two

cubits

but threw it four

cubits:

Rava said: He is exempt.

Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said that he is exempt

because

he did not intend to throw it four

cubits, but intended to throw it two, which is not a prohibited labor; thus he is mitasek, since he was occupied with a permitted act and a prohibited act resulted from it.

Abaye said that he is liable

because

he did intend,

at any rate,

to throw it in general,

and therefore this is not mitasek but an unwitting transgression.

And it was also stated: A person threw an object four cubits in the public domain by mistake, because he was

under the impression

that he was throwing the object permissibly in the

private domain, but it turned out

that it was the

public domain:

Rava said: He is exempt.

And Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said that he is exempt

because

he did not intend to throw it in a prohibited manner.

And Abaye said that he is liable

because

he did intend to throw it in general.

And we say:

It is necessary

for Abaye and Rava to teach us their dispute in all three cases, despite their similarity to one another.

For had he taught us

only their dispute in the

first

case, in which he intended to cut something detached but cut something attached, I might have said that only

in that case Rava said

that it is mitasek,

because he did not intend

at all

to perform the prohibited cutting,

and his intention to cut something detached was not realized.

But if he intended to throw it two and threw it four, since four

cubits

cannot be thrown without the two, as every throwing of four cubits also includes throwing two cubits, his intention to throw two was in fact realized; he merely did more than he initially intended to do.

I might say that he agrees with Abaye

that it is not included in mitasek. Therefore, it is necessary to teach us that Rava also disputes this case.

And had he taught us this case,

in which he intended to throw two and threw four, I might have said that only

in this case Rava said

that it is mitasek,

because he did not intend to throw it four,

and throwing less than four does not have the status of “throwing” with regard to the prohibition.

But when he was under the impression

that it was the

private domain and it turned out to be the

public domain, since he intended to throw it four,

which is a complete act of throwing, but thought that it was a permitted throwing,

I might say that he agrees with Abaye

that it is not mitasek. Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us that Rava and Abaye dispute even in such a case.

And we raise an objection to Rava:

We learned in the Mishna: The primary categories of labor—

there are forty less one.

And we considered: Why do I need the enumeration?

And Rabbi Yohanan said: That

even

if one performed them all in a single lapse of awareness, he is

liable

to bring a sin-offering

for each one individually.

As was explained in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, it is only when one was aware of the sanctity of Shabbat but unaware of the individual labors that he is liable for each one individually.

This works well according to Abaye, who says that in a case such as this,

in which he intended to throw two cubits, which is half the measure of the labor, but threw four, he is

liable

for a sin-offering—

you can find a case

in which he errs regarding all the labors of Shabbat and still has awareness of the sanctity of Shabbat. For example,

he knew that Shabbat was prohibited,

that the day was Shabbat,

and he knew the prohibition of the labors,

but

he was mistaken about the measures,

intending to perform less than the minimum measure of a labor but performing the minimum measure. And so it would be with each and every labor [for a measure for which one is liable is stated with regard to all the labors].

But according to Rava, who says

that if one intended to perform less than the minimum measure [for example, if he intended to throw two cubits], he is

exempt

from a sin-offering because he is mitasek, it necessarily follows that the unwittingness that makes him liable for a sin-offering consists of his thinking that the labor itself is permitted.

If so, this is difficult:

how can you find

liability for a sin-offering for each and every labor

when one was aware of the sanctity of Shabbat but unaware of the individual labors?

For since he thinks that all the labors are permitted, how is Shabbat distinguished for him from a weekday, so that he can be called one who was “aware of the sanctity of Shabbat”?

This works well if he holds

Rava

in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, who says that once one was unaware of the

punishment of

karet, although he was aware of the prohibition,

meaning that he knew of the prohibition but nevertheless is considered unwitting with regard to liability for a sin-offering, because his lack of awareness of the severity of the punishment causes him to be considered unwitting—

you can find

awareness of the sanctity of Shabbat and unawareness of all the labors in a case where

he knew of Shabbat as a prohibition,

that there is a prohibition of the negative commandment with regard to all the labors, but he was mistaken in thinking that they are not punishable by karet.

But if he holds

Rava

in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says

that one is not liable for a sin-offering

until he is unaware both of the negative commandment and of karet, it is difficult:

he knew of Shabbat—

in what sense?

And we answer:

He knew of it through the prohibition of

the

Shabbat boundaries,

that he knew of the prohibition against going beyond the Shabbat boundary, but he did not know any of the thirty-nine labors [and the prohibition against going beyond the boundary is not included among the labors],

and this is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that the prohibition of the Shabbat boundaries is from the Torah.

Mishna:

The primary categories of labor are forty less one.

And these are:

1. One who sows.

2.

And one who plows.

3.

And one who reaps.

4.

And one who gathers,

one who collects cut stalks or other detached produce of the ground [in the place where it grows] and makes a pile of them.

5.

And one who threshes,

one who beats the stalks to extract their kernels.

6.

And one who winnows,

one who tosses the mixture of chaff and grain kernels into the air after threshing, in order to separate the straw from the kernels by means of the wind.

7.

One who selects

waste from food by hand.

8.

One who grinds.

9.

And one who sifts,

sifting flour in a sieve.

10.

And one who kneads ...

11.

And one who bakes.

It was explained above, on 49b, that from the juxtaposition of the passage concerning Shabbat to the passage concerning the labor of the Tabernacle, we learn that all the labors performed in the Tabernacle are “primary categories of labor” prohibited on Shabbat.

The labors listed thus far were used in the Tabernacle for preparing the ingredients for dyeing, with the blue, purple, and crimson dyes, from sowing them until boiling them.

12.

One who shears wool

from the hide.

13.

One who whitens it,

washing it.

14.

And one who combs it,

combing the wool or beating it in order to separate it and prepare it for spinning.

15.

And one who dyes it.

16.

And one who spins,

making threads from wool.

These labors were performed with the wool prepared for the work of the Tabernacle.

17.

And one who sets the warp,

stretching the warp threads in order to prepare them for weaving.

18.

And one who makes two heddles,

making two rings or two loops through which to pass the warp threads.

19.

And one who weaves two threads,

passing the weft thread twice between the warp threads and thereby creating two rows of fabric.

20.

And one who cuts

and severs

two threads,

as the threads are sometimes too long and he cuts them for the sake of weaving.

These labors were used in preparing the curtains of the Tabernacle.

21.

One who ties.

22.

And one who unties.

These two labors were performed in the Tabernacle in setting up the nets used to trap the ḥillazon, from which the blue dye was made.

23.

And one who sews two stitches.

24.

One who tears in order to sew two stitches,

as sometimes there is a round hole in a fabric, and it cannot be sewn unless one first tears slightly around it and then sews it with a straight stitch.

These two labors were performed with the curtains of the Tabernacle.

25.

One who traps a deer,

and the same applies to other living creatures.

26.

One who slaughters it.

27.

And one who skins it

from its hide.

28.

One who salts it,

salting the hide, which is the beginning of its tanning.

29.

And one who tans its hide.

30.

And one who scrapes it,

scraping the hair from the hide.

31.

And one who cuts it

into strips.

These labors were used in preparing the hide of the taḥash.

32.

One who writes two letters.

33.

And one who erases

writing

in order to write

in its place

two letters.

They wrote letters on the boards of the Tabernacle in order to mark the partner of each board. Sometimes they erred in the notation and erased it in order to write the correct letter.

34.

One who builds.

35.

And one who demolishes

the structure.

They erected and dismantled the Tabernacle.

36.

One who extinguishes.

37.

And one who kindles.

They kindled a fire beneath the pot in which the dye ingredients were boiled, and extinguished it.

38.

One who strikes with a hammer

for the purpose of completing a labor, as a craftsman strikes a vessel with a hammer at the completion of its manufacture in order to smooth it and finish its repair.

39.

One who carries out from one domain to another.

These, then, are the primary categories of labor, forty minus one.