Shabbat 73a — the Talmud in English

And Rava concludes for his proof that if one intended to cut what was detached, but cut what was attached, he is exempt:

Rather, is it not that “the other mitzvot” in the opening clause and in the concluding clause do not deal with the same matter. For

the phrase “the other mitzvot” in the beginning and at the end does not refer to the same matter. For

the opening clause of “the stringency of Shabbat over the other mitzvot” means

the statement that “Shabbat is more stringent than the other mitzvot” refers to

with regard to an idolater, and as we established it above: slaughtering, pouring a libation, and burning incense for idolatry.

as we established above: one who slaughtered an animal, poured wine, or offered incense for idolatry.

And the concluding clause of “the stringency of the other mitzvot over Shabbat” means

the statement that “the other mitzvot are more stringent than Shabbat” refers to

with regard to the other mitzvot, and not with regard to idolatry.

and not to idolatry.

And we explain the concluding clause:

And “he was unwitting without intending” with regard to the other mitzvot,

that he is liable—

what are the circumstances?

For example, there was before him a piece of forbidden fat,

for he thought that

the forbidden fat before him

was permitted fat, and he ate it [and it is called “without intending,” since he did not intend to eat forbidden fat].

and it is called “without intending” because he did not intend to eat forbidden fat].

This is not so with regard to Shabbat, for he is exempt

if a similar circumstance occurred. For example,

he intended to cut what was detached, but cut what was attached,

which is

exempt—

because he is a mitasek.

But with eating forbidden fat he is liable even as a mitasek, for we hold: “One who is occupied with forbidden fats and forbidden sexual relations is liable to bring a sin-offering, since he derives benefit” .

It is thus explained in the beraita in accordance with Rava’s words: if he intended to cut what was detached but cut what was attached, he is exempt.

And it is impossible to establish that the exemption with regard to Shabbat is specifically when he intended to lift what was detached but cut what was attached. For concerning the other mitzvot we established that he intended to eat permitted fat, which is an action similar to eating forbidden fat, except that it is permitted eating. Necessarily, then, with regard to Shabbat too it deals with this: even when he intended to cut, he is a mitasek, since he did not intend to perform a prohibited cutting.

And Abaye

can say to you:

“He was unwitting without intending”

with regard to the other mitzvot is not as we established it—that he thought forbidden fat was permitted fat and therefore ate it. Rather,

what are the circumstances?

In a case where there was before him melted forbidden fat,

and he thought it was saliva,

and he did not know at all that it was a food,

and he swallowed it,

and it emerges that he did not intend at all to eat, for saliva is not fit for eating, and only the term “swallowing” applies to it, as it is written in Job: “until I swallow my saliva.”

And similarly, that which it teaches:

“This is not so with regard to Shabbat, for he is exempt”

means

that he intended to lift what was detached but cut what was attached,

for only then is he

exempt

because of mitasek, since he did not intend to cut at all.

But if he intended to cut what was detached and cut what was attached—

he is liable,

since he is not included in the category of “mitasek.”

It was stated: If he intended to throw

an object in the public domain

two

cubits,

but threw four

cubits:

Rava said: He is exempt.

Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said: He is exempt,

since

he did not intend to throw four

cubits, but to throw two, which is not a prohibited labor, and he is a mitasek, for he was occupied with a permitted matter and a prohibition came about through him.

Abaye said: He is liable,

since

he did intend

in any event

to throw, and therefore this is not mitasek but unwitting action.

and therefore this is not mitasek but an unwitting transgression.

And it was further stated: A person threw an object four cubits in the public domain by mistake, because he was

thinking

that he was throwing the object permissibly in the

private domain, but it turned out

that it was

the public domain:

Rava said: He is exempt.

And Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said: He is exempt,

since

he did not intend to perform a prohibited throwing.

And Abaye said: He is liable,

since

he did intend to throw in general.

And we say:

And it is necessary

for Abaye and Rava to inform us of their dispute in all three cases, although they resemble one another.

For if he had taught us

only their dispute

in the first case,

concerning one who intended to cut what was detached but cut what was attached, I would have said that specifically

in that case Rava says

that he is a mitasek,

for he did not intend

at all

to perform a prohibited cutting,

and his intention to cut what was detached was not accomplished.

But if he intended to throw two and threw four, for four

cubits

cannot be thrown without the two, since every throwing of four cubits also includes a throwing of two cubits, then his intention, which was to throw two, was accomplished, except that he did more than he initially intended to do.

I might say that he agrees with Abaye

I might say that he agrees with Abaye

that he is not included in the category of mitasek; therefore it is necessary to inform us that Rava disputes even in this case.

And if he had taught us this case

that he intended to throw two and threw four, I would have said that specifically

in this case Rava says

that he is a mitasek,

for he did not intend to throw four,

and less than four does not have the designation “throwing” applied to it.

But if he was thinking

that it was

the private domain, but it turned out to be the public domain, for he intended to throw four, for this is a complete act of throwing, except that he thought it was a permitted throwing,

which is a complete act of throwing, but thought that it was a permitted throwing,

I might say that he agrees with Abaye

that he is not a mitasek. Therefore,

it is necessary

to inform us that Rava and Abaye also dispute in such a case.

And we raise an objection to Rava:

We learned: The primary categories of labor—

they are forty less one.

And we ask concerning it: Why do I need the number?

And Rabbi Yohanan said: That

even

if he performed all of them in one lapse of awareness—

he is liable

for a sin-offering

for each and every one.

And as was explained in the Mishna at the beginning of our chapter, it is only when he knowingly knows of Shabbat but is unwitting concerning the labors that he is liable for each and every one.

Granted, according to Abaye, who says that in such a case

that he intended to throw two, which is half the measure of the labor, and threw four,

he is liable

for a sin-offering—

you can find

that he is unwitting concerning all the labors of Shabbat and nevertheless remains included in knowingly knowing of Shabbat. For example,

he knew of the prohibition of Shabbat,

that today is Shabbat,

and he knew of the prohibition of the labors, except that

but

he erred concerning the measures, intending to perform less than the measure of a labor but performing the measure. And so with every labor [for a measure for which one is liable was stated with regard to all the labors].

intending to perform less than the minimum measure of a labor but performing the minimum measure. And so it would be with each and every labor [for a measure for which one is liable is stated with regard to all the labors].

But according to Rava, who says

that if he intended to perform less than the measure [for example, when he intended to throw two cubits]

he is exempt

from a sin-offering because he is a mitasek, necessarily his unwitting action that makes him liable for a sin-offering is that he thinks the labor itself is permitted.

If so, this is difficult:

how can you find

liability for a sin-offering for each and every labor

when he knowingly knows of Shabbat but is unwitting concerning the labors?

For since he thinks that all the labors are permitted, in what way is the day of Shabbat distinguished for him from an ordinary weekday, so that it can be called “knowingly knowing of Shabbat”?

This works if Rava holds

Rava

like Rabbi Yohanan, who says: Since he was unwitting concerning the

punishment of

excision, although he knowingly violated the negative commandment,

for he knows of the prohibition, nevertheless he is considered unwitting for liability to a sin-offering, since lack of knowledge of the severity of the punishment renders him “unwitting”—

you can find

knowingly knowing of Shabbat together with being unwitting concerning all the labors in a case where

he knew Shabbat through the negative commandment,

for he knew that there is a negative-commandment prohibition with regard to all the labors, but was unwitting in thinking that there is no punishment of excision for them.

But if Rava holds

Rava

like Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who says

he is not liable for a sin-offering

until he is unwitting concerning both the negative commandment and excision,

this is difficult:

that he knew Shabbat—

through what?

And we answer:

that he knew it through the

prohibition of

Shabbat boundaries,

for he knew of the prohibition against going outside the boundary on Shabbat, but he did not know any of the thirty-nine labors [and the prohibition against going outside the boundary is not included among the labors],

and this is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that the prohibition of boundaries is from the Torah.

Mishna:

The primary categories of labor are forty less one.

And these are they:

a.

One who sows.

b.

And one who plows.

c.

And one who harvests.

d.

And one who gathers,

who gathers sheaves that were harvested, or other detached produce of the ground [in the place where they grew], and makes a pile from them.

e.

And one who threshes,

who beats the sheaves to remove the kernels from them.

f.

And one who winnows,

who throws into the air the mixture of chaff and grain kernels after threshing, in order to separate the straw from the kernels by means of the wind.

g.

And one who sorts

waste from food with his hand.

h.

And one who grinds.

i.

And one who sifts,

who sifts flour in a sieve.

j.

And one who kneads ...

k.

And one who bakes.

It was explained above, folio 49b, that from the fact that the section of Shabbat was juxtaposed to the section of the labor of the Tabernacle, we learn that all the labors that were performed in the Tabernacle are “primary categories of labor” prohibited on Shabbat.

The labors listed thus far were used in the Tabernacle for preparing the dyes, with the blue, purple, and crimson colors, from their sowing until their cooking.

12.

One who shears the wool

from the hide.

13.

And one who whitens it,

who washes it.

14.

And one who combs it,

who combs the wool or beats it in order to separate it and prepare it for spinning.

15.

And one who dyes it.

16.

And one who spins,

who makes threads from wool.

These labors were performed with the wool that they made for the labor of the Tabernacle.

17.

And one who sets up the warp,

who stretches the warp threads in order to prepare them for weaving.

18.

And one who makes two heddle-loops,

who makes two rings or two loops for passing the warp threads through.

19.

And one who weaves two threads,

who passes the weft thread twice between the warp threads, thereby creating two rows of woven fabric.

20.

And one who tears

disconnecting

two threads,

for sometimes the threads are too long and he disconnects them for the purpose of weaving.

These labors were used in preparing the curtains of the Tabernacle.

21.

One who ties.

22.

And one who unties.

These two labors were performed in the Tabernacle in setting up the nets for trapping the chilazon, from which the blue dye is made.

23.

And one who sews two stitches.

24.

And one who tears in order to sew two stitches,

for sometimes there is a round hole in a woven fabric, and it is impossible to sew it except by tearing around it slightly and then sewing it again with a straight stitch.

These two labors were performed in the curtains of the Tabernacle.

25.

One who traps a deer,

and the same applies to other living creatures.

26.

And one who slaughters it.

27.

And one who skins it

from its hide.

28.

One who salts it,

who salts the hide, which is the beginning of its tanning.

29.

And one who tans its hide.

30.

And one who scrapes it,

who scrapes the hair from the hide.

31.

And one who cuts it

into strips.

These labors were used in preparing the hide of the tachash.

32.

One who writes two letters.

33.

And one who erases

the writing

in order to write

in its place

two letters.

They wrote letters on the boards in the Tabernacle in order to mark the mate of each board, and sometimes they erred in the writing and erased it in order to write the correct letter.

34.

One who builds.

35.

And one who demolishes

the building.

They erected and dismantled the Tabernacle.

36.

One who extinguishes

37.

And one who kindles

They kindled a fire beneath the cauldron of the dyes and extinguished it.

38.

One who strikes with a hammer

for the completion of a labor, as a craftsman strikes with a hammer upon a utensil at the completion of its making, in order to smooth it and complete its repair.

39.

One who carries out from one domain to another.

These are the primary categories of labor, forty less one.