Shabbat 72b (עב:) — the Talmud in English

It was stated

He intended to lift the

vegetable

that had been detached

which had fallen into a vegetable bed, but he erred,

and cut the attached plant—

he is exempt.

This is because he is a case of “one who is engaged in another activity” (mitasek), and not one who acted unwittingly. One who is engaged in another activity is exempt from a sin-offering, as we derive from the phrase written concerning a sin-offering: “that he sinned in it,” which indicates that he is liable only if he intended the very act in which he sinned, but acted unwittingly—for example, he thought that today was an ordinary weekday or that this labor was permitted. Only then is he liable to a sin-offering. But if he was engaged in another matter and mistakenly performed this act, he is exempt from a sin-offering.

There is an additional condition for defining an act as one performed by a person engaged in another activity: with regard to the matter he intended to do, he must not have intended to perform a prohibited labor.

Here, everyone agrees that this is a case of one engaged in another activity, since he did not intend at all to perform an act of cutting, but only to lift the vegetable.

But if he intended

to cut the detached item, but cut the attached item—

Rava and Abaye disagree about this.

Rava said: He is exempt.

Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said that he is exempt,

because this too is included in the category of one engaged in another activity.

For he did not intend to perform the prohibited cutting

of an attached item [whether because he was unaware that it was Shabbat or because he was unaware that the labor was prohibited]; rather, he intended to cut a detached item, which is a permitted act.

Abaye said that he is liable: For he did intend

nevertheless

to perform cutting in general,

and this is not a case of one engaged in another activity, but of one who acted unwittingly.

Rava said: From where do I say

that even if he intended to cut, he is considered one engaged in another activity?

As it was taught:

There is

a stringency with regard to Shabbat

that is greater

than with regard to other mitzvot.

And

conversely, there is

a stringency with regard to other mitzvot

that is greater

than with regard to

Shabbat

.

And the baraita explains:

The stringency of Shabbat over other mitzvot—

with regard to Shabbat,

if he

performed

in it

two [

and the Gemara will explain whether this means two different labors or whether he repeated one labor twice]

while unaware of both acts, he is liable

to bring a sin-offering

for each and every one.

Unlike the case with other mitzvot.

And the stringency of other mitzvot over Shabbat—

with regard to other mitzvot,

if

he acted unwittingly without intending, he is liable

to bring a sin-offering,

unlike the case with Shabbat.

The Gemara immediately interprets the baraita.

The Master said

in the baraita:

“The stringency of Shabbat over other mitzvot is that, with regard to Shabbat, if he performed two labors while unaware of both acts, he is liable for each and every one, unlike the case with other mitzvot.”

We raise a difficulty:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

that “two while unaware of both acts” with regard to Shabbat means

that he performed reaping and grinding,

which are two primary categories of labor, and therefore he is liable to bring two offerings, if so,

correspondingly,

similarly,

with regard to other mitzvot,

this would mean

that he ate forbidden fat and blood,

which are two distinct bodies of prohibition, analogous to reaping and grinding.

This cannot be said, because there is no difference between them.

For also

here,

with regard to Shabbat,

two

sin-offerings

he is liable to bring, and

also

here,

with regard to forbidden fat and blood, as well,

two he is liable to bring,

even if he ate them while unaware of both acts!

Rather, if you would say that with regard to

other mitzvot,

where he is liable to bring only one

even when he performed two acts,

what are the circumstances—

for example,

he ate

an olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

and then

he

ate another olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

while unaware of both acts.

Correspondingly, with regard to Shabbat,

this would mean

that he performed reaping and reaping,

having reaped two dried figs while unaware of both acts.

The difficulty still remains, since

here he is liable to bring one, and here

he is liable to bring one!

For with regard to Shabbat too, he is not liable to bring two offerings for the same labor that he repeated twice while unaware of both acts!

And we answer:

Actually, with regard to Shabbat this means

that

he performed reaping and grinding.

And what is the meaning of “unlike the case with other mitzvot”

It refers to idol worship,

and is stated

in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ami.

For Rav Ami said: If one slaughtered

an animal for idol worship, and also

burned incense,

and

poured a libation

to an idol

while unaware of the various acts,

meaning that he was unaware of the law prohibiting the worship of idols—

he is liable to bring only one offering.

These acts of idol worship are analogous to reaping and grinding with regard to Shabbat, since they are different acts; nevertheless, he is not liable to bring a separate sin-offering for each act. This is the meaning of the baraita, that “other mitzvot” differ from Shabbat.

And we object:

In what way did you establish

this statement concerning “other mitzvot”—

as referring to idol worship.

If so,

say the latter clause,

as it teaches:

“The stringency of other mitzvot is that, with regard to other mitzvot, one who acted unwittingly without intending is liable,”

unlike the case with Shabbat.

This statement, “one who acted unwittingly without intending,” with regard to idol worship [

which is called “other mitzvot”]—

what are the circumstances

in which he would be liable at all for a sin-offering for unwitting idol worship?

If you say that he thought

that the object of idol worship was not an idol but

a synagogue, and he bowed to it.

The tanna’s statement in the baraita, “one who acted unwittingly without intending,” would mean that he erred in not knowing that it was an idol, and therefore did not intend at all to bow to or worship an idol.

If so, the difficulty arises: Why would he be liable to bring a sin-offering at all for such bowing?

For

his heart was directed—

to Heaven!

He did not worship an idol at all, even unwittingly!

For even if he had known that it was an idol, he would not have performed a prohibited act by bowing to it, since his intention was not to worship it, but to bow through this act of bowing for the sake of Heaven!?

Rather, if he saw a statue,

a statue in the form of a king, which had not been erected for the purpose of idol worship, but which people bowed to in honor of the king,

and bowed [

bowed down]

to it.

But the difficulty still remains, since either way—

If he accepted it

the statue

as a deity,

then he himself made the statue into an idol, and if so

he acted intentionally

when he bowed to it as an idol, and he does not bring a sin-offering, which is brought only for an unwitting transgression!?

And if he did not accept it as a deity

but bowed to the statue only in honor of the king—

it is nothing!

For he did not intend to worship an idol.

Rather, the case in the baraita is one in which he indeed bowed to an idol, knowing that it was an idol, and his heart was not directed toward Heaven. But, on the other hand, he did not accept it as a deity!

And he did not do so out of a personal desire to worship an idol, but

out of love

for a person, wishing to please him by bowing to the idol, or he bowed to it

out of fear

of a human being.

And “one who acted unwittingly without intending” means that his unwitting error consisted of thinking that it was permitted to bow to an idol when doing so out of love or fear, when he does not intend in his heart to worship it as a deity [and knows and believes in his heart that it has no substance. Ritva].

This works out well according to Abaye, who says

that one who worships an idol out of love or fear

is liable

to execution if he acted intentionally and to a sin-offering if he acted unwittingly.

But according to Rava, who says

that one who worships an idol out of love of a person or out of fear of him

is exempt

from execution and from a sin-offering —

what can be said?

What case of unwitting idol worship without intent is there in which he would be liable to bring a sin-offering?

Rather,

it can be found

in the case of one who “says: It is permitted,”

who is mistaken regarding the very prohibition, thinking that the Torah contains no prohibition against idol worship; for example, a convert who converted among gentiles. [ And since he had never known of the prohibition, he is called “one who does not intend.” Rashi, Sanhedrin 62b, s.v. “Rather”].

The difficulty still arises from what the baraita teaches:

“Unlike the case with Shabbat, where he is entirely exempt.”

And if it is discussing one who says, “It is permitted,” why would he be entirely exempt with regard to Shabbat? Although one who says, “It is permitted,” is unwitting both with regard to Shabbat itself and with regard to the prohibition of the labors, nevertheless this is a case in which “both this and that were forgotten.”

For

Rava did not ask Rav Naḥman until this point [

above, on 70b] concerning a case in which both this and that were forgotten

except whether he is liable to bring one

sin-offering

or whether he is liable to bring two,

that is, one for each labor.

But that he would be entirely exempt—

no.

For it is obvious that he is liable to bring at least one sin-offering.