Shabbat 72b — the Talmud in English

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He intended to lift the

vegetable

that was detached

that had fallen into a vegetable bed, but he erred,

and cut the attached —

he is exempt.

Because this is “engaged in something else,” and not inadvertence. And one who is engaged in something else is exempt from a sin-offering, as we derive from what is written concerning a sin-offering: “which he sinned in it,” which indicates that he is liable specifically when he intended that very thing in which he sinned, but erred, thinking that today was an ordinary weekday or that this labor was permitted; only then is he liable to a sin-offering. But if he was engaged in another matter and, by mistake, did this thing, he is exempt from a sin-offering.

There is another condition for defining an act as “engaged in something else”: with regard to the thing that he thought to do, he must not have intended to perform in it a forbidden labor.

Here, according to everyone, it is considered “engaged in something else,” since he did not intend at all for the act of cutting, but only to lift it.

But if he intended

to cut the detached item, and cut the attached item —

Rava and Abaye disagree about it.

Rava said: He is exempt.

Abaye said: He is liable.

And we explain:

Rava said: He is exempt,

since this too is included in “engaged in something else.”

For he did not intend to cut the forbidden thing

of an attached item [with inadvertence concerning Shabbat or with inadvertence concerning the prohibition of the labor]; rather, he intended to cut a detached item, which is a permitted act.

Abaye said: He is liable, for he did intend

nevertheless

to cut in general,

and this is not “engaged in something else,” but inadvertence.

Rava said: From where do I say this

that even if he intended to cut, it is considered “engaged in something else”?

For it was taught:

There is

a stringency with Shabbat

more

than with the other mitzvot.

And

on the other hand there is

a stringency with the other mitzvot

more

than

with

Shabbat.

And the baraita explains:

The stringency of Shabbat over the other mitzvot —

with Shabbat,

if

he performed

in it

two [

and the Gemara will explain whether this means two different labors or whether he repeated one labor twice]

in one lapse of awareness, he is liable

a sin-offering

for each one and one.

Which is not so with the other mitzvot.

And the stringency of the other mitzvot over Shabbat —

with the other mitzvot,

if

he was inadvertent without intending, he is liable

a sin-offering,

which is not so with Shabbat.

And immediately the Gemara interprets the baraita.

The master said

in the baraita:

“The stringency of Shabbat over the other mitzvot: with Shabbat, if he performed two [acts] in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each one and one, which is not so with the other mitzvot.”

We raise a difficulty against it:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

that “two in one lapse of awareness” with regard to Shabbat means

that he performed reaping and grinding,

which are two primary categories of labor, and therefore he is liable for two, if so

the equivalent of it,

similarly,

with regard to the other mitzvot,

that would mean that

he ate forbidden fat and blood,

which are two different bodies of prohibition, corresponding to reaping and grinding.

It is impossible to say this, for there is no difference between them.

For also

here,

with Shabbat,

two

sin-offerings

he is liable, and

also

here,

with forbidden fat and blood, likewise

two he is liable,

even if he ate them in one lapse of awareness!

Rather, perhaps you will say that with

other mitzvot,

the other mitzvot, where he is liable only for one,

even when he performed two,

what are the circumstances —

in a case

where he ate

an olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

and again

he

ate an olive-bulk of

forbidden fat

in one lapse of awareness.

The equivalent of it with regard to Shabbat

would be

that he performed reaping and reaping,

that he reaped two dried figs in one lapse of awareness.

It still presents a difficulty, for

here he is liable for one, and here

he is liable for one!

For also with Shabbat he is not liable for two for the same labor that he repeated and performed twice in one lapse of awareness!

And we answer:

Actually, with regard to Shabbat it means

that

he performed reaping and grinding.

And what is “which is not so with the other mitzvot”

referring to? To idolatry

it refers,

and in accordance with Rav Ami.

For Rav Ami said: If he slaughtered

an animal for idolatry, and also

burned incense,

and

poured a libation

to idolatry

in one lapse of awareness,

meaning that the law that it is forbidden to worship idolatry escaped him —

he is liable for only one.

And these acts of worship with idolatry are like reaping and grinding with regard to Shabbat, which are different acts, and nevertheless he is not liable for a separate sin-offering for each act. And this is the intention of the baraita, that the “other mitzvot” differ from Shabbat.

And we object:

In what did you establish

this statement concerning “the other mitzvot” —

with idolatry.

If so,

say the latter clause,

as it teaches:

“The stringency of the other mitzvot: with the other mitzvot, if he was inadvertent without intending, he is liable”

“which is not so with Shabbat.”

This ‘he was inadvertent without intending’ with regard to idolatry [

called “the other mitzvot”] —

what are the circumstances

in which he would be liable at all for a sin-offering for idolatry while inadvertent?

If you say, [he thought]

with regard to the idolatry that it was not idolatry but

a synagogue, and he bowed down to it.

And what the tanna said in the baraita, “he was inadvertent without intending,” means that he was inadvertent in that he did not know that it was idolatry, and therefore he did not intend at all to bow down and worship idolatry.

If so, this presents a difficulty: why should he be liable for a sin-offering at all for such bowing?

And

after all, his heart —

was toward Heaven!

For he did not worship idolatry at all, not even inadvertently!

For even if he had known that this was idolatry, he would not have performed a prohibition by his bowing, since his intention was not to worship it, but to bow with this bowing toward Heaven!?

Rather, [the case is] that he saw an andarta,

a statue in the form of the king, which was not erected for the purpose of idolatry, but people bow to it in honor of the king,

and bowed [

bowed down]

to it.

But there is still a difficulty, for in either case —

If he accepted it

the andarta

as a deity,

then he himself made the andarta into idolatry, and if so,

he is deliberate

in his bowing to it as idolatry, and he does not bring a sin-offering, which comes only for inadvertence!?

And if he did not accept it as a deity,

but bowed to the andarta only in honor of the king —

it is nothing!

For he did not intend for idolatry.

Rather, the case in the baraita is indeed that he bowed to idolatry, knowing that it was idolatry, and his heart was not toward Heaven. But, on the other hand, he did not accept it upon himself as a deity!

And he did not do so out of a personal desire to worship idolatry, but

out of love

for a person, wishing to give him pleasure by bowing to idolatry, or he bowed to it

out of fear

of a human being.

And “inadvertent without intending” means that his inadvertence consisted in thinking that it was permitted to bow to idolatry when he does so out of love of a person or out of fear of him, when he does not intend in his heart for divinity [and he knows and believes in his heart that there is nothing to it. Ritva].

This works out well according to Abaye, who says

that one who worships idolatry out of love or fear

is liable

to death when deliberate and to a sin-offering when inadvertent.

But according to Rava, who says

that one who worships idolatry out of love of a person or out of fear of him

is exempt

from death and a sin-offering —

what is there to say?

What is “inadvertent without intending” with regard to idolatry, for which he is liable to a sin-offering?

Rather,

you can find it

in one who says, “It is permitted,”

who is mistaken regarding the prohibition itself, thinking that there is no prohibition of idolatry in the Torah. For example, a convert who converted among the gentiles. [ And since he never knew of the prohibition, he is called “one who does not intend.” Rashi, Sanhedrin 62b, beginning “Rather”].

It still presents a difficulty: regarding what the baraita teaches,

“which is not so with Shabbat, for he is entirely exempt.”

And if it deals with one who says “It is permitted,” why should he be entirely exempt with regard to Shabbat? Although one who says “It is permitted” is inadvertent both concerning Shabbat itself and concerning the prohibition of the labors, nevertheless this is “both this and that were in his lapse of awareness.”

But

Rava did not ask Rav Naḥman up to this point [

above, on page 70b] concerning a lapse of awareness regarding both this and that

except whether he should be liable for one

sin-offering

or whether he should be liable for two.

That is, for each labor and labor.

But that he should be entirely exempt —

no.

For it is obvious that he is liable for at least one sin-offering?