Shabbat 69a — the Talmud in English

And it is written at the beginning of the passage:

“And when you err and do not perform all these commandments,”

that is, idolatry, which is equivalent to all the commandments.

And it is written, “But the person who acts defiantly ...

and that person shall be cut off from among his people.”

And from what is written, “There shall be one Torah for you,” we derive:

They were all equated,

all the sin-offerings for inadvertent acts of all the prohibitions in the Torah,

with idolatry—

just as there,

with regard to idolatry, one is liable for an offering only for

a matter for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet.

As it is written immediately afterward, “And the person who acts defiantly ... and that person shall be cut off” [to exclude acts such as embracing and kissing an idol, for which there is no karet],

and for whose inadvertent violation one brings a sin-offering.

That is, only for a matter whose deliberate violation entails karet is there a sin-offering for its inadvertent violation.

So too, every matter for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet

has

a sin-offering for its inadvertent violation.

And for this reason an inadvertent act was equated with a deliberate act: to derive the inadvertent act regarding the entire Torah from the deliberate act regarding idolatry.

And we raise the matter:

But according to Munbaz,

who says that even if he had awareness at the time of the act, he is considered inadvertent with regard to a sin-offering—

in what is the inadvertence?

After all, he is completely deliberate, whereas with regard to a sin-offering it is written “inadvertence”?!

And we answer:

For example, he was unaware of the offering.

He knows the prohibition and that one is liable to karet for performing it deliberately, but he does not know that there is also a punishment of a sin-offering for performing it inadvertently.

And the Sages

hold that

“inadvertence regarding an offering” is not called inadvertence,

unless he was unaware of the prohibition itself.

And we raise the matter:

And according to the Sages—

in what is the inadvertence?

To what extent must he be unaware?

Rabbi Yohanan said: Once he was unaware of karet,

that he does not know that one is liable to karet for it,

even though he was deliberate regarding the prohibition,

that he knows that the matter is forbidden by a prohibition, he is considered inadvertent. For then the offering comes for the inadvertence involved in not knowing the punishment of karet for the transgression. And as we said above, “There shall be one Torah for the one who acts inadvertently” is juxtaposed with “And the person who acts ... and that person shall be cut off.”

And Reish Lakish said: Until he is unaware of both the prohibition and karet,

for he knows neither of them.

Rava said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?

For Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is more plausible, as we said, since even when he knows of the prohibition, he is inadvertent because he does not know the severity of the punishment. [Tos.]

The verse says with regard to a sin-offering:

“which one should not perform”

“(inadvertently)”

“and he is guilty.”

and he is guilty.”

For it implies: until he is unaware of the prohibition and the karet involved in it, since “which one should not perform” refers to a prohibition, and regarding it the verse said “inadvertently.”

And we raise the matter:

And Rabbi Yohanan, what does he do with this verse of Rabbi

Shimon ben Lakish, which says “which one should not perform—inadvertently”?

What does he derive from it?

And we answer:

He requires it for that which was taught:

“And if one person sins inadvertently

from among the people of the land.”

It implies, from the exclusion “from among the people of the land,” that the verse comes to say that not every person of the land is liable for a sin-offering. It teaches you:

to exclude an apostate,

from whom an offering for his sin is not accepted.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

From here you learn: it is said,

“which one should not perform

(inadvertently) and he is guilty,

or his sin that he committed was made known to him, and he shall bring his guilt-offering [a sin-offering].” And we derive:

A person

who would return through awareness,

for had he known, he would have returned from his sin, is the one who

brings an offering for his inadvertence.

One who would not return through awareness—

does not bring an offering for his inadvertence.

For this is the meaning of the verse: “which one should not perform [which he would not have performed had he known of the prohibition, but he performed it] inadvertently [and sinned only because he lacked awareness] and he is guilty”—he is the one who brings a sin-offering [Rashi, Hullin 5b]; to exclude an apostate, who would not return through awareness, and therefore does not bring an offering.

We learned

in our chapter:

The primary labors

of Shabbat

are forty less one

in number.

And we raise the matter: Why do I need the enumeration?

Why must the tanna say that the number of the primary labors is forty less one, when he enumerates all of them and we know their number automatically?

And Rabbi Yohanan said:

To teach you

that if he performed

the labors

all in one state of unawareness, and

he was not informed in the interim that he had sinned, he

is liable

for a sin-offering

for each one and one

of the primary labors. And the enumeration is merely a sign, to know how many sin-offerings it is possible to incur on a single Shabbat.

And we raise the matter:

How can you find it

that he is liable for each and every labor? Necessarily,

with deliberate awareness of Shabbat and inadvertence regarding the labors.

He knows that today is Shabbat, but he does not know that these labors are forbidden on Shabbat.

For if it is inadvertence regarding Shabbat and deliberate awareness regarding the labors—that is, he forgot that today is Shabbat but knows of the prohibition of the labors—we learned in the Mishna at the beginning of our chapter that he is liable for only one sin-offering for all the labors that he performed during one Shabbat.

And now this is difficult:

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said: Once he was unaware of karet, even though he was deliberate regarding the prohibition,

he is considered inadvertent; this is satisfactory, for

you can find it

that he is unaware regarding all the labors, that he does not know that they are forbidden, and nevertheless he still knows that today is Shabbat.

His awareness is expressed in this manner:

For example, he knew Shabbat with regard to a prohibition.

There is a prohibition concerning all the labors or some of them, but he believes that they do not entail karet, and through this he is considered “inadvertent,” liable for a sin-offering.

It follows that with regard to the labors he is inadvertent, and with regard to Shabbat he is deliberate.

But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said:

he is not liable for a sin-offering

until he is unaware of both the prohibition and karet,

this is difficult:

He knew Shabbat—

with regard to what?!

Since he believes that all the labors are permitted, that they entail neither a prohibition nor karet, there is no distinction for him between Shabbat and an ordinary day, and his law should be like that of one who forgot that today is Shabbat, who is liable for only one sin-offering for all the labors of Shabbat. And how is it possible for him to become liable for thirty-nine sin-offerings?

And we answer:

He knew

Shabbat

with regard to the Shabbat limits,

that there is a prohibition of the Shabbat limits on Shabbat.

And according to Rabbi Akiva,

who says that the prohibition of the Shabbat limits is from the Torah.

In any event, it is not included among the labors. Consequently, it is possible that he is unaware regarding all the labors [and incurs thirty-nine sin-offerings], and is deliberate regarding Shabbat, knowing that today is Shabbat and that the Shabbat limits are forbidden.

And we raise the matter:

Who is the tanna for this which the Sages taught:

1.

If he was unaware of this and that,

both of Shabbat and of the labors—

this is the inadvertence stated in the Torah!

That is, this is certainly called inadvertence.

2.

If he was deliberate regarding this and that—

this is the deliberate act stated in the Torah!

3.

If he was unaware regarding Shabbat and deliberate regarding the labors, or was unaware regarding the labors and deliberate regarding Shabbat,

4.

or if he said: I know that this labor is forbidden, but I do not know

whether

one is liable for it to bring an offering or not—

all these are included within inadvertence, and

he is liable

for a sin-offering.

In accordance with whom

is this?

In accordance with Munbaz!

For according to the Sages, inadvertence regarding an offering alone would not be considered inadvertence.

Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to an oath of utterance [for which one is liable for a sin-offering, when one swears to eat or not to eat and violates one’s oath inadvertently],

[for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, such as one who swore that he would eat or would not eat and violated his oath unwittingly]

that one is not liable for it to bring an offering until he is unaware of the prohibition involved,

that he forgets his oath at the time of eating, so that he is unaware of the prohibition.

And we raise the matter:

“Everyone agrees”—

who

is the one who agrees?

Necessarily,

Rabbi Yohanan

is the one who agrees. For although with regard to Shabbat he holds that unawareness of karet is considered inadvertence according to the Sages, nevertheless with regard to an oath, which does not involve karet, necessarily one must be unaware of the prohibition.

And one cannot say that Munbaz agrees with regard to an oath that unawareness of the punishment of the offering is not considered inadvertence, for what is the difference from Shabbat?

And we object:

It is obvious

that Rabbi Yohanan agrees!?

For

when Rabbi Yohanan said

that an offering can be incurred even in a deliberate act, it is only

where there is karet.

Because of his unawareness of the punishment of karet, he is considered inadvertent.

But where there is no karet, he did not say

that an offering can be incurred even in a deliberate violation. And if so, necessarily his inadvertence is regarding the prohibition, for according to the Sages, unawareness regarding an offering is not considered inadvertence anywhere.]

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind to say

that Rabbi Yohanan would also say with regard to an oath that although he was deliberate regarding the prohibition, he is considered inadvertent. And if you ask: If so, in what is he inadvertent? The answer is: I would say that there is room for the opposite conclusion, that with regard to an oath the Sages would agree with Munbaz that unawareness regarding an offering is considered inadvertence. For

since it is a novelty

that one is liable for a sin-offering for an oath of utterance,

for throughout the entire Torah we do not find

a transgression of

a prohibition for which one brings an offering,

but only for a transgression whose deliberate punishment is karet.

And

if

here

with regard to an oath,

one brings

a sin-offering for a mere transgression of a prohibition,

therefore, I might have said

that

when the Torah innovated that even if he was unaware of the punishment of the offering [although he knew of the transgression of the prohibition], he is considered inadvertent here, and therefore

an offering too he should be liable to bring.

the punishment of the offering [although he knew of the negative-commandment violation], he is considered unwitting in this case, therefore

he is also liable to bring an offering.