Shabbat 68b (סח:) — the Talmud in English

And we analyze:

But

if

he did not forget

the very existence of Shabbat, but forgot that today was Shabbat,

what is the halakha? —

He is liable for each and every labor.

For if this is not so, but even when he did not forget the very existence of Shabbat his status is like that of one who forgot it, and he is liable only one sin-offering for each and every Shabbat, the Mishna should also have written this case in the middle clause: Whether he forgot or did not forget the very existence of Shabbat, he is liable for each and every Shabbat.

And this is difficult: If so,

rather than teach

in the final clause:

One who knows that it is Shabbat and performed many labors on many Shabbatot —

he is liable for each and every labor,

it would have been preferable

to teach

in it:

One who knows the very existence of Shabbat,

but forgot that today was Shabbat—is liable for each and every labor, even though all the labors constitute one error. And I know that

all the more so in this case,

where he knows that today is Shabbat but erred with regard to the prohibition against the labors, he is liable for each and every labor, since each labor constitutes a separate error! We answer:

Rather,

the first clause

of the Mishna

deals

with one who recognized

the mitzva of Shabbat

and ultimately forgot

it.

And the statement of Rav and Shmuel as well —

is analogous to one who recognized it and ultimately forgot it,

as he explains:

And this is how it was stated:

Rav and Shmuel both said: Even a child who was taken captive among gentiles, and a convert who converted among gentiles,

who had never heard anything about the mitzva of Shabbat —

are analogous to one who recognized it and ultimately forgot it, and are liable

for one sin-offering.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish both said: It is specifically

if initially he

recognized it and ultimately forgot it

that he is liable for a sin-offering.

But a child who was taken captive among gentiles and a convert who converted among gentiles is exempt

entirely from a sin-offering, for this is not an inadvertent transgression; rather, he is coerced. For anyone who says that something prohibited is permitted is considered coerced, and the Torah exempted him.

A challenge was raised:

It was taught in a beraita:

The Sages stated a great general principle with regard to Shabbat: Anyone who forgets the very existence of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot —

is liable only one sin-offering.

How so?

A child who was taken captive among gentiles, and a convert who converted among gentiles, and who performed many labors on many Shabbatot —

is liable only one sin-offering.

And similarly, he is not liable

for

many acts of eating

blood

that he ate throughout his life, but only one sin-offering,

one.

And

similarly,

for forbidden fat

that he ate throughout his life, he brings a sin-offering

one.

And for idolatry

that he practiced throughout his life, one sin-offering

one.

And likewise, for every prohibition in the Torah for which a sin-offering is brought, even though he transgressed many times, he brings only one sin-offering.

And Munbaz exempts

the child who was taken captive entirely from a sin-offering.

And this is how Munbaz argued before Rabbi Akiva: Since one who acts intentionally is called a sinner

as it is written with regard to the oath of testimony, “And if a person sin,” and the verse is speaking even of one who acts intentionally,

and one who acts inadvertently is called a sinner,

we derive the matter through a binyan av:

Just as one who acts intentionally

is liable only when

he had knowledge

that the matter was prohibited,

so too one who acts inadvertently

is liable specifically in a case

where he had knowledge

in the past that it was prohibited and afterward forgot. Only in this manner is he called one who acts inadvertently and is liable to bring a sin-offering. This excludes a child who was taken captive, who never knew that the matter was prohibited.

Rabbi Akiva said to him

to Munbaz:

I add to your words!

That is, if you seek to compare one who acts inadvertently to one who acts intentionally, you should compare them completely. But this is impossible.

For can one say:

Just as one who acts intentionally, whose knowledge existed at the time of the act,

so too one who acts inadvertently

is even one

whose knowledge existed at the time of the act

of the transgression, and even in such a case he should be liable to bring a sin-offering?!

He said to him

Munbaz:

Yes! And all the more so have you added

to my words. For indeed, even in such a case of inadvertence I say that he is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Akiva said to him

Rabbi Akiva:

According to your words,

since even one who knows at the time of the act is considered to have acted inadvertently —

this is not called inadvertence; it is intentional transgression!

And below it explains their dispute.

And we conclude the challenge:

In any event, it teaches: How so?

A child

who was taken captive is liable to bring a sin-offering.

Granted, according to Rav and Shmuel, this works,

for they hold that one is liable to bring a sin-offering even in the case of a child who was taken captive. [And the reason the beraita mentions a child who was taken captive is to teach the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Munbaz. But the same law applies to one who recognized it and ultimately forgot it: he is liable only one sin-offering, as in the Mishna.]

But according to Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,

who exempt a child who was taken captive from a sin-offering —

is this not difficult?!

We answer:

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish could say to you:

Is it so that

there is not Munbaz, who exempts

a child who was taken captive?

We, when we say

that he is exempt, say so

in accordance with Munbaz!

We inquire:

What is Munbaz’s reason?

For it is impossible to derive one who acts inadvertently from one who acts intentionally through a binyan av, since they are opposites: one who acts intentionally is exempt from a sin-offering, whereas one who acts inadvertently is liable to bring a sin-offering.

And we answer: Munbaz derives it from that

which is written

in the passage concerning the sin-offering for idolatry:

“You shall have one Torah for one who acts inadvertently.” And adjacent to it is written, “But the person who acts defiantly,”

that is, one who acts intentionally.

He juxtaposed one who acts inadvertently with one who acts intentionally

and necessarily, the verse juxtaposed them even though they are not similar:

Just as one who acts intentionally, who had knowledge,

so too one who acts inadvertently, who had knowledge.

We inquire:

And what do the Sages

mean—that is, Rabbi Akiva, who disagrees with Munbaz—by

this phrase, “one Torah”?

With regard to what were one who acts inadvertently and one who acts intentionally juxtaposed?

And we answer:

They require it for that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi would teach his son.

It is written in the passage concerning the sin-offering for idolatry:

“You shall have one Torah for one who acts inadvertently.”