Shabbat 68a (סח.) — the Talmud in English

One who performs many labors

all of which

resemble a single labor,

which are derivatives of one primary category [and whose unwitting transgression was that he did not know that they were forbidden],

is liable for only one sin-offering.

For he is like one who performs the same labor several times during a single period of unawareness, so that everything is considered one unwitting transgression.

The same applies if he performed a primary category and its derivative: this is considered one labor. But if he performed two derivatives of two different primary categories, it is as though he performed two primary categories of labor, and he is liable for each derivative separately.

Gemara:

And we raise a question:

What is the reason the tanna taught

in the Mishna

“a major general principle”?

If you say that it is because he intended

the tanna wished

to teach

later in our chapter [75b]: “And they stated

another general principle

”—and that principle includes fewer matters than the principle in our Mishna, and therefore

he taught “a major general principle,”

and with regard to Shemitta as well,

it could be said that the reason the Mishna in tractate Shevi’it [chapter 7, mishna 1] teaches, “They stated a major general principle with regard to Shemitta,” is

because he intended to teach

later in that same mishna, “And

they stated another general principle,

and the second principle is narrower than the first [see Tosafot, s.v. “And with regard”]. Therefore

he taught

with regard to the first principle

“a major general principle,”

to say that it is major in relation to the second principle that follows it.

This cannot be said.

4.

But with regard to tithes, where the Mishna teaches

at the beginning of tractate Ma’aserot, “They stated a general principle with regard to tithes,” and afterward teaches, “And they stated

another general principle

”—

and

nevertheless

it did not teach

at the beginning

“a major general principle”?!

[Tosafot, in their commentary beginning “But with regard,” ask: What is the difficulty? After all, there the first principle is not broader than the second. See Tosafot of Rabbi Asher.]

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: With regard to Shabbat and Shemitta, which contain primary categories and derivatives,

[With regard to Shabbat, the primary categories are those labors that were performed in the Tabernacle, and the derivatives are labors resembling the primary categories. And with regard to Shemitta, the primary categories are the labors stated in the Torah, while the derivatives are the other forms of work performed in the field and vineyard.] Therefore

he taught

with regard to them

“a major general principle.”

But

with regard to tithes, which do not contain primary categories and derivatives

he did not teach “a major general principle.”

And we challenge this:

But according to bar Kappara, who taught

in the Tosefta

“a major general principle” with regard to tithes, what primary categories and what derivatives are there

with regard to tithes?!

And we answer:

Rather, is this not the reason

—not because of primary categories and derivatives. Rather, the reason is that with regard to anything for which a general principle is stated and whose punishment is more severe—that is, whose prohibition encompasses more than that of another matter for which a general principle is also stated—he teaches “a major general principle.”

Therefore, with regard to Shabbat he teaches “a major general principle,” because

the punishment for Shabbat is more severe than that for Shemitta, since

the prohibition of

Shabbat applies both to

an object that was

detached

at the onset of Shabbat

and to

an object that was

attached

at the beginning of Shabbat, such as grinding and kneading, which apply even to something that had been detached before the day.

Whereas

the prohibition of

Shemitta, with regard to something detached

at the beginning of the seventh year,

does not apply,

since it is produce of the sixth year and the laws of Shemitta do not apply to it, but only

to something attached

at the beginning of the seventh year

does it apply.

And with regard to Shemitta, he teaches “a major general principle,” because

the punishment for Shemitta is more severe than that for

tithes, since Shemitta applies both to food for humans and to food for animals,

as even food for animals acquires the sanctity of Shemitta, as it is written: “And for your animal and for the wild animal that is in your land,”

whereas tithes apply to food for humans

but

do not apply to food for animals! [According to Torah law, only grain, wine, and oil are subject to tithes; the Sages instituted that other fruits and vegetables are also subject, provided that they are food for humans.]

And according to bar Kappara, who teaches “a major general principle”

also

with regard to tithes,

the reason is that

the punishment for tithes is more severe than that for pe’a

[as there is also a mishna concerning pe’a that states “They stated a general principle,” as will be explained below],

since tithes apply to figs and vegetables

[by rabbinic ordinance],

whereas pe’a does not apply to figs and vegetables!

As we learned

in tractate Pe’a:

They stated a general principle with regard to pe’a: Anything that is food, is guarded, grows from the ground, is harvested all at once, and is brought in for storage is obligated in pe’a.

And we explain:

“Food”

excludes the shoots of istis and koʿtza,

a plant used for dyeing [see Rashi and Tosafot for why the Mishna mentions the shoots rather than istis and koʿtza themselves].

“And is guarded”

excludes ownerless produce. “And grows from the ground”

excludes truffles and mushrooms,

which have no root in the ground and derive their nourishment from the air.

“And is harvested all at once,”

meaning that it is harvested at one time,

excludes figs,

because figs do not ripen all at once and are harvested little by little.

“And is brought in for storage,”

meaning that it does not spoil quickly and can be brought to a place where it will be preserved for a long time,

excludes vegetables,

which spoil quickly and are not brought in for storage .

Whereas with regard to tithes we learned: They stated a general principle with regard to tithes: Anything that is food, is guarded, and grows from the ground is obligated in tithes. Whereas

the conditions of

“being harvested all at once” and “being brought in for storage” were not taught.

It follows that the punishment for tithes is more severe than that for pe’a; therefore bar Kappara teaches “a major general principle” with regard to tithes.

Rav and Shmuel both say:

The first clause of the

Mishna,

which states that one who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat is liable for only one sin-offering, applies specifically

to a child captured by gentiles and to a convert who converted among the gentiles

who had never heard of the mitzva of Shabbat.

But

one who

knew

about the matter of Shabbat

and ultimately forgot

it is considered as one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat but forgot that the day was Shabbat, and

is liable for each and every Shabbat

a sin-offering.

And we challenge Rav and Shmuel:

We learned

in the Mishna:

“One who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat.”

And we infer from the wording “one who forgets”:

Is it not implied that he originally had awareness

and afterward forgot, and nevertheless he is liable for only one sin-offering? This is a difficulty for Rav and Shmuel?!

And we answer:

No!

Rather,

what does “one who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat” mean?

It had been forgotten from him

forever—that is, he had never known

the fundamental principle of Shabbat!

And we infer:

But if he knew and ultimately forgot, what is the law?

He is liable for each and every Shabbat.

If so,

rather than teach

in the middle clause

“One who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot is liable for each and every Shabbat,” should it not teach

something more instructive,

“He knew and ultimately forgot,”

that he is liable for each Shabbat, even though in this case one cannot say that the intervening days constitute awareness that divides, since he completely forgot the fundamental principle of Shabbat and we would know

all the more so this

—that one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat but forgot that the day was Shabbat is liable for each and every Shabbat, since the intervening days constitute awareness with regard to this forgetting?!

And we answer: Indeed, this is the intention of the Mishna:

And what is meant by

“one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat”?

One who knew the fundamental principle of Shabbat and forgot it!