Shabbat 68a — the Talmud in English

One who performs many labors

that are all

of the nature of one labor,

which are derivative labors of one primary category [and his unwittingness was that he did not know that they were forbidden],

is liable only for one sin-offering.

For he is like one who performs the same labor several times during one period of unawareness, in which everything is considered one unwitting act.

The same law applies if he performed a primary category and its derivative: this is considered one labor. But if he performed two derivatives of two different primary categories, it is as though he performed two primary categories of labor, and he is liable for each derivative separately.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty concerning it:

What is the reason the tanna taught

in the Mishna

“a great general rule”?

If you say it is because he intended

the tanna

to teach

later in our chapter [75b], “and

another general rule

they stated,” and that general rule includes fewer matters than the general rule of our Mishna, and for that reason

he taught, “a great general rule.”

And regarding the seventh year as well,

it may be said that the reason that which is taught in tractate Shevi'it [chapter 7, Mishna 1], “They stated a great general rule regarding the seventh year,” is

because he intended to teach

afterward in that same Mishna, “and

another general rule

they stated,” and the second general rule is smaller than the first general rule [see Tosafot, s.v. “And regarding”], and therefore

he taught

with regard to the first general rule

“a great general rule,”

to say that it is great in relation to the second rule that follows it.

It is impossible to say this.

4

But regarding tithes, where it is taught

at the beginning of tractate Ma'asrot, “They stated a general rule regarding tithes,” and afterward it teaches, “and

another general rule

they stated,”

and

nevertheless

it did not teach

at the beginning

“a great general rule”?!

[Tosafot raised a difficulty in s.v. “But”: What does he challenge? For there the first general rule is not greater than the second. And see Tosafot of the Rosh.]

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei bar Avin said: Shabbat and the seventh year, which contain primary categories and derivative categories,

[in Shabbat, the primary categories are those labors that were performed in the Tabernacle, and the derivative categories are labors resembling the primary categories. And in the seventh year, the primary categories are the labors stated in the Torah, and the derivative categories are the other forms of work in the field and vineyard], therefore

he taught

regarding them

“a great general rule.”

But

tithes, which do not contain primary and derivative categories —

he did not teach, “a great general rule.”

And we challenge this:

But according to Bar Kappara, who teaches

in the tosefta

“a great general rule” regarding tithes, what primary categories and what derivative categories are there

regarding tithes?!

And we answer:

Rather, is this not the reason

that it is because of primary and derivative categories. Rather, the reason is that regarding every matter about which a general rule is stated and whose punishment is greater, meaning that its prohibition encompasses more than another matter about which a general rule is also stated, he teaches regarding it “a great general rule.”

Therefore, regarding Shabbat he teaches “a great general rule,” because

the punishment of Shabbat is greater than that of the seventh year, for

the prohibition of

Shabbat exists both with regard to

a thing that was

detached

at the onset of Shabbat

and with regard to

a thing that was

attached

at the beginning of Shabbat, such as grinding and kneading, which apply even to something detached before the day.

Whereas

the prohibition of

the seventh year, regarding something detached

at the beginning of the seventh year

does not exist,

for it is produce of the sixth year and the laws of the seventh year do not apply to it; only

regarding something attached

at the beginning of the seventh year

does it exist.

And regarding the seventh year, he teaches “a great general rule,” because

the punishment of the seventh year is greater than that of

tithes, for the seventh year applies both to food for humans and to food for animals,

for even in food for animals the sanctity of the seventh year takes effect, as it is written, “and for your animal and for the beast that is in your land,”

whereas tithes apply to food for humans

but

do not apply to food for animals!

[For by Torah law only grain, wine, and oil are subject to tithes, and the Sages instituted that other fruits and vegetables are also subject to them, provided that they are food for humans.]

And according to Bar Kappara, who teaches “a great general rule”

even

regarding tithes,

his reason is that

the punishment of tithes is greater than that of peah,

[for regarding peah as well there is a Mishna, “They stated a general rule,” as will be stated below],

for tithes apply to figs and vegetables

[by rabbinic law],

whereas peah does not apply to figs and vegetables!

For we learned

in tractate Peah:

They stated a general rule regarding peah: Anything that is food, is guarded, grows from the land, is gathered at one time, and is brought in for preservation is subject to peah.

And we explain:

“Food” —

to exclude the shoots of dyer's woad and weld,

a plant used for dyeing [see Rashi and Tosafot why it says “shoots of” rather than woad and weld themselves].

“And is guarded” —

to exclude ownerless produce. “And grows from the land” —

to exclude truffles and mushrooms,

which have no root in the ground and draw nourishment from the air.

“And is gathered at one time,”

that it is gathered all at once —

to exclude figs,

whose ripening does not occur all at once, and they are gathered little by little.

“And is brought in for preservation,”

that it does not spoil quickly and can be brought into a place where it will be preserved for a long time —

to exclude vegetables,

which spoil quickly and are not brought in for preservation.

Whereas concerning tithes we learned: They stated a general rule regarding tithes: Anything that is food, is guarded, and grows from the land is subject to tithes. Whereas

the conditions of

“being gathered at one time” and “being brought in for preservation” were not taught.

It follows that the punishment of tithes is greater than that of peah; therefore Bar Kappara teaches “a great general rule” regarding tithes.

Rav and Shmuel both said:

The first clause of the

Mishna,

that anyone who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat is liable only for one sin-offering, applies specifically

to a child taken captive among non-Jews and to a convert who converted among non-Jews

who had never heard of the commandment of Shabbat.

But one who

one who

recognized

the matter of Shabbat

and ultimately forgot

it is as though he knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat, but forgot that today was Shabbat, and

he is liable for each Shabbat and Shabbat

a sin-offering.

And we challenge Rav and Shmuel:

We learned

in the Mishna:

“One who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat,”

and we infer from the wording “one who forgets”

is it not [implied], by inference, that he had knowledge originally,

and afterward forgot, and nevertheless he is liable only for one sin-offering, which is difficult for Rav and Shmuel?!

And we answer:

No!

Rather,

what is [the meaning of] “anyone who forgets the fundamental principle of Shabbat”?

It had been forgotten from him

from the beginning, meaning that he had never known

the fundamental principle of Shabbat!

And we infer:

But one who recognized it and ultimately forgot — what [is the law]?

He is liable for each Shabbat and Shabbat.

If so,

rather than teaching

in the middle clause

“One who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat and performs many labors on many Shabbatot is liable for each Shabbat and Shabbat,” let it teach

something preferable to it:

“He recognized it and ultimately forgot,”

he is liable for each Shabbat, even though in this case it is not applicable to say that the intervening days constitute knowledge to divide, since he completely forgot the fundamental principle of Shabbat and we would know

all the more so this,

that one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat but forgot that today is Shabbat is liable for each Shabbat and Shabbat, since the intervening days constitute knowledge with regard to this forgetting?!

And we answer: Indeed, this is the intention of the Mishna:

And what is

“one who knows the fundamental principle of Shabbat”?

One who knew the fundamental principle of Shabbat and forgot it!