Shabbat 69b — the Talmud in English

it teaches us this:

Abaye [holds] that also concerning an oath of utterance the Rabbis disagree with Munbaz, and ignorance of the offering is not considered ignorance.

And if so, necessarily we require that he be unaware of the prohibition.

In Tractate Shevuot [26a] they learn from that which is written, “for everything that a person shall express by an oath,” that he does not transgress the prohibition of a false oath unwittingly unless he was a “person” at the time of the oath. That is, his mind was settled, and he was not under compulsion. For example: if, at the time when he swore, “I ate,” or, “I did not eat,” he erred and thought that this was indeed the case, he is not liable for an offering for his oath.

He raised an objection to Abaye

from that which was taught in a beraita:

What is an unwitting oath of utterance concerning the past?

For he is always under compulsion, since at the time of the oath he thinks that he is swearing truthfully. [

As for an oath concerning the future, for example, one who swore that he would eat in the future or that he would not eat, it is possible to find an unwitting act: when he took the oath his mind was settled, but afterward he forgot that he had sworn, and therefore transgressed his oath].

For if he said

at the time when he swore a false oath concerning something that occurred or did not occur:

I know that this oath is prohibited, but I do not know whether one is liable for it to bring an offering or not—

he is liable

for an offering [but if he does not know at all that it is prohibited to swear falsely, there is no greater compulsion than this].

It follows that the Rabbis agree with Munbaz concerning an oath, that ignorance of the offering alone is what renders one liable to bring an offering. And this is difficult for Abaye, who said: all agree concerning the offering of an oath that he is not liable until he is unaware of the prohibition involved in it.

And we answer Abaye:

this

beraita,

who is its author?—

It is Munbaz.

But according to the Rabbis, in accordance with Abaye, it is impossible for him to become liable for an unwitting oath of utterance concerning the past.

Since whether he thinks that he is speaking the truth, or whether he thinks that there is no prohibition in a false oath, he is exempt by virtue of the law of “the person” concerning an oath.

According to him, an offering for an oath is possible only in an oath concerning the future, where he knew at the time of the oath, and afterward the oath or the prohibition against transgressing the oath was concealed from him. [And this is like the opinion of Rabbi Ishmael in Tractate Shevuot].

Another wording: Who is its author

is this beraita?

If you say Munbaz,

what does it teach us?

It is obvious

that he holds this way?!

For

now, throughout the entire Torah, where it is not a novelty

that an offering is brought for those liable to excision,

Munbaz said that ignorance of the offering is called ignorance. Here,

concerning an oath,

where it is a novelty

that an offering is brought for the prohibition of a negative commandment—

is it not all the more so

that ignorance of the offering is called ignorance?

Rather, no; it is the Rabbis.

And it teaches us that they agree concerning an oath that ignorance of the offering is considered ignorance,

and it is a refutation of Abaye.

And we conclude:

A refutation!

A non-priest, who eats teruma:

If he ate it unwittingly, he must pay the priest the principal plus a fifth.

And if he ate it intentionally, he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, and he must pay the priest the principal, but he does not pay a fifth. For the fifth comes as atonement, whereas the atonement of one who eats intentionally is only death at the hands of Heaven.

And Abaye said: all agree concerning

a non-priest who eats unwittingly

teruma—

that one is not liable for it to pay a fifth until he is unaware of the prohibition involved in it. [

And Rashi explains: he thinks that it is ordinary produce, and therefore there is no prohibition in it].

And we inquire concerning that which Abaye said:

all agree

concerning the payment of a fifth for eating teruma that he is liable only for ignorance of the negative commandment.

Who

is the one who agrees? Necessarily,

Rabbi Yohanan

is the one. Rabbi Yohanan agrees concerning eating teruma that only ignorance of the negative commandment is considered ignorance concerning teruma, even though according to his view, concerning Shabbat it is possible for ignorance to exist even when he was aware of the negative commandment.

And we object:

Is it obvious?!

For

when Rabbi Yohanan says

that ignorance of excision is considered ignorance, it is

where excision exists,

but

where excision does not exist, it is not so.

And necessarily he must be unaware of the negative commandment.

And we answer:

It might enter your mind

that

death

at the hands of Heaven, which is the punishment for one who eats teruma intentionally,

stands in place of excision

of the other prohibitions in the Torah.

And when he was unaware

that the legal status of one who eats teruma intentionally is

death—

he should likewise be liable

to pay a fifth, as in the case of ignorance of excision concerning the other prohibitions.

It teaches us this: Abaye teaches that ignorance of the punishment of death at the hands of Heaven is not like ignorance of the punishment of excision. Therefore, we require that he be unaware of the prohibition involved in it.

что ошибка относительно наказания смертью от руки Небес не подобна ошибке относительно наказания каретом. Поэтому требуется, чтобы он ошибся относительно содержащегося в ней запрета.

Rava said: Death

for intentional eating of teruma

stands in place of excision. And the fifth

for unwitting eating of teruma

stands in place of an offering.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Yohanan, if he was unaware concerning teruma of the punishment of death, then even though he was aware of the negative commandment, he is considered unwitting and is liable to pay a fifth.

Rav Huna said: If one was traveling in the wilderness and does not know when it is Shabbat, he counts six days

from the day on which he took note that he had forgotten when it was Shabbat,

and observes

Shabbat

one day.

That is, the seventh day of his counting.

And this law is a rabbinic enactment, so that he will remember the day of Shabbat.

Hiyya bar Rav said: He observes one day.

That is, the following day after he took note [but the day on which he took note he does not observe, since perhaps he had already performed labor on it beforehand, and it turns out that he did not observe it as Shabbat].

And he counts

afterward

six

weekdays, and on the seventh day he rests.

And we explain:

With regard to what do they disagree?

One master,

Rav Huna,

holds:

he counts

according to the creation of the world,

for the weekdays came first.

And one master,

Hiyya bar Rav,

said: Like the first man,

who was created on the eve of Shabbat, and the first day of his counting was Shabbat.

He raised an objection

to Hiyya bar Rav from that which was taught:

If one was traveling on the road and does not know when it is Shabbat—

he observes one day for six.

And we infer:

Is it not

that this is what it says:

he counts six and observes one day.

For this is what is implied: he observes one day for the six days that have passed. And this is difficult for Hiyya bar Rav?!

And we answer:

No,

this is not the meaning of the beraita. Rather, this is what it says:

he observes one day and counts six.

And we object:

If so,

why does it teach

he observes one day for six?

But

he observes one day and counts six—

it should have said

so?!

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty from that which

was taught: If one was traveling on the road or in the wilderness, and does not know when it is Shabbat—

he counts six and observes one day.

A refutation of Hiyya bar Rav?!

And we conclude:

A refutation!

Rava said:

On the other days he is forbidden to perform his labor as usual. Rather,

each and every day he performs for himself

labor

only sufficient for his livelihood

because of preservation of life, since every day is in doubt—perhaps it is Shabbat.

Except

for

that day

which he observes, on which he rests completely from labor.

And we wonder:

And should he die of hunger on that day

from hunger?! For he does not perform on it even enough for his livelihood.

And we answer:

He performs from the day before

enough for

two livelihoods.

And we object: How is it permitted for him to perform on the preceding day enough for two livelihoods?

Perhaps the day before was Shabbat,

and it turns out that he desecrated Shabbat without the need of preserving life for that day?!

Rather, each and every day he performs for himself

enough for

his livelihood.

And

even that day

which he observes.

And that day—

by what does he recognize it

as Shabbat?

By Kiddush and Havdala!

For he recites Kiddush and makes Havdala on that day.

And the Sages enacted this merely as a remembrance, so that he would have one day different from the other days, so that the laws of Shabbat would not be forgotten by him.

Rava said: If he recognized part of [

an alternative version:

the number of]

the day on which he set out.

That is, he knows that today is the third or fourth day from his departure, but he does not know on which day he departed—

he performs labor the entire

same

whole day.

That is, on the eighth day from his departure [which is the same day of the week as the day of his departure]. For that day is certainly not Shabbat, since he did not set out on the road on Shabbat. And likewise on the fifteenth day, and on the twenty-second day from his departure, and so forever.

And we object:

Is it obvious?!

And we answer:

It might enter your mind that, since he does not set out

on the road

on the eve of Shabbat—

on Friday—

he also does not set out

on the eve of Shabbat, because of the honor of Shabbat.

And this one—if he nevertheless set out on the fifth day of the week,

since at the latest he set out on Thursday—if so,

he should be permitted to perform labor for two days,

also on the ninth day from his departure, which is certainly not Shabbat, since he did not set out on the eve of Shabbat.

It teaches us this: sometimes he finds a caravan, and it happens that he sets out

even on the eve of Shabbat. Therefore, the ninth day as well is in doubt—perhaps it is Shabbat.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who knows the essence of Shabbat.

And we inquire:

From where are these matters

that sometimes he brings one sin-offering for all the Shabbatot, and sometimes he brings a sin-offering for each and every Shabbat?

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: Two verses are written.

A.

“And the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat,”

which implies one Shabbat.

B.

And it is written, “And you shall observe My Shabbatot,”

which implies many Shabbatot.

How

are these two verses to be reconciled?

“And the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat”—

one observance for many Shabbatot,

so that all the Shabbatot are considered one Shabbat.

“And you shall observe My Shabbatot”—

one observance for each and every Shabbat,

so that each Shabbat is considered on its own.

And Scripture entrusted the interpretation of the two verses to the Sages, and they said by reasoning that one who forgot the essence of Shabbat has all the Shabbatot considered for him as one unwitting act. But one who knew the essence of Shabbat, but forgot that today was Shabbat, has each Shabbat as an unwitting act in its own right, because the weekdays in between constitute “knowledge” to divide them.

That is, it is not considered that one who repeats and performs his labor on every Shabbat, since it was concealed from him when the day of Shabbat is, has “one concealment” that makes him liable for only one offering.

Since the very knowledge of the weekdays between the Shabbatot divides his acts on the two Shabbatot into two different concealments, which make him liable for separate sin-offerings.

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak challenged this: On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable!

“And the Children of Israel shall observe the Shabbat”

implies

one observance

for only one Shabbat. That is, a separate observance

for each and every Shabbat.

And this verse speaks of a situation in which each Shabbat is one unwitting act.

“And you shall observe My Shabbatot”

implies

one observance for many Shabbatot,

so that all of them are considered one unwitting act.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who knows that it is Shabbat.