Shabbat 5b — the Talmud in English

He was reading a scroll,

made in the form of a scroll, at the entrance of his house while he was sitting

on the threshold,

which was a karmelit,

and the scroll rolled from his hand

into the public domain before the entrance of his house—that is, the scroll unrolled until one end of the scroll reached the public domain before him, while he was still holding its other end: he

rolls it back to himself

and need not be concerned, because since one end of the scroll is still in his hand [“its attachment is in his hand,”] its removal from there is not considered a removal, and there is no prohibition here on bringing from the public domain into a karmelit.

But if

he was reading

a scroll

at the top of the roof,

which is a private domain,

and the scroll rolled from his hand

into the public domain, while its attachment was in his hand, then there is a distinction in the matter:

Before it reached ten handbreadths,

that is, if the end of the scroll did not reach a height of ten handbreadths above the surface of the public domain, he

rolls it back to himself,

because the air of the public domain above ten handbreadths is a “place of exemption.”

But

once

one end of it

to

the height of

ten handbreadths

above the surface of the public domain, which is the air of the public domain, he is prohibited from rolling it back to himself. And although “its attachment is in his hand,” nevertheless the Sages decreed lest it fall entirely into the public domain and he bring it from there; and therefore the Sages said: although its attachment is in his hand, nevertheless, in this case it is called bringing in. And what should he do?

He turns it over

the scroll

onto the writing

so that it should not lie in disgrace, and leaves it thus on the wall until the end of Shabbat.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

Even when it rolled into the public domain,

why

must he

turn it over onto the writing

and is he prohibited from rolling it back to himself?

But it did not rest,

for the scroll is standing in the air parallel to the wall and is not resting upon it; why, then, should it be prohibited to remove it from there?

And he said

he answered,

Rabba:

Here, with what are we dealing?

With an inclined wall,

and the scroll is considered as resting upon it, and its removal from it is considered a removal.

And just as Rabba explained here, so too is the explanation of the words of Rabbi Yohanan, who held liable one who caught rainwater from atop a wall, because here we are dealing with an inclined wall, and therefore he is liable.

And we challenge the Gemara’s comparison:

You may say that Rabba said

that removal from atop an inclined wall is a removal,

with a scroll

he said this, because

it is made

for a scroll

to rest,

that is, a scroll can rest there.

But

water

on an inclined wall—

is it made to rest?

Can it rest there, so that we should hold liable one who removes it from there!?

Rather, Rava said

to explain the words of Rabbi Yohanan, who held liable one who received rainwater in his fellow’s courtyard and carried it out into the public domain—and the difficulty raised above was that he did not load his hand, but Heaven loaded it for him, and there is no removal here:

Here we are dealing with

a case in which he caught

the water

from atop

a hollow

filled with water in his fellow’s courtyard, and it follows that there is a removal here by the one who carried it out.

And the Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yohanan’s words concern catching water from atop a

hollow,

then

it is obvious

that one who catches it from there and carries it into the public domain is liable; what novelty did Rabbi Yohanan teach us in this matter!?

And we answer:

You might have said: If Rabbi Yohanan had not taught us,

one might have said,

water upon water is not a resting

that would make one who removes it from there and carries it out liable, because the water moves and sways.

Therefore

he teaches us

Rabbi Yohanan that it is a resting.

And Rava proceeded,

who held liable one who catches water from the surface of a hollow,

according to his reasoning [

Rava followed his own method]

! For Rava said:

Water upon water—that is their resting

to make one who removes them from there liable. [ And this is when Rava held liable in the case of water upon a hollow.]

But

a nut upon water,

since it does not rest there from its movement,

that is not its resting

for one to become liable for removing it from there.

Abaye inquired:

A nut

that was resting

in a vessel, and

but the

vessel

was

floating upon water,

which is not considered as resting because it moves and sways, and he removed the nut and carried it out— is he liable?

The sides of the uncertainty are: whether

we follow the nut,

that is, whether we relate to the nut as it is in relation to the vessel,

and it is resting,

for it is considered as resting in the vessel, and if so, he is liable.

Or perhaps: we follow the vessel,

that is, we do not relate to the nut by itself, but to the vessel together with the nut,

and it is not resting;

the two of them together are not resting,

for

the

vessel moves

upon the surface of the water, and if so, he is exempt.

And we conclude:

Teyku!

The Gemara further explains:

Oil that

was

floating upon wine

or water, and he removed the oil from atop it and carried it out—this law depends upon the

dispute between Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis.

For we learned

in tractate Tevul Yom [2:5]:

Oil

of teruma

that was floating upon wine

of teruma,

and a one who immersed that day touched

it, for he invalidates teruma through his touch,

on the oil,

he

invalidated only

the

oil alone.

For he is not considered to have touched all the teruma, but only the oil. And the oil does not have the power to render the wine impure, because it itself is only “invalid,” and is not “impure” so as to have the power to render others impure.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri says: The two are joined to one another,

and both became invalid together.

And likewise in our matter: according to the Sages, he is not liable for taking up the oil, for the oil is considered as another thing floating upon the wine, and this is not its resting. But according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, he is liable for it.

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ila’ai said that Rabbi Yohanan said: If he was carrying

in a private domain

foods

and drinks,

that is, he loaded them upon himself on Shabbat while walking, without intending to carry them out,

and

he was

entering and leaving

the public domain while carrying them—even

the entire day, he is not liable,

until he stops,

and afterward goes out. And the reason is:

Because the removal involved in loading them upon his body is not a removal that makes him liable, for he did not remove them with the intention of carrying them out, as will be explained. Therefore, if he stopped, and there is a resting here, since “the resting of his body” is like “the resting of an object,” he is liable for “the removal of his body” from its stationary position, which is like “the removal of an object”; and once he goes out into the public domain and stops there, there are removal and resting, and he is liable. But if he did not stop, there is no removal except the act by which he removed them to load them upon himself, and this was not with the intention of carrying them out; therefore he is not liable.

He said

he explained,

Abaye: And this is when he stopped to rest [

to rest], for this is a complete stopping and the object has rested, and therefore he is liable when he removes his body from there. But if he stopped in order to adjust the load upon him [to arrange his load upon himself], this is not a stopping, and it is as though he were still walking, and he is not liable.

And the Gemara discusses:

From where

did Abaye know to distinguish between stopping in order to rest and stopping in order to adjust the load?

From what the master said [

Rabba, who was Abaye’s teacher]: One who was carrying a load, walked four cubits in the public domain, and stopped there is liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain, for the removal of his body is like the removal of an object, and his resting is like the resting of an object. But one who carried four cubits in the public domain and stopped during the carrying is exempt, because the stopping in the middle is a resting, and there is no carrying of four cubits at once.

And Rabba explains which stopping in the middle nullifies his carrying, and which stopping at its end makes him liable: if

during

the carrying of

four cubits

he stopped, this is its law: if he

stopped

in the middle

to rest,

this is a stopping, and he is

exempt,

for he did not carry four cubits at once.

But if he stopped in order

to adjust the load,

this is not a stopping, and it is as though he carried four cubits at once, and he is

liable.

But if he stopped

outside the four cubits [

after carrying the four cubits], then the law is the reverse:

If he

stopped to rest,

it is a complete resting, and he is

liable

for it.

But if he stopped

to adjust the load,

he is

exempt,

for this is not a stopping, and it is not considered a resting for which he would be liable.

We have therefore learned that stopping in order to rest is a complete stopping and is considered a resting. But stopping in order to adjust the load is not a complete stopping and is not considered a resting.

And the Gemara challenges Rabbi Yohanan:

What does Rabbi Yohanan teach us

by his words!?

If it is to teach us

that there was no removal from the outset for this purpose [

to carry them out], that is, its novelty is that the first removal that he performed when he loaded them upon his shoulder is not a removal, because every removal that was not with the intention of carrying them out is not a removal for which to make him liable?

Rabbi Yohanan already said it once [

for Rabbi Yohanan already taught us this law]:

for Rav Safra said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One who moves his objects from one corner to another

in his house,

and then changes his mind about them,

while he is walking and holding them in his hand,

and carries them

to the public domain, he is

exempt, for there was no initial act of taking out for this purpose

at that time.

And if so, why did Rabbi Yohanan need to teach us this law again!?

And we answer: Indeed, this law is what Rabbi Yohanan came to teach us; rather, these two statements

are statements of different amoraim,

that is, different amoraim stated the same law in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

One master,

Rabbi Avin in the name of Rabbi Ilai,

stated it

this law in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

in this wording [

in a certain formulation].

And one master,

Rav Safra in the name of Rabbi Ami,

stated it

this very law in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

in this wording, [

in another formulation]. "

A shop is a private domain. A paltaya, that is, a city's open square, where people gather for commerce [a marketplace], is a public domain. A setav, ["istunit"], is before the entrances of the shops, where the shopkeepers sit on platforms, and a karmelit is a karmelit."

The Sages taught: One who carries

an object while walking

from a shop to a paltaya by way of a setav,

that is, from a private domain to a public domain by way of a karmelit:

He is

liable,

since he did not set down his load in the karmelit. But if he stood in the meantime or set down his load in the karmelit, he is exempt, for it turns out that he carried from a private domain to a karmelit, and from a karmelit to a public domain, which is only a rabbinic prohibition.

And Ben Azzai exempts,

even though he did not stand in the meantime.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Granted,

the reason of

Ben Azzai

is satisfactory, for he holds that

"one who walks is deemed to be standing,"

and it turns out that this person is like one who carried from a private domain to a karmelit and set it down there, and then again lifted it from the karmelit and carried it to the public domain, in which case he is exempt.

Rather,

the reason of

the Sages

should be difficult:

Even if they indeed hold [

although they hold]:

"one who walks is not deemed to be standing,"

nevertheless, why should he be liable? And

where do we find such a case in which he is liable [

where do we find such a case in which he is liable]!? For perhaps the Torah rendered one liable only for carrying directly from a private domain to a public domain; but this person, between whom and it another domain intervened—where do we know that the Torah rendered one liable even for this!?

He said,

he answered,

Rav Safra said, Rabbi Ami said,

Rabbi Yohanan: