Shabbat 6a — the Talmud in English

It is just as [as follows:]

it is comparable

to one who transfers an object in the public domain

more than four cubits and sets it down, for which he is liable! For

there, is it not so that, even though he holds it and proceeds,

do we not say there that as long as the object is in his hand and he is walking with it, he is

exempt

all the time that he is walking and does not set it down, even though he has already transferred it four cubits in the public domain? Nevertheless,

when he sets it down,

when he subsequently sets it down in the public domain, he is

liable,

and we do not say that since a “walking of exemption” interrupted in the meantime, he is exempt. If so,

here too,

when he took it out from a private domain to a public domain by way of a karmelit,

it is no different.

He is liable, even though a “walking of exemption” was interrupted when he passed through a karmelit in the meantime.

And the Gemara objects:

Are they comparable [and are these two matters indeed similar to one another]!? For

indeed,

there,

with regard to one who transfers more than four cubits in the public domain,

wherever he sets it down, it is a place of liability [wherever he would set it down after transferring it four cubits, he would become liable]; that is, although he walked a “walking of exemption,” he did not walk in an “exempt place,” but in a place where, had he set it down there without delaying from setting it down, he would have become liable. Whereas

[wherever he would place it after carrying it four cubits, he would be liable]. That is, although he walked in a manner that would not itself create liability, he did not walk through a “place of exemption”; rather, he walked through a place where, had he placed the object down there instead of continuing to carry it, he would have been liable. But

here,

with regard to one who takes it out by way of a portico,

if he sets it down in the portico, it is an exempt place.

Rather,

the Gemara compares our matter to another matter:

it is just as one who transfers an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits, for which he is liable! For

there, is it not so that, even though if he set it down within four cubits [if he had set down the object within four cubits], he would have been

[if he had placed the object down within four cubits], he would have been

exempt.

Nevertheless,

when he sets it down at the end of four cubits,

he is

liable.

If so,

here too,

when he took it out from a private domain to a public domain and transferred it through a karmelit,

it is no different,

and he is liable even though, had he set it down in the karmelit, he would have been exempt.

And we reject this:

Are they comparable!?

Indeed,

there,

with regard to one who transfers four cubits in the public domain,

with regard to this person [with regard to this person], whose removal was at the place where it was, within four cubits of that place

[with regard to this individual], whose lifting of the object took place where it did, the area within four cubits of that place

is an exempt place,

but

for everyone, it is a place of liability!

That is, with regard to another person who performed the removal at a distance of four cubits, even within this person’s four cubits it is a place of liability. But

here,

when he takes it out by way of a karmelit,

for everyone

the karmelit

is an exempt place.

Rather,

the Gemara compares our matter to another matter:

it is just as one who takes out,

similar to a person who takes out

from a private domain to a public domain by way of the ‘sides of the public domain.’

For example, a courtyard whose wall was breached into the public domain. The place of the wall that fell is the “sides of the public domain,” whose law is not that of the public domain. And just as

there,

there, with regard to one who takes out by way of the sides of the public domain,

is it not so that, even though if he set it down at the sides of the public domain,

he would be

exempt, and

nevertheless

when he sets it down in the public domain

he is

liable.

Therefore,

here too,

when he takes it out from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico,

it is no different.

He is liable even though, had he set it down in the portico, he would have been exempt.

Rav Pappa challenged him: This works for the Rabbis, who say that the sides of the public domain are not like the public domain,

and according to them, if he had set it down at the sides of the public domain he would have been exempt; indeed, it can be learned from this for our matter.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the sides of the public domain

also

are like the public domain,

and if he had set it down there he would have become liable,

what is there to say [from where do we know to make one who takes out from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico liable]!?

[from where can we derive liability for one who carries from a private domain to a public domain through a portico]!?

He said,

he answered

Rav Aha son of Rav Ika

to Rav Pappa:

You may say that you have heard Rabbi Eliezer say that the sides of the public domain are like the public domain only where there are no pegs [Rabbi Eliezer said that the sides of the public domain are not like the public domain only in a place where there are no pegs separating the public domain from its sides].

[Rabbi Eliezer said that the sides of the public domain do not have the status of the public domain only in a place where no stakes separate the public domain from its sides].

But

where there are pegs, have you heard him say so!? [In a place where there are pegs in the walls at the sides of the public domain, which are placed so that the wagons will rub against the pegs and not against the wall and knock it down—did Rabbi Eliezer say that even in this case they are like the public domain]!?

Therefore, for this,

for the sides of the public domain,

it is comparable.

That is, if so, even according to Rabbi Eliezer we can compare one who takes out by way of a portico to one who takes out by way of the sides of the public domain in a place where there are pegs.

Rabbi Yohanan said: And Ben Azzai concedes

who exempts one who takes out by way of a portico

with regard to one who throws

from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico, that he is liable. For the reason that Ben Azzai exempted him when he was walking by way of a portico is that “one who walks is like one who stands,” and this does not apply to one who throws by way of a portico; therefore Ben Azzai concedes that he is liable. And Rabbi Yohanan comes to teach us that even Ben Azzai concedes that one who takes out by way of a portico should be made liable, as is one who takes out by way of the sides of the public domain; and Rabbi Yohanan exempted only one who walks, because “one who walks is like one who stands.”

And the Gemara supports Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

It was also taught likewise,

in accordance with his words:

One who takes out from a shop to the plaza by way of a portico

is

liable.

Whether one who takes out

from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico

or one who brings in

from a public domain to a private domain by way of it.

Whether one who extends

from one domain to another by way of it

or one who throws

from one domain to another by way of it.

Ben Azzai says: One who takes out and one who brings in

from one domain to another by way of a portico while he is walking is

exempt,

because “one who walks is like one who stands.” But

one who extends and one who throws

from one domain to another by way of a portico is

liable.

The Sages taught: There are four domains

that are distinct in their laws

for

taking out

on Shabbat:

a.

A private domain.

b.

And a public domain.

c.

And a karmelit.

d.

And an exempt place.

a.

And which is a private domain?

A ditch that is ten

handbreadths deep, so that the place at the bottom of the ditch is surrounded on all sides by partitions of ten,

and four

by four handbreadths, which is the measure of a significant place.

And likewise a fence [a wall]

[a partition]

that is ten

handbreadths high

and four

by four handbreadths, the place at the top of the wall is considered a private domain. This is because with regard to its four sides we say, “extend and raise [the] surface of the partition onto its top,” and it follows that its top is surrounded by partitions ten [handbreadths high] on four sides, and its interior is four by four handbreadths.

This is a complete private domain.

b.

And which is a public domain?

A sartaya [a road on which people travel from city to city],

[a road used to travel from city to city],

and a paltaya [a city plaza, where people gather for commerce—a marketplace]

[a large city square where people gather for commerce—a marketplace]

that is large,

which has a width of sixteen cubits.

And passageways [of a city that are sixteen cubits wide]

[of a city that are sixteen cubits wide]

that are open through [open at both their ends] to the public domain,

[open from both ends] into the public domain,

this is a complete public domain.

One may not take out from this private domain

that we stated

to this public domain

that we stated.

And one may not bring in from this public domain to this private domain. And if

he took out

from a private domain to a public domain

and brought in,

or brought in from a public domain to a private domain:

If he did so

unwittingly,

he is

liable for a sin-offering,

like all the labors of Shabbat, whose intentional violation is punishable by excision and whose unwitting violation is a sin-offering.

And if he did so

intentionally,

he is

punished by excision

if he was not forewarned,

and is stoned

if he was forewarned.

c. And which is a karmelit:

But a sea,

whose partitions are not considered partitions, but it is not a place of public passage, and its area is four by four handbreadths.

And an open field [an expanse of fields],

which is not surrounded by partitions, but is not a place of public passage, and its area is four by four handbreadths.

And a portico [this is the “stiv” mentioned above, 5b],

which likewise has no partitions, is not a place of public passage, and its area is four by four handbreadths.

And the karmelit.

That is, all these are “karmelit” [and the wording of the beraita will be explained in the Gemara below], and this is the law of the karmelit:

a.

It is neither like a public domain,

because it is not similar to the banners of the wilderness [the Israelite camp arranged by its banners in the wilderness], since it is not made for public passage,

nor like a private domain,

because it does not have partitions like a private domain.

b.

And one may not carry and conduct business

with an object

within it,

by rabbinic decree, like the prohibition of transferring an object four cubits in the public domain.

And if he carried and conducted business within it,

he is

exempt,

because by Torah law a karmelit is not a public domain, but is in the category of an “exempt place.”

And one may not take out from it to the public domain,

by rabbinic decree,

nor from the public domain into it. And one may not

bring in from a private domain into it

by rabbinic decree,

nor from it into a private domain. And if he took out and brought in,

he is

exempt.

The beraita further teaches laws of taking out that have no connection to the division of the domains; rather, even though one takes out from a private domain to a private domain, the Sages nevertheless prohibited it:

courtyards belonging to many people,

to each of which many houses belonging to different people open.

And

likewise

passageways that are not open through

to the public domain from here and from there, but are closed on three sides and open only on the fourth side to the public domain, and into which several courtyards belonging to different people open. If

they made an eruv

the residents of the houses in the courtyard together, by an “eruv of courtyards” [collecting bread from all the residents of the houses and placing it in one of the courtyard’s houses], and the residents of the houses in the courtyards of the passageway joined together in a “joining of passageways” [a joint collection of all the courtyards], then they are

permitted

to carry from a house to a courtyard by means of the “eruv of the courtyards,” and from the houses in the courtyards of the passageway to the passageway, and in the passageway itself by means of the “joining of passageways.”

But if

they did not make an eruv,

then they are

prohibited.

A person stands on the threshold [the outer threshold of the entrance of a house open to the public domain]

which is three handbreadths above the ground, but is not four by four handbreadths wide, such that it would be a “karmelit,” and its law is that of an “exempt place”:

This is

taking

an object

from the homeowner

who is standing in the private domain beside him,

and

likewise

giving it to him.

And this is

taking from a poor person

who is standing in the public domain beside him,

and

likewise

giving it to him,

that is, it is permitted to take out and bring in from a “place exempt from liability” to the public domain and to the private domain.

Provided that he does not take from the homeowner

who is standing in the private domain

and give to the poor person

who is standing in the public domain. And he should not take

from the poor person and give to the homeowner,

because he is treating the prohibitions of Shabbat lightly ab initio, causing an act of taking out from the private domain to the public domain, and because of a decree lest he come to be lenient and take out from the private domain to the public domain.

And if he took

from a person standing in this domain

and gave

to a person standing in the second domain,

all three are exempt.

Others say:

There is

an entryway platform

that

serves two domains,

that is, at times its status is like that of the private domain beside it, and at times its status is like that of the public domain beside it. How?

When the doorway

of the private domain

is open,

the status of the entryway platform is

like the inside.

And when

the doorway

of the private domain

is locked,

the status of the entryway platform is

like the outside.

And if

the

entryway platform was ten

handbreadths

high and four

by four handbreadths wide,

it is an independent domain,

and one does not take out from the private domain into it. All the words of Others will be explained in the Gemara below, 9a.

The Master said,

in the aforementioned beraita,

“This is a private domain ”.

And the Gemara discusses:

to exclude what

did the tan[n]ay say the expression “this is”?

And it explains:

to exclude this [opinion] of Rabbi Yehuda.

That is, a private domain is only like these that are surrounded by partitions [or that have three partitions], and this comes to exclude the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that two partitions on the two sides suffice to make a private domain.

An alley enclosed on three of its sides and open to the public domain on its fourth side, although by Torah law it is a private domain, since three partitions suffice to make it a private domain, nevertheless the Sages prohibited carrying within it, because the Sages were concerned that, since one of its ends is open to the public domain, people might come to err and liken the permission to carry in the alley to carrying in the public domain, and come to carry four cubits even in a completely established public domain. And the Sages instituted that a distinguishing sign be made for this alley at its end open to the public domain, by placing a side-post [a pillar ten handbreadths high] at one of the sides of the breach to the public domain, or by laying a crossbeam across the two walls of the alley, close to the public domain.

But if the alley was open through at both of its sides, so that it had only two partitions, then it is not a private domain according to the Sages, and it is forbidden to carry in it as in a karmelit, and placing a side-post or a crossbeam is of no avail to it. And all the more so if the public domain had two partitions on its two sides: placing a side-post or a crossbeam would not be effective to permit carrying between the houses, for it is a fully established public domain, since it has only two partitions. This is the view of the Sages, but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, as will be explained in the beraita before us.

For it was taught: Furthermore

Rabbi Yehuda said: One who has houses on the two sides of the public domain

opposite one another—the way between them is a private domain, since it has two partitions by means of the houses. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to carry within it, because even an alley that has three partitions, if it is open on its fourth side to the public domain, the Sages prohibited carrying within it until he rectifies it with a side-post or a crossbeam; and all the more so this one, which is open on both of its sides to the public domain.