Shabbat 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

It is just as [that is, this case is comparable]

[This is similar]

to one who carries an object in the public domain

more than four cubits and places it down, in which case he is liable! For

there, is it not so that, although he continues to hold it and walk,

we say that as long as the object is in his hand and he is walking with it, he is

exempt

as long as he is walking and does not put it down, even though he has already carried it four cubits in the public domain? Nevertheless,

when he places it down,

when he subsequently places it down in the public domain, he is

liable,

and we do not say that, since a period of “exempt walking” intervened meanwhile, he is exempt. If so,

here too,

when he takes an object from a private domain to a public domain by way of a karmelit,

it is no different.

He is liable, even though “exempt walking” intervened when he passed through the karmelit in the interim.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Are the cases comparable [can these two matters really be compared to one another]!?

For

there,

with regard to carrying more than four cubits in the public domain,

wherever he places it is a liable place [wherever he would place it after carrying it four cubits, he would be liable]. That is, although he walked by means of “exempt walking,” he did not walk in an “exempt place”; rather, he walked in a place where, had he placed it there without delaying from placing it down, he would have been liable. But

[wherever he would place it after carrying it four cubits, he would be liable]. That is, although he walked in a manner that would not itself create liability, he did not walk through a “place of exemption”; rather, he walked through a place where, had he placed the object down there instead of continuing to carry it, he would have been liable. But

here,

in the case of one who takes an object by way of a portico,

if he places it in the portico, it is an exempt place.

Rather,

the Gemara compares our matter to another matter:

it is just as with one who carries an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits, in which case he is liable! Yet

there, is it not so that, although, if he places it within four cubits [if he had placed the object within four cubits],

he would have been

exempt.

Nevertheless,

when he places it at the end of four cubits,

he is

liable.

If so,

here too,

when he takes an object from a private domain to a public domain and carries it by way of a karmelit,

it is no different,

and he is liable even though, had he placed it in the karmelit, he would have been exempt.

We reject this:

Are the cases comparable!?

For

there,

in the case of carrying four cubits in the public domain,

with regard to this man [with regard to this person], whose lifting took place where it did, indeed, within four cubits of that place

is

an exempt place,

but

for everyone, it is a liable place!

That is, with regard to another person who lifted an object four cubits away, even within this person’s four cubits it is a liable place. But

here,

when one takes an object by way of a karmelit,

for everyone

the karmelit

is an exempt place.

Rather,

the Gemara compares our matter to another matter:

it is just as with one who takes an object,

like a person who takes an object

from a private domain to a public domain by way of the ‘sides of the public domain.’

For example, a courtyard whose wall was breached into the public domain. The place where the partition fell is the “sides of the public domain,” whose law is not that of the public domain. And just as

there,

in the case of one who takes an object by way of the sides of the public domain,

is it not so that, although, if he places it by the sides of the public domain,

he would be

exempt,

nevertheless,

when he places it in the public domain

he is

liable.

Therefore,

here too,

when he takes an object from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico,

it is no different.

He is liable even though, had he placed it in the portico, he would have been exempt.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this: This works well according to the Rabbis, who say that the sides of the public domain are not considered like the public domain,

and according to them, if he placed the object by the sides of the public domain he would be exempt; thus one can indeed derive our case from it.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the sides of the public domain

also

are considered like the public domain,

and if he placed it there he would be liable,

what is there to say [from where do we derive liability for one who takes an object from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico]!?

[from where can we derive liability for one who carries from a private domain to a public domain through a portico]!?

He said,

Rabbi Akha son of Rabbi Ika

answered

Rav Pappa:

You may infer that you have heard Rabbi Eliezer say that the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain only where there are no stakes [Rabbi Eliezer said that the sides of the public domain are not considered unlike the public domain only where no stakes separate the public domain from its sides].

[Rabbi Eliezer said that the sides of the public domain do not have the status of the public domain only in a place where no stakes separate the public domain from its sides].

But

where there are stakes, have you heard him say that!? [In a place where there are stakes in the walls at the sides of the public domain, placed there so that carts will strike the stakes rather than the wall and knock it down—did Rabbi Eliezer say that even in such a case they are considered like the public domain]!?

Therefore, with regard to this,

the sides of the public domain,

it is comparable.

That is, even according to Rabbi Eliezer, we can compare one who takes an object by way of a portico to one who takes an object by way of the sides of the public domain where there are stakes.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Ben Azzai concedes

—although he exempts one who takes an object by way of a portico—

in the case of one who throws

an object from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico, that he is liable. The reason Ben Azzai exempted one who walked by way of a portico is that “walking is considered like standing,” and this does not apply when one throws by way of a portico. Therefore, Ben Azzai concedes that he is liable. Rabbi Yohanan teaches us that even Ben Azzai concedes that one who takes an object by way of a portico must be held liable, as is one who takes an object by way of the sides of the public domain; Rabbi Yohanan exempted only one who walks, because “walking is considered like standing.”

The Gemara supports Rabbi Yohanan’s statement:

It was taught likewise,

in accordance with his statement:

One who takes an object from a shop to a public square by way of a portico

is

liable.

Whether one who takes an object

from a private domain to a public domain by way of a portico

or one who brings an object in

from a public domain to a private domain by way of it.

Whether one who extends an object

from one domain to another by way of it

or one who throws an object

from one domain to another by way of it.

Ben Azzai says: One who takes an object or brings an object in

from one domain to another by way of a portico while walking is

exempt,

because “walking is considered like standing.” But

one who extends an object or throws an object

from one domain to another by way of a portico

is liable.

The Sages taught: There are four domains

with differing laws

for

taking objects out on

Shabbat:

a.

A private domain.

b.

And a public domain.

c.

And a karmelit.

d.

And an exempt place.

a.

And what is a private domain?

A ditch that is ten

handbreadths deep, so that the area at the bottom of the ditch is surrounded on all sides by partitions ten handbreadths high,

and four

by four handbreadths wide, which is the measure of a significant place.

And likewise, a wall [a partition]

[a partition]

that is ten

handbreadths high

and four

by four handbreadths wide is considered a private domain at the top of the wall. This is because with regard to all four sides we say, “Draw up and raise [the partitions],” meaning that the surfaces of the partitions extend upward onto its top; consequently, its top is surrounded by partitions ten handbreadths high on all four sides, and its interior is four by four handbreadths.

This is a complete private domain.

b.

And what is a public domain?

A sרטיא [a road used for travel from one city to another],

[a road used to travel from city to city],

and a pלטיא [a large open area in a city where people gather for commerce—a market]

[a large city square where people gather for commerce—a marketplace]

that is large,

having an area sixteen cubits wide.

And alleys [in a city, sixteen cubits wide]

[of a city that are sixteen cubits wide]

that are open through [open at both ends] to the public domain,

[open from both ends] into the public domain,

this is a complete public domain.

One may not take objects out from this private domain

that we mentioned

to this public domain

that we mentioned.

And one may not bring objects in from this public domain to this private domain. And if

he took an object out

from the private domain to the public domain,

or brought an object in

that is, brought it from the public domain to the private domain:

If he did so

unintentionally,

he is

liable to bring a sin-offering,

as with all the labors of Shabbat, whose intentional violation is punishable by karet and whose unintentional violation requires a sin-offering.

If he did so

intentionally,

he is

punished by karet

if he was not forewarned,

and stoned

if he was forewarned.

c. And what is a karmelit?

But the sea,

whose boundaries are not considered partitions, is not a place of public passage, and its area is four by four handbreadths.

And an open field [an expanse of fields],

which is not enclosed by partitions but is not a place of public passage, and whose area is four by four handbreadths.

And a portico,

which is the “portico” mentioned above on 5b, which likewise has no partitions, is not a place of public passage, and has an area of four by four handbreadths.

And the karmelit.

That is, all of these are karmelit [the wording of the beraita will be explained below in the Gemara], and this is the law of a karmelit:

a.

It is neither like a public domain,

because it does not resemble the standards of the encampment in the wilderness [the Israelite camp arranged according to its standards in the wilderness], since it is not intended for public passage,

nor is it like a private domain,

because it does not have partitions like a private domain.

b.

One may not carry objects

within it

in it,

by rabbinic decree, as in the prohibition against carrying an object four cubits in the public domain.

But if one carried an object within it,

he is

exempt,

because according to Torah law a karmelit is not a public domain; rather, it has the status of an “exempt place.”

And one may not take objects out from it to the public domain,

by rabbinic decree,

nor from the public domain into it. And one may not

bring objects in from a private domain into it

by rabbinic decree,

nor from it into a private domain. But if he took an object out or brought one in,

he is

exempt.

The beraita further teaches laws of carrying out that are unrelated to the division of domains. Even though one takes an object from one private domain to another private domain, the Sages nevertheless prohibited it:

the courtyards belonging to many people,

where many houses belonging to different people open into each courtyard.

And

likewise,

alleys that are not open through

to the public domain at both ends, but are closed on three sides and open only on the fourth side to the public domain, and into which several courtyards belonging to different people open. If

the residents joined in an eruv

the people whose houses are in the courtyard together by means of an “eruv of courtyards” [bread is collected from all the residents of the houses and placed in one of the courtyard’s houses], and the residents of the houses in the courtyards opening into the alley joined together by means of a “partnership of alleys” [a joint collection from all the courtyards], then they are

permitted

to carry from a house to the courtyard by means of the “eruv of courtyards,” and from the houses in the courtyards opening into the alley to the alley, and within the alley itself by means of the “partnership of alleys.”

But if they

did not join in an eruv,

they are

forbidden.

A person stands on the threshold [the outer threshold of the entrance of a house opening to the public domain]

which is three handbreadths above the ground, but is not four by four handbreadths wide, so that it would be a karmelit; rather, it has the law of an “exempt place”:

This is

taking

an object

from the homeowner

who is standing in the adjacent private domain,

and

likewise

giving it to him.

And this is

taking from a poor person

who is standing in the adjacent public domain,

and

likewise

giving it to him; that is, it is permitted to carry an object out of and into a “place exempt” from the public domain and the private domain.

meaning that it is permitted to carry an object out of and into “a place exempt from liability” and the public and private domains.

Provided that he does not take from the homeowner

who is standing in the private domain

and give it to the poor person

who is standing in the public domain. And he should not take

from the poor person and give it to the homeowner,

because this would constitute an initial disregard for the prohibitions of Shabbat, causing an object to be carried out from the private domain into the public domain; and because of a decree, lest he come to be lenient and carry an object out from the private domain into the public domain.

And if he took

from a person standing in one domain

and gave it

to a person standing in the other domain,

all three are exempt.

Others say:

There is

a threshold

that

serves two domains,

meaning that at times its status is that of the adjacent private domain, and at times its status is that of the adjacent public domain. How so?

When the entrance

of the private domain

is open,

the status of the threshold

is like the interior.

And when the

entrance to the

private domain

is locked,

the status of the threshold

is like the exterior.

And if the

threshold was

ten handbreadths high

and

four wide

by four handbreadths,

it is an independent domain, and one may not carry from the private domain into it. All the statements of Others will be explained in the Gemara below, on page 9a.

and one may not carry from the private domain into it. All the statements of Others will be explained in the Gemara below, on page 9a.

The Master said,

in the aforementioned beraita,

“This is the private domain.”

And the Gemara asks:

To exclude what

did the tanna say the expression, “This is”?

And it explains:

To exclude that which is [the opinion] of Rabbi Yehuda.

That is, a private domain exists only in the manner of those domains that are enclosed by partitions [or that have three partitions], in order to exclude the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that two partitions on opposite sides suffice to establish a private domain.

An alleyway enclosed on three sides and open to the public domain on its fourth side is, by Torah law, a private domain, since three partitions suffice to establish a private domain. Nevertheless, the Sages prohibited carrying within it, because they were concerned that, since one of its ends is open to the public domain, people might err and compare the permission to carry in the alleyway with carrying in the public domain, and come to carry four cubits even in a fully established public domain. The Sages therefore instituted that a distinguishing feature be made for this alleyway at its end open to the public domain, by placing a lehi [a post ten handbreadths high] at one side of the breach to the public domain, or by laying a beam across the two walls of the alleyway near the public domain.

But if the alleyway was open at both ends, so that it had only two partitions, it is not a private domain according to the Sages, and it is prohibited to carry within it as in a karmelit; placing a lehi or a beam does not help it. And all the more so, if the public domain had two partitions on its opposite sides, placing a lehi or a beam would not be effective in permitting carrying between the houses, since it is a fully established public domain, as it has only two partitions. This is the view of the Sages, but Rabbi Yehuda disagrees, as will be explained in the following beraita.

As it was taught: Furthermore,

Rabbi Yehuda said: One who has houses on the two sides of the public domain

opposite one another: the way between them is a private domain, since it has two partitions formed by the houses. Nevertheless, it is prohibited to carry within it, because even in the case of an alleyway with three partitions, if it is open on its fourth side to the public domain, the Sages prohibited carrying within it until he rectifies it with a lehi or a beam; all the more so in this case, which is open on both sides to the public domain.