Shabbat 5a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi obligates only when it is a roofed private domain

that has a roof over it,

as we say: A house is considered as though it were full.

That is, an object enclosed on every side is considered as though it were filled with objects up to its roof, so that its airspace is not regarded as airspace. Therefore, anything thrown into it is considered to have come to rest,

But if it is not roofed, no.

If so, one cannot derive from here, according to Rabbi, that it is unnecessary for the object to come to rest on a surface of four by four handbreadths, since it is considered as though it came to rest on a surface of four by four handbreadths.

And if you would say

to explain:

here too,

perhaps our Mishna, which obligates one for taking an object from a hand and placing it in a hand, is dealing

with a

private

domain that is roofed.

This cannot be said, because:

This works for a roofed private domain,

that is, it is understandable that when the Mishna obligates one for taking an object and placing it within the hand of the homeowner who is standing in a private domain, one may indeed say that the Mishna is dealing with a domain that is roofed.

But

in a roofed public domain, who is liable!?

That is, regarding what the Mishna obligates for taking an object from and placing it within the hand of the poor person standing in the public domain: is it possible to explain that the Mishna obligates one for carrying out from and bringing into a roofed public domain!?

But Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said that Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits in a roofed public domain is exempt, because it is not comparable

to that domain

to the banners of the wilderness

[the encampment of the Children of Israel, who camped in the wilderness according to their banners]. That is, since all the labors of Shabbat are derived from the Tabernacle, liability applies only in the manner in which the activity occurred in the Tabernacle. The public domain there in the wilderness was not roofed; therefore, there is no liability for carrying an object four cubits in a roofed public domain, and likewise there is no liability for carrying out from or bringing into a roofed public domain.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said

to resolve our Mishna, which obligates one for taking an object from and placing it within a hand, even though a hand is not a surface of four by four handbreadths:

Whose opinion is this?

Our Mishna follows

Others, as it is taught:

Others say:

If a person threw an object from one domain to another and another person received it:

If

the recipient remained

in place and

received

the object in his hand,

the one who threw it is liable,

for he was the one who performed both the taking and the placement.

But if

the recipient moved

from

his place

and ran toward the object

and received

it in his hand, the one who threw it is

exempt,

for one performed the taking and the other performed the placement, since the object was not received in the recipient’s hand through the agency of the one who threw it.

But surely this is difficult:

If he remained in place and received it, he is liable!?

We require placement upon a surface of four by four handbreadths, and there is none,

for the recipient received it in his hand.

Rather, conclude from this

with regard to the opinion of Others:

we do not require

placement upon

a surface of four by four handbreadths.

And our Mishna follows their opinion.

And we challenge this:

But perhaps,

even according to Others,

it is placement that we do not require,

as is demonstrated by the fact that they made the one who threw the object liable for placing it in another’s hand.

But perhaps for

taking it from a surface of four by four handbreadths

we do require it,

even according to Others. Yet our Mishna obligates one even for taking an object from a hand, which is not a surface of four by four handbreadths!?

And perhaps placement as well,

that is, even if you do not learn from here concerning Others that placement upon a surface of four by four handbreadths is unnecessary, because

perhaps

the beraita is dealing with a case

where he spread out his garment

[he spread out his garment], which is four by four handbreadths,

and received it

inside his garment,

so that there is placement as well

upon a surface of four by four handbreadths.

Rabbi Abba said

to resolve our Mishna:

Our Mishna too,

our Mishna as well should be explained [like the beraita of Others] as dealing with a case

where he took [the object] from a basket

[a basket measuring four by four handbreadths] held by the homeowner or the poor person,

and placed it upon a basket

held by them,

so that there is placement as well

upon a surface of four by four handbreadths.

And we challenge this:

But it teaches “his hand”

in our Mishna [“The poor person extends his hand inside, and places [the object] into the ‘hand’ of the homeowner. The homeowner extends his hand outside, and places [the object] into the ‘hand’ of the poor person]!

And we answer:

Read

in our Mishna

“a basket that is in his hand”!

We nevertheless challenge this:

This works with a basket in a private domain,

that is, it is understandable that what we learned, “and placed it into the hand of the homeowner,” who is standing in a private domain, can indeed be interpreted as placing it into a basket in his hand.

But a basket in the public domain

in the hand of the poor person—

is it a private domain!?

Should

we say

that our Mishna

is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda!?

As it is taught: Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: If one stuck a pole

—

in the public domain, with a basket at its top, and

if he

threw

from the public domain

and it came to rest upon it, he is liable,

as one who carries out from one domain to another—

For if

our Mishna

follows Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

it is difficult:

“The homeowner extends his hand outside and places [the object] into the hand of the poor person”—

which you interpret as referring to “a basket that is in his hand”—

why is he liable,

the homeowner!? After all,

he is carrying out from a private domain to a private domain

[this is nothing other than carrying out from a private domain to a private domain].

And we answer:

You may even say

that our Mishna follows

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda

as well.

There,

with regard to the stuck pole, we are dealing with a case in which the basket was

above ten

handbreadths, and therefore the basket is considered a private domain.

Here,

in our Mishna, we are dealing with a case in which the poor person is holding the basket

below ten

handbreadths, so it does not become a private domain.

Rabbi Abbahu found this difficult

with regard to Rabbi Abba’s resolution:

Does it teach

in our Mishna

“a basket that is in his hand”!

But it teaches “his hand”!

Rather, Rabbi Abbahu said

to explain our Mishna, which obligates one for taking an object from and placing it in a hand even though it is not a surface of four by four handbreadths: It is dealing with a case

where the homeowner or the poor person lowered

[lowered] his

hand below three

handbreadths, close to the ground,

and received it

there in his hand. Since his hand is less than three handbreadths from the ground, it is like the ground itself, and as though the object had been placed upon the ground, which is a surface of four by four handbreadths.

And we challenge this:

But it teaches “standing”

in our Mishna [“How does the poor person stand outside and the homeowner inside”]. According to this interpretation, he is actually sitting, since while standing he cannot lower his hand below three handbreadths!? And we answer: Our Mishna is dealing with one

who bends over

[standing and bending over].

And if you wish, say

that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he was standing

in a pit

and his hand was close to the edge of the pit, within three handbreadths.

And if you wish, say

that our Mishna is to be explained

with regard to a dwarf,

whose hand, even when he is standing, does not necessarily reach to within three handbreadths of the ground.

He said,

то есть

Rava

expressing astonishment at these resolutions:

Did the tanna take all this trouble to teach us all these cases,

that is, did the tanna nevertheless take the trouble to teach us that one who carries out from one domain to another is liable only through these unusual means!? He should have taught: “He spread out the corner of his garment, which is four [handbreadths wide], inside.”

Rather, Rava said

to resolve our Mishna, which obligates one for taking an object from and placing it within another person’s hand:

A person’s hand is significant for him

as four by four,

and therefore, when a person places an object within another person’s hand, or takes it from there, he is liable as though he had placed it upon or taken it from a surface of four by four handbreadths.

And when Ravin came

from the Land of Israel,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: A person’s hand is significant for him as four by four.

из одного владения в другое

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ilai said that Rabbi Yohanan said: If one threw an object

from one domain to another

and it came to rest

on its own, without his intending this,

within another person’s hand,

the one who threw it

is liable.

And the Gemara asks: What

does Rabbi Yohanan come to teach us

that

a person’s hand is significant for him as four by four,

and therefore one is liable for placing an object in the hand—

But Rabbi Yohanan already said this once [he already stated it once], as cited above!?

как приведено выше!?

And we answer:

Lest you say,

if Rabbi Yohanan had not taught us his second statement:

This applies

to the hand being considered as four by four

when he made it significant

[the person performing the labor]

for the object placed in it

of his fellow, that is, when he intended to place the object in his fellow’s hand and thereby gave the hand significance.

But when he did not make the hand significant for the object placed in it,

that is, when the object proceeded and came to rest on its own in his fellow’s hand, so that the person performing the labor did not designate the hand as the place where he would deposit what he threw,

say that it does not

mean that the hand should be considered as four by four—

He comes to teach us

in his second statement that even when the person performing the labor did not give his fellow’s hand significance, it is inherently considered as four by four, and the one who threw the object is liable.

Rabbi Avin said that Rabbi Ilai said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

If a person threw an object from one domain to another, or four cubits in a public domain, and another person received it:

If

the recipient remained

in place and

received

the object in his hand, the one who threw it

is liable,

because the taking and the placement were performed through his agency.

But if

the recipient moved

from

his place

and ran toward the object

and received

it in his hand, the one who threw it

is exempt,

because one performed the taking and the other performed the placement, since the object was not received in the recipient’s hand through the agency of the one who threw it.

It was taught likewise: Others say: If he stood in his place and received it, he is liable.

If he was lifted from his place and received it, he is exempt.

He inquired

[was uncertain]

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

if

a person threw

a

object

from one domain to another,

and he himself was lifted

himself

from his place

and ran after the object to the other domain,

and returned

there

and received it

in his hand,

what

is the ruling: does he become liable on account of carrying out from one domain to another!?

And the Gemara challenges:

What is it that is uncertain to him

for Rabbi Yoḥanan [what reason is there to be uncertain about this]? Yet the thrower performed the lifting with his throwing, and the placing with his lifting and receiving; so why should he not be liable!?

He said

he explained:

Rav Adda bar Ahava: Two forces,

the force that lifts and the force that places,

in one person

who performed both of them—that is what

he is uncertain about

for Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Does

two forces in one person resemble one person

who lifted and placed,

and

if so he is

liable?

Or perhaps:

two forces in one person

resemble two people,

where one lifts and the other places,

and

if so he is

exempt

like the law concerning two who performed it?

And we conclude:

teyku!

Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

If he was standing in the public domain, and

brought

[extended]

his hand into his fellow’s courtyard, and received

there

rainwater

in his hand,

and took out

it to the public domain in his hand, he is

liable.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection to this:

Yet we learned in our Mishna: “The poor person extended his hand inside, or took from within it and brought out—the poor person is liable”; but “The poor person extended his hand inside, or [the homeowner] gave into it and he brought out—both are exempt.” If so:

What difference is there whether his fellow loaded him

that is, the homeowner, as in the case of our Mishna, and

what difference is there whether water loaded him

as in the case stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan—

In either case he ought to be exempt, because

he did not perform the lifting

of the object from the second domain, and it follows that he performed only the placing; so why should he be liable!?

And we answer:

Do not say

that in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words, “he brought his hand into his fellow’s courtyard and

received

rainwater,” the meaning is that he extended his hand and rainwater fell into it, while he performed no action—

Rather,

this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He brought his hand into his fellow’s courtyard and

caught

rainwater. That is, he struck the rainwater with one hand during its descent and received it with his other hand. Therefore he is liable, for he lifted and placed it.

And we still challenge:

But we require lifting from atop a place of four

and yet

there is none

when he caught rainwater from the air during its descent!?

He said,

he answered,

Rabbi Ḥiyya, son of Rav Huna:

This is referring to

a case where he caught

the rainwater by striking with one hand toward his other hand,

from atop a wall

onto which the rainwater was pouring.

And we still challenge: If he caught it

from atop a wall as well

why is he liable?

But it did not come to rest

before its lifting, for the rainwater does not rest on the wall, but hangs in the air parallel to it, and this is not a placing for which one becomes liable for lifting from there!?

And we answer:

As Rabbah said

elsewhere in explaining a similar challenge, that it refers to

a slanted wall. Here too,

we are dealing, in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words,

with

rainwater that was pouring onto

a slanted wall.

And the Gemara discusses:

And where was Rabbah’s statement said [in what matter did Rabbah say “a slanted wall”?]

And we explain: Rabbah said it

The Gemara explains: Rabba said it

with regard to that which we learned

in tractate Eruvin: