Shabbat 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

And within

the height of

ten

handbreadths in the public domain

Rabbi Akiva

and the Sages disagree!? Is it indeed clear to Rabba, as appears from what he said, “Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Akiva’s,” and not the Sages’, in explaining the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages:

According to Rabbi Akiva, he is liable under the principle of “one who carries out from a private domain into a public domain,” because “an object that is caught in the air of the public domain is considered as though it had come to rest.” If so, Rabbi Akiva holds him liable only when he threw the object within ten handbreadths, which is the airspace of the public domain.

According to the Sages, he is exempt, because they do not hold that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest”!?

But Rabba raised this as a question

for Rabba was uncertain about this matter: Is this indeed the explanation of their dispute?]!?

For Rabba asked:

Is it only when he threw the object through the air of the public domain

below

a height of

ten

handbreadths, which is the airspace of the public domain, that

Rabbi Akiva

and the Sages

disagree

and this is the basis of their dispute]:

For Rabbi Akiva holds: An object caught

in the air of the public domain

is considered as though it had come to rest. And the Rabbis hold: We do not say that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest—

But

if he threw the object

above ten

handbreadths, in the upper airspace of the public domain, where it was not caught in the air of the public domain, and he cannot be held liable on the basis that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,”

everyone agrees

that even according to Rabbi Akiva he is

exempt—

And according to everyone,

both Rabbi Akiva and the Sages,

we do not derive

liability for the

one who throws

from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain

from the case of one who extends

and therefore they do not hold him liable when he throws the object above ten handbreadths!

That is to say: Although one of the categories of carrying out includes “one who extends an object from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain,” even when he extends it above ten handbreadths—and this is a separate case of “one who extends”—nevertheless, he is liable only when he extends an object from one domain to another, because this was the manner of extending objects in the Tabernacle: They extended objects from one wagon to another, both of which stood in the public domain. However, when one throws an object from one private domain to another private domain through the public domain, since we do not find such an activity in the Tabernacle, one cannot impose liability on him under the category of “one who extends.” Therefore, when he throws an object above ten handbreadths, where he cannot be held liable on the basis of “an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,” we do not hold him liable even under the category of “one who extends.”

Or perhaps

it is only when he threw the object at a height

above ten

handbreadths, in the airspace of the public domain, that

Rabbi Akiva

and the Sages

disagree:

For Rabbi Akiva holds: We derive the law of one who throws from that of one who extends,

and he holds him liable under the category of “one who extends.”

And the Rabbis hold: We do not derive the law of one who throws from that of one who extends

to hold him liable for throwing an object from one private domain to another private domain through the airspace of the public domain above ten handbreadths, under the category of “one who extends.”

But

if he threw the object

below ten handbreadths, everyone agrees that he is liable

under the category of “one who carries out from a private domain into a public domain.”

What is the reason?

Because

we say: An object caught

in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,

even according to the Sages.

If so, the difficulty arises: How could Rabba state unequivocally that our Mishna is in accordance only with Rabbi Akiva, when according to one possibility in Rabba’s own uncertainty, the Sages also agree with it!? And we answer:

This is not difficult! After Rabba had raised it as a question

for Rabba,

it was subsequently resolved for him

at first Rabba was uncertain, but ultimately he resolved the matter for himself],

for he held that only Rabbi Akiva

held that

an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,

whereas the Sages do not agree with him. Once he had resolved his uncertainty, he said: “Whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi Akiva’s.”

We raise another difficulty against Rabba: What difference does it make that we find that Rabbi Akiva holds one liable when the object comes to rest without resting on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths? Our Mishna proves that neither for placing an object down nor for lifting it is it necessary that it be above a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Therefore, the Mishna holds the poor person or the homeowner liable when he takes the object from the hand of the person opposite him—

But

perhaps

perhaps

even Rabbi Akiva

requires no proper placing down,

as is evident from his ruling that one is liable even when the object was caught only in the air of the public domain, for which he holds him liable as though it had come to rest;

but with regard to lifting

from a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths, one might say that it

is required

even according to Rabbi Akiva. The difficulty from our Mishna, which holds one liable even for lifting an object from a place that is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, would therefore remain!?

Rather, Rav Yosef said

to resolve the difficulty concerning our Mishna, which holds one liable for lifting or placing an object down on a hand:

Whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of our Mishna:

It is Rabbi’s!

And the Gemara discusses this:

Which Rabbi?

That is, from which statement of Rabbi can we learn that he does not require lifting and placing an object down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths?

Shall we say that this is the Rabbi

about whom it was taught: One who threw

an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits

and it came to rest

the object

on a projection

that extended even

any amount

in the public domain:

Rabbi holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

This proves that according to Rabbi, placing an object down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths is not required. This cannot be said, however, because the Gemara rejects this possibility:

There,

in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages concerning a projection, their dispute must be explained

as we will say below

as the Gemara will explain below, on page 8a], namely,

according to Abaye,

and one cannot learn from there that in every case placing an object down on a surface four handbreadths by four handbreadths is unnecessary:

For Abaye said:

an example of a tree standing in the private domain, that is, the trunk of the tree, which was four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, stood in the private domain, and if its foliage, which was not four by four wide, extended toward the public domain, and he threw an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits

Here,

in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, we are dealing

with

a case such as

a tree standing in the private domain,

that is, the trunk of the tree, which was four handbreadths by four handbreadths, stood in the private domain,

and

if

its foliage,

which was not four by four handbreadths,

extended into the public domain, and he threw

an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits

and it came to rest

the object

on its foliage

of the tree after four cubits:

For Rabbi holds:

He is liable—because of carrying an object four cubits in the public domain—even though the object came to rest on foliage that is not four handbreadths wide, because

we say: Extend

that is, project]

its foliage after its trunk,

that is, the trunk, which is four handbreadths wide, causes the foliage to be regarded as a place four handbreadths as well. It follows that it is as though he threw the object four cubits in the public domain and it came to rest on a place four handbreadths by four handbreadths.

And the Rabbis hold: We do not say, “Extend its foliage after its trunk,”

and since the foliage is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths, he is not liable for carrying the object four cubits in the public domain.

According to Abaye’s explanation, it follows that Rabbi held one liable for “any projection” only when it has the status of a “place of four,” but we still have not heard that Rabbi maintains that placing need not be performed upon a place of four.

Rather,

the Gemara explains Rav Yosef’s statement, that his intention was:

This is Rabbi,

from this statement of Rabbi it may be inferred that he does not require placing and uprooting from a place of four

as it was taught:

If one threw an object from the public domain to the public domain, with the private domain in between:

Rabbi holds him liable,

because we say: “An object caught”—in the airspace of the private domain, which extends upward to the firmament—“is considered as though it were placed.”

But the Sages exempt him,

because they do not maintain that “an object caught is considered as though it were placed.”

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi would hold him liable for two [transgressions]: one for carrying out,

when the object was caught in the airspace of the private domain and was therefore considered as though it had been placed there.

And one for carrying in,

since, once it is considered to be placed in the private domain, he is consequently liable for uprooting it from there and carrying it into the second public domain.

It follows,

necessarily that

Rabbi does not require

for

either uprooting or placing to be upon a place measuring four by four,

for according to Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of his statement, Rabbi holds him liable even for carrying in.

The Gemara raises an objection to this explanation of our Mishna:

But it was stated concerning it

regarding Rabbi’s statement:

Rav and Shmuel both said: