Shabbat 4b — the Talmud in English

And within

the height of

ten

handbreadths in the public domain

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagree!? Is it indeed so that it was obvious to Rabbah, as appears from what he said, “Whose view is this? It is Rabbi Akiva’s,” and not the Sages’, in explaining the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Sages:

According to Rabbi Akiva, he is liable by virtue of “transferring from the private domain to the public domain,” and because “something caught in the air of the public domain is considered as though it had come to rest”; therefore Rabbi Akiva holds him liable only when he threw it within ten handbreadths, which is the air of the public domain.

According to the Sages, he is exempt, because they do not hold that “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest”!?

According to the Sages, he is exempt, because they do not hold that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest there?

But Rabbah had in fact raised this as a question [and Rabbah was uncertain about this matter, whether this is indeed the explanation of their dispute]!?

? Rabba was uncertain about this matter: Is this indeed the explanation of their dispute?

For Rabbah asked:

Is it only when he threw it through the air of the public domain

below

the height of

ten

handbreadths, which is the air of the public domain, that

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagree,

?

and this is the basis of their disagreement [and this is their reasoning in the dispute]:

:

For Rabbi Akiva holds: something caught

in the air of the public domain—

is considered as though it had come to rest. And the Rabbis hold: we do not say that something caught is considered as though it had come to rest—

But

if he threw it

above ten

handbreadths, at a height within the air of the public domain, where it was not caught in the air of the public domain, and he cannot be held liable on account of “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest,”

according to everyone

and even according to Rabbi Akiva he is

exempt—

And according to everyone,

both Rabbi Akiva and the Sages,

we do not derive

liability for one who

throws

from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain

from one who extends,

and therefore they do not hold him liable above ten handbreadths!

That is, although among the forms of labor of transferring there is also “one who extends from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain,” even when he extends it above ten handbreadths, and this is a separate category of “extending,” nevertheless he becomes liable only when he extends from one domain to another, because this was the form of the labor of extending in the Tabernacle: they would extend objects from one wagon to another standing in the public domain. But when he throws from a private domain to a private domain through the public domain, since we do not find such a labor in the Tabernacle, there is no basis for holding him liable under the category of “extending.” Therefore, when he threw it above ten handbreadths, where he cannot be held liable on account of “something caught,” we do not hold him liable even by virtue of “extending.” They gave two answers. The first: if we were to derive one who throws from one who extends, then we would hold him liable for throwing below ten handbreadths on account of “extending,” even according to the one who holds that “something caught is not considered as though it had come to rest.”

Tosafot [However, this answer depends upon the uncertainty raised by Tosafot as to whether one who extends is liable below ten handbreadths. See further what they asked concerning this explanation.] The second: since this is explicitly established in the Mishna below, 96a, it necessarily follows that neither of them disputes this law, and that Mishna would be unlike both of them. And see carefully the wording of Rashi below, 97a, concerning Rabbah’s question mentioned there, and what is explained about his words in the notes to “Chavruta” on Tosafot. See also a third resolution of this difficulty in their words, s.v. “For we say.” Or perhaps

it is specifically when he threw it at a height

above ten

handbreadths, at the height of the public domain, that

the Sages and Rabbi Akiva disagree,

and

and this is the basis of their disagreement:

For Rabbi Akiva holds: we derive one who throws from one who extends,

and he holds him liable by virtue of the category of “extending.”

And the Rabbis hold: we do not derive one who throws from one who extends

to hold him liable for throwing from a private domain to a private domain through the air of the public domain above ten handbreadths, under the category of “extending.”

But

if he threw it

below ten, everyone agrees that he is liable

under the category of “transferring from a private domain to a public domain,”

what is the reason?

Because

we say: something caught

is considered as though it had come to rest,

even according to the Sages.

And if so, this is difficult: how could Rabbah state plainly that our Mishna follows only Rabbi Akiva, when according to one possibility in Rabbah’s own uncertainty, even the Sages agree with this!? And we answer:

This is not difficult! After Rabbah had asked

his question,

he subsequently resolved it for himself [at first Rabbah was indeed uncertain, and in the end he resolved it for himself],

for he held that Rabbi Akiva

alone held:

something caught is considered as though it had come to rest,

but the Sages do not agree with him. Once he had resolved his uncertainty, he said, “Whose view is this? It is Rabbi Akiva’s.”

The question is raised again against Rabbah: What does it matter that we find Rabbi Akiva holding one liable for a placement not upon a place of four [handbreadths]? After all, our Mishna proves that both for placement and for taking up, it is unnecessary that it be upon a place of four [handbreadths], and for this reason the Mishna held the poor person or the homeowner liable when he took [the object] from the hand of the person opposite him—

And

behold,

perhaps even Rabbi Akiva

requires no placement, as is evident from his words, since he holds him liable even in a case where the object was caught only in the air of the public domain, and he holds him liable for it as though it had come to rest;

but taking up

from upon a place of four [handbreadths] can be said to be

required even according to Rabbi Akiva. Yet the difficulty from our Mishna remains, since it holds him liable even for taking up not from upon a place of four [handbreadths]!? b. Earlier, on 4a, two explanations were brought in the notes—in the name of

Kehilot Yaakov—for the connection between “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest” and liability for [placing it] on a hand that is not a place of four [handbreadths]. The first: “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest” means in the air, which is not a place of four [handbreadths], and necessarily a place of four is not required. The second: “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest” means on the ground, which is a place of four [handbreadths], and he is liable for placing it on a hand because this is like placing it on the ground, which is a place of four [handbreadths]. [A similar matter is explained concerning an eruv upon a place of four [handbreadths]; see there.] And Kehilot Yaakov raised a difficulty with the second explanation [section 6, letter vav, where he wrote that this difficulty had already been raised in “Avnei Nezer,” section 240, and discussed at length]: Since the fact that according to Rabbi Akiva a place of four [handbreadths] is not required means that there really is here a place of four [handbreadths], because it is as though the object came to rest on the ground, then the same should apply concerning taking up: he already took it up from a place of four [handbreadths]. What difference is there between taking up and placement!? [The same difficulty applies to the explanation cited above in the notes in the name of the later authorities concerning Rashi, that the Gemara’s essential proof is from Rabbi Akiva holding him liable even though the object did not stop moving: the Gemara here is likewise difficult, for in the end, since it is resting in his hand and is not moving, let us say, “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest,” and it is thus like having come to rest upon a place of four [handbreadths]. It is possible, however, that according to Rashi, when it is in his hand we do not say “something caught is considered as though it had come to rest.” See Tosafot, s.v. “But below,” who brought them the “Kehilot Yaakov,” and see there.] On the basis of this difficulty, he explained there according to the third explanation cited above in the notes; see further there in “Kehilot Yaakov” another explanation. Rather, Rav Yosef said to resolve the difficulty from our Mishna, which holds one liable for taking up or placing upon the hand: Whose view is this?

from a surface four handbreadths wide, it may be said that it

does require

such a surface even according to Rabbi Akiva. The difficulty from our Mishna, which holds one liable even for lifting an object from a surface that is not four handbreadths wide, would nevertheless remain!

Our Mishna’s—

it is Rabbi’s!

And the Gemara discusses:

Which Rabbi,

that is, from which statement of Rabbi can it be learned that he does not require taking up and placement upon a place of four [handbreadths]?

Shall I say it is this Rabbi?

As it was taught: He threw

an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits

and it came to rest

the object

upon a projection

that extended even

any amount

in the public domain:

that extends even

Rabbi holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

From here it is proven that according to Rabbi placement upon a place of four [handbreadths] is not required.

Thus it is impossible to say this, because the Gemara rejects this possibility: There, in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages concerning a projection, their dispute can be explained

as we shall state below [as the Gemara will explain below, 8a], namely in accordance with Abaye,

and one cannot learn from there that placement upon a place of four [handbreadths] is never required.

For Abaye said:

as we will say later

as the Gemara will explain below, on page 8a. Their dispute is

in accordance with Abaye,

Here, in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, we are dealing

with

an example of a tree standing in the private domain, that is, the trunk of the tree, which was four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, stood in the private domain, and if its foliage, which was not four by four wide, extended toward the public domain, and he threw an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits

and it came to rest

the object

on its foliage

of the tree after four cubits:

a tree standing in a private domain,

that is, the trunk of the tree, which is four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, stood in the private domain,

For Rabbi holds:

he is liable—for carrying four cubits in the public domain—even though the object came to rest upon foliage that is not four handbreadths wide, because

we say: cast [throw]

its foliage after its trunk,

that is, the trunk, which is four wide, causes the foliage also to be regarded as a place of four, and it follows that it is as though he threw four cubits in the public domain and the object came to rest upon a place of four.

And the Rabbis hold: we do not say, cast its foliage after its trunk,

and since the foliage is not four by four wide, he is not liable for carrying four cubits in the public domain.

the object

on its foliage

after a distance of four cubits:

Rabbi holds:

He is liable for carrying an object four cubits in the public domain, even though the object came to rest on foliage that is not four handbreadths wide, because

we say: Extend

the foliage

after the trunk

That is, the trunk, which is four handbreadths wide, gives the foliage the status of a place four handbreadths wide as well. It follows that it is as though he threw the object four cubits in the public domain and it came to rest on a surface four handbreadths wide.

And the Sages hold: We do not say, “Extend the foliage after the trunk,”

and since the foliage is not four by four handbreadths wide, he is not liable for carrying an object four cubits in the public domain.

And according to Abaye’s explanation, it is clarified that even Rabbi held liable for “a ledge of any amount” only when it has the status of “a place of four,” and still we have not heard that Rabbi holds: placement atop a place of four is not required.

Rather

the Gemara explains Rav Yosef’s words, that his intention was

“here is Rabbi,”

from this statement of Rabbi one can learn that he does not require placement and removal from atop a place of four

for it was taught:

If one threw from a public domain into a public domain, with a private domain in the middle:

Rabbi holds him liable,

because we say: “Caught in the air of the private domain—which rises to the firmament—it is considered as though it were placed.”

But the Sages exempt,

because they do not hold: “Caught is considered as though it were placed.”

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Rabbi would hold him liable for two: one on account of carrying out

when it was caught in the air of the private domain, and it was as though it had been placed there.

And one on account of bringing in,

since, once it is considered placed in the private domain, he is automatically liable for its removal from there and its bringing into the second public domain.

Thus,

necessarily

he does not require

for Rabbi

neither removal nor placement on a place four by four,

for Rabbi holds him liable even for bringing in, according to Rav Yehuda’s interpretation of his words.

And the Gemara raises an objection to this explanation of our Mishna: it was stated concerning it

with regard to Rabbi’s words

:

Rav and Shmuel both said: