Shabbat 4a — the Talmud in English

Here -

the beraita that prohibits it deals with the law of transferring the produce that is in his hand

to another courtyard.

And

as Rava asked Rav Naḥman [

when Rava asked Rav Naḥman]:

If his hand was full of produce and he extended it outside, what is the ruling regarding returning it to that

courtyard?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

It is permitted

to return it to that courtyard.

Rava then asked Rav Naḥman again: Returning it

to another courtyard—what is the ruling?

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

It is prohibited

to return it to another courtyard.

Rava asked Rav Naḥman:

And what is the difference [

what distinction is there between them]?

Rav Naḥman said to him: I will answer you

“When you eat a kor of salt over it” [

when you measure out a kor of salt for me, I will tell you the reason for the matter]. The distinction is:

There,

when he returns it to the same courtyard from which he removed the object,

his intention was not carried out [

his intention to remove the object from it was not carried out].

Here,

when he returns it to another courtyard,

his intention was carried out,

his intention to remove the object from the courtyard where it had been was carried out, and a decree must be issued lest he throw the object into the public domain, to which he extended his hand.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised a dilemma: If one stuck bread to an oven

on Shabbat, did

they permit him to remove it before he comes to liability for a sin-offering, or did they not permit him?

He said,

Rav Aḥa bar Abaye challenged

Ravina: What are the circumstances,

how are we to understand what Rav Beivai bar Abaye said—that his doubt concerns saving him from a sin-offering?

If you say it was an unwitting act and he did not remember [

if you say that the case is one in which he acted unwittingly—for example, he did not know that it was Shabbat, and still had not remembered], this cannot be said, because

for whom did they permit it [

for whom are we considering whether they permitted it]? That is, if he does not know that it is Shabbat, he is not asking us what to do, and it is impossible to discuss whether they permitted him to remove it or did not permit him to remove it.

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the case is one in which

he returned and remembered [

he again remembered] that it was Shabbat. But even this cannot be said, because

who becomes liable

for a sin-offering if he remembered before the bread that he put into the oven was baked, which is the completion of the labor of baking!?

!?

Keritot 2a]:

All those liable to sin-offerings are not liable until their beginning [

the beginning of the transgression, which in our case is putting the bread into the oven]

was unwitting, and their end [

the end of the transgression, which in our case is the baking itself]

was unwitting?

If so, this person remembered before the bread was baked; even if he does not remove it, he will not become liable to a sin-offering. How, then, could Rav Beivai be uncertain whether he may remove it before he becomes liable to a sin-offering? In any event, he will not become liable to a sin-offering!?

The Gemara answers:

Rather,

Rav Beivai’s doubt did not concern liability to a sin-offering. Rather, it concerned a case in which he put the bread into the oven

intentionally,

and

before he comes to the prohibition

for which one is liable to

stoning

if he was forewarned,

Rav Beivai should raise the dilemma

for Rav Beivai.

Сказал

Rabbi Shila

said [

that is, Rabbi Shila offered a different answer]:

Actually,

Rav Beivai’s doubt concerned a case in which he put the bread into the oven

unwittingly

and did not remember.

And

as for your difficulty:

“For whom did they permit it!?”

I will tell you:

For others

Rav Beivai was uncertain whether it is permitted for them to remove the bread, so that the baker will not come to liability for a sin-offering.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

to Rabbi Shila’s answer:

Do we tell a person, “Sin so that your fellow will merit”!?

That is, if the issue is not saving oneself from a prohibition but saving one’s fellow, it is obvious that a person may not transgress a prohibition, even a minor one, so that his fellow will not transgress a severe prohibition!?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Actually,

Rav Beivai’s doubt concerned a case in which he put the bread into the oven

intentionally,

and indeed the issue does not concern a sin-offering;

but say:

they permitted him to remove it

before he comes to the prohibition carrying stoning.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught it explicitly,

he taught Rav Beivai’s statement as a definitive ruling and not as a doubt, and with regard to the prohibition carrying stoning:

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: If one stuck bread to an oven, they permitted him to remove it before he comes to the prohibition carrying stoning.

We learned in the Mishna:

A poor person extended his hand

inside, and placed something into the hand of the homeowner, or removed something from it and took it outside—the poor person is liable:

The Gemara asks:

Why is he liable

the poor person, for placing something into the hand of the homeowner or for removing it from there?

But we require the removal and placement to be from upon

a place four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths,

and

in this case, when he removed it from the homeowner’s hand or placed it in the homeowner’s hand,

there is no

place four handbreadths by four handbreadths. Why, then, is the poor person liable for placing it there or removing it from there!?

He said,

he answered,

Rabba: Whose opinion is this,

whose view does our Mishna reflect?

It is Rabbi Akiva’s,

it is,

as he says: We do not require a place four by four.

As we learned: One who throws from one private domain to another private domain, with a public domain

running

between them,

between the two private domains,

Rabbi Akiva holds him liable

for carrying from the private domain into the public domain.

But the Sages exempt him.

The Gemara explains

their reasoning:

Rabbi Akiva

held: We say, “An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest”.

And the Rabbis held: We do not say, “An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest.”

We have therefore learned from Rabbi Akiva’s words that placement upon a place four [handbreadths] is not required, since the airspace of the public domain is not a place four [handbreadths], and nevertheless he is liable for carrying into it.

a. The airspace of the public domain, up to and including a height of ten handbreadths, is part of the public domain. But airspace above a height of ten handbreadths is not considered the “public domain.” Therefore, one who carries from a private domain into a public domain above ten handbreadths is not liable.

b. If two private domains project above the public domain from one side of the public domain [“one balcony”], and one extended an object from this private domain to the private domain opposite it, he is liable on account of “extending,” since the Levites in the Tabernacle extended objects from one wagon to another, both of which stood on the same side of the public domain. However, concerning one who throws an object from one to the other, we learned in the Mishna below, in the chapter “One Who Throws,” 96a, that he is not liable, because the Levites’ work was performed by extending and not by throwing. It is this distinction that our discussion addresses.

c. One who extends an object is liable when he extends it at a height above ten handbreadths, because the Levites’ extending in the Tabernacle was likewise from one private domain to another by way of an area above ten handbreadths. Their extending was from one wagon to another, and the height of a wagon is ten handbreadths or more.

The Gemara challenges Rabba’s statement, “It is Rabbi Akiva’s opinion,” which implies that the Sages disagree with him concerning the law that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest, and that our Mishna cannot accord with their view: Does this mean that it was obvious to Rabba [

is it indeed obvious to Rabba],

that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest -

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