Shabbat 3b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Hiyya said to Rav,

who had asked his doubt before Rabbi:

Son of nobles!

And

did I not tell you: when Rabbi is occupied with this tractate, do not ask him in another tractate, lest he not have it in mind

and be embarrassed—

for were it not

that Rabbi is a great man, you would have put him to shame! For he would give you a resolution that is not a resolution. Nevertheless, now,

although you asked your question concerning the tractate of Shabbat while Rabbi was occupied with another tractate,

he has given you a proper resolution.

That is, were it not that Rabbi is a great man, you would have put him to shame, for he would have answered you with a resolution that is not a resolution. Nevertheless, on this occasion he answered you properly.

So

thus

it was taught,

in accordance with Rabbi’s words:

If he was carrying foodstuffs and beverages from before daybreak,

and he took them outside after nightfall, he is liable, because this is not comparable to his hand;

the discussion before us concerns one who extended his hand, which was full, into another domain on the eve of Shabbat or on Shabbat: is he permitted to return it to himself on Shabbat?

Abaye said:

This law

is obvious to me

from the Mishna before us, for

a person’s hand

extended into another domain

is neither like the public domain,

that is, if a person was standing in the public domain and his hand was extended into the private domain, his hand is not drawn after his body to be considered like the public domain [which is the domain in which his body is standing], so that one who transfers from the private domain to his hand, or from his hand to the private domain, will be liable on account of “taking out from one domain to another.”

And

also

not like the private domain,

that is, if the person was standing in the private domain and his hand was extended into the public domain, his hand is not drawn after his body to be considered like the private domain—which is the domain in which his body is standing—so that one who takes out from the public domain to his hand, or from his hand to the public domain, will be liable on account of “taking out from one domain to another.”

And Abaye explains his words: this that I said, “a person’s hand

does not resemble the public domain,”

is obvious to me

from the hand of the poor person

in our Mishna. That is what we learned: “The poor person [standing in the public domain] extended his hand inside, and the homeowner took [an object] from it; both are exempt.” It is clear that the homeowner is not liable for removing from the hand of the poor person standing in the public domain and bringing it into the private domain. Thus, a hand extended from the public domain is not considered like the public domain.

And this that I said, “a person’s hand

does not resemble the private domain,”

is obvious to me

from the hand of the homeowner

in our Mishna. That is what we learned: “The homeowner [standing in the private domain] extended his hand inside, and the poor person took [an object] from it; both are exempt.” It is clear that the poor person is not liable for removing from the hand of the homeowner standing in the private domain and taking it out into the public domain. Thus, a hand extended from the private domain is not considered like the private domain.

However,

Abaye asked

[Abaye is uncertain concerning this law]: Since the hand is not drawn after the body with regard to liability by Torah law, it is therefore another domain. And if so, it is necessary to inquire:

a person’s hand

which he extended [whether on the eve of Shabbat or on Shabbat] while it was full into another domain,

what is the law that it should become

the hand on Shabbat

a karmelit,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

Did

the Rabbis penalize it,

did the Sages penalize it, so that the hand should be a karmelit, and it would be forbidden

to return it to him

[to return his hand to himself], since now he is considered to be taking the object from a karmelit into the public domain [or into the private domain], and his hand would have to remain extended in this way until the conclusion of Shabbat?

Or not

did they penalize him, and it is permitted for him to return his hand.

Come and hear: If his hand was full of produce and he took it outside: one [beraita] taught

[in one beraita we learned]:

it is forbidden to return it

to his hand.

And another [beraita] was taught

[and in a second beraita we learned]:

it is permitted to return it.

Is it not that they disagree about this: that one,

the tan­-nay in the beraita that forbids returning it,

holds that it resembles a karmelit,

and therefore it is forbidden to return it.

And the other,

the tan­nay in the beraita that permits it,

holds that it does not resemble a karmelit.

And we reject this:

No,

not as you explained the contradiction between the beraitot, but

everyone—

both beraitot hold that if he extended his hand into the private domain, or into the public domain below a height of ten handbreadths, the hand

resembles a karmelit.

And there is no difficulty

with the contradiction between the beraitot:

Here,

the beraita that forbids returning it is speaking of a case where he extended his hand into the public domain

below

the height of

ten

handbreadths, for up to this height it is the air of the public domain, and it follows that he extended his hand from the private domain into the public domain; therefore they penalized him, so that his hand should be like a karmelit.

Here,

the beraita that permits it is speaking of a case where he extended his hand into the public domain

above

the height of

ten

handbreadths, which is not the air of the public domain, but is a “place of exemption,” and therefore they did not penalize him.

And if you wish, say

to resolve the contradiction between the beraitot:

both this and that,

the two beraitot are speaking of a case where he extended his hand

below ten

handbreadths,

and

according to everyone

it does not resemble a karmelit,

and it is not considered an independent domain. And even the beraita that forbids it is not for the reason that the hand is an independent domain, and therefore it is forbidden to return it.

And there is no difficulty:

Here,

the beraita that permits it is speaking of a case where he extended his hand

from before daybreak.

Here,

the beraita that forbids it is speaking of a case where he extended his hand

after nightfall.

And the Gemara explains: if he extended his hand

from before daybreak,

when he did not perform any prohibition,

the Rabbis did not penalize him

from returning it; and since it is not an independent domain, he is permitted to return his hand.

But if he extended his hand

after nightfall,

when he performed a rabbinic prohibition by extending his hand with an object into the second domain,

the Rabbis penalized him

so that he should not return it. This is not because they made it like a karmelit, but merely a penalty.

And we raise an objection to this:

On the contrary, the opposite is more reasonable!

If he extended his hand from before daybreak, we should say that it is forbidden to return it, whereas when he extended his hand after nightfall, we should say that they did not forbid him to return it. For when he extends his hand

from before daybreak,

when there was no removal on Shabbat, it follows

that if he throws it, he will not come to liability for a sin-offering

[if he throws the object from his hand because it is difficult for him to keep his hand, full and extended into the public domain, until the conclusion of Shabbat, he will not become liable for a sin-offering]. In such a case it would be appropriate to say

that the Rabbis should penalize him,

since there is no concern of a prohibition by Torah law if he does not comply with the rabbinic decree, and he will throw it. But if he extended his hand

after nightfall, for if he throws it,

if he throws the object in his hand into the public domain because it is difficult for him to comply with the rabbinic decree that forbade him to return his hand, which is full,

he will come through it to liability for a sin-offering,

for he removed it, transferred it, and placed it on Shabbat; in such a case we should say

that the Rabbis should not penalize him,

lest he throw the object from his hand and come to a prohibition by Torah law.

And since we do not answer in this manner

[and since the members of the b­eit-midrash did not resolve the contradiction between the beraitot in this manner], it is clear that they hold that the Sages did not take into consideration enacting a decree out of concern lest one fail to comply with it and perform a more serious prohibition. And if so,

resolve

from this his doubt,

of Rav Beיבי bar Abaye,

who was uncertain about a similar matter!

For Rav Beיבי bar Abaye asked:

A person who

attached

a

loaf to an oven

on Shabbat, and when the loaf is baked he will become liable for a sin-offering on account of the labor of “baking”: did

they permit him

the Sages

to remove it,

to take it out of the oven, despite the fact that removing bread from the oven involves a rabbinic prohibition,

before he comes to liability for a sin-offering,

that is, so that he should not come to liability for a sin-offering?

Or did they not permit it.

And from the words of the yeshiva scholars

resolve that they did not permit

him to remove it, just as we say here, that the Sages did not refrain from penalizing him by having him return his hand, despite the concern lest he throw the object from his hand and come to a prohibition from the Torah.

And the Gemara says concerning this:

This is not difficult, and resolve it!

That is to say, what difference does it make that Rav Bibi’s question should be resolved?

And if you wish, say:

Rav Bibi’s question will in fact not be resolved.

And it is not difficult,

that is to say, we shall explain the contradiction between the baraitot in this manner:

Here

—the baraita that permits it—is dealing with a case in which he extended his hand on Shabbat

inadvertently.

Here

—the baraita that prohibits it—is dealing with a case in which he extended his hand on Shabbat

deliberately.

And the Gemara explains: If he extended his hand

inadvertently, the Sages did not penalize him

to return his hand, for he did so inadvertently. His hand. But if he extended his hand on Shabbat

deliberately, the Sages penalized him

not to return his hand.

And if you wish, say

to resolve the contradiction between the baraitot:

Both this and that

—the two baraitot—are dealing with a case in which he extended his hand

inadvertently. And here they disagree about whether they penalized an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate act

, the disagreement between the baraitot being whether they also penalized an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate act:

One

—the tan[n]ay of the baraita that prohibits it—

holds that they penalized an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate act.

And the other

—the tan[n]ay of the baraita that permits it—

holds that they did not penalize an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate act.

And if you wish, say

to explain the contradiction between the baraitot:

They never penalized

an inadvertent act on account of a deliberate act,

and

nevertheless

it is not difficult

to reconcile the contradiction between the baraitot. For

here,

the baraita that permits it is dealing with the law of returning the hand

to that same courtyard

from which he extended his hand.