Shabbat 3a — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Mattana to Abaye:

This is not difficult.

The difficulty that you raised is not a difficulty, because

granted

the “exempt” cases taught

b in the first clause

there is no difficulty why the tanna does not mention them among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat. Since these did not participate at all in the principal labor, but merely provide assistance to another person who performs the entire labor, they are therefore initially permitted to do so, and

“exempt but permitted” is not taught.

His act is not counted among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat.

Rather,

those “exempt” cases taught in

the latter clause, “exempt”

each of them brings him close

but forbidden

to do so initially by rabbinic decree—this is indeed

difficult

to me: why are they not counted among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat?

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against what Rav Mattana said, that the “exempt” stated in the first clause means “exempt but permitted”:

Is there, throughout the laws of Shabbat, “exempt but permitted”!?

Is there, in all the laws of Shabbat, an expression of “exempt” whose meaning is “exempt and also permitted”!?

But Shmuel said: Every “exempt” of Shabbat,

that is,

exempt but forbidden, except for these three,

outside of these three,

which are exempt but permitted:

a.

the trapping of a deer.

b.

and the trapping of a snake.

c.

and opening an abscess.

And if so, the “exempt” taught in our Mishna means “exempt but forbidden,” and how did Rav Mattana say that it is exempt but permitted?

And we answer: Shmuel did not include every place where we taught the expression “exempt” in his general rule. Rather,

when

it was necessary

for Shmuel

to explain which “exempt” is “exempt but forbidden” and which is “exempt but permitted,” it was only with

“exempts” in which he performs an act

[only with the expression “exempt” stated concerning one who performed an act]; and concerning them Shmuel properly explained that the intention is “exempt but forbidden,” except for three—

But

“exempts” in which he does not perform an act—there are many

[there are many expressions of “exempt” stated concerning one who did not perform an act]. That is, there are many expressions of “exempt” concerning one who did not perform an act whose intention is exempt but permitted, such as this one in our Mishna; and Shmuel did not speak at all about these.

And here the Gemara returns to Rav Mattana’s original difficulty:

Nevertheless

there is a difficulty:

there are twelve

and why did we teach, “two that are four inside, and two that are four outside,” which implies that there are only eight labors!?

And we answer: The tanna does not enumerate all the acts of carrying forbidden by rabbinic decree, but only

the exemptions through which one can come to liability for a sin-offering he counts.

Only those forms of labor whose performer can come to liability for a sin-offering—namely, removals [for carrying out or bringing in], for if he completes the act and places it down he will be liable for a sin-offering—those the tanna taught under “the acts of carrying on Shabbat.” But the forms of labor

through which one cannot come to liability for a sin-offering

[where the performer cannot come to liability for a sin-offering on this occasion],

he does not count

the tanna, even though the Sages forbade doing so.

For this reason we taught only, “two that are four inside,” namely, complete carrying out and bringing in, plus two removals for carrying out [one with transferring from domain to domain, and the other without it, for one standing inside]. And likewise, “two that are four outside,” namely, complete bringing in and carrying out, plus two removals for bringing in, with transfer from domain to domain and without it—for one standing outside. But the acts of placing down performed by the one opposite him the tanna does not count. And the Gemara asks: Why indeed

are both exempt

when two performed a labor together, this one removing and that one placing!?—

but a labor was performed between them

[after all, a complete labor was performed between the two of them], and why are both exempt!?

And we answer, because

it was taught: Rabbi says:

The Torah said in the portion of Leviticus concerning a sin-offering: “And if one person sins unwittingly

from among the people, when he performs

one of the commandments of the Lord that may not be performed, and he incurs guilt. Or his sin becomes known to him which he committed, and he shall bring his offering.” And we expound the expression “when he performs” as though it said “when he performs it,” namely, the “labor,” to teach us that only

the one who performs

alone

it

in its entirety

[the entire labor] is liable,

but not one who performs part of it,

namely, “this one removes and that one places down.”

One person and he performed it,

who removed and placed down by himself,

is liable

for a sin-offering. But

two people and they performed it,

this one removing and that one placing down, they are

exempt.

It was also stated: Rabbi Hiyya bar Gamda said: It was uttered from the mouth of the group

to explain our Mishna, which did not make one liable in the case of “this one removes and that one places down,”

and they said:

From the implication that Scripture said

“when he performs it,”

we learn that only

one person who performed it

is

liable,

but

two who performed it are exempt.

It has already been explained that a person is not liable for carrying from domain to domain unless he removed the object in this domain and placed it down in another domain. The discussion before us deals with the details of the law of removal and the law of placing down.

Rav asked Rabbi

[Rav asked Rabbi]: He was standing in the private domain and

his fellow loaded him

on his shoulder

food and drink,

and he carried them out

on his shoulder

outside

and stood there;

what is

the ruling as to whether he becomes liable for carrying out?

The sides of the doubt are: whether

the removal of his body,

together with what is upon it, when he began to walk,

is considered like the removal of an object from its place,

as though he removed what was upon him from the private domain,

and

if so,

he is liable.

Or perhaps, not

is the removal of his body considered like the removal of an object, and it follows that he did not remove it and is not liable.

Rabbi said to him

to Rav:

He is liable,

because the removal of his body is considered like the removal of an object.

Perhaps you will say: We learned in our Mishna, “The poor person extended his hand inside, or the householder placed [an object] into it, and the poor person carried it out; both are exempt,” and the poor person too is included in the exemption. It is therefore proven that the removal of the poor person’s hand, loaded together with the object, from the private domain is not to be considered removal, and therefore the poor person does not become liable. And it is proven that the removal of his body or his hand is not considered like the removal of an object!?

Your answer is:

and it is not comparable

the removal of his body loaded with an object

to

the removal of

his hand

loaded with it:

What is the reason

[what is the distinction]?

His hand is not resting

on the ground, and therefore the removal of the poor person’s hand extended into the private domain, together with the object that the householder placed in it, is not considered removal of the object from the private domain. In contrast,

his body is resting

on the ground. Therefore, the removal of his body together with the object upon it is considered removal of the object.