Shabbat 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rav Mattana said to Abaye:

This is not difficult.

Your objection is not an objection, because

granted that

the “exempt” cases taught in the first clause b

of the first part,

there is no difficulty as to why the tanna does not mention them among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat. Since these people did not participate at all in the principal act of labor, but merely provide assistance to another person who performs the entire act of labor, they are permitted to do so ab initio, and

“exempt but permitted” is not taught.

His act is not counted among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat.

Rather,

with regard to those “exempt” cases taught in

the latter clause, that it says “exempt”

each one of them brings

but is prohibited

to do so ab initio by rabbinic decree, the matter is indeed

difficult

to me: Why are they not counted among the acts of carrying stated with regard to Shabbat?

The Gemara raises an objection to what Rav Mattana said, that the “exempt” stated in the first clause means “exempt but permitted”:

Is there anywhere in all the laws of Shabbat “exempt but permitted”!?

Is there, throughout the laws of Shabbat, an expression of “exempt” whose meaning is “exempt and also permitted”!?

But did Shmuel not say: Every “exempt” case of Shabbat

that is,

exempt but prohibited, except for these three

[apart from these three],

which are exempt but permitted:

a.

trapping a deer.

b.

and trapping a snake.

c.

and opening an abscess.

If so, the “exempt” stated in our Mishna means “exempt but prohibited.” How, then, did Rav Mattana say that it means “exempt but permitted”?

And we answer: Shmuel did not apply his general principle to every place where the expression “exempt” is taught. Rather,

when

it was necessary

for Shmuel

to explain which “exempt” means “exempt but prohibited” and which means “exempt but permitted,” it was only with regard to

“exempt” cases in which he performs an act

[only with regard to the expression “exempt” stated concerning one who performed an act]; and in those cases Shmuel explained that it means “exempt but prohibited,” except for three—

But

there are many “exempt” cases in which he does not perform an act

[there are many instances where the expression “exempt” is stated concerning one who did not perform an act]. That is, there are many expressions of “exempt” concerning one who did not perform an act whose meaning is “exempt but permitted,” such as the case in our Mishna. Shmuel was not speaking about these cases at all.

The Gemara now returns to Rav Mattana’s original difficulty:

Nevertheless

the difficulty remains:

there are twelve,

so why did we learn, “two that are four inside, and two that are four outside,” implying that there are only eight acts of labor!?

And we answer: The tanna does not enumerate all the acts of carrying that are prohibited by rabbinic decree. Rather, he counts only

those exempt cases that can lead to liability for a sin-offering.

He teaches only those forms of labor whose perpetrator could come to incur liability for a sin-offering, namely, acts of removing [for carrying out or bringing in], since if he were to complete the act and place the object down, he would be liable for a sin-offering. These are what the tanna taught in “The acts of carrying on Shabbat.” But the forms of labor

that cannot lead to liability for a sin-offering

[in which the person performing them cannot incur liability for a sin-offering on this occasion],

he does not count

the tanna, although the Sages prohibited performing them.

For this reason, we learned only “two that are four inside,” namely, fully carrying out and fully bringing in, plus two acts of removing in carrying out [one with transfer from one domain to another, and one without such transfer, for the person standing inside]. Similarly, “two that are four outside” means fully bringing in and fully carrying out, plus two acts of removing in bringing in, with and without transfer from one domain to another, for the person standing outside. But the acts of placing down performed by the other person are not counted by the tanna. The Gemara asks: Why indeed are

both exempt

when two people performed one act of labor together, one removing and the other placing it down!? —

But the act of labor was performed between them

[the complete act of labor was performed through the two of them]; why, then, are both exempt!?

And we answer, because

it was taught: Rabbi says:

The Torah states in the portion of Vayikra concerning a sin-offering: “And if one person sins unwittingly from among the people, when he performs

any of them

of the mitzvot of the Lord that may not be performed, and he incurs guilt; or the sin of which he sinned is made known to him, and he shall bring his offering.” We interpret the expression “when he performs it” as though it said “when he performs it”—that is, the “act of labor”—to teach us that only

one who performs

by himself

the

entire act

[the entire act of labor] is liable,

but not one who performs only part of it,

namely, “one removes and the other places down.”

If one person performs it,

removing and placing down it himself, he is

liable

for a sin-offering. But

if two perform it,

one removing and the other placing down, they are

exempt.

It was likewise stated: Rabbi Hiyya bar Gamda said: It was uttered by the assembly

to explain our Mishna, which did not impose liability in the case of “one removes and the other places down,”

and they said:

From the implication of the verse’s saying

“when he performs it”,

we learn that only

one who performs it

is

liable,

but

two who perform it are exempt.

It has already been explained that a person is not liable for carrying from one domain to another unless he removes the object in one domain and places it down in another. The sugya before us discusses the details of the law of removing and the law of placing down.

Rav asked Rabbi

[Rav asked Rabbi]: If he was standing in the private domain and

his fellow loaded him

on his shoulder

with food and drink,

and he carried them out

on his shoulder

outside

and stood there,

what

is the law—does he become liable for carrying?

The two sides of the uncertainty are: Is

the removal of his body,

together with what is upon it, when he began walking,

considered like the removal of an object from its place,

as though he had removed what was upon him from the private domain,

and

if so,

he is liable?

Or perhaps not:

the removal of his body is not considered like the removal of an object, so it emerges that he did not remove the object, and he is not liable.

He said to him Rabbi said to Rav:

He is liable,

because the removal of his body is considered like the removal of an object.

One might say: We learned in our Mishna, “If the poor person stretched his hand inside, or if the householder placed something into it and he carried it out, both are exempt,” and the poor person too is included in the exemption. This proves that the removal of the poor person’s loaded hand, together with the object, from the private domain is not considered removal; therefore, the poor person is not liable. It proves that the removal of one’s body or hand is not considered like the removal of an object!?

The answer is:

It is not comparable

the removal of one’s body while carrying an object

to

the removal of

his hand

while it is carrying an object:

What is the reason

[what is the distinction]?

His hand is not resting

on the ground,

and therefore the removal of the poor person’s hand extended into the private domain, together with the object that the householder placed in it, is not considered removal of the object from the private domain. By contrast, his body is resting

on the ground. Therefore, the removal of his body together with the object upon it is considered removal of the object.

on the ground. Therefore, the removal of his body together with the object upon it is considered removal of the object.