Shabbat 2b — the Talmud in English

“Knowledges” of impurity,

with regard to the impurity of the Temple and its sacred things,

two which are four.

That is: a person who is impure, who is forbidden to eat sacred flesh and is forbidden to enter the Temple, and who knew of his impurity, but erred because, after his knowledge of his impurity, the knowledge that he was impure disappeared from him, and he ate sacred flesh, or he erred and entered the Temple while impure—he is liable for a sin-offering. And Scripture specifies the liability for the offering when the person knew that he was eating sacred flesh, or knew that this was the Temple, but his own impurity disappeared from him.

Thus, there are “two [disappearances of] knowledges of impurity” for which he is liable by an explicit verse: the disappearance of the knowledge of impurity, and he ate sacred flesh; and the disappearance of the knowledge of impurity, and he entered the Temple.

And there are two further disappearances of knowledges of impurity for which he is liable by an amplification of the verses, for the liability was not written explicitly in the Torah. And they are: a. He knew that he was impure, but it escaped him that this was sacred flesh, and he thought that it was ordinary food; therefore he ate it while impure. b. He knew that he was impure, but it escaped him that this was the place of the Temple; therefore he entered it while impure—

Thus, there are two “which are four.”

The acts of Shabbat—

two which are four.

The appearances of afflictions—

two

which are four.

That is: two appearances of afflictions are stated explicitly in the Torah as rendering a person impure with the impurity of the affliction of tzaraat: they are se’et, which is an affliction of a white color, at the degree of whiteness of white wool; and baheret, whose degree of whiteness is as intense as the whiteness of snow.

And there are two further appearances of afflictions that are not written explicitly in the Torah, but are hinted at in the wording of the verse, “sapahat,” which teaches that each of the two afflictions also has a “derivative.” One is an affliction whose appearance of whiteness is like the whiteness of an eggshell, and it is a derivative of the affliction of se’et. The other is an affliction whose appearance of whiteness is like the whiteness of the plaster of the Sanctuary, and it is a derivative of the affliction of baheret.

And the Gemara asks:

What is different here,

in our Mishna,

that it teaches, “two which are four inside, and two which are four outside,” and what is different there,

in the Mishna in Shevuot,

that it teaches, “two which are four,” and no more

[once and not more than once]!? And it explains:

Here,

our Mishna,

since Shabbat is the principal subject

[which is found in Tractate Shabbat, the principal place for the laws of Shabbat],

it teaches—

the tannai teaches in the Mishna—

“primary categories,”

that is, carrying-out acts, which are learned from the verses,

and it also teaches

also

“derivatives,”

that is, bringing-in acts, which are learned only from reasoning, “what difference is there to bring in and what difference is there to take out”; and in both together you find “two which are four inside” and “two which are four outside.

But

there,

in Tractate Shevuot,

since Shabbat is not the principal subject

[this is not the principal place for the laws of Shabbat], therefore only

primary categories,

that is, carrying-out acts,

it teaches

among them the “two which are four” that they contain, but

derivatives,

that is, bringing-in acts,

it does not teach

at all.

But the Gemara asks: Yet

what are the primary categories?

[What are the primary categories in the labor of carrying out?] They are surely

carrying-out acts

[carrying out].

And

therefore

carrying-out acts are two,

only two

they are!

One carrying-out act of a poor person and one of a homeowner; so how did the tannai teach there “two which are four” in carrying-out acts alone!?

And if you would say

that perhaps you would interpret

that

that Mishna did not count all four as liabilities, but two

of them as liabilities

from the Torah,

and

two

of them as exemptions

from the Torah, and they are forbidden only by rabbinic decree, as in our Mishna—if so, the difficulty is:

but “the acts of Shabbat are two which are four,” which we learned in the Mishna in Shevuot,

“the acts of Shabbat are two which are four,”

it teaches it in the manner of “the appearances of afflictions,”

“two which are four,” which are also mentioned in that same Mishna,

it teaches.

And if so,

just as there,

with regard to “the appearances of afflictions,”

all of them,

all four appearances, are

for liability

by Torah law—if a person entered the Temple inadvertently or ate sacred flesh while impure because of one of the four appearances of afflictions, he is liable for an offering— because all these appearances render a person impure by Torah law—

so here too,

with regard to “the acts of Shabbat,”

likewise, all of them,

the four carrying-out acts, are

for liability

by Torah law!?

Rather, Rav Pappa said

to resolve it in another manner:

Here,

in our Mishna,

since Shabbat is the principal subject, it teaches liabilities and exemptions

[our Mishna counts both those labors for which one is liable by Torah law and those labors for which one is exempt by Torah law but which are forbidden rabbinically], and in them you indeed find eight: four liabilities and four exemptions. Whereas

there,

in the Mishna in Tractate Shevuot,

since Shabbat is not the principal subject,

only

liabilities it teaches, and exemptions it does not teach.

And the Gemara asks:

The liabilities—what are they? Carrying-out acts!

That is, we learned in that same Mishna “carrying-out acts,” which implies carrying out, and among them you must find four liabilities. Yet

“carrying-out acts” are only two

только

they are

[for you have no carrying-out acts for which he is liable by Torah law except two: one of a poor person and one of a homeowner; so how did we learn, among the liabilities of carrying out alone, “two which are four”]!?

And we answer: that Mishna counts

two of carrying out,

of the poor person and the homeowner,

and two of bringing in,

of the poor person and the homeowner.

And the Gemara asks: How can you say this,

for “carrying-out acts

which implies “carrying out,”

it teaches,

as we wondered!?

Rav Ashi said: The tannai

calls

“bringing in” also “carrying out.”

And bringing-in acts are included within “carrying-out acts.”

And we explain:

From where

do you learn that the tannai also calls bringing in “carrying out”?

From what we learned

below, in the chapter “The Great Principle” [73a], concerning “the primary categories of labor are forty less one”:

One who carries out from domain to domain is liable.

And yet,

are we not dealing

with an instance

that he brings in

[that he brings in]

from the public domain to the private domain,

and surely he is liable even for bringing in, as explained in our Mishna?

And

nevertheless

he calls it,

the tannai calls bringing in, which is included in the labor of carrying out taught there, by the name

“carrying out,”

as he said, “one who carries out from domain to domain.” It is thus explained that the tannai also includes bringing in within the expression carrying out.

And the Gemara asks:

And what is the reason

that the tannai also calls bringing-in acts “carrying-out acts”?

The Gemara answers:

Every uprooting of an object from its place,

whether it is in the private domain or whether it is in the public domain,

the tannai calls “carrying out.”

For the object was taken out from the place where it had been.

Ravina said: Our Mishna

[our Mishna]

also proves it precisely:

even from our Mishna it can be proven that the tannai calls bringing in “carrying out,”

for

behold,

it teaches “carrying-out acts,” and immediately explains

the tannai

bringing in,

for we learned: “The poor person extended his hand inside and the homeowner placed [the object] into his hand,” which is “bringing in.”

Learn from this!

Rava said

to resolve how the tannai taught bringing-in acts in the language of “carrying-out acts,” both in the Mishna in Shevuot and in our Mishna: when we learned “the acts of Shabbat are two which are four,” the expression “carrying-out acts” does not indicate the act of carrying out, for bringing-in acts are also included. Rather,

it teaches “domains”:

Таков смысл Мишны:

And this is the interpretation of the Mishna:

“The domains of Shabbat are two”

—they are: the private domain and the public domain. There are four labors in the inside and four in the outside. That is, through these two domains you find four labors for one standing inside, and four labors for one standing outside.

We learned in the Mishna: “The acts of Shabbat are two which are four inside, and two which are four outside.” And the Mishna explains what “which are four” means, namely, two additional exemptions, inside and outside: the poor person extended his hand inside, and the homeowner took [the object] from it; or he placed [the object] into it and he took it out—both are exempt. The homeowner extended his hand outside, and the poor person took [the object] from it; or he placed [the object] into it and he brought it in—both are exempt. And Rav Mattana thought that all the exemptions mentioned in our Mishna were to be counted, and therefore:

He said

objecting

Rav Mattana to Abaye:

But

these, are they eight!?

But the labors taught in our Mishna, are they only eight, as the tanna said: two that are four inside, and two that are four outside!? For if we take into account those taught in our Mishna, we find that

there are twelve

twelve labors], four for which one is liable, and eight cases in which one is exempt

For in the first part of the two parts of the seifa that explain what “they are four” are, you will find four cases of “exemption.” And likewise in the second part of the seifa. And with the four liable [acts] from the Torah that were specified in the first two parts of the risha, which explains what “two” are, you have twelve modes of labor taught in our Mishna, and not eight.

He said to him

Abaye to Rav Mattana:

And according to your reasoning,

according to your method, that all the “exempt” [acts] are labors that are fit to be counted, then this should be difficult for you: for

there are sixteen

sixteen labors taught in our Mishna], not eight!?

For in the two parts of the risha, which explains what “two” are, we taught, with regard to each of the four labors for liability, that the one who performs the removal and the placement is the one who becomes liable, whereas the other, who merely assisted him, is “exempt.” And if so, four additional “exempt” [acts] have been added, which ought to be counted together with the twelve already mentioned; you have sixteen labors fit to be counted.