Shabbat 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the First Mishna The labor of “transferring from one domain to another” is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, and it is the first labor explained in tractate Shabbat. The labor of “transferring” is performed by moving an object from one place to another, in two ways: by taking out an object from a private domain into a public domain, or by bringing in an object from a public domain into a private domain. The labor of transferring has three components: a. Removing the object from the domain in which it is situated. b. Carrying it into the other domain. c. Placing it in the other domain. Only one who performs all three components of the labor on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition of labor. However, one who removed an object from its place and carried it into another domain but did not place it there has not violated a Torah prohibition of labor, since he did not perform the labor completely. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed a prohibition even against removing without placing, and against placing without removing, in the ways that will be explained below. The first Mishna details eight forms of taking out and bringing in: four prohibited by Torah law, and four prohibited by rabbinic law. There are, however, additional forms prohibited by rabbinic law, as will be explained in the Gemara. These eight forms are divided into two possibilities: The first: a person is standing inside, in a private domain, and takes out or brings in an object. The second: a person is standing outside, in a public domain, and brings in or takes out an object. For each of these possibilities, the Mishna presents four forms of taking out and bringing in that are prohibited. Two of them are prohibited by Torah law, and two by rabbinic law. However, as stated, there are other forms prohibited by rabbinic law that are not explained in the Mishna. Mishna:

The Mishna begins by detailing the four forms of taking out with regard to a person standing inside, in a private domain:

The acts of taking out on Shabbat,

taking an object out on Shabbat from a private domain into a public domain, or bringing an object in from a public domain into a private domain, are

two;

two of them are prohibited by Torah law,

which are four,

when two rabbinically prohibited forms are added.

And this concerns a person standing

inside,

within a house, which is a private domain, who takes an object from there into a public domain, or brings an object into it from a public domain.

In other words, there are four forms of the prohibition of the labor of “transferring” with regard to a person standing in a private domain, two of which are prohibited by Torah law, and two by rabbinic law.

The two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside are:

a. If he removes the object from a private domain, carries it into a public domain, and places it there.

b. If he extends his hand into a public domain, removes the object from there, carries it to himself, into the private domain, and places it there.

The two forms prohibited by rabbinic law are:

a. If he removes the object from a private domain and carries it into a public domain, but does not place it there.

b. If he removes the object from a private domain and does not take it out into the public domain, but gives it into the extended hand of a person standing in the public domain, and the latter takes it out into the public domain and places it there.

In both these forms he did not perform the complete labor of transferring, because he only removed the object from the private domain but did not place it in the public domain; therefore, the violation is only rabbinic.

The Mishna continues and says that there are also four forms of the labor of transferring for a person standing outside, in the private domain:

And

there are

two

labors of transferring from one domain to another that are prohibited by Torah law,

which are four,

when two rabbinically prohibited labors are added, with regard to a person standing

outside

[in the public domain].

That is, there are two forms of bringing in and taking out that are prohibited by Torah law with regard to a person standing outside, in the public domain, when he performs the complete labor of removing from one domain, carrying into another domain, and placing the object there.

And there are two further forms of bringing in from the public domain into the private domain for which he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, since he performed only removal; nevertheless, the Sages prohibited them.

Now, after the Mishna said that there are four forms for each of the two possibilities—four forms for a person standing inside, and four for a person standing outside—it explains all the forms.

First, the Mishna explains the two labors prohibited by Torah law for a person standing outside, and the two labors prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside:

How

are the two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing outside, in the public domain, and the two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside, in the private domain, performed?

The poor person is standing outside,

in the public domain,

and the homeowner

is standing

inside,

in the private domain:

a.

The poor person extended his hand

with an object inside it

inside,

into the private domain, where the homeowner is standing,

and gave

the object

into the homeowner’s hand.

Thus the poor person performed a complete labor, transferring the object from one domain to another by removing it from the public domain and placing it in the private domain [in the homeowner’s hand].

b.

Or he took

the poor person an object

from it,

from the homeowner’s hand, which is in the private domain,

and took it out

the poor person took the object into the public domain, to the place where he was standing, and placed it there. Thus the poor person performed a complete labor: he removed the object from the private domain, carried it into the public domain, and placed it there.

In both these forms,

the poor person

alone

is liable

by Torah law, because he performed removal in one domain and placing in another domain.

And

if

the homeowner, he is exempt.

It is even permitted for him to do so initially, since the homeowner did not participate in the labor at all. However, it is prohibited for the homeowner to give the object into the poor person’s hand; this is a rabbinic prohibition.

Here, then, are two forms of liability—one of taking out and the other of bringing in—for the poor person standing outside. This is what we learned: “Two outside.”

The Mishna now explains the two forms prohibited by Torah law for the person standing inside, in the private domain:

c.

The homeowner extended his hand

with an object in it

outside,

into the public domain, where the poor person is standing,

and gave

the object

into the poor person’s hand,

and it follows that the homeowner took the object out by removing it from the private domain and placing it in the public domain.

d.

Or the homeowner took

an object

from it,

from the poor person’s hand, which is in the public domain,

and brought in

the object into the private domain, where he is standing, and placed it there; it follows that the homeowner brought it in by removing it from the public domain and placing it in the private domain.

In both cases,

the homeowner

alone

is liable,

since he performed removal in one domain and placing in another domain.

And

if

the poor person, he is exempt.

It is even permitted for him to do so initially, since he did not participate in the labor at all. However, it is prohibited for the poor person to give the object into the homeowner’s hand; this is prohibited by rabbinic law.

Here, then, are two forms of liability—taking out and bringing in—for the homeowner standing inside. This is what we learned: “Two inside.”

From this point onward, the Mishna explains together what we learned as “which are four inside” and “which are four outside”—that is, the two removals prohibited for the person standing inside by rabbinic law, and the two removals prohibited for the person standing outside by rabbinic law: e.

The poor person extended his hand

with an object in it

inside,

into the private domain, where the homeowner is standing, but did not place it there,

and the homeowner took it from it,

from the poor person’s extended hand, and placed it in the domain in which he was standing. It follows that the poor person removed the object from the public domain and carried it into the private domain without placing it there.

f.

Or he gave

the homeowner an object

into it,

into the hand of the poor person extended into the private domain,

and the poor person took out

the object and placed it in the domain in which he was standing. It follows that the homeowner performed only removal from the private domain and gave the object into the poor person’s extended hand, without carrying it into the public domain and placing it there.

In both this case and that case,

both are exempt,

because in both these forms the labor of transferring was completed not by either one of them alone, but only by both of them: one performed removal in one domain, and the other performed placing in the second domain. Therefore, both are exempt by Torah law.

Thus, we have removal together with carrying into the other domain, for which one is exempt because he did not place the object, and which is prohibited by rabbinic law for the person standing outside.

Likewise, it is prohibited by rabbinic law for the person standing inside to remove an object and give it into the hand of the person standing outside, extended inside, even without carrying it into the other domain, because removal together with giving it into the poor person’s hand is prohibited by rabbinic law.

g.

The homeowner extended his hand

with an object in it

outside,

into the public domain, where the poor person is standing,

and the poor person took it from it,

from the homeowner’s extended hand, and placed it in the domain where he was standing.

Or he gave

the poor person an object

into it,

into the homeowner’s extended hand,

and the homeowner brought in

the object into the private domain and placed it there.

Both are exempt.

For in both these forms the labor of transferring was completed only by both of them: one performed removal in one domain, and the other performed placing in the second domain. Therefore, they are exempt by Torah law.

Thus, we have an additional removal for which one is exempt but which is prohibited by rabbinic law, for the person standing inside, together with extending the object into the other domain; and an additional removal for the person standing outside, without extending the object into the other domain.

This is what we learned: “Which are four inside” and “which are four outside.” For here there are two removals for which the person standing inside is exempt, but which are prohibited for him by rabbinic law, and two removals for which the person standing outside is exempt, but which are prohibited for him by rabbinic law.

In summary:

Both the homeowner and the poor person are subject to two Torah prohibitions: one, taking out, and the other, bringing in.

And they are subject to two rabbinic prohibitions: one, uprooting the object and transferring it to the second domain without placing the object in the second domain, but rather another person takes it from his hand; and the other, uprooting the object and placing it within that same domain into the hand of a person standing in the second domain, who extends his hand toward him, into the domain in which he is standing.

Gemara:

We learned there

in tractate Shevuot [2a:

Oaths

of expression are

two

explicitly stated in the Torah,

which are four,

when two oaths that are not explicitly stated in the Torah, but are only alluded to in the wording of the verse, are added.

That is, there are two oaths of expression written explicitly in the Torah, for violating which a person is liable to bring a sin offering [a variable offering]. They are oaths concerning the future, which involve benefit or detriment for the one who takes the oath—for example, one who swears that he will eat something but does not eat it, or one who swears that he will not eat and then eats it.

And there are two additional oaths that are not written explicitly in the Torah, but are derived from an expansion of the wording of the verse. These are oaths concerning the past—for example, one who swears, “An oath that I ate,” when he did not eat, or, “An oath that I did not eat,” when he did eat.