Shabbat 2a — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the first Mishna The labor of “carrying out from one domain to another” is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat, the seventh day of the week sanctified as a day of rest. It is the first labor explained in tractate Shabbat. The labor of “carrying out” is performed by transferring an object from one place to another, in two ways: by carrying out an object from a private domain to a public domain, or by bringing in an object from a public domain to a private domain. The labor of carrying out has three parts: A. Removing the object from the domain in which it is resting. B. Transferring it to the other domain. C. Placing it in the other domain. Only one who performs all three parts of the labor on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition of labor. But one who removed an object from its place and transferred it to another domain but did not place it there has not violated a Torah prohibition of labor, since he did not perform the labor completely. Nevertheless, the Sages decreed a prohibition even against removing without placing, and against placing without removing, in the ways explained below. The first Mishna lists eight forms of carrying out and bringing in: four prohibited by Torah law and four prohibited by rabbinic decree. There are, however, additional forms prohibited by rabbinic decree, as the Gemara—the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna—will explain. These eight forms are divided into two possibilities: The first: a person is standing inside, in a private domain, and carries out or brings in an object. The second: a person is standing outside, in a public domain, and brings in or carries out an object. For each of these possibilities, the Mishna presents four forms of carrying out and bringing in that are prohibited. Two are prohibited by Torah law, and two by rabbinic decree. But, as stated, there are other forms prohibited by rabbinic decree that are not explained in the Mishna. Mishna:

The Mishna begins by detailing four forms of carrying out with regard to a person standing inside, in a private domain:

“The acts of carrying out on Shabbat,”

the carrying out of an object on Shabbat from a private domain to a public domain, or the bringing in of an object from a public domain to a private domain, are

two;

two are prohibited by Torah law,

“which are four,”

when two forms prohibited by rabbinic decree are added.

This concerns a person standing

inside,

inside a house, which is a private domain, who carries an object from there into a public domain, or brings an object into it from a public domain.

In other words, there are four forms of the prohibition of the labor of “carrying out” with regard to a person standing in a private domain, two of which are prohibited by Torah law, and two by rabbinic decree.

The two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside are:

A. If he removes the object from a private domain, transfers it to a public domain, and places it there.

B. If he extends his hand into a public domain, removes the object from there, transfers it to himself, into the private domain, and places it there.

The two forms prohibited by rabbinic decree are:

A. If he removes the object from a private domain and transfers it to a public domain, but does not place it there.

B. If he removes the object from a private domain but does not take it into the public domain; rather, he gives it into the outstretched hand of a person standing in the public domain, and that person carries it into the public domain and places it there.

In both of these forms, he did not perform the complete labor of carrying out, because he only removed the object from the private domain but did not place it in the public domain. Therefore, the violation is only rabbinic.

The Mishna continues and says that there are also four forms of the labor of carrying out for a person standing outside, in a public domain:

And

there are

two

acts of transferring an object from one domain to another that are prohibited by Torah law,

which are four,

with the addition of two acts prohibited by rabbinic decree, concerning a person standing

outside

[in the public domain].

That is, there are two forms of bringing in and carrying out that are prohibited by Torah law for a person standing outside, in the public domain, when he performs the complete labor of removing an object from one domain, transferring it to another domain, and placing it there.

There are also two forms of bringing an object from the public domain to the private domain for which he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, because he performed only the removal; nevertheless, the Sages prohibited them.

Now, after the Mishna has said that there are four forms for each of the two possibilities—four forms for a person standing inside and four for a person standing outside—it explains all the forms.

First, the Mishna explains the two acts prohibited by Torah law for a person standing outside and the two acts prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside:

How

are the two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing outside, in the public domain, and the two forms prohibited by Torah law for a person standing inside, in the private domain?

The poor person stands outside,

in the public domain,

and the householder

stands

inside,

in the private domain:

A.

The poor person extended his hand

with an object inside it

inside,

into the private domain, where the householder is standing,

and gave

the object

into the householder’s hand.

By doing so, the poor person performed a complete labor: he transferred the object from one domain to another by removing it from the public domain and placing it in the private domain [in the householder’s hand].

B.

Or, he took

the object

from it,

from the householder’s hand, which is in the private domain,

and carried out

the object into the public domain, to the place where he was standing, and placed it there. By doing so, the poor person performed a complete labor: he removed the object from the private domain, transferred it to the public domain, and placed it there.

In both of these forms,

only the poor person

alone

is liable

by Torah law, because he performed removal in one domain and placing in another domain.

But

if

the householder, he is exempt.

It is even permitted initially for him to do this, since the householder took no part in the labor at all. But it is rabbinically prohibited for the householder to give the object into the poor person’s hand.

Thus, there are two forms carrying liability: one of carrying out and one of bringing in, for the poor person standing outside. This is what we learned: “two outside.”

The Mishna now explains the two forms prohibited by Torah law for the person standing inside, in the private domain:

C.

The householder extended his hand

with an object in it

outside,

into the public domain, where the poor person is standing,

and gave

the object

into the poor person’s hand,

and it follows that the householder carried out the object by removing it from the private domain and placing it in the public domain.

D.

Or, the householder took

an object

from it,

from the poor person’s hand, which is in the public domain,

and brought in

the object into the private domain, where he was standing, and placed it there. It follows that the householder brought it in by removing it from the public domain and placing it in the private domain.

In both cases,

the householder

alone

is liable,

since he performed removal in one domain and placing in another domain.

But

if

the poor person, he is exempt.

It is even permitted initially for him to do this, since he took no part in the labor at all. But it is rabbinically prohibited for the poor person to give the object into the householder’s hand.

Thus, there are two forms carrying liability—carrying out and bringing in—for the householder standing inside. This is what we learned: “two inside.”

From this point onward, the Mishna explains together what we learned as “which are four inside” and “which are four outside”: the two removals prohibited by rabbinic decree for the person standing inside, and the two removals prohibited by rabbinic decree for the person standing outside: E.

The poor person extended his hand

with an object in it

inside,

into the private domain where the householder is standing, but did not place it there,

and the householder took it from it,

from the poor person’s outstretched hand, and placed it in the domain where he was standing. It follows that the poor person removed the object from the public domain and transferred it to the private domain without placing it there.

F.

Or, he gave

the householder an object

into it,

into the hand of the poor person extended into the private domain,

and the poor person carried out

the object and placed it in the domain where he was standing. It follows that the householder performed only the removal from the private domain and gave the object into the poor person’s outstretched hand, without transferring it to the public domain and placing it there.

In both this case and that case,

both are exempt,

because in both forms the labor of carrying out was completed only through the actions of both of them: one performed the removal in one domain, and the other performed the placing in a second domain. Therefore, both are exempt by Torah law.

Thus, we have a removal followed by transfer to the other domain for which one is exempt because he did not place the object, and which is rabbinically prohibited for the person standing outside.

Likewise, it is rabbinically prohibited for the person standing inside to remove an object and give it into the hand of the person standing outside, whose hand is extended inside, even without transferring it to the other domain, because removal together with giving it into the poor person’s hand is rabbinically prohibited.

G.

The householder extended his hand

with an object in it

outside,

into the public domain where the poor person is standing,

and the poor person took it from it,

from the householder’s outstretched hand, and placed it in the domain where he was standing.

Or, he gave

the poor person an object

into it,

into the householder’s outstretched hand,

and the householder brought in

the object into the private domain and placed it there.

Both are exempt.

In both of these forms, the labor of carrying out was completed only through the actions of both of them: one performed the removal in one domain, and the other performed the placing in a second domain. Therefore, they are exempt by Torah law.

Thus, we have another removal for which the person is exempt but which is prohibited by rabbinic decree, for the person standing inside, together with extending an object to the other domain; and another removal for the person standing outside, without extending the object to the other domain.

This is what we learned: “which are four inside” and “which are four outside.” There are two removals here for which the person standing inside is exempt but which are prohibited by rabbinic decree, and two removals for which the person standing outside is exempt but which are prohibited by rabbinic decree.

In summary:

Both the homeowner and the poor person have two prohibitions from the Torah: one is to take out, and the other is to bring in.

And two prohibitions of rabbinic enactment: one, to uproot and transfer to the second domain without placing the object in the second domain, but rather another person takes it from his hand. And the second, to uproot and give in that same domain into the hand of a person standing in the second domain and extending his hand toward him, into the domain in which he is standing.

Gemara:

We learned there

in tractate Shevuot [2a:

Oaths

of expression are

two

explicitly [stated] from the Torah,

which are four,

by including two oaths that are not explicitly stated in the Torah, but are only hinted at in the wording of the verse.

That is, there are two oaths of expression written explicitly in the Torah, for violating which a person is obligated to bring a sin-offering [of ascending and descending value], and they are oaths concerning the future in which there is benefit or harm to the one who swears, such as when he swore that he would eat something and did not eat, or swore that he would not eat and ate.

And there are two further oaths that are not explicitly written in the Torah, but are learned from an amplification of the verse; they are oaths concerning the past, such as one who swears, “An oath that I ate,” when he did not eat, or, “An oath that I did not eat,” when he ate.