Shabbat 29b — the Talmud in English

And if

he placed it

as a garment

in a box—

according to everyone, it is impure,

for by concealing it he revealed his דעת that he considers it significant and that it has the status of a “garment.”

These tannaim did not disagree

these tannaim

but

in a case

where he hung it on a peg

[a peg] and showed that he desired it, [and this concealment is inferior to placing it in a box].

And in another manner they disagree:

or where he placed it behind

the door [and placing it behind the door is inferior to hanging it on a peg, but preferable to throwing it into the garbage].

Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: Since he did not throw it into the garbage

Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: Since he did not throw it into the garbage—

it is proven that

his mind remains upon it,

and he desires to use it.

And this is the explanation of the words of Rabbi Eliezer, who said: “Whether from the mukan,” meaning whether he placed it in a box, and whether “not from the mukan,” meaning whether he placed it on a peg or behind the door.

And in all of them Rabbi Eliezer said that it is impure.

And we raise an objection: Since, when he placed it behind the door or hung it on a peg, he considered it a garment capable of receiving impurity—

why did he call it

Rabbi Eliezer

“not from the mukan”?

And we explain:

For

placing it behind the door or on a peg,

relative to

placing it in a

box—

it is not mukan [for it is inferior to it].

What is the reason?

And Rabbi Joshua reasoned:

Even when he placed it behind the door or on a peg, it is pure.

What is the reason?

Since he did not place it in a box,

to conceal it—he revealed his דעת that he had completely nullified it, and it does not have the status of a garment, and it is pure.

And the “from the mukan” that Rabbi Joshua stated means even when he placed it behind the door or hung it on a peg; and “not from the mukan” means when he threw it into the garbage.

And we raise an objection: If you say that by not placing it in a box he revealed his דעת that he was nullifying it, this is difficult—

and why did he call it “mukan”?

And we explain:

For

placing it behind the door,

relative to

throwing it into the

garbage—

it is mukan, but since he nullified it, it is pure.

hung it on a peg [which he regards as “prepared”],

And Rabbi Akiva

distinguishes between them:

In

a case where he

hung it on a peg [for he considers it “mukan”]—

who says that it is pure, because it is “not from the prepared.”

he follows Rabbi Eliezer

that it is impure.

And

when he placed it behind the door [for this concealment is inferior to hanging it on a peg]—

From where do we know

he follows Rabbi Joshua

who says that it is pure, for it is “not from the mukan.”

And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, who disagree in the Mishna concerning a garment wick, whether it is impure—this is the disagreement in which they disagree, and they follow their respective positions.

And we conclude:

And Rabbi Akiva retracted in favor of Rabbi Joshua,

and reasoned that even in the case of mukan it is pure.

From where

do we know that he retracted?

And we explain:

Rava said: Since it teaches

in the Mishna

“a garment wick.”

And we infer:

Why specifically did it teach “a garment wick”,

which implies that it is still a garment?

Let it teach “a wick of a garment”

which implies that he folded it from a garment [and it is not the garment itself].

What

is this that the tanna used the wording of

“a wick

of the garment”?—

For it is still a garment!

And Rabbi Akiva says in the Mishna: It is pure.

Infer from this that he retracted in favor of Rabbi Joshua, and he reasons that even when it is a garment that is still somewhat significant in his eyes, Rabbi Akiva declares it pure.

Mishna:

1.

A person may not bore a tube

made from the shell

of an egg, fill it with oil, and place it

on the eve of Shabbat

over the mouth of the lamp so that it will drip

oil into the lamp.

And the reason for the prohibition is a rabbinic decree, lest he take some of the oil to use it. And one who takes from the oil that he designated for lighting is liable on account of extinguishing [see Beitza 22a and Tosafot there] .

And

they decreed

even

if the tube

is of earthenware,

which is repulsive and is not ordinarily used.

But Rabbi Judah permits

placing a tube over the mouth of the lamp and filling it with oil, because we are not concerned lest he come to use some of it on Shabbat.

But if the potter attached it

to the lamp

from the outset—

it is permitted

to light with it,

because it is one vessel

and the prohibition against taking oil from the burning lamp is evident, and there is no concern lest they come to use some of the oil .

2.

A person may not fill a bowl with oil and place it beside the lamp

on the eve of Shabbat,

and place the end

[the edge] of

the wick inside it so that the wick will

lighting in this manner, and he did not decree lest one come to take some of the oil.

draw

oil from the bowl. Because of the concern lest he come to use some of the oil.

And Rabbi Judah permits

lighting in this manner, and did not decree lest he come to use some of it.

Gemara:

And it is necessary

to inform us of all these cases in the Mishna [the tube, earthenware, and bowl].

For if he had informed us of an egg tube,

I might have said:

In this case the Rabbis say

that it is forbidden to light with it, because

since

this tube

is not repulsive,

there is concern lest he

come to use some

of it on Shabbat .

But

to light with a tube

of earthenware, which is repulsive, perhaps they agree

the Rabbis

with Rabbi Judah

that we do not decree.

It teaches us that even with earthenware they decreed.

And if he had informed us

of their disagreement concerning a tube

of earthenware,

I might have said that specifically in this case

Rabbi Judah says

that it is permitted to light with it, since it is repulsive.

But in that case—

with a tube of an egg—

perhaps Rabbi Judah agrees with them,

Rabbi Judah

with the Rabbis,

that it is forbidden to light with it.

It teaches us that in this case as well he disagrees.

And if he had informed us of these two—

a tube of an egg and one of earthenware—I might have said that specifically

in these Rabbi Judah says

that it is permitted, and he did not decree lest he come to use some of it,

because nothing is interrupted

between the tube and the lamp. In that case the prohibition is conspicuous, and it is evident to him that taking the oil causes the lamp to be extinguished.

But

to place oil in a

bowl

beside the burning lamp and place the end of the wick inside it,

where there is an interruption,

for the burning head of the wick is inside another vessel—

perhaps Rabbi Judah agrees with them,

Rabbi Judah

with the Rabbis, that they decreed in this case. Since there is an interruption between the place of the fire and the place of the oil, there is greater concern lest he come to take oil from the bowl .

in the

It teaches us that here too Rabbi Judah permits.

And if he had informed us

the Mishna

in that case—

in the bowl—I might have said:

In that case the Rabbis say

that there is concern lest he come to use some of it [since it is not one body with the burning lamp].

But in these two—

a tube of an egg and one of earthenware—

perhaps the Rabbis agree

the Rabbis

with Rabbi Judah,

that there is no reason to decree in this case, since he will certainly distance himself from it.

Therefore

it is necessary

to inform us of all of them.

We learned in the Mishna:

And if the potter attached it from the outset, it is permitted

because it is one vessel.

The tanna

in a beraita taught:

If he attached it

the homeowner himself on the eve of Shabbat

with plaster and clay—

it is permitted

to light with it.

And we raise an objection:

But did we not learn “if the

tube was attached by the

potter,”

which implies specifically an attachment by the potter, and not one attached by the homeowner himself?

And we explain:

What is “potter”

that we learned in our Mishna?—

Like

an attachment of a

potter,

meaning that it is attached firmly.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Judah said:

I have proof permitting the placement of an egg tube, for

once we spent Shabbat [when we were sitting. And the version in the Tosefta is: when we were dwelling]

toward Rabbi Yehuda

in the upper chamber of the House of Natza in Lod. And they brought us a tube of an egg, filled it with oil, bored it, and placed it over the mouth of the lamp

so that it would drip into it.

And there were present

in that upper chamber

Rabbi Tarfon and elders,

and they saw the act

and said nothing to us

about the fact that we had not acted according to law. It follows that they too held that one should not decree in this case.

They said to him,

the Sages: Is it indeed

a proof from there?

The people

of

the House of Natza are different, for they are diligent!

For they were all learned, God-fearing, and mindful, and there was no concern lest they come to use oil from the lamp. But elsewhere, in another place, even they would agree that we decree in this matter [Rashi above, 20a, s.v. evarim].

Avin,

a man

of Tzippori [who lived in Tzippori],

do you hold?

dragged a bench in an upper chamber of marble,

in an upper chamber whose floor was made of marble [and there was no concern that he would make a furrow]. And this act took place

above, before

before

Rabbi Isaac ben Elazar.

He said to him: If I remain silent before you,

and do not rebuke you,

as

it is impossible

the colleagues remained silent before

[Rabbi Tarfon and the elders]

before Rabbi Judah

when he filled a tube with oil and placed it over the mouth of the lamp, and therefore he thought to permit it on the basis of their silence, I fear that here

a mishap will emerge from it,

for a failure may result from this.

For one must decree

a decree

not to drag even in

a marble upper chamber, lest,

perhaps from this they will come to drag also in

an ordinary upper chamber

that is not paved.

And although he does not intend to make a furrow, it is forbidden to drag a bench there, because he follows Rabbi Judah, who says that an unintended act is forbidden.

The head of the synagogue,

who brings in and seats the children,

of the dyers, dragged a bench above, before

before

Rabbi Yirmeya the Great.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya:

According to whom

do you hold?

According to Rabbi Shimon,

who says that an unintended act is permitted, and therefore you hold that there is no concern in dragging a bench, since even if it makes a furrow, he does not intend to do so.

I have a response to give you:

Say that Rabbi Shimon said

that it is permitted to drag, this applies only

to

benches

that are large.

For

since they are heavy,

it is impossible

to move them in another manner, and therefore it is permitted.

But

with

benches

that are small,

which he can lift in his hand and move elsewhere—

who said

that Rabbi Shimon said it is permitted to drag them?

And

this statement of Rabbi Yirmeya

disagrees

with this

that

said

Ulla.

For Ulla said: The disagreement

between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah as to whether it is permitted to drag applies only

to

benches

that are small, but with

benches

that are large—

according to everyone it is permitted

to drag them. For they possess two grounds for leniency: it is impossible to do otherwise, and he does not intend to make a furrow.

Rav Yosef raised an objection: Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, a chair, or a bench, provided that he does not intend

by his dragging to make a

furrow.

And we bring a proof:

It teaches

in the beraita “a bed”—that is analogous to benches

that are large.

And it teaches

in the beraita “a chair”—that is analogous to benches

that are small .

And Rabbi Shimon says that it is permitted to drag them.

This is difficult

for this beraita

to both of them?

[For Rabbi Yirmeya this is difficult, for it proves that Rabbi Shimon permitted even large objects; and for Ulla it is difficult, for it implies that small objects are permitted only according to Rabbi Shimon, whereas according to Rabbi Judah they are forbidden].

And we resolve:

Ulla explains

the beraita

according to his position.

And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great explains

the beraita

according to his position.

Ulla explains

the beraita

according to his position,

and explains it as follows:

“Bed”

that it teaches is not a large bed, but a small bed,

analogous to a chair

which is small; but with a large bed, even Rabbi Judah agrees that it is permitted to drag it.

And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great explains

the beraita

according to his position,

and explains it as follows:

“Chair”

that the beraita teaches that Rabbi Shimon permitted dragging is a large chair,

analogous to a bed

which is large; but with a small chair, which can be lifted by hand, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden to drag it.

Rabba raised an objection

from a Mishna in Kilayim to Rabbi Yirmeya the Great:

Sellers of garments

of kilayim

sell

the garments and wear them

in their usual manner

in order to show them to the buyers. There is no prohibition of kilayim in this, because the Torah prohibited wearing kilayim only when one wears them in order to warm himself.

Provided that

the seller

does not intend

by wearing it to benefit,

in

the days of

heat,

in order to protect himself

from the heat, and in

the days of

rain,

in order to protect himself

from the rain.

And

the sellers who are

modest,

upright people who distance themselves from every suspicion of improper speech, do not wear a garment of kilayim at all, but

carry them behind themselves on a staff,

placing the staff on their shoulders, so that their shoulders do not touch the garment at all.

And we prove:

But here,

with sellers of garments,

it is possible

for every person

to act like the modest ones, since

garments

that are small

on Shabbat

are analogous,

for they can be dragged,

and when he does not intend

to benefit from wearing them,

does Rabbi Shimon permit it initially?

Infer from this: Rabbi Shimon permitted even where another manner is possible.

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rabbi Yirmeya the Great,

who said that where another manner is possible Rabbi Shimon did not permit it—

a refutation.

Mishna:

The labor of extinguishing that was performed in the Tabernacle, from which the labor of extinguishing on Shabbat is derived, was the extinguishing of pieces of wood that had been kindled for the purpose of making charcoal.

For this is the manner of making charcoal: one kindles pieces of wood, and after they have been burned in the fire and the charred logs remain, one extinguishes the fire, and what remains of the logs serves as charcoal.

It follows that the labor of extinguishing is not defined merely as extinguishing a fire, but as a labor performed for the purpose of making charcoal, or for another improvement to the object being burned.

But if the extinguishing is performed merely for the purpose of extinguishing, and not for the purpose of improving the object being burned, this is “a labor not needed for its own purpose,” concerning which Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon disagree whether one is liable for it.

One who extinguishes the lamp

on Shabbat,

because he is afraid of gentiles [such as the Persians, who on their festival did not permit lighting a lamp except in their house of idolatry].

Or because he is afraid

of robbers.

Or because of a sick person who has

an evil spirit [melancholy], and is not settled except in darkness.

Or he extinguishes the lamp

because of the sick person

in order

that he sleep [and the Gemara explains which sick person is meant].

In all these circumstances:

he is exempt.

But if he extinguishes the lamp because he is

concerned for the lamp,

fearing that if the oil is consumed, the vessel in which he lights it will be damaged.

Or because he is

sparing the oil

, so that it will not be used up, and he wants to use it another time.

Or because he is

sparing the wick

, so that it will not be consumed.

In all these cases

he is liable

for the labor of extinguishing.

And this is according to the view of Rabbi Judah, who holds that one who performs a labor that is not needed for its own purpose is liable. Therefore, although his intention in extinguishing is only for the purpose of preserving the oil, or for the purpose of safeguarding the wick so that it will not be consumed, and not for the purpose of improving the oil or the wick, in any event he is liable.

Rabbi Yose exempts in all of them,

even in these latter cases, because it is a “labor that is not needed for its own purpose,” for he does not desire the extinguishing for the sake of the thing being extinguished itself, but for the sake of another purpose.

Except for

one who extinguishes the lamp in order to singe

the wick

.

Because he makes

the wick, through his extinguishing, into

charcoal

. From then on, when he comes to light it another time, it will burn well, and this is a labor needed for its own purpose.