Shabbat 29b (כט:) — the Talmud in English

And if he

placed it

as a garment

in a box—

everyone agrees that it is impure,

since by concealing it he demonstrated that he considers it significant and that it has the status of a “garment.”

These tanna’im did not disagree

in that case,

but

when he

hung it on a peg [A peg] and demonstrated that he wanted it, [and this concealment is less significant than placing it in a box].

and thereby showed that he wanted it; putting it away in this manner is less conclusive than placing it in a box.

And according to another possibility, they disagree

if he placed it behind

the door [and placing it behind the door is less significant than hanging it on a peg, but more significant than throwing it into the garbage].

Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: Since he did not throw it into the garbage

Rabbi Eliezer reasoned: Since he did not throw it into the garbage—

it is proven that

his mind remains upon it,

and he intends to use it.

And this is the explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: “Whether from the prepared,” meaning whether he placed it in a box, or “not from the prepared,” meaning whether he placed it on a peg or behind the door.

And in all these cases Rabbi Eliezer said that it is impure.

And we raise an objection: Since when he placed it behind the door or hung it on a peg, and considered it a garment susceptible to impurity,

why did

Rabbi Eliezer

call it ‘not from the prepared’?

And we explain:

That

placing it behind the door or on a peg,

relative to

placing it in a

box—

is not considered prepared [as it is less significant than placing it in a box].

What is the reason?

And Rabbi Yehoshua reasoned:

Even when he placed it behind the door or on a peg, it is pure.

What is the reason?

Since he did not place it in a box,

to conceal it, he revealed his intention that he had completely renounced it; it no longer has the status of a garment, and it is pure.

And the “prepared” mentioned by Rabbi Yehoshua means even when he placed it behind the door or hung it on a peg, while “not from the prepared” means when he threw it into the garbage.

And we raise an objection: If you say that by not placing it in a box he revealed his intention that he had renounced it, this is difficult—

and why did he call it ‘prepared’?

And we explain:

That

placing it behind the door,

relative to

throwing it into the

garbage—

is considered prepared,

but since he renounced it, it is pure.

And Rabbi Akiva

distinguishes between them:

When

he

hung it on a peg [as he considers it “prepared”]—he

who says that it is pure, because it is “not from the prepared.”

held like Rabbi Eliezer

that it is impure.

And

when he placed it behind the door [as this concealment is less significant than hanging it on a peg]—he

From where do we know

held like Rabbi Yehoshua,

who says that it is pure, since it is “not from the prepared.”

And Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, who disagree in the Mishna concerning whether the wick made from the garment is impure, disagree on the basis of this dispute, and their positions follow their respective reasoning.

And we conclude:

And Rabbi Akiva later retracted in favor of Rabbi Yehoshua,

and held that even when it is prepared, it is pure.

From where

do we know that he retracted?

And we explain:

Rava said: Since it teaches

in the Mishna

“the wick of the garment.”

And we analyze:

Why particularly did it teach “the wick of the garment,”

which implies that it is still a garment?

Let it teach: “a wick made from a garment,”

which would imply that he folded it from a garment [and that it is not itself a garment].

What

is the reason that the tanna employed the wording

“the wick

of the garment”?—

It is still a garment!

And Rabbi Akiva says in the Mishna that it is pure.

Infer from this that he retracted in favor of Rabbi Yehoshua, and held that Rabbi Akiva purifies even a garment that is still somewhat significant in his eyes.

Mishna:

1.

A person may not pierce a tube

made from the shell

of an egg, fill it with oil, and place it

on the eve of Shabbat

over the mouth of the lamp so that it will drip

oil into the lamp.

The reason for the prohibition is a rabbinic decree, lest he take some of the oil for use. One who takes oil that he had designated for lighting is liable for extinguishing [see Beitza 22a and Tosafot there] .

And

they decreed

even

when the tube

is made of earthenware,

which is repulsive and is not ordinarily used.

But Rabbi Yehuda permits

placing a tube over the mouth of the lamp and filling it with oil, because we are not concerned lest he come to use some of it on Shabbat.

But if the potter attached the tube

to the lamp

from the outset—it is

permitted

to light with it,

because it is a single vessel,

and the prohibition against taking oil from the burning lamp is evident, so there is no concern that people will come to use some of the oil .

2.

A person may not fill a bowl with oil and place it beside the lamp

on the eve of Shabbat,

and place the end [the edge]

of

the wick inside it so that the wick will

lighting in this manner, and he did not decree lest one come to take some of the oil.

draw

oil from the bowl. The reason is the concern that he might come to use some of the oil.

And Rabbi Yehuda permits

lighting in this manner, and did not decree lest he come to use some of it.

Gemara:

And it is necessary

to state all these cases in the Mishna [the tube, earthenware, and bowl].

For if he had taught us only the case of an egg-shell tube,

I would have said:

Here the Sages say

that it is prohibited to light with it because

since

this tube

is not repulsive,

there is concern lest he

come to use some of it

on Shabbat .

But

to light with a tube

of earthenware, which is repulsive—perhaps they agree

the Sages

with Rabbi Yehuda

that no decree is made.

It therefore teaches us that they decreed even in the case of earthenware.

And if he had taught us

their dispute concerning a tube

of earthenware,

I would have said that it is specifically in this case that

Rabbi Yehuda says

that it is permitted to light with it, since it is repulsive.

But in that case—

the tube made from an eggshell—

perhaps he agrees

Rabbi Yehuda

with the Sages

that it is prohibited to light with it.

It therefore teaches us that he also disagrees in this case.

And if he had taught us these two cases—the tube made from an egg and the tube made from earthenware—I would have said that it is specifically

a tube of an egg and one of earthenware—I might have said that specifically

in these cases that Rabbi Yehuda says

that it is permitted, and he did not decree lest he come to use some of the oil,

because nothing is interrupted

between the tube and the lamp. In that situation, the prohibition is conspicuous, and it is clear to him that taking the oil causes the lamp to be extinguished.

But

to place oil in a

bowl

beside the burning lamp and place the end of the wick inside it,

where there is an interruption,

as the burning end of the wick is located inside another vessel—

perhaps Rabbi Yehuda agrees

Rabbi Yehuda

with the Sages

that they decreed in this case. Since there is an interruption between the place of the fire and the place of the oil, there is greater concern that he might come to take oil from the bowl .

It therefore teaches us that Rabbi Yehuda permits even in this case.

And if the Mishna had taught us

the ruling only

in that case—the bowl—I would have said:

But we learned

In that case the Sages say

that there is concern lest he come to use some of the oil [since it is not one body with the burning lamp].

But in these two cases—

the tube made from an egg and the tube made from earthenware—

perhaps the Sages agree

the Sages

with Rabbi Yehuda

that no decree should be made, since he will certainly distance himself from using the oil.

For this reason it is

necessary

to teach us all of them.

We learned in the Mishna:

“But if the potter attached it from the outset, it is permitted,”

because it is a single vessel.

The tanna

taught in a beraita:

If he attached it

the homeowner himself on the eve of Shabbat

with plaster and clay—it is

permitted

to light with it.

And we raise an objection:

But didn’t we learn “If the

tube was attached by the

potter,”

which implies specifically an attachment performed by the potter, and not one performed by the homeowner himself?

And we explain:

What does “potter”

mean in our Mishna?—

Like

the attachment of a

potter,

meaning that it is firmly attached.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said:

I have proof that it is permitted to place an egg-shell tube, because

one time we spent Shabbat [when we were sitting; the version in the Tosefta reads: “when we were dwelling”]

in the upper chamber of the house of Nitzah, in Lod. They brought us an egg-shell tube, filled it with oil, pierced it, and placed it over the mouth of the lamp

so that it would drip into it.

a harmful result will emerge from it,

And there were

in that upper chamber

Rabbi Tarfon and the Elders,

and they saw what we did,

and said nothing to us

about our failure to act according to the law. This implies that they too held that no decree should be made in this case.

The Sages said to him:

Is it really

a proof from there?

The

people of

the house of Nitzah are different, for they are diligent!

They were all learned, reverent, and attentive, and there was no concern that they might come to use oil from the lamp. But elsewhere, they too would agree that a decree is made in this case [Rashi above, 20a, s.v. evarim].

Avin,

a man of

Tzippori [who lived in Tzippori],

do you hold?

dragged a bench in a marble upper chamber,

an upper chamber whose floor was made of marble [and there was no concern that he would make a furrow]. This incident occurred

before

the presence of

Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar.

He said to him: If I remain silent toward you,

and do not protest against you,

just

as

the Sages remained silent [Rabbi Tarfon and the Elders]

But

toward Rabbi Yehuda

when he filled a tube with oil and placed it over the mouth of the lamp, and therefore you inferred that it is permitted based on their silence, I fear that here

a mishap will result from it,

and this may lead to a failure.

For one must make a

decree

not to drag even in

a marble upper chamber, lest

as a result people come to drag also in

an ordinary upper chamber,

which is not paved.

And although he does not intend to make a furrow, it is prohibited to drag a bench there, because he holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who says that an unintended act is prohibited.

The head of the synagogue,

who brings in and seats the children,

of Beitzra, dragged a bench before

the presence of

Rabbi Yirmeya the Great.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him:

It teaches in the beraita “a bed,” which is comparable to

According to whom

do you hold?

According to Rabbi Shimon,

who says that an unintended act is permitted, and therefore you hold that there is no concern in dragging a bench, because even if he makes a furrow, he does not intend to do so.

I have a response to give you:

Say that Rabbi Shimon said

that dragging is permitted only

with

benches

that are large,

as

since they are heavy,

it is impossible

to move them in another manner, and therefore it is permitted.

But

with

benches

that are small,

which he can lift in his hands and move elsewhere—

who said

that Rabbi Shimon permits dragging them?

And the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya

the beraita

disagrees with

“Bed,”

what

comparable to a chair, which is small. But with regard to a large bed, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that it is permitted to drag it.

Ulla said.

For Ulla said: The dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda over whether dragging is permitted applies only

according to his own reasoning, and explains it as follows:

to

benches

that are small, but with

benches

that are large—

everyone agrees that it is permitted

to drag them, because they possess two factors favoring permission: it is impossible to move them in another manner, and he does not intend to make a furrow.

Rav Yosef raised an objection: Rabbi Shimon says: A person may drag a bed, a chair, or a bench, provided that he does not intend

by dragging it to make a

furrow.

And we bring a proof:

It teaches

in the beraita “a bed”—which is comparable to

large

and it teaches

in the beraita “a chair”—which is comparable to

small .

And Rabbi Shimon says that it is permitted to drag them.

This is difficult—

this beraita

for both of them?

[For Rabbi Yirmeya it is difficult, as it is evident that Rabbi Shimon permitted even large objects; and for Ulla it is difficult, as it implies that small objects are permitted only according to Rabbi Shimon, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda they are prohibited.]

And we answer:

Ulla explains

the beraita

in accordance with his reasoning.

And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great explains

the beraita

in accordance with his reasoning.

Ulla explains

the beraita

in accordance with his reasoning,

and explains it as follows:

“Bed”

as it is taught in the beraita does not mean a large bed, but a small bed

comparable to a chair,

which is small. But with regard to a large bed, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that it is permitted to drag it.

And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great explains

the beraita

in accordance with his reasoning,

and explains it as follows:

“Chair”

as it is taught in the beraita, which Rabbi Shimon permitted one to drag, means a large chair

comparable to a bed,

which is large. But with regard to a small chair, which can be lifted by hand, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is prohibited to drag it.

Rabba raised an objection

from a Mishna in Kilayim to Rabbi Yirmeya the Great:

Sellers of garments

containing kilayim

may sell

the garments and wear them

in the usual manner

to display them to customers. There is no prohibition of kilayim in this, because the Torah prohibited wearing kilayim only when one wears them for warmth.

Provided that

the seller

does not intend

to derive benefit from wearing it,

during

days of

sunshine,

to protect himself

from the sunshine, and

during days of

rain,

to protect himself

from the rain.

And sellers who are

the sellers who are

modest,

righteous men who distance themselves from any suspicion of improper conduct, do not wear a garment containing kilayim at all; rather, they

drape it over a pole behind them,

placing the pole on their shoulders, so that their shoulders do not touch the garment at all.

And we prove:

But here,

in the case of sellers of garments,

it is possible

for every person

to act like the modest ones, since

garments

that are small

on Shabbat

are comparable,

as they can be dragged;

and when he does not intend

to derive benefit from wearing them,

does Rabbi Shimon permit it initially?

Infer from this that Rabbi Shimon permitted even where another method is possible.

And we conclude:

A refutation of Rabbi Yirmeya the Great,

who said that where another method is possible Rabbi Shimon did not permit it—

a refutation.

Mishna:

The labor of extinguishing that was performed in the Tabernacle, from which the labor of extinguishing on Shabbat is derived, consisted of extinguishing pieces of wood that had been burned for the purpose of making charcoal.

For this is the manner of making charcoal: pieces of wood are ignited, and after they have burned in the fire and the charred logs remain, the fire is extinguished, and what remains of the logs serves as charcoal.

It follows that the labor of extinguishing is not defined merely as extinguishing a fire, but as a labor performed for the purpose of making charcoal, or for another improvement of the object being burned.

But if the extinguishing is performed merely for the purpose of putting out the fire, and not for the purpose of improving the object being burned, it is a “labor not required for its own purpose,” concerning which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree whether one is liable.

One who extinguishes the lamp

on Shabbat

because he fears the gentiles [such as the Persians, who on their festival did not permit a lamp to be lit except in their house of idol worship],

or because he fears

bandits,

or because of a sick person who has

an evil spirit [melancholy], and whose mind is settled only in darkness,

or who extinguishes the lamp

because of the sick person

so that he may

sleep [and the Gemara explains what type of sick person is meant]—

In all these cases: he is

exempt.

But if he extinguishes the lamp because he is

concerned for the lamp,

fearing that if the oil is consumed, the vessel in which he lights it will be damaged.

Or because he

begrudges the oil

so that it will not be consumed, and wants to use it another time.

Or because he

begrudges the wick

so that it will not be consumed.

In all these cases,

he is liable

for the labor of extinguishing.

This is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one who performs a labor not needed for its own purpose is liable. Therefore, although his intention in extinguishing is solely to preserve the oil, or to protect the wick so that it will not be consumed, and not to improve the oil or the wick, he is nevertheless liable.

Rabbi Yose exempts in all of them,

even in the latter cases, because this is a labor not needed for its own purpose: he does not desire the extinguishing for the sake of the object being extinguished itself, but for another purpose.

Except for

one who extinguishes the lamp in order to singe

the wick.

And the reason is:

because he makes

the wick, through his extinguishing it,

a coal.

From that point onward, when he comes to light it again, it will burn properly; thus, this is a labor needed for its own purpose.