Shabbat 153b (קנג:) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yitzhak said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The teruma of a deaf-mute

does not become non-sacred, because it is uncertain

whether his mind is lucid. Because of the doubt, one must treat it with the stringencies of teruma and prohibit it to non-kohanim.

Nevertheless, the competent person must return and designate another teruma in order to rectify the untithed produce, for perhaps the first designation was not valid teruma.

When the question arises for you

which is preferable, a deaf-mute or a competent person,

according to the Rabbis

the question arises for you, since they hold that a deaf-mute is not obligated in the mitzvot because he lacks awareness.

As we learned: Five may not designate teruma, and if they designated teruma, their teruma is not teruma. And these are they: a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor.

None of these may designate teruma, as we derive from the verse concerning the teruma of the Tabernacle, “whose heart moves him.” One must have a heart [awareness] with which to make a voluntary offering. [Jerusalem Talmud].

And one who designates

what

does not belong to him, without the owner’s authorization, for it is written: “The teruma of your seed.”

And a gentile who designated

the

produce

of

the

Israelite, and even if he

designated it

with his authorization,

of the Israelite,

his teruma is not teruma, because a gentile is not qualified to act as an agent. We derive the law of agency from the verse, “So shall you also raise.” And we expound: Just as you are members of the covenant, so too your agents must be members of the covenant.

According to the Rabbis, the question arises: If he has a deaf-mute and a minor with him,

According to the Sages, there is a question when he has a deaf-mute and a minor:

what

is the law? Do we say:

He gives it to the deaf-mute

and not to the minor, because

a minor,

although he does not possess awareness,

will eventually attain awareness

when he grows up?

Or perhaps, he gives it to the minor

and not to the deaf-mute, because

a deaf-mute

is an adult. Although he does not possess awareness,

he may be confused with an adult who is competent, and people may come to give the purse even to one who is obligated in the mitzvot. But an adult will not be confused with a minor.

And we conclude:

Some say: He gives it to the deaf-mute.

And some say: He gives it to the minor.

And we raise a difficulty: If the road became dark for him

and there is

no

gentile, no donkey, no deaf-mute, no imbecile, and no minor with him, what

should he do?

Rabbi Yitzhak said: There was still

another measure

available

to them,

but the Sages did not wish to reveal it.

And we raise a difficulty:

What

is

the other

measure

that

was

available

to them? And we answer: That he

carry it

the purse in the public domain

less than four cubits at a time.

He should lift the purse and carry it less than four cubits, then stop to rest. In this way the initial lifting is nullified. He should then lift it again, carry it less than four cubits, and stop, and continue in this manner until he reaches his home. It follows that he has not carried it four cubits in a single transfer; therefore he is not liable by Torah law.

And we raised this objection:

Why did the Sages not reveal it?

For by doing so, they are concealing words of Torah.

And we answered:

Because: “It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, but the glory of kings is to investigate a matter.”

It is permitted to conceal words of Torah for the sake of the honor of Heaven. But one should not conceal a person’s honor, wealth, or importance; rather, one should investigate them.

And we asked:

But here, what honor of God is there

in concealing this enactment?

And we answered: If the matter were revealed and people carried the object in increments of fewer than four cubits,

perhaps

as a result

they would come to carry four cubits in the public domain

at once, and thereby transgress a Torah prohibition.

And since the matter could readily lead to a Torah prohibition, they did not wish to reveal it.

Nevertheless, they did not prohibit the matter entirely. Rather, if he has no gentile, animal, or deaf-mute, mentally incompetent person, or minor with him, he may carry it in increments of fewer than four cubits. But if he has one of these, he should not do so.

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: On that day

when they ascended to the upper chamber of Hanania ben Hezekiah and enacted the eighteen decrees [and this decree as well—that he should not carry his purse in increments of fewer than four cubits, but should give it to a gentile—is included among the eighteen decrees ],

they filled the measure.

That is, they increased the safeguards for the Torah to a heaping measure, and they measured well, in order to increase the protective fence in Israel.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: On that day they leveled the measure.

There are three measures: heaping [the largest of all], overflowing [the intermediate measure], and leveled [the smallest]. Since they heaped the measure and enacted an excessive number of decrees, the public could not withstand their decree. As a result, they came to transgress words of Torah, and their measure was thereby leveled. It would have been better for them to measure with an overflowing measure [the intermediate measure], because then it would not be leveled as a result of its excessive fullness.

It was taught: A parable

with which he compared

Rabbi Eliezer

when he called this decree “a heaping measure”:

To what is this matter comparable? —

To a basket

that is

full of cucumbers and gourds. A person places mustard into it, and it

holds

even that. For the mustard seeds are small, and they fall between the cucumbers and remain inside the basket. So too here, they enacted properly and added a prohibition against something that can endure.

And the parable with which

he compared

Rabbi Yehoshua

when he called this decree “a leveled measure”:

To what is this matter comparable? —

To a trough

that is

full of honey.

A person

places pomegranates and walnuts into it, and it vomits

the honey inside it out.

So too here, by increasing the prohibitions, they caused people to transgress the original prohibitions. Perhaps he would not rely on the gentile to take the purse from him. And since they prohibited him from carrying it in increments of fewer than four cubits where there is a gentile, he would come to carry it four cubits at once. For a person cannot restrain himself when it comes to his money.

The Master said: If he has no gentile with him, he places it on the donkey.

And we wondered:

But he is driving his animal

For he is leading the donkey through the public domain on Shabbat while it is laden with the purse, and this is a Torah prohibition. For

the Torah said: “

Do not

perform any labor

you and your animal.” What is the ordinary labor performed jointly by a person and an animal? This is driving an animal, leading it through the public domain while it is laden with a burden . From here we derive the same principle for all the labors of Shabbat: it is prohibited for him to perform them through an animal.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: He places it

the purse

upon it

[upon the animal]

while it is walking.

For we maintain that there is no liability for carrying on Shabbat unless one uproots the object from one place and places it in another. Here, the animal did not uproot the purse from its place; rather, he uprooted it and placed it upon the animal. But if he placed it on the animal while it was standing, then when it begins to walk, it uproots the object. For the uprooting of its body is considered like the uprooting of an object. As it was stated above [3a]: If another person loaded him with food and drink and he carried them outside, he is liable, for this is properly considered his uprooting and placing. But if he placed the purse on the animal after it had already begun walking, the animal has not uprooted the object. Since a person would likewise not be liable for carrying in such a case, there is also no prohibition of driving an animal.

And we challenge this again:

But it is impossible that the animal will not stop

the animal

to urinate and defecate

before it reaches the city. Therefore, there is indeed uprooting and placing on its part. For whenever it stops to rest, once it begins walking again, this is considered a new act of uprooting. We should therefore say again that the uprooting of its body is considered like the uprooting of an object.

And we answer: This is what he does:

While it is walking,

he

places it

the purse

upon it. And when it stops

to defecate, he

takes it from it

before it uproots itself again from its place. And he places it on it again only after it has uprooted itself from its place. It follows that the animal never uproots itself from its place while the object is upon it. Consequently, it is not considered to have uprooted the object together with the uprooting of its body.

And we challenge this:

If so, even

on

his fellow as well

he could place the purse in this manner. Why is it necessary to place it on the donkey?

Rav Pappa said:

They permitted this only when placing it on a donkey.

For if he himself uprooted the object while walking and carried the purse through the public domain, he would be liable to bring a sin-offering [for standing is required only when another person has loaded an object onto him, since in that case the object is uprooted only through the uprooting of his body from its place of standing. But where he himself uprooted the object by hand while walking, standing is not required].

Therefore,

whenever

he himself would carry it

with his body,

he would be

liable to bring a sin-offering; when

he places it on

his fellow

while walking, he is indeed

exempt but prohibited

from placing it on him by rabbinic decree.

And whenever

he places it on

his fellow and is exempt but prohibited, when

he places it on

his donkey it is permitted

initially.

Since there is no Torah prohibition of driving an animal in this case, they permitted him to do so, because if they did not permit it, he would come to carry it four cubits in the public domain with his body.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: If his bundle was placed on his shoulder

on the eve of Shabbat, while it was still day, he

runs beneath it

[that is, while it is placed upon him] through the public domain even after Shabbat has begun,

until he reaches his house.

Since he began running before the onset of Shabbat and did not stop to rest, it follows that he did not uproot the bundle on Shabbat. And for placing without uprooting, one is not liable.

And we infer:

Specifically

when he

runs

did they permit him.

But

if he walks

little by little

[a small amount at a time, that is, calmly],

they did not

permit him, even though in such a case as well there is no uprooting on Shabbat, since he did not stop to rest.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that walking is prohibited? —

Since

he walks in his ordinary manner,

he has no reminder.

We are concerned that he will forget and stop to rest after the day has become sanctified, and then continue walking. And

he will come

thereby

to perform uprooting and placing

on Shabbat. For the uprooting of his body after he has stopped is considered like the uprooting of the object.

But when he is running, he has a reminder, and he will remember and not stop to rest.

And we challenge this: How is it permitted for him to run with his bundle? After all,

ultimately, when he reaches his house, it is impossible that he will not stop

and stand

briefly,

a short distance outside his house before entering. That place is still the public domain. And when he uproots himself to enter the house, there is again uprooting in the public domain. And when he places the bundle in the house, there is placing in the private domain.

And

it follows that he

is bringing an object from the public domain into the private domain

through uprooting and placing.

And we answer: When he arrives at his house, he does not place the bundle in the ordinary manner. Rather,

he throws it in an unusual manner.

For example, he throws it behind his shoulder, which is not the ordinary manner of placing. It follows that he performs uprooting without placing, and for this as well he is not liable.

Rami bar Hama said: One who drives his animal on Shabbat

when it is laden with a burden in the public domain—if he did so

unintentionally, he is liable to bring a sin-offering; and intentionally, he is liable to stoning.

His status is in every respect like that of one who desecrates Shabbat through one of the thirty-nine labors.

What is the reason

for the opinion of Rami bar Hama?

Rava said:

Because

the verse says: “You shall not perform any labor, you and your animal.”

And from this verse we derive the prohibition against driving an animal.

And from here we also derive that his status is like that of one who desecrates Shabbat in every respect. For since the verse says “you and your animal,” one who drives

his animal

is made

comparable

to the performance of labor

by him.

Just as he,

if he performs labor himself,

unintentionally

he is

liable to bring a sin-offering, and intentionally he is liable to stoning, so too

when he performs labor through

his animal as well,

the same applies:

unintentionally, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and intentionally, he is liable to stoning.

Rava said: There are two answers

that

can be given

against the words of Rami bar Hama, demonstrating that the halakha is not in accordance with him.

One is that

this

is written

with regard to the sin-offering for idolatry:

“There shall be one Torah for you, for one who acts unintentionally.”

And adjacent to it is

“But the person who acts defiantly”

whether native or stranger, blasphemes the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. And we expound:

The entire Torah is made comparable to idolatry.

Just as with regard to idolatry,

one is not liable for an unintentional act by a sin-offering until

he performs

the

act with his own body,

as it is written, “for one who acts unintentionally,”

so too

with regard to all those acts for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, he is not liable

until he performs the act with his own body.

But one who drives an animal, who performs the act through his animal, is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

And furthermore,

this

we learned in a Mishna: One who desecrates Shabbat through an act for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for its unintentional performance and to karet for its intentional performance

if he desecrated it in the presence of witnesses and after a warning, he is liable to stoning. And since it teaches, “through an act for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering for its unintentional performance,”

by inference, there is something

in the desecration of Shabbat

for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for its unintentional performance, nor to stoning for its intentional performance. And what is it? —

The prohibition

of

“driving an animal.”

But according to Rami bar Hama, who says that even one who drives an animal is liable to a sin-offering and stoning, this is difficult. We have not found a Torah prohibition on Shabbat that does not entail a sin-offering and stoning.

And we reject this: The implication that there is something on Shabbat that does not entail a sin-offering and stoning

does not

refer to driving an animal, but to

the prohibition of Shabbat limits, according to Rabbi Akiva.

He maintains that the prohibition against going beyond the Shabbat limit is a Torah prohibition. But it does not entail a sin-offering or stoning; it is merely a negative commandment.

Alternatively, it refers to the prohibition of

kindling

on Shabbat

according to Rabbi Yosei,

who says: Why does the verse state, “You shall not kindle fire in all your settlements on the day of Shabbat”? Is this not already included in the statement, “You shall not perform any labor”? Rather, kindling was singled out as a prohibition, so that it does not entail a sin-offering or stoning like the other labors of Shabbat, but only a standalone negative commandment.