Shabbat 154a (קנד.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Zevid taught

this statement

as follows: Rami bar Hama said: One who drives an animal on Shabbat, if he did so unwittingly, is not liable to a sin-offering.

But

if he did so intentionally, he is liable to stoning,

as for all the labors of Shabbat.

Rava raised an objection:

But was it not taught

in a beraita: One who desecrates Shabbat through an act for which one is liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance is liable to stoning for its intentional performance?

It follows

that

an act for which one

is not liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance, one is not liable to stoning for its intentional performance.

If so, since one is not liable to a sin-offering for driving an animal, he should likewise not be liable to stoning for doing so intentionally. And this is difficult for Rami bar Hama.

And we answer: This is not a precise inference. For

does it explicitly state

that

“that for which one is not liable

for its unwitting performance to a sin-offering, one is not liable to stoning for its intentional performance”?

Perhaps

this is what it is saying:

Every

act for which one is liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance

is always

subject to stoning for its intentional performance.

But it can nevertheless be said that

there is an act for which

even though one

is not liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance,

nevertheless one is

liable to stoning for its intentional performance.

And what is it? —

Driving an animal.

And there are some acts for which there is no liability of karet for their intentional performance, such as the prohibition of Shabbat boundaries according to Rabbi Akiva, and kindling a fire according to Rabbi Yosei.

Rava, the brother of Rav Mari bar Rahel, used to teach this statement in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, as exempting one who drives an animal

entirely. [

And in the manuscripts before us it reads:

And some say:

Rava

was the father of Rav Mari bar Rahel

.

And he said:

According to the latter version,

which says that he was the father of Rav Mari bar Rahel,

there is a difficulty from

what is stated in tractate Yevamot,

that Rav [a]

[a]

enabled Rav Mari bar Rahel to serve, and appointed him as the parnas of Babylonia

[he appointed him to be an officer in Babylonia] . And although his father was a convert, and we maintain: “All appointments that you make may be only from among your brothers,” since his mother was Jewish, the phrase “from among your brothers” applies to him. Thus, his father was a convert. And how could you say that he was Rava’s son?

And we answer:

Perhaps there were two men named Mari bar Rahel.

And Rashi and Tosafot did not include this version.]

For

Rabbi Yohanan said: One who drives his animal on Shabbat is entirely exempt. If he did so unwittingly, he is not liable to a sin-offering, because the entire Torah was equated with idolatry.

Just as there, in the case of idolatry, an act must be performed with his own body, so too, with regard to all those acts for which one is liable to sin-offerings. But one who drives an animal performs no act with his own body; rather, he does so through his animal.

And even for intentional performance he is not liable

to stoning.

For

that

which we learned in the Mishna: One who desecrates Shabbat through an act for which one is liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance is liable to stoning for its intentional performance.

It follows

that

an act for which one

is not liable to a sin-offering for its unwitting performance, one is not liable to stoning for its intentional performance.

And since there is no sin-offering for driving an animal, there is likewise no stoning for it.

And

for

lashes for a

prohibition, he is likewise not liable

as with all prohibitions of the Torah. Because

it is

the prohibition of driving an animal,

a prohibition that was given as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty.

And although there is no court-imposed death penalty for driving an animal itself, nevertheless, the prohibition “You shall not perform any labor,” from which the prohibition of driving an animal is derived, comes to warn against the other labors of Shabbat, which are punishable by death.

Tosafot further wrote [according to the second approach] that the ordinary meaning of “labor” written with regard to Shabbat is an act punishable by death, as it is written: “Whoever performs labor on it shall be put to death.” Therefore, the primary purpose of the verse “You shall not perform labor” is to refer to labor for which there is a death penalty. Consequently, one is not flogged for it. But in general, where a prohibition includes both liability to a death penalty and a warning for lashes, one is flogged for it. And according to the understanding of the Maggid Mishne regarding the position of Maimonides [see note 4], driving an animal is considered a prohibition that was given as a warning for a death penalty specifically because we find a death penalty even for an act shared by a person and an animal, such as plowing. And for every prohibition that was given as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty, one is not flogged.

For its primary purpose is to impose a death penalty, not lashes.