Shabbat 112a — the Talmud in English

The knot that they tie

the strap

to the zimma, and the knot that they tie

the strap

to the istrida,

with these

there is no liability, but there is a prohibition—

there is.

For they leave the strap tied there for a certain period.

And there are

knots

that are permitted ab initio, and what are they?—

A woman may tie

the

openings of her garment, and the like, for this knot is made only for a short time.

And now the Gemara explains the details of the knots listed in the Mishna.

The opening of a garment.

And we raised it as a question:

It is obvious

that it is permitted to tie it, since it is made to be closed and opened frequently.

And we answer:

It is necessary,

but with an opening

that has two openings

two tongues with which to tie it.

Lest you say:

Since she can remove the garment and put it on by opening only one of the tongues,

one of them

she ties and never unties, but rather

does away with it,

and since, when she ties both tongues, it is not known which of them she will leave as a permanent knot and which she will open, we should prohibit both knots because of the doubt;

it teaches us

that it is permitted to tie both tongues.

And the strings of the hairnet.

And we raised it as a question:

It is obvious

that it is permitted to tie them, since they are made to be opened every day.

And we answer:

It is necessary

when she tied the hairnet in such a manner that she did not tighten it to her head, but rather

made it loose for her.

Lest you say, she will pull it off

the hairnet from her head without untying the knot, and it will be a permanent knot—

it teaches us that a woman is concerned for her hair, and she loosens it.

And the straps of a shoe and sandal.

It was stated: One who untied the straps of a shoe and sandal—

One teaching says: He is liable for a sin-offering.

And another teaching says: He is exempt, but it is prohibited.

And another teaching says: It is permitted ab initio.

It is difficult concerning shoe as opposed to shoe; it is difficult concerning sandal as opposed to sandal!

And we answer:

Concerning shoe as opposed to shoe there is no difficulty.

This, which teaches that he is liable for a sin-offering,

is with

a knot

of a shoemaker,

which the shoemaker makes when he inserts the strap into the shoe in such a way that it will be fixed in it, which is a permanent knot.

Exempt, but it is prohibited—

is with

a knot

of scholars,

which scholars tie in a manner that is not completely tight on their feet; sometimes they remove the shoe without opening the strap’s knot, and sometimes they open it in order to put on the shoe tightly, such as during the rainy season.

Permitted ab initio—

is with the people of Meḥoza,

who tie it tightly and need to open it every day.

Concerning sandal as opposed to sandal

also

there is no difficulty.

This, which teaches that he is liable for a sin-offering,

is with

a sandal

of the Arabs,

of the Ishmaelites,

whose shoemakers tie,

for them the straps of the sandal permanently.

Exempt, but it is prohibited—

with the sandals of other people, in which the shoemakers do not fix the straps, but rather

with a cord,

which each person puts on himself,

which they tie themselves,

the people themselves, in such a manner that from time to time they untie them.

Permitted ab initio—

with a sandal in which two people go,

which two people use, and each of them needs to adjust it to the size of his foot, so it follows that they untie it every day.

And

as in the case of Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda, the brother of Rav Sala the Pious, had a pair of sandals,

in which there was a shoemaker’s knot, made for permanence.

Sometimes he went out in it, and sometimes

his son went out in it,

the child.

He came before Abaye and said

that he asked

him:

A knot

of this sort—

what is its status?

He said to him,

Abaye:

You are liable for a sin-offering!

He said to him: Now,

if you had told me

“Exempt, but it is prohibited”,

it would have been

what was difficult to me,

why is it prohibited?

But now

“liable for a sin-offering”—

you are telling me!?

Abaye said to him:

For what reason

is it difficult to you even concerning its rabbinic prohibition?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda:

Because on

a weekday

as well, sometimes I go out in it, and sometimes the child goes out in it.

He said to him: If so, since you both use it and each time it is necessary to untie the knot in order to adjust it to each one’s foot—

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking behind Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit.

it is permitted ab initio.

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking behind Rabbi Abahu in a karmelit.

The strap of his sandal broke.

And the sandal fell from his foot, and he could not carry it in the karmelit.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya to Rabbi Abahu:

What shall I do with it

so that I can put on the sandal?

He said to him,

Rabbi Abahu:

Take moist reed grass, which is fit

which is suitable

for animal food,

and therefore is not muktzeh,

and wrap it around it.

Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef

in a courtyard.

Its strap broke.

He said to him,

Abaye to Rav Yosef:

What shall I do with it?

He said to him,

Rav Yosef:

Leave it,

leave the sandal in the place where it fell!

Abaye said to him:

What is different from the case of Rabbi Yirmeya,

in which Rabbi Abahu permitted him to put it on by wrapping it with moist reed grass?

Rav Yosef said to him:

There,

where it happened that it fell in a karmelit,

it is not guarded,

it is not protected there. And so that his shoe should not be lost, he permitted him to put it on his foot by tying reed grass.

But

here,

where the sandal fell in a courtyard—

it is guarded,

it is protected there, and there is no need to permit repairing it and carrying it in such a manner.

A sandal has on both of its sides “tar siyot,” which is the place where the sandal’s straps are attached to the sandal.

When the outer tar siyah breaks and it is repaired, the repair is visible from the outside, and it is disgraceful to put it on. But if one exchanges the right sandal for the left foot (see the illustration at the end of the book), the repair will be on the inner side, between the two feet, and there it is not visible.

Abaye said to him: Why is it prohibited for me to take it in my hand?

But

still

it is an implement,

for it is still a shoe fit for use, because

if I wish—

I can turn it from

a shoe for the right foot

into

a shoe for the left foot,

the left,

and then it is fit to repair it on its inner side, and it is still considered a shoe.

He said to him: From

what we find that

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains

explains

Rabbi Yoḥanan

the matter of the breaking of the tar siyot

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who disputes the Sages concerning this matter—

infer from it

that Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that

the halakha is according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that if the outer tar siyah of the sandal breaks, the designation of an implement is removed from it, and we do not take into consideration that it is possible to exchange the sandal to the other foot and make the place where the tar siyah broke the inner side.

What is it?

Where do we find the dispute concerning an outer tar siyah that broke, and that Rabbi Yoḥanan decided according to Rabbi Yehuda by explaining the matter of the breaking of the tar siyah according to him?

For it was taught: A sandal whose two ears broke, or

whose

two tar siyot broke,

the inner and the outer,

or whose entire sole

the heel

of it

is pure,

because the designation of an implement has been removed from it.

And if only

one of its ears or one of its tar siyot was removed, or most of its sole was removed—

it is impure,

because it can be repaired. For even if the outer tar siyah was removed and it is disgraceful to repair it, since its repair will be visible from the outside, it is still possible to exchange it and put it on the other foot, in which case its repair will be on the inner side.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If

the

tar siyah of the

inner

side broke—

it is impure. The outer—

it is pure.

And Ulla said, and some say Rabbah bar bar Ḥana:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Just as the dispute is concerning impurity,

so is the dispute concerning Shabbat,

whether it is permitted to carry it.

But not concerning chalitza!

And we raised it as a question: Rabbi Yoḥanan—

according to whom,

according to which tannaitic authority among those mentioned in the beraita [the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda], did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that this authority disputes both concerning impurity and concerning Shabbat, but agrees with the other authority concerning chalitza?

If you say: According to the Sages.

And this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Since concerning impurity it is an implement—

concerning Shabbat as well it is an implement,

since it can be exchanged to the other foot,

but not concerning chalitza, for it is not an implement

fit for chalitza

it is.

For the sandal must fit the foot for which it was intended, and in this the Sages agree with Rabbi Yehuda that it is not an implement.

It is impossible to say this. For

But we learned: If she performed chalitza

with a shoe

of

the

left

foot while it was worn

on

the

right

foot, her chalitza is valid!

That is, we find that although initially it is a mitzva to remove the right shoe from the right foot of the yavam, if the yavam wore a left shoe on his right foot, his chalitza is valid.

And if so, why, if the tar siyah of the left shoe broke, is it invalid for chalitza? After all, it is fit after the fact for chalitza, since if it is placed on the right foot, the place of the repair will be on the inner side, and then it will not be visible.

Rather, necessarily,

because

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

Rabbi Yoḥanan said this.

And this is what he said:

Since concerning impurity

Rabbi Yehuda holds

it is not an implement—

concerning Shabbat as well it is not an implement.

But not

did Rabbi Yehuda hold so

concerning

the matter of

chalitza—

since

it

indeed

is an implement

with regard to it.

For we learned that after the fact it is possible to perform chalitza with a left sandal when it is on the right foot.

And Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that although the breaking of its outer tar siyah removes from it the designation of an implement for impurity and for Shabbat, it nevertheless retains the designation of an implement for chalitza.

And we reject this:

I might say that we say, “She performed chalitza

with a shoe

of the left

when it is

on

the

right foot, her chalitza is valid”—

where

this shoe

for its matter

for the other laws of an implement

is an implement.

But

here—

for its matter,

concerning impurity and Shabbat,

it is not an implement.

For Rabbi Yehuda said: If the

tar siyah

on the outer side breaks—

it is pure.

Evidently—

it is not an implement!

And the Gemara answers by changing the wording:

Actually,

Rabbi Yoḥanan

according to Rabbi Yehuda

said it.

And

say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement should be understood as follows:

and likewise concerning

the matter of

chalitza, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is not an implement, and therefore it is not fit for chalitza.

Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is not a utensil, and therefore it is not fit for ḥalitza.