Shabbat 112a (קיב.) — the Talmud in English

The knot that they tie

the strap

to the zemama, and the knot that they tie

the strap

to the istrida—

with these

liability is absent, but a prohibition—

does exist,

because they leave the strap tied there for a certain period.

And there are

knots

that are permitted ab initio. And what are they?—

A woman may tie

a

opening of her robe, and the like, because this knot is made only for a short time.

The Gemara now explains the details of the knots listed in the Mishna.

The Gemara now explains the details of the knots listed in the Mishna.

The opening of her robe.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

It is obvious

that it is permitted to tie it, since it is made to be closed and opened regularly.

And we answer:

It is necessary

only in the case of an opening

that has two cords,

two strings with which to tie it.

Lest you say:

since she can take off the garment and put it on by opening only one of the strings,

one of them

she ties and never unties, but rather

permanently nullifies it,

and since when she ties both strings it is not known which one she will leave as a permanent knot and which one she will open, perhaps both knots should be prohibited because of the uncertainty,

it teaches us

that it is permitted to tie both strings.

And the threads of a hairnet.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

It is obvious

that it is permitted to tie them, since they are made to be opened every day.

And we answer:

It is necessary

where she tied the hairnet in such a way that she did not tighten it around her head, but rather

made it loose for herself.

Lest you say, she will pull it off

her head without untying the knot, and it will thereby be a permanent knot—

it teaches us that a woman takes care for her hair, and she unties it.

And the straps of a shoe or sandal.

It was stated: One who untied the straps of a shoe or sandal—

One teaching says: He is liable for a sin-offering.

And another teaching says: He is exempt, but it is prohibited.

And another teaching says: It is permitted ab initio.

The shoe contradicts the shoe, and the sandal contradicts the sandal!

And we answer:

The shoe does not contradict the shoe.

The one that teaches that he is liable for a sin-offering—

in

a knot

made by a shoemaker,

which the shoemaker makes when inserting the strap into the shoe in such a way that it will remain fixed in it, and it is therefore a permanent knot.

“He is exempt, but it is prohibited”—

in

a knot

of the Sages,

which Torah scholars tie in a manner that is not completely tight around their feet. At times they remove the shoe without opening the strap’s knot, and at times they open it in order to put on the shoe tightly, as on rainy days.

“It is permitted ab initio”—

in the case of the people of Meḥoza,

who tie it tightly and need to open it every single day.

The sandal and the sandal

also

do not contradict one another.

The one that teaches that he is liable for a sin-offering—

in

a sandal

of the Arabs,

belonging to the Ishmaelites,

whose knots are made by shoemakers,

for the shoemakers tie the sandal’s straps for them permanently.

“He is exempt, but it is prohibited”—

in the sandals of other people, for the shoemakers do not fix straps in them, but rather

with a cord,

as each person puts his own straps in it,

which they themselves tie,

in such a manner that they occasionally untie them.

“It is permitted ab initio”—

in a sandal used by two people,

for two people use it, and each one must adjust it to the size of his foot; consequently, they untie it every day.

And

this is in accordance with the practice of Rav Yehuda. Rav Yehuda, the brother of Rav Sala the pious, had a pair of sandals

in which there was a shoemaker’s knot, made to remain permanently.

At times he wore them, and at times

his son wore them,

the child.

He came before Abaye and said

that he asked

him:

A knot

of this kind—

what is the halakha?

He said to him,

Abaye:

He is liable for a sin-offering!

He said to him: Now,

if you had told me

“He is exempt, but it is prohibited,”

that would have been

what I found difficult,

namely, why is it prohibited?

But now

“He is liable for a sin-offering”—

that is what you tell me!?

Abaye said to him:

Why

did you find even its rabbinic prohibition difficult?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda:

Because on

a weekday

as well, sometimes I wear it, and sometimes the child wears it.

He said to him: If so, since both of you use it and each time the knot must be untied in order to adjust it to the wearer’s foot—

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking behind Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit.

it is permitted ab initio.

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking behind Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit.

The strap of his sandal snapped.

The sandal fell from his foot, and he could not carry it in the karmelit.

He said to him,

Rabbi Yirmeya to Rabbi Abbahu:

What shall we do with it

so that I can put the sandal back on?

He said to him,

Rabbi Abbahu:

Take moist reeds, which are fit

and suitable

as animal food,

and therefore are not muktze,

and wrap them around it.

Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef

in a courtyard.

His strap snapped.

Abaye said to him,

to Rav Yosef:

What shall I do with it?

Rav Yosef said to him:

leave the sandal where it fell!

Leave it,

leave the sandal where it fell!

Abaye said to him:

What is different from the case of Rabbi Yirmeya,

where Rabbi Abbahu permitted him to put it on by wrapping it with moist reeds?

Rav Yosef said to him:

There,

where it happened to fall in a karmelit,

it is not guarded,

it is not protected there. In order that his shoe should not be lost, he permitted him to put it on his foot by tying it with reeds.

But

here,

where the sandal fell in a courtyard, it

is guarded,

as it is protected there; there is no need to permit repairing it and carrying it in this manner.

A sandal has “tarasiyyot” on both sides, the places where the sandal’s straps are attached to the sandal.

When the outer tarasiyya snaps and it is repaired, the repair is visible from the outside, and it is disgraceful to wear it. However, if the right sandal is exchanged to the left foot, the repair will be on the inner side, between the two feet, where it is not visible.

Abaye said to him: Why is it prohibited for me to pick it up by hand?

But

it is still

a utensil,

as it is still a shoe fit for use, because

if I wish,

I can turn it from

a shoe for the right foot

into

a shoe for the

left foot,

and then it can be repaired on its inner side and is still considered a shoe.

He said to him: From

what we find that

Rabbi Yoḥanan explains

the matter

of Rabbi Yoḥanan

the snapping of the tarasiyyot

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who disagrees with the Rabbis concerning this matter—

infer from this

that Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that if the outer tarasiyya of the sandal snaps, it loses the status of a utensil, and we do not take into consideration that the sandal can be exchanged to the other foot, making the place where the tarasiyya snapped the inner side.

What is this?

Where do we find the dispute concerning an outer tarasiyya that snapped, and where Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda by explaining the matter of the snapped tarasiyya according to his view?

As it was taught in a beraita: If both ears of a sandal snapped, or

if

both of its tarasiyyot snapped,

the inner and the outer ones,

or if its entire sole was removed,

the heel

of the sandal—

it is pure,

because it has lost the status of a utensil.

But if only

one of its ears or one of its tarasiyyot was removed, or most of its sole was removed—

it is impure,

because it can be repaired. For even if the outer tarasiyya was removed and repairing it is disgraceful because its repair would be visible from the outside, it can still be exchanged and worn on the other foot, in which case its repair would be on the inner side.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If

the

inner

tarasiyya

snapped—

it is impure. The outer one—

it is pure.

And Ulla said, and some say Rabba bar bar Ḥana:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Just as there is a dispute with regard to ritual impurity,

whether it retains the status of a utensil,

so is there a dispute with regard to Shabbat,

whether it is permitted to carry it.

But not with regard to ḥalitza!

And we raised a difficulty: Rabbi Yoḥanan—

according to whom,

according to which of the tannaim mentioned in the beraita—the Rabbis or Rabbi Yehuda—did Rabbi Yoḥanan say that this tanna disagrees both with regard to ritual impurity and with regard to Shabbat, but concedes to the other view with regard to ḥalitza?

If you say it was according to the Rabbis,

and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan meant:

Since with regard to ritual impurity it is a utensil,

with regard to Shabbat as well it is a utensil,

since it can be exchanged to the other foot,

but not with regard to ḥalitza, since it is not a utensil

fit for ḥalitza

it is.

For the sandal must fit the foot for which it was intended, and in this the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that it is not a utensil.

This cannot be said. For:

But we learned: If she removed

a shoe

of the

foot

left

when it was worn

on the

foot

right—

her ḥalitza is valid!

That is, we find that although the mitzva is initially to remove the right shoe from the right foot of the yavam, if the yavam wore a left shoe on his right foot, the ḥalitza is valid.

If so, why, when the tarasiyya of the left shoe snaps, is it invalid for ḥalitza? It is fit for ḥalitza after the fact, since if it is placed on the right foot, the repaired area will be on the inner side and will not be visible.

Rather, necessarily

we must say that

Rabbi Yoḥanan spoke according to Rabbi Yehuda.

The Gemara rejects this:

And this is what he meant:

Since with regard to ritual impurity

Rabbi Yehuda holds that

it is not a utensil—

with regard to Shabbat as well it is not a utensil.

But not

does Rabbi Yehuda hold this

with regard to

the matter of

ḥalitza—

since

it

indeed

is a utensil

with regard to it.

For we learned that after the fact one may perform ḥalitza with a left shoe when it is on the right foot.

And Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that although the snapping of its outer tarasiyya removes its status as a utensil with regard to ritual impurity and Shabbat, it nevertheless retains the status of a utensil with regard to ḥalitza.

And the Gemara rejects this:

I can say that we say: “She removed

a shoe

of the left

when it is

on

the right

foot, her ḥalitza is valid”—

where

this shoe

for its purpose,

for the other laws governing a utensil,

is a utensil.

But

here,

for its purpose,

with regard to ritual impurity and Shabbat,

it is not a utensil.

For Rabbi Yehuda said: If the

tarasiyya

outer

snapped—it is pure.

Evidently,

it is not a utensil!

And the Gemara answers by changing the reading:

Actually,

Rabbi Yoḥanan

said it according to Rabbi Yehuda

.

And

say

that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement should be understood as follows:

And likewise with regard to

the matter of

ḥalitza,

Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is not a utensil, and therefore it is not fit for ḥalitza.