Shabbat 112b (קיב:) — the Talmud in English

And this teaches us that when we say that if the left sandal was removed using the right leg, the chalitza is valid,

where

it is fit for its purpose—

it is considered a utensil.

But here—

it is not considered a utensil for its purpose.

And we challenge this:

And did Rabbi Yohanan actually say this, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the outer strap was removed, it is not a utensil for any purpose

?

But Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

And we learned

in tractate Kelim:

If one

of the sandal’s

straps was severed, and he repaired it

[and the same law applies if he has not yet repaired it; see Rashi]—it remains a utensil. Therefore, if the sandal belonged to a zav, it is

impure with impurity of midras,

as its impurity as a primary source of impurity has not ceased.

Is that not—

regardless of whether

its inner strap was severed,

or whether

its

outer strap was severed?

We see that even with regard to impurity, the halakha is that although the outer strap was removed, it is still considered a sandal.

And we answer:

No,

the Mishna is referring specifically to a case in which the

inner strap was severed.

And we challenge this:

But

if its

outer strap was severed,

according to your explanation—

it is pure

the sandal.

If so,

as there is a distinction between a case in which the inner strap was severed and one in which the outer strap was severed,

then this should be difficult:

rather than teaching

later in that same Mishna a distinction between the first strap being severed and the second strap being severed:

If

its

second strap was severed, and he repaired it—

the sandal is pure

from

the

impurity of

midras,

as it is a primary source of impurity, because the designation of the original sandal has been nullified when its second strap was also severed. [And once he repairs it, we say: “A new entity has come here.”]

But

it nevertheless remains

impure,

the repaired sandal being impure with

impurity through contact with midras,

which is a first-degree impurity, since we regard the sandal as though it had touched the earlier sandal at the moment its second strap was severed, when that earlier sandal was impure with impurity of midras.

And since both of its straps were severed, it necessarily means that one outer strap and one inner strap were severed, since an ordinary sandal has only two straps.

If so, it would have been preferable to

make the distinction within that very case,

the case of the first strap being severed, and say:

When is this statement applicable,

that the sandal continues to be impure with impurity of midras after one of its straps has been removed? It is when

the

strap that was severed was the

inner one.

But if the one strap that was severed was the

outer

strap, then

it is

pure!

Rabbi Yitzhak ben Yosef said: Our Mishna

dealing with impurity of midras

is referring to a sandal that has four straps and four straps with buckles.

The Mishna does not mean that when the second strap is severed the sandal is pure when one outer and one inner strap have been severed. Rather, it means that its two outer straps were severed, in which case it becomes pure because it no longer has an outer strap, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And it is preferable to explain it this way

so as not to undermine Rabbi Yohanan’s statement,

who said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and also said that the halakha follows an unattributed Mishna.

When Ravin came, he said:

Rav Hanan bar Abba said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: The halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And we question Ravin’s report in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

And did Rabbi Yohanan actually say this,

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?

But since Rabbi Yohanan explains the Mishna according to Rabbi Yehuda, learn from this

that Rabbi Yohanan

agrees with Rabbi Yehuda!?

And we answer:

They are amoraim, and they disputed Rabbi Yohanan’s position.

Each one understood his view differently.

We learned there: All the utensils of householders—

their measure

for holes that render them no longer fit to receive impurity is a hole

the size

of

pomegranates.

Ḥizkiya raised a dilemma: If

the utensil was perforated to the measure

of a hole through which an olive can emerge,

meaning that an olive could pass through the hole,

and he sealed it,

and it was perforated again

near it to the measure

of a hole through which an olive can emerge, and he sealed it,

until he completed

the series of holes

to “the size of a hole through which a pomegranate can emerge,”—

what is the halakha?

Rabbi Yohanan said to him: Rabbi, you taught us the case of a sandal whose one strap was severed and he repaired it—

it is impure with impurity of midras.

But if, after he repaired the first strap,

the

second strap

was severed, and he repaired it—

it is pure from impurity of midras, but impure with impurity through contact with midras.

And we said to you: What is different

about a case in which the first strap

was severed,

when the sandal continues to impart impurity of midras—

since the second strap remains.

If so, when the second strap

also

is severed, it too should continue to impart impurity of midras—for

once he repairs it,

the first strap has already been repaired

!?

And you told us

to answer

it: After the second strap was severed, even if he repaired it,

a

a new entity

of a sandal

has come here.

Here too,

when it was perforated and sealed, and then perforated and sealed again,

a new entity

of a utensil

has come here.

He applied this verse

Ḥizkiya to Rabbi Yohanan:

This is not—

a human being!

He is not [Rabbi Yohanan] a human being but an angel!

Some say: “Like this one—

a human being!”

This is a man of exceptional ability in every matter!

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rava bar Zimuna:

If

the

earlier generations

are regarded as though they were

the sons of angels, then

we

are regarded as

the sons of men.

And if the earlier generations

are regarded as

the sons of men, then

we

are regarded as

donkeys.

And

even

not like the donkey of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa or that of Rabbi Pinḥas ben Yair, but—

like ordinary donkeys.

We learned in the Mishna:

And

he ties

wine and oil skins.

And we discuss this:

Isn’t it obvious

that these are not permanent knots, since he must regularly open them!?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary because the skin has two

ears, with which he ties it.

Lest you say that he nullifies one of them

and leaves the knot in place—

it teaches us

that he unties both knots of the two ears.

We learned further: He ties a cloth over the mouth of a

pot of meat.

And we discuss this:

Isn’t it obvious!?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary because

the pot has

a shalakha,

another opening from which the food can be removed.

Lest you say that he nullifies it,

the knot of the cloth, since he has no need to open it in order to remove the food,

it teaches us

that he does not leave it tied.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He ties it

to a rope at the entrance, in front of the animal, so that it will not go out.

And we discuss this:

Isn’t it obvious,

since he must untie the knot so that he can take the animal out?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary because, for the purpose of tying the entrance,

there are

two isarin

ropes, one above the other. [Another explanation: He ties two knots on the two sides of the entrance, since the rope had not been tied even on one side since the previous day.]