Shabbat 111b — the Talmud in English

But Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said in the name of Rav: This mesukaryeta de-nezeyata

the stopper of the barrel, around which a cloth is wound so that it will be tightened היטב

is forbidden to tighten it on a Festival

because he squeezes out the wine absorbed in the cloth, even though he does not intend to squeeze it. Thus, Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon in the laws of Shabbat, for according to Rabbi Shimon, an unintended act is permitted ? And we answer:

In that case, even Rabbi Shimon agrees

that it is forbidden to tighten the stopper,

for Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon agrees in the case of pesik reisha velo yamut

and here too it is a pesik reisha, since it is impossible to tighten the stopper without squeezing the wine out of it. Therefore, there is no proof from here that Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon concerning the prohibitions of Shabbat.

And we object:

But Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

in every matter that he does not intend, which is forbidden.

And Rav Hanan bar Ami said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

for an unintended act is permitted.

And Rav Hiyya bar Avin taught it without names

that it was not amoraim speaking in the names of Rav and Shmuel who disputed the matter, but Rav and Shmuel themselves disputed it:

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

Thus, Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon concerning the prohibitions of Shabbat

?

Rather, Rava said: I and the lion of the group interpreted it

and resolved the contradiction in Rav’s words,

and who was he

the lion of the group

? Rabbi Hiyya bar Avin!

For indeed Rav said

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

that it is permitted for everyone to apply rose oil to his wound,

but not for his reason

but for another reason.

And we inquire about this:

What does “the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but not for his reason” mean?

If you say: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who permits it, but not for his reason, for Rabbi Shimon held: It heals

the rose oil heals, and even so it is permitted for everyone, since it is permitted for princes, and there is no matter that is permitted for one and forbidden for another.

And

if

Rav held: It does not heal

at all, and therefore it is permitted.

And

if

Rav held that it does not heal?

But since it is taught

in the Mishna in the words of the first tanna

“Princes may apply rose oil on their wounds,” it follows that it heals

for if it does not heal, why do they apply it to the wound? And since even the first tanna holds that it heals, in accordance with whom does Rav speak? And we conclude:

Rather, the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who permits it, but not for his reason. For Rabbi Shimon held: Although it is not common

for rose oil to be found in the place of this person who applies it,

it is permitted

since it is permitted for princes.

But Rav held

in accordance with the first tanna, that

if it is common, yes; and if it is not common, no

for it is evident that he applies it for healing,

and in Rav’s locality rose oil was common

rose oil, and therefore he permits it.

We have returned to you, chapter “Eight Creeping Creatures.”

Mishna:

In the chapter “The General Principle,” the labors of tying and untying were counted among the thirty-nine primary labors.

In the Tabernacle they would tie the threads of the curtains that had broken, with a permanent knot, one intended to endure forever; and from here we learn that the labor of tying is only with a knot made to endure, and not with a knot intended to be opened.

Likewise, in the labor of the Tabernacle there were hunters of chilazon who needed from time to time to untie the knots in the nets in order to widen or shorten them, and from here we learned the labor of untying.

And these are the knots

that are permanent

for which one is liable:

such as

the camel-drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot,

with which they tie a knot that is not intended to be untied.

And just as he is liable for tying them—

so is he liable for untying them.

Rabbi Meir says: Every knot

that is not tight,

which he can untie with one of his hands—

one is not liable for it,

for tying it, even if he made it so that it would endure forever.

Gemara:

And we raised it as a question:

What are the camel-drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot?

The practice is to make a hole in the camel’s muzzle, put a strap into the hole, and tie it in the form of a permanent ring. To this ring, called a zimma, they periodically attach a rope with which to lead the camel, and sometimes they untie it.

Likewise, they tie a strap in the form of a ring in the hole at the head of the ship, and to this ring, called an istrida, they periodically tie a rope, and sometimes they detach it from the ring.

And the Gemara discusses for which knot one is liable:

If you say it is the knot that they tie

the knot with which they tie the rope

to the zimma,

to the ring placed in the hole in the camel’s nose,

and

the

knot that they tie to the istrida—

this

knot—

is not a permanent knot!

Rather: the knot of the zimma itself, and that of the istrida itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Every knot

that one can untie with one hand, one is not liable for it.

Rav Aḥadvoi asked his brother,

the brother

of Rav Aḥa: A loop, according to Rabbi Meir—

what is its status?

And the sides of the doubt are: Is

Rabbi Meir’s reason

because he can untie it with one of his hands? And this one too—

he can untie it

with one of his hands.

Or perhaps, Rabbi Meir’s reason

is because it is not tight, whereas this

loop

is tight.

And we conclude:

teyku.

Mishna:

There are knots for which one is not liable

a sin-offering

as for the camel-drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

A woman may tie

ab initio

the opening

of the cords

of her garment, and the strings of the hairnet

on her head,

and of

the strings

of a paskia,

a wide belt,

and the straps of a shoe and sandal, and the wineskins

leather containers of

wine and oil, and a pot of meat

over which they place a garment. For all these knots are made in order to open them again.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One may tie

a rope

before the animal

across the width of the opening

so that it will not go out.

Gemara:

And we raised it as a question:

This itself is difficult.

You said

at first that

there are knots for which one is not liable, as for the camel-drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

And it implies that only

liability

of a sacrifice

is absent, but the prohibition

to make them by rabbinic decree—

is present.

And

if

you then teach: A woman may tie the opening of her garment—

which implies that it is permitted to make it

even ab initio!?

And we answer:

This is what it says: There are knots for which one is not liable,

such as

the camel-drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

And what are they?