Shabbat 111b (קיא:) — the Talmud in English

But Rav Shimi bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rav: This stopper of a wine barrel,

the stopper of the barrel around which a cloth is wrapped so that it will be tightened היטב

may not be tightened on a Festival

because he thereby squeezes out the wine absorbed in the cloth, even though he does not intend to squeeze it. This proves that Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the laws of Shabbat, for according to Rabbi Shimon, an unintentional act is permitted? And we answer:

In that case, even Rabbi Shimon agrees

that it is prohibited to tighten the stopper,

as Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes in a case of a guaranteed consequence

and here, too, it is a guaranteed consequence, since it is impossible to tighten the stopper without squeezing the wine out of it. Therefore, no proof can be brought from here that Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat.

And we challenge this:

But Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

with regard to every unintentional act, which is prohibited.

And Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

as an unintentional act is permitted.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin taught this statement without the names of the transmitters:

It was not that amoraim stated differing opinions in the names of Rav and Shmuel; rather, Rav and Shmuel themselves differed in this matter:

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon.

This proves that Rav does not rule in accordance with Rabbi Shimon with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat?

And we answer:

Rather, Rava said: I and the lion of the group explained it,

we resolved the apparent contradiction in Rav’s statements—

and who was he?

the lion of the group?

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Avin!

For although Rav said

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

that everyone is permitted to apply rose oil to his wound,

it was not for his reason,

but for another reason.

We inquire about this:

What is the meaning of “the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, but not for his reason”?

If you say it means that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who permits it, but not for his reason, since Rabbi Shimon holds that rose oil heals,

the rose oil heals, and nevertheless it is permitted for everyone, since it is permitted for kings, and there is no substance that is permitted for one person but prohibited for another.

But

if

Rav holds that it does not heal

at all, and therefore he permits it,

and

since

does Rav hold that it does not heal?

But from the fact that the Mishna teaches

in the statement of the first tanna,

“Kings may apply rose oil to their wounds,” it follows that it heals,

for if it does not heal, why do they apply it to the wound? And since even the first tanna holds that it heals, in accordance with whom does Rav speak? And we conclude:

Rather, it means that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who permits it, but not for his reason. For Rabbi Shimon holds: Although it is not commonly found

that rose oil is available in the place where this person who applies it lives,

it is permitted

since it is permitted for kings.

But Rav holds

like the first tanna, that

if it is commonly found, yes; but if it is not commonly found, no,

as it is evident that he applies it for medicinal purposes,

and in Rav’s locale rose oil was commonly found,

and therefore he permits him to apply it.

We have completed the chapter “Eight Creeping Creatures.”

Mishna:

In the chapter “The Primary Category of Labor,” the labors of tying and untying were enumerated among the thirty-nine primary labors.

In the Tabernacle, they would tie the threads of the curtains that had snapped with a permanent knot, one intended to endure forever. From here we learn that the labor of tying applies only to a knot made to endure, and not to a knot intended to be opened.

Likewise, as part of the work of the Tabernacle there were snail hunters who occasionally had to untie the knots in the nets in order to widen or shorten them; from this we learn the labor of untying.

And these are knots

that are permanent

for which one is liable:

for example,

the camel drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot,

for they tie a knot that is not intended to be untied.

And just as one is liable for tying them,

so is one liable for untying them.

Rabbi Meir says: Any knot

that is not tight,

which he can untie with one of his hands—

one is not liable for it,

for tying it, even if he made it in order that it endure forever.

Gemara:

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

What is the camel drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot?

The practice is to make a hole in the camel’s nose, insert a strap into the hole, and tie it in the form of a permanent ring. A rope is occasionally attached to this ring, called a zemama, in order to lead the camel with it, and at times it is untied.

Likewise, they tie a strap in the form of a ring in the hole at the head of the ship, and they occasionally tie a rope to this ring, called an istrida, and at times detach it from the ring.

The Gemara discusses which knot entails liability:

If you say it is the knot that they tie

the rope

to the zemama,

the ring placed in the hole in the camel’s nose,

and

the

knot that they tie to the istrida—

this

knot—

is not a permanent knot!

Rather, it is the knot of the zemama itself, and that of the istrida itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Meir says: Any knot

that one can untie with one hand, one is not liable for it.

Rav Aḥadvoi raised a dilemma before Aḥoi,

his brother,

the son of Rav Aḥa: What is the status of a loop for Rabbi Meir—

what is the halakha?

The sides of the dilemma are as follows: Is

Rabbi Meir’s reason

that one can untie it with one hand? And this one too—

he can untie it

with one hand?

Or perhaps, Rabbi Meir’s reason

is that it is not tight, whereas this

loop

is tight?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Mishna:

There are knots for which one is not liable

a sin-offering

like the camel drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

A woman may tie

ab initio

the opening

of the laces

of her robe, and the threads of a hairnet

on her head,

and

the threads of a

paskia,

a wide belt,

and the straps of a shoe or sandal, and wine- and oil-flasks

made of leather

and a pot of meat

over which a cloth is placed, since all these knots are made in order to be opened again.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: One may tie

a rope

in front of an animal

across the width of the doorway

so that it will not go out.

Gemara:

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

This itself is difficult.

You said

at first that

there are knots for which one is not liable, like the camel drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

And it implies that only

liability

for an offering

is absent, but a prohibition

to make them by rabbinic decree

does exist.

And

if

you then taught: A woman may tie the opening of her robe—

which implies that it is permitted to make it

even ab initio!?

And we answer:

This is what it says: There are knots for which one is not liable,

such as

the camel drivers’ knot and the sailors’ knot.

And what are they?