Shabbat 111a (קיא.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

But did not Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba say that Rabbi Yohanan said:

Everyone agrees—

even the tanna'im who permitted inflicting a blemish on a firstborn animal that already has a blemish—

that one who causes leavening after another has caused leavening is liable.

With regard to preparing a meal-offering, the Torah states that it is prohibited to prepare it by causing it to become leavened. If one kneaded the dough in a manner that caused it to become leavened and another baked it, the second is also liable, even though it was already leavened,

as it is stated: “You shall not bake leavened bread,” and “You shall not make it leavened.”

Baking is included within the general category of making; why, then, was it necessary to write it explicitly? Rather, this teaches that just as one is liable for baking, so is one liable for each and every act that causes leavening.

And likewise, they agree

that one who severs after another has severed is liable.

If one cut the testicles and left them in the scrotum [and the animal could no longer reproduce], and another came and detached them from the scrotum and threw them away, the second is also liable,

as it is stated: “And crushed, and mutilated, and detached, and severed ...

and in your land you shall not do.” And this is how we expound it:

If one is liable for severing,

even though he left them in the scrotum,

is it not all the more so that one is liable for detaching them?

Why, then, was it necessary to write “and detached”?

Rather,

the verse comes

to include one who detaches after another has severed, establishing that he is liable.

The difficulty nevertheless remains: How may a person drink a cup of an akarim potion, even if he is already a eunuch? And we answer:

Rather, [the ruling is stated] with regard to an old man,

who can no longer reproduce and with regard to whom there is no prohibition of castration [and this case is preferable to one who severs after another has severed, since that applies specifically when his condition initially resulted from castration, whereas old age is not castration Tosafot, s.v. “Rather, with regard to an old man”]. Therefore, it is permitted for him to drink a cup of an akarim potion. And we challenge this:

But did Rabbi Yohanan not say: These are precisely

the remedies mentioned in tractate Gittin for one who lacks reproductive power:

“Restore me to my youth,”

after I have grown old, so that reproductive power was renewed in me? And since an old man, too, can reproduce, is he not prohibited from undergoing castration?

And we answer:

Rather, [the ruling is stated] with regard to a woman,

for castration is not applicable to her, and she is also not obligated in the mitzva of procreation [as it is written: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and subdue it”; and we expound that specifically a man, whose way is to subdue, is obligated in procreation, whereas a woman, whose way is not to subdue, is not obligated].

And we challenge this:

But according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, who says: With regard to both of them,

the man and the woman,

he says: “And God blessed them and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply,”

in the plural,

what can be said?

The woman should be prohibited from castration on account of the mitzva of procreation.

And we conclude:

[The ruling is stated] with regard to an old woman; alternatively, with regard to a barren woman,

for procreation is not applicable to her.

Mishna:

One who suffers from his teeth,

who has toothache,

may not rinse his mouth with vinegar,

that is, he may not fill his mouth with vinegar to heal his teeth, since it is evident that he is doing so for medicinal purposes.

But he may dip in it in his usual manner,

dipping his bread and food in vinegar,

and if he is healed, he is healed.

One who suffers from his loins may not apply

to them

wine or vinegar,

since it is not customary to apply them except for medicinal purposes.

But he may apply oil,

since healthy people, too, customarily apply oil.

But not rose oil,

since it is expensive and uncommon, and it is not customary to apply it except for medicinal purposes.

Princes may apply rose oil to their wounds, since it is their practice to apply it on weekdays

even when they have no wound.

Rabbi Shimon says: All Jews are the sons of kings,

and what is permitted to princes is permitted to all Jews.

Gemara:

Rav Aha the Tall, who is Rav Aha bar Pappa, posed a difficulty to Rabbi Abbahu: We learned

in the Mishna:

One who suffers from his teeth may not rinse his mouth with vinegar.

Does this mean that vinegar is beneficial

for

the teeth?

But is it not written: “Like vinegar to the teeth and like smoke to the eyes”?

It is not difficult: This [verse] refers to the sourness of fruit,

wine made from unripe grapes, which is harmful to the teeth;

that [Mishnaic ruling] refers to vinegar,

which is beneficial to the teeth.

And if you wish, say: Both [the verse and the Mishna] refer to vinegar. In this case, there is a wound; in that case, there is no wound.

And we explain:

Where there is a wound, it heals;

the vinegar heals the teeth.

Where there is no wound, it weakens;

the vinegar weakens the teeth, causing them to move farther apart from one another.

We learned in the Mishna:

He may not rinse his mouth with vinegar.

We examine this:

But it was taught in a beraita: He may not rinse and spit it out, but he may rinse and swallow it,

since it is not evident that he is drinking it for medicinal purposes; whereas the Mishna prohibits rinsing in every manner?

And we answer:

Abaye said: When we learned this also in the Mishna, we learned it as referring to rinsing and spitting it out!

But swallowing it is permitted.

Rava said: Even if you say

that the Mishna is referring to

rinsing and swallowing,

there is no difficulty:

Here, [the beraita] is referring to before dipping,

as the beraita that permits swallowing is speaking of before the meal, when it was customary to dip in vinegar during the meal; one who sees him swallowing it says that this is his dipping.

Here, [the Mishna] is referring to after dipping,

as the Mishna is speaking of after he has eaten and dipped as much as he needed, in which case he is certainly drinking it for medicinal purposes.

And we challenge this:

Let us say: Since before dipping it is permitted, after dipping it should also be permitted,

since there is no matter that is prohibited during part of Shabbat and permitted during another part of it; rather, once it is permitted during part of it, it is permitted throughout,

for we have heard that Rava holds of the principle “since”?

As it is stated in tractate Beitza, a person may immerse himself on Shabbat, but it is prohibited to immerse vessels on Shabbat. Rava explains that vessels are prohibited because it appears that one is repairing a vessel, whereas in the case of a person it appears that he wishes to cool himself in the water. The Gemara there challenges this: That works on Shabbat; but on Yom Kippur, when bathing for pleasure is prohibited and everyone knows that he intends immersion, why is it permitted? Concerning this,

Rava said: There is no matter that is permitted on Shabbat and prohibited on Yom Kippur,

but rather,

since it is permitted on Shabbat, it is also permitted on Yom Kippur.

And we answer:

Rava later retracted this ruling

of our passage, and held that in truth it is permitted even after dipping on the basis of “since”; and he resolves the contradiction between the Mishna and the beraita in accordance with Abaye.

And we challenge this:

From where do you know that he retracted this ruling? Perhaps he retracted that ruling,

perhaps Rava initially stated that ruling concerning Yom Kippur and later retracted it, so that we do not apply the principle of “since”; rather, immersion is truly prohibited on Yom Kippur, and likewise in our passage it is prohibited to rinse with vinegar after dipping?

And we answer:

This cannot enter your mind, as it was taught in a beraita: All those obligated

to immerse themselves immerse in their usual manner, whether on the Ninth of Av or on Yom Kippur.

It is therefore necessarily the ruling in our passage that was stated first, and from it he later retracted.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who suffers from his loins ...

Rabbi Shimon says: All Jews are the sons of kings.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon!

And we examine this:

Does this mean that Rav holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon,

who is lenient with regard to the prohibitions of Shabbat?