Shabbat 102b — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the chapter of The Builder

In the Mishna before us, two of the labors of Shabbat are explained: building and striking with a hammer.

The labor of building also includes the preparations for building, such as dressing stones, and likewise quarrying stones from the mountain for the purpose of building.

The labor of striking with a hammer includes all labors that are defined as the completion of a labor, such as the final blow on a stone after quarrying it from the mountain, which detaches it from the mountain, and likewise all labors in which there is improvement, even when they are not at the completion of the labor.

Mishna:

One who builds

on Shabbat [which is one of the primary categories of labor]—

how much may he build and become liable?

One who builds any amount!

And one who dresses stones,

who squares the stone and completes it by smoothing it or making grooves in it, his measure of liability is any amount, because of the completion of the labor, and as will be explained below in the Mishna, that the liability for the labor of “striking with a hammer” is for any amount.

And one who strikes with a hammer

which is the “primary category of labor” of completing labors [or improving them], for example: one who quarries stones from a mountain, after he has quarried most of the stone from its quarrying place, strikes it with a large blow with a hammer, and it breaks apart and falls from its place of attachment—this is the completion of its labor.

And anyone who completes a labor on Shabbat has performed a derivative of striking with a hammer.

But for the quarrying itself he is liable on account of the labor of building. For all actions belonging to building are forbidden because of the labor of building.

And

one who strikes

with a ma’atzad,

a large iron hammer used in iron construction.

One who drills

pierces a wall in order to insert into it a peg of any size.

For all these—one who performs them, even in the measure of

any amount—

is liable!

This is the rule

with regard to the measures of the labors of Shabbat:

Anyone who performs a labor

in a certain measure, even any amount,

and his labor endures,

meaning that it has use and benefit, and there are people who preserve the product of the labor in such a measure and do not add to it, because it is already fit for their use without adding to it.

If he performed it

on Shabbat—

he is

liable

for it.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says:

It is not only one who improves the utensil on Shabbat who is liable. Rather,

even one who strikes with a mallet

[a large hammer]

upon the anvil at the time of the labor,

in the manner in which craftsmen do during the labor, he is

liable, because he is

considered, through his striking upon the anvil,

as improving a labor.

And in the Gemara it will be explained what the improvement is and what is the nature of the labor of striking with a hammer upon the anvil during the labor.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: one who builds in the measure of

any amount

is liable.

And we raise it against this: building any amount—

what is it fit for,

and what has he built?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

There is benefit in building any amount,

for a poor person digs a pit

small, of the measure of any amount, in order

to conceal his coins in it

[and one who digs in a house is liable because of building. See Rashi above, 73b, passage beginning “He is exempt from it.”].

And likewise, we find

something corresponding to it with regard to the Tabernacle,

where there was building of any amount in its erection,

for the tent-makers

would

dig a pit

in order

to conceal their needles in it.

And since in the Tabernacle there was the labor of building in the measure of any amount, and likewise we find it among poor people, this is an important labor for which one becomes liable.

Abaye said: Since they rust,

for the needles develop rust if they are placed in the earth,

they did not do this

in the Tabernacle. And therefore it is not considered an important labor, because the labor must have an important measure, as it was in the Tabernacle.

Rather,

we find building any amount:

for a poor person makes the supports of a small stove,

iron legs upon which to place a small earthenware stove,

to place a small pot upon it.

And we find such a measure also in the labor of the Tabernacle.

Correspondingly, with regard to the Tabernacle, the cooks of dyes

of dye, which they prepared in order

to dye

the

curtains

of the Tabernacle, if it happened

that their labor was lacking,

meaning that they lacked a small amount of dyed wool and had to cook dyes again in order to dye a small amount of wool, they

would make the supports of a small stove, to place a small cauldron upon it.

Rav Aha bar Yaakov said:

They did not do anything in the Tabernacle in a limited manner; rather, they did everything from the outset sufficiently and more than sufficiently, since

there is no

conduct of

poverty

appropriate to practice

in a place of wealth,

and the Tabernacle was a place in which they practiced wealth.

Rather, for a homeowner who has a hole in his mansion,

in a fine house in which he lives, is particular even about a small hole in it,

and seals it

with clay, and is liable for sealing it with anything at all, because of the labor of building.

Correspondingly, with regard to the Tabernacle: for a board in which a woodworm fell,

a worm that gnawed a hole in it—

he drips lead into it,

lead,

and seals it.

Samuel said: One who sets a stone in place

sets the stone in the foundation of the building, moving it from side to side, and thereby preparing the ground beneath it so that the stone will sit properly—even if he did not place mortar, he

is liable

because of building. For this is building of any amount, since there are people who set only the stone, without placing mortar.

It was objected:

It was taught in a beraita: One person

places the stone, and another places the mortar—

only

the one who places the mortar is liable

and not the one who places the stone.

And this is difficult for Samuel, who makes one who places the stone liable even without mortar!

And we respond to the objector:

But according to your reasoning: say the latter clause

of that beraita:

Rabbi Yose says: And even if he lifted

a stone

and placed it upon a course of stones,

a row of wall stones—

he is liable.

We have found that Rabbi Yose is even more stringent than Samuel: even for mere placing he makes one liable, even though he did not set the stone in order to correct its place of sitting properly. And is this not difficult for the first clause of the beraita, which says that specifically the one who places the mortar is liable?

Rather,

it is necessarily so that there are

three

three types of courses of

building there was:

A. A

lower course,

the bottom one, which is the construction of the foundation stones of the building.

B.

Middle courses,

the construction of all the courses of the building, from the course upon the foundation stones to the upper course, apart from the upper course itself.

C.

And upper—

the construction of the upper course.

The construction of a

lower course

requires setting and earth,

setting the stone so that it will sit straight, and placing earth around it to support it.

And this is what Samuel is discussing: he is liable even though he did not place mortar.

The construction of a

middle course

also requires clay,

mortar together with the setting.

And this is what the first clause of the beraita is discussing.

But an

upper course—

by mere placing,

it suffices without setting and without mortar. There is no concern if the stone inclines to one side, since there is no additional course of stones above it.

And this is what Rabbi Yose is discussing, making one liable for merely raising a stone onto the course.

We learned in the Mishna:

and one who dresses stones

is liable on Shabbat.

And we raise it against this:

“One who dresses stones”—

on account of what is he liable,

for the derivative of which primary category is he made liable: is it because of building or because of striking with a hammer?

Rav said:

He is liable

because of building.

And Samuel said: because of striking with a hammer,

for dressing is the completion of the improvement of the stone. And furthermore, every groove that he makes is its “completion of labor,” for in that place he will not make another groove.

And Rav and Samuel likewise disagreed concerning the liability of

one who makes a hole in a chicken coop

[made of wood] and pierces it so that the harmful odor will leave the chickens.

Rav said:

He is liable

because of building.

And Samuel said:

He is liable

because of striking with a hammer,

for this is the completion of the labor of the coop. But he is not liable because of building for making an “opening” in the coop, since any opening that is not made for bringing in and taking out is not an opening.

And Rav and Samuel likewise disagreed concerning one who

inserts a peg into the socket of a hoe,

who drives a small peg into the iron hole of the hoe in order to tighten with it the wooden handle of the hoe that enters the iron hole.

Rav said:

He is liable

because of building,

and there is building in utensils.

And Samuel said:

He is liable

because of striking with a hammer,

and not because of building, since the handle is already inserted into the iron, and this is only the completion of the labor of making the hoe, through the tightening that he performs. And it is necessary to teach us their disagreement in each of the forms.

For if he had taught us the first one,

that of dressing stones, I would have said: specifically

in that case did Rav say

that it is building,

because this is the way of building,

to dress the stone in order to build with it.

But one who makes a hole in a chicken coop, for this is not the way of building,

for, on the contrary, he is dismantling the building and is not making an opening in it,

say that he agrees with Samuel

that he is not liable because of building, but because of striking with a hammer.

And if he had taught us this,

that of one who makes a hole in a chicken coop, I would have said that specifically

in this case he said

that Rav is liable because of building,

because it resembles building, for he made it for air,

since even in the building of houses they make windows and holes for air.

But

one who inserts

a peg into the socket of a hoe, for this is not the “way of building”—

say that he agrees with Samuel

that he is liable only because of striking with a hammer.

And if he had taught us this,

that of the peg in the socket of the hoe, I would have said that specifically

in this case Samuel said

that it is not building because this is not the way of building, and it does not resemble building at all.

But in these other two,

in dressing stones and making a hole in a chicken coop,

say that he agrees with Rav

that his liability is because of building.

Therefore

it is necessary

to teach us their disagreement in all of them.

Rav Natan bar Oshaya asked Rabbi Yohanan: One who dresses stones—

on account of what is he liable?

He showed him with his hand,

he showed him with his hand: he struck his fist upon his palm like one who strikes with a hammer, whose liability is

because of striking with a hammer,

and this is in accordance with the view of Samuel.

And we object:

But did we not learn

in the Mishna:

“And one who dresses stones, and one who strikes with a hammer”—

which implies that they are two different things?

And we answer:

Say

without the conjunction “and”:

“One who dresses stones,”

who is liable because of

striking with a hammer—

his measure is any amount.