Shabbat 102b (קב:) — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the Chapter of One Who Builds

The Mishna before us explains two of the labors of Shabbat: building and striking with a hammer.

The labor of building also includes preparations for building, such as chiseling stones, as well as quarrying stones from a mountain for the purpose of building.

The labor of striking with a hammer includes all labors defined as the completion of a labor, such as the final blow struck on a stone after it has been hewn from the mountain, which detaches it from the mountain, as well as all labors that involve improvement, even when they do not constitute the completion of the labor.

Mishna:

One who builds

on Shabbat [which is one of the primary categories of labor]—

how much must he build to be liable?

One who builds any amount!

And one who chisels,

who squares a stone and completes it by smoothing it or making grooves in it, is liable for any amount, because this is the completion of a labor, as will be explained below in the Mishna: liability for the labor of “striking with a hammer” applies for any amount.

And one who strikes with a hammer,

which is the primary category of labor involving the completion of labors [or their improvement], for example: One who hews stones from a mountain, after he has hewn away most of the stone from the quarry, strikes it with a large blow of a hammer, and it breaks off and falls from its place—this is the completion of its labor.

And anyone who completes a labor on Shabbat performs a derivative of striking with a hammer.

For the quarrying itself, he is liable on account of the labor of building, since all activities connected with building are prohibited as the labor of building.

And

one who strikes

with a meitzad,

a large iron hammer used in iron construction,

or one who drills

a hole in a wall in order to insert a peg of any size—

for all these, one who performs them, even in the measure of

any amount, is

liable!

This is the principle

with regard to the measures of the labors of Shabbat:

Anyone who performs a labor

in a specified measure, even any amount,

and his labor endures,

meaning that it has use and benefit, and there are people who retain the product of such a labor in that measure and do not add to it, because it is already fit for their use without any addition—

if he performed it

on Shabbat, he

is

liable

for it.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel says:

It is not only one who improves a vessel on Shabbat who is liable. Rather,

even one who strikes with a hammer

[a large hammer]

on the anvil during the course of his labor,

as craftsmen do while working, is

liable, because he is

considered, by striking the anvil,

to be improving the labor.

The Gemara will explain what this improvement is and the nature of the labor of striking the anvil during the course of the work.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who builds in the measure of

any amount

is liable.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this: Building any amount—

what use is it fit for,

and what has he built?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said:

There is a benefit to building any amount,

as a poor person digs a pit

of any size in order

to conceal his coins in it

[and one who digs in a house is liable on account of building. See Rashi above, 73b, beginning he is exempt for it].

And similarly, we find

a parallel case with regard to the Tabernacle,

where there was building of any amount when it was erected:

As the sewers of the curtains

were

digging a pit

in order

to conceal their needles in it.

Since there was a labor of building in the Tabernacle in the measure of any amount, and we likewise find this among poor people, it is therefore an important labor for which one is liable.

Abaye said: Since they rust,

as the needles become rusty if they are placed in the ground,

they did not do this

in the Tabernacle. Therefore, it is not considered an important labor, since the labor must have a significant measure, as it did in the Tabernacle.

Rather,

we find building of any amount,

as a poor person makes the supports of a small stove,

iron legs on which to place a small earthenware stove,

to place a small pot upon it.

And we find this same measure in the labor of the Tabernacle.

A parallel case with regard to the Tabernacle: the cooks of the ingredients

of the dye, which they prepared in order

to dye

the

curtains

of the Tabernacle—if it happened

that their labor was deficient,

meaning that they lacked a small amount of dyed wool and had to cook ingredients again in order to dye a small amount of wool, they

would make the supports of a small stove, to place a small cauldron upon it.

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said:

They did not perform anything in the Tabernacle in a constrained manner. Rather, they initially made everything in ample quantity, since

there is no

practice of

poverty

that is appropriate

in a place of affluence,

and the Tabernacle was a place where affluence was practiced.

Rather, as for a homeowner who has a hole in his palace,

in a fine house in which he lives, he is particular even about a small hole in it,

and seals it

with clay, and is liable for sealing it even in the smallest amount, on account of the labor of building.

A parallel case with regard to the Tabernacle: as for a board in which a woodworm had fallen,

a worm that had bored a hole in it—

he would pour lead into it,

lead,

and seal it.

Shmuel said: One who sets a stone in place

by positioning the stone in the foundation of a building, moving it from side to side and thereby preparing the ground beneath it so that the stone will sit properly, is

liable

on account of building, even if he did not apply mortar. This is building of any amount, as there are people who set a stone in place without applying mortar.

Meytivi:

It was taught in a beraita: One person

places the stone, and another places the mortar—only

only

the one who places the mortar is liable,

and not the one who places the stone.

This is difficult for Shmuel, who holds that one who places the stone is liable even without mortar!

And we respond to the one who raised the difficulty:

And according to your reasoning, say the latter clause

of that beraita:

Rabbi Yosei says: Even if he raised

a stone

and placed it on a course of stones,

a row of wall stones—

he is liable.

We have thus found that Rabbi Yosei is even more stringent than Shmuel: one is liable even for merely placing the stone, without setting it properly or correcting the place where it rests. This is difficult for the first clause of the beraita, which says that specifically the one who places the mortar is liable?

Rather,

it must be that there are

three

three types of courses of

building.

a. The

lower

course is the construction of the foundation stones of the building.

b. The

middle

courses are the construction of all the courses of the building, from the course resting on the foundation stones up to the uppermost course, excluding the uppermost course itself.

c.

And the upper

course is the construction of the uppermost course.

Constructing a

lower

course

requires setting the stones properly and using earth: positioning the stone so that it sits straight and placing earth around it to support it.

This is what Shmuel is discussing: one is liable even though he did not apply mortar.

Constructing a

middle

course

also requires mortar, together with setting the stone properly.

This is what the first clause of the beraita is discussing.

Whereas the

uppermost course requires

merely placing

the stone; it does not require setting it properly or applying mortar, because there is no concern if the stone tilts to one side, since no further course of stones will be placed above it.

This is what Rabbi Yosei is discussing when he holds one liable merely for raising a stone and placing it on the course.

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who chisels

on Shabbat is liable.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

One who chisels—

on account of what is he liable?

For a derivative of which primary category is he liable: building or striking with a hammer?

Rav said:

He is liable

on account of building.

And Shmuel said: On account of striking with a hammer,

because chiseling is the final improvement of the stone. Moreover, each groove that he makes is the “completion of its labor,” since he will not chisel that particular place further.

Rav and Shmuel likewise disagreed regarding the liability of

one who makes a hole in a chicken coop

[made of wood], making the hole so that the harmful odor will escape from the chickens.

Rav said:

He is liable

on account of building.

And Shmuel said:

He is liable

on account of striking with a hammer,

because this completes the manufacture of the coop. But he is not liable on account of building for making an “opening” in the coop, since any opening that is not intended to let things enter and exit is not considered an opening.

Rav and Shmuel likewise disagreed concerning one who

inserts a peg into the eye of a hoe,

driving a small peg into the hole in the iron blade of the hoe in order to tighten the wooden handle of the hoe, which enters the hole in the iron.

Rav said:

He is liable

on account of building,

since there is building with regard to vessels.

And Shmuel said:

He is liable

on account of striking with a hammer,

and not on account of building, since the handle is already inserted into the iron. This is merely the completion of the manufacture of the hoe, through the tightening he performs. It is necessary to state their dispute with regard to each of these cases.

For had he taught us the first case,

that of chiseling, I might have said that specifically

in that case Rav said

that it is building,

because this is the usual manner of building,

to chisel the stone in order to build with it.

But concerning making a hole in a chicken coop, where this is not the usual manner of building,

since, on the contrary, he is dismantling the building and is not making an opening in it,

say that he agrees with Shmuel

that he is not liable on account of building, but only on account of striking with a hammer.

And had he taught us this case,

that of making a hole in a chicken coop, I might have said that specifically

in this case

Rav said that he is liable on account of building,

because it resembles building, as he makes it for ventilation,

since even in building houses, windows and holes are made for ventilation.

But

one who inserts

a peg into the eye of a hoe, where this is not the “usual manner of building,”

say that he agrees with Shmuel

that he is liable only on account of striking with a hammer.

And had he taught us this case,

that of inserting a peg into the eye of a hoe, I might have said that specifically

in this case Shmuel said

that it is not building, because this is not the usual manner of building and it does not resemble building at all.

But in those other two cases,

the case of chiseling and the case of making a hole in a chicken coop,

say that he agrees with Rav

that his liability is on account of building.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to state their dispute in all of them.

Rav Natan bar Oshaya asked Rabbi Yoḥanan: One who chisels—

on account of what is he liable?

He showed him with his hand,

demonstrating with his hand that he struck his fist against his palm, like one who strikes with a hammer, indicating that his liability is

on account of striking with a hammer,

in accordance with Shmuel’s view.

And we challenge this:

But did we not learn

in the Mishna:

“And one who chisels, and one who strikes with a hammer”—

which implies that they are two different things?

And we answer:

Say:

without the conjunction “and,”

“One who chisels,

who is liable on account of

striking with a hammer”—

his measure is any amount.