Shabbat 103a — the Talmud in English

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There is proof for Rav from our Mishna, for we learned in it: ![](pamud.bmp "

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One who drills any amount

is liable.

And “one who drills” means that his intention is to fill the hole and insert a peg into it; whereas when he does not intend to fill it, it is called “one who pierces.”]]

Granted, according to Rav,

who holds one liable for any amount of building, such as the hole of a chicken coop, considering the one who makes the hole to be building, this one who drills is also considered to be building any amount. And although here he is destined to fill the hole, he is nevertheless liable, since

it appears as though he has bored a hole

for it also appears that he drilled a hole

for building,

for which he is liable, since the hole was useful for the building.

But according to Shmuel,

who says that one who makes a hole in a chicken coop is liable on account of striking with a hammer and not on account of building: granted, in a chicken coop, making the hole properly constitutes the completion of its work. But one who drills into a wall—

it is not the completion of the work,

for he is still destined to fill it—so why is he liable?

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With one who pierced it with an iron stake,

who drilled with a long iron nail,

and left it inside it

and left the nail there in order to hang something on it,

which is the completion of the work.

That is, he did not perform his work in two stages, drilling and filling; rather, while he was drilling, he fixed the nail in the wall.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the principle:

anyone who performs work, and his work endures, on Shabbat.

And we inquire concerning it:

“This is the principle”—

what does it include?

And we answer:

It includes one who hollows out a kafiza in a kav,

a utensil suitable for making a receptacle containing a kav, which is four log, in which he hollowed out the measure of a kafiza, at a depth containing only three log. And although his intention is to add and hollow it out further afterward, he is liable for it, since there are people who leave it in that state.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who strikes with a hammer on the anvil

during the course of work is liable, because he is like one who repairs the work, even though he is not repairing a utensil but merely striking the anvil.

And we inquire concerning it:

What is he doing?

He is not striking the utensil that he is making, but only the anvil; what repair and completion of work is there in this?

And we answer:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Because he trains his hand,

for he habituates and directs his hand to the type of striking required for his work, a large strike or a small one, and this is the repair of his work.

The sons of Rahava

raised the following objection

against it [

the name of a person]:

But from now on, if one saw a craft

a person who saw and observed the performance of a craft

on Shabbat and learned it

and learned it through his observation, shall we also say that

here too he is liable,

just as you say that he is liable for training his hand and preparing himself for work, even though in practice he performed no work with his hand?!

And we answer:

Rather, Abaye and Rava both say: For the flatteners of the sheets of the Tabernacle

who flattened sheets of gold for plating the boards

would do so!

They would strike with a hammer on the anvil in the middle of their work in order to smooth the hammer, for the hammer became nicked while striking the gold, and it was necessary to smooth it by striking it on the hard anvil so that the hammer would not damage the sheet, which was thin; and the work consists in repairing the hammer itself!

It was also taught so: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes with a hammer on the anvil during the course of work—

is liable. For the flatteners of the sheets of the Tabernacle would do so.

Mishna:

One who plows—

any amount.

And likewise one who performs the derivative works of plowing, which are works performed in the ground, such as:

one who weeds,

pulling out bad weeds from among the plants.

And

likewise one who performs derivative works of sowing, such as:

one who cuts dry branches

cutting dry branches from the tree.

and one who cuts off branches,

cutting new moist branches, which are sometimes numerous and weaken the tree.

If he performed any of these even in a measure of

any amount—

he is liable.

b.

One who gathers wood,

who cuts it from among the trees,

if

his intention

is to improve

the tree through this, this is a derivative of sowing; and if his intention is to improve the ground, this is a derivative of plowing, and their measure is

any amount.

And

if

his intention is to take the wood

for fuel,

their measure is

enough to cook

with it

a light egg [

the size of a dried fig from a hen’s egg, as explained above, chapter 8, folio b], since then his liability is on account of reaping, and this is the measure of the work of reaping.

One who gathers grasses

that are attached to the ground,

if it is to improve—

in

any amount.

And

if

it is in order to feed

an animal,

their measure is

as much as fills a kid’s mouth.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning it: One who plows any amount—

what use is it for?

And we answer:

for the seed of a gourd,

to sow a gourd seed there. [And although we learned above, folio 90b, concerning carrying out, that one is liable only for two gourd seeds, a distinction must be made. Regarding carrying out, when many are carried out at once, we say that a person does not trouble himself to carry out fewer than two for sowing. But regarding plowing, each hole is made separately; Rashi.]

Similarly, with regard to the Tabernacle,

they would plow any amount.

For a furrow

of any amount

for

sowing

one stalk of dye-plants

used for dyeing.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who weeds, one who cuts dry branches, and one who cuts off branches

is liable for any amount.

The Sages taught: One who uproots chicory,

a type of grass,

and one who cuts off twigs [

they are a type of reeds: while they are tender they are fit for human consumption; when they become somewhat hard they are fit for animal consumption; when they dry they are fit for fuel].

If

he uproots them

for eating,

their measure is

the size of a dried fig. If for an animal, as much as fills a kid’s mouth. If for fuel, enough to cook a light egg

and all these are measures for the work of reaping. But

if it is to beautify the ground,

he is liable on account of plowing, and therefore its measure is

any amount.

And we inquire concerning it:

Are all of them

when he uproots them for the purpose of human or animal consumption

not also [intended] to beautify the ground

?!

For even if his intention is for eating or for an animal, the ground is beautified by itself; why should he not be liable for any amount by the law of plowing?!

And we answer:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say:

here

in a marsh [

a grazing place]

they taught this,

where there is no benefit in beautifying the ground, but only in reaping.

Abaye and Rava both say: Even if you say that it is in a field that is not a marsh,

it is nevertheless not difficult.

And it is a case where he does not intend

to beautify the ground, but only for eating or for an animal; therefore he is not liable for any amount.

And we challenge this:

But Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes

who holds that an unintended act is permitted

in a case of “cut off its head and will it not die,”

in which one is liable. And here too it is a “cut off its head and will it not die” case, for the ground is inevitably beautified?!

And we answer:

It is necessary [to state this] only in a case where he does it on his fellow’s land,

where he does not care whether the ground is beautified [for this is work not needed for its own purpose, Tosafot, s.v. “on his fellow’s land”].

Mishna:

One who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or

with his left. Whether from one name

who wrote that letter twice,

or from two names

who wrote two different letters.

Whether from two signs,

who wrote one letter with ink and one letter with sikra [red paint].]

In every language,

in the script of any nation.

He is liable.

Rabbi Yose said: They made

the one who writes

two letters liable only on account of making a mark,

and therefore, even if he did not write two letters but merely made two marks as a sign, he is liable.

For thus

they

would write on the boards of the Tabernacle

when they dismantled it, they would mark them with a sign in order

to know which was its partner,

so that the order of the boards would not become confused for them when erecting the Tabernacle.

Rabbi Judah said: We find a small name

that is derived

from a large name.

For example,

“Shem” [

the son of Noah]

from “Shimon” and from “Shemuel.”

“Noah” from “Nahor.”

“Dan” from “Daniel.”

“Gad” from “Gadiel.”

Rabbi Judah comes to teach us that even if he intended to write a long word and wrote only part of it, but that part which he wrote is itself a word, he is liable for it.

Gemara:

And we inquire concerning it:

Granted, with [

writing] by

the right hand, he should be liable, because this is the normal manner of writing. But with

writing by

the left hand—

why

is he liable?

Is this not an abnormal manner of writing?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: They taught this with regard to a left-handed person!

And we challenge this:

Let

the hand

of his left hand be like everyone else’s right hand, and

the left hand specifically

should make him liable,

but

his right hand should not make him liable.

Why then did we learn that he is liable whether with his right hand or with his left?

Rather, Abaye said: The Mishna is dealing with one who is skilled with both hands,

for the manner of his writing is with both hands.

Rav Yaakov, son of the daughter of Yaakov, said: Whose opinion is this?

the Mishna—

It is Rabbi Yose’s. For he said: They made

the one who writes

two letters liable only on account of making a mark.

And one who writes with his left hand, although it is not considered writing, is nevertheless no worse than making a mark, for he is liable even when making a mark with his left hand.

And we challenge this:

But since the latter clause

of the Mishna

is Rabbi Yose’s,

necessarily

the first clause—

is not Rabbi Yose’s?!

And we answer:

The entire

Mishna

is Rabbi Yose’s! [

for the tanna forgot and did not mention his name at the beginning, and when he remembered, he returned and mentioned his name. Rashi, Hullin 104b, s.v. “Everyone who says.”]

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Judah said: We find

that a person who intends to write a large word and writes only part of it is liable, such as when he writes a small name from a large name, for example: Shem from Shimon or from Shemuel, Noah from Nahor, Dan from Daniel, or Gad from Gadiel.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Judah’s words that in all the examples he brought of “a small name from a large name,” he specifically cited names containing two non-identical letters; it follows that Rabbi Judah holds one liable only for writing two different letters.

The Gemara asks:

But Rabbi Judah,

is it indeed only for writing

two letters

from a large name

and they are two “names” [

each letter has a different “name”] that he

holds one liable,

but one who writes

two letters and they are one name,

such as when he intended to write “Sheshakh” and wrote “Shesh,”

he does not hold liable.

But was it not taught

in a beraita that Rabbi Judah holds one liable even when writing two identical letters from a large name?

For it was taught: It is stated in the passage concerning the sin-offering, “When a person sins … and performs

one of these.”

And we expound: Had the verse said

“and performs one,”

I would

be able

to say that one is not liable for a sin-offering for performing work on Shabbat, such as the work of writing,

until he writes

the

entire name,

the entire word that he had intended to write at the beginning of the writing.

And likewise I could have said that one who weaves on Shabbat is not liable for the work of weaving

until he weaves the entire garment

that he began to weave.

And likewise I could have said that one who performs the work of making “houses of threads,” such as one who makes houses of threads in a sieve, would not be liable

until he makes

the houses of threads of

the entire sieve.

The verse says “

and he performs

one of,”

which indicates that even for performing part of the work one is liable for a sin-offering.

Lest you say:

If

from the restrictive inference of

“of one”

we expound,

I might be able to say that even if he wrote only one letter, wove only one thread, or made only one house of threads in a sieve,

he will be liable.