Shabbat 103a (קג.) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear:

There is proof from our Mishna supporting Rav, for we learned in it:

One who drills any amount

is liable.

And “drilling” means that his intention is to fill the hole and insert a peg into it; whereas when he does not intend to fill it, it is called “piercing”"].

Granted, according to Rav,

who holds one liable for construction of any amount, such as making a hole in a chicken coop, considering the one who makes the hole to be performing the labor of building, this drilling is likewise considered building of any amount. And although here he is destined to fill the hole, he is nevertheless liable, since

it appears as though he drilled a hole

which also appears to be

for construction,

as the hole benefited the construction, for which he is liable.

But according to Shmuel,

who says that one who makes a hole in a chicken coop is liable due to striking the final blow and not due to building, granted that in a chicken coop, making the hole is indeed the completion of his labor. But when one drills into a wall,

it is not the completion of his labor,

as he is still destined to fill it; and why is he liable?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he pierced it with an iron peg,

as he drilled with a long iron nail,

and left it inside

and left the nail there in order to hang something on it,

which is the completion of the labor.

That is, he did not perform his labor in two stages, drilling and filling; rather, when he drilled, he fixed the nail in the wall.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general rule:

Anyone who performs a labor and his labor endures, on Shabbat.

And we raised a question concerning it:

This is the general rule—

what does it come to include?

And we answer:

It comes to include one who hollowed out a measure of kapiza in a kav,

a vessel suitable for making a receptacle holding a kav, which is four log, in which he hollowed out the measure of a kapiza, with a depth holding only three log. And although he intends to continue hollowing it out afterward, he is liable for it, since there are people who leave it in that state.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One who strikes with a hammer on an anvil

during the course of his labor is liable, because he is considered to be improving the labor, despite the fact that he is not improving a vessel but merely striking the anvil.

And we raised a question concerning it:

What is he doing?

He is not striking the vessel that he is making, but only the anvil; what improvement and completion of labor is involved in this?

And we answer:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Because he trains his hand,

as he accustoms and directs his hand to the type of striking required for his labor, whether a strong or a light strike, and this is the improvement of his labor.

The sons of Reḥava raised an objection

They raised the following objection:

the sons of Reḥava [

the name of a person]:

But from now on, if one saw a craft

a person who saw and observed the performance of a craft

on Shabbat and mastered it,

and learned it through his observation, shall we say that

he is likewise liable,

just as you say that he is liable for training his hand and preparing himself for the labor, despite the fact that in practice he performed no labor with his hand?!

And we answer:

Rather, Abaye and Rava both say: Because the metal beaters of the Tabernacle,

who hammered sheets of gold to cover the boards,

did so!

They would strike with a hammer on the anvil in the midst of their labor in order to smooth the hammer, which became notched when striking the gold. It was necessary to smooth it by striking it against the hard anvil so that the hammer would not damage the sheet, which was thin; and the labor consists in improving the hammer itself!

It was also taught likewise: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who strikes with a hammer on an anvil in the course of his labor—

is liable. For the metal beaters of the Tabernacle did so.

Mishna:

Plowing—

any amount.

Likewise, one who performs derivatives of the labor of plowing, which are labors performed in the ground, such as:

weeding,

pulling out weeds from among the plants.

And

likewise one who performs derivatives of the labor of sowing, such as:

pruning dry branches,

cutting dry branches from a tree.

And cutting off new branches,

cutting moist, new branches, which are sometimes numerous and weaken the tree.

If he performed any of these even in a measure of

any amount—

he is liable.

b.

One who gathers wood,

cutting it from among the trees,

if

his intention is

to improve

the tree by doing so, this is a derivative of sowing; and if his intention is to improve the ground, this is a derivative of plowing, and their measure is

any amount.

And

if

his intention is to take the wood

for fuel,

their measure is

enough to cook

with it

a small egg [

the size of a gerogeret from a hen’s egg, as explained above, 80b], since in that case his liability is due to reaping, and this is the measure for the labor of reaping.

One who gathers herbs

that are attached to the ground,

if it is to improve—

in

any amount.

And

if

it is in order to feed

an animal,

their measure is

enough to fill a kid’s mouth.

Gemara:

And we raised a question concerning it: Plowing any amount—

what is it fit for?

And we answer:

For planting a pumpkin seed,

to plant a pumpkin seed there. And although we learned above, 90b, with regard to carrying out, that one is liable only for two pumpkin seeds, there is a distinction. With regard to carrying out, when many items are carried out at once, we say that a person does not trouble himself to carry fewer than two seeds for planting. But with regard to plowing, each furrow is made separately, Rashi].

Correspondingly, with regard to the Tabernacle,

they would plow any amount.

As it is suitable

for a furrow of any amount

for

the planting of

a single stalk of dye material

used for coloring.

We learned in our Mishna:

One who weeds, prunes dry branches, or cuts off new branches

in any amount is liable.

The Sages taught: One who pulls up wild chicory,

a type of grass,

or cuts off twigs [

a type of reed; while soft, they are fit for human consumption; when they have hardened somewhat, they are fit for animal consumption; and when they have dried, they are fit for fuel].

If

he pulls them up

for eating,

their measure is

the size of a dried fig. If for an animal, enough to fill a kid’s mouth. If for fuel, enough to cook a small egg,

and all these are measures for the labor of reaping. But

if it is to beautify the ground,

he is liable due to plowing, and therefore its measure

is any amount.

And we raised a question concerning it:

Are all of them

when he pulls them up for the purpose of human or animal consumption

not also to beautify the ground

as well?!

After all, even if his intention is for human or animal consumption, the ground is automatically beautified; why should he not be liable for any amount due to plowing?!

And we answer:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say:

Here

they taught

the halakha

with regard to a meadow [

a grazing area], where there is no benefit in beautifying the ground, only in reaping.

Abaye and Rava both say: Even if you say that it is a field and not a meadow,

there is likewise no difficulty.

And this is a case where he did not intend

to beautify the ground, but only for human or animal consumption; therefore he is not liable for any amount.

And we challenge this:

But Abaye and Rava both say: Rabbi Shimon concedes

who holds that an unintentional act is permitted

when it is a case of “cut off its head and it will not die,”

that he is liable. Here too, it is a case of “cut off its head,” since the ground is inevitably beautified?

And we answer:

It is necessary to state this in a case where he performs it on his fellow’s land,

as he does not care whether the ground becomes beautified [this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, Tosafot, s.v. “on his fellow’s land”].

Mishna:

One who writes two letters, whether with his right hand or

with his left hand, whether from one name

writing the same letter twice,

or from two names

writing two different letters.

Whether from two symbols,

writing one letter in ink and one in red paint [red color].

In any language,

in the script of any nation.

He is liable.

Rabbi Yosei said: They made one liable

the one who writes

two letters only because of making a mark,

and therefore, even if he did not write two letters but merely made two marks as a sign, he is liable.

For so

they

would write on the boards of the Tabernacle

when they dismantled it, they would make a sign on them in order

to know which was its partner,

so that the order of the boards would not be confused when the Tabernacle was erected.

Rabbi Yehuda said: We find a small name

that is derived

from a large name.

For example,

“shem” [

a name of a son of Noah]

from “Shimon” and from “Shemuel.”

“Noaḥ” from “Naḥor.”

“Dan” from “Daniel.”

“Gad” from “Gadiel.”

Rabbi Yehuda comes to teach that even if he intended to write a long word and wrote only part of it, if the small part that he wrote is itself a word, he is liable for it.

Gemara:

And we raised a question concerning it:

Granted, writing

with the right hand

is liable, because that is the usual manner of writing. But writing

with the

left hand—

why

is he liable?

Is that not an unusual manner of writing?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yirmeya said: They taught this with regard to a left-handed person!

And we challenge this:

Let

his

left hand be like everyone else’s right hand, and

the left specifically

should render him liable,

but

the right should not render him liable.

Why, then, did we learn that he is liable whether he writes with his right or with his left?

Rather, Abaye said: The Mishna is speaking of one who is equally proficient with both hands,

whose normal manner of writing is with both hands.

Rav Yaakov, son of Bat Yaakov, said: Whose opinion is this

Mishna?

It is Rabbi Yosei’s. For he said: They made one liable

the one who writes

two letters only because of making a mark.

And one who writes with his left hand, although it is not considered writing, is nevertheless no less than making a mark, for one is liable even when making a mark with the left hand.

And we challenge this:

But from the fact that the latter clause

of the Mishna

is Rabbi Yosei’s,

it necessarily follows that

the first clause—

is not Rabbi Yosei’s?!

And we answer:

The entire

Mishna

is Rabbi Yosei’s! [The tanna forgot to mention his name at the beginning, and when he remembered, he went back and mentioned his name, Rashi, Hullin 104b, s.v. “Everyone who says.”]

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said: We find

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said: We find

that when a person intends to write a large word and writes only part of it, he is liable. For example, he writes the small name “shem” from the larger name “Shimon” or “Shemuel,” “Noaḥ” from “Naḥor,” “Dan” from “Daniel,” or “Gad” from “Gadiel.”

The Gemara infers from Rabbi Yehuda’s words that in all the examples he brought of “a small name from a large name,” he specifically chose names containing two different letters. This implies that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable only for writing two different letters.

The Gemara asks:

But Rabbi Yehuda,

is it indeed only for writing

two letters

from a large name

and they are two “names” [

each letter has a different “name”] that he

holds one liable,

but one who writes

two letters and they are one name,

such as when he intended to write “Sheshakh” and wrote “Shesh,”

is not liable?

But it was taught

in a beraita that Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable even when he writes two identical letters from a large name.

As it was taught: It is stated in the passage concerning the sin-offering: “When a person sins … and performs

one of these.”

And we expound: Had the verse said

“and performs one,”

I

might

say that one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for performing a labor on Shabbat, such as the labor of writing,

until he writes

the

entire name,

the entire word that he had intended to write at the beginning of his writing.

Likewise, I might say that one who weaves on Shabbat is not liable for the labor of weaving

until he weaves the entire garment

that he began to weave.

Likewise, I might say that one who performs the labor of making “heddles,” for example, making heddles in a sieve, is not liable

until he makes

the heddles of

the entire sieve.

The verse states “and performs

one of

these,”

which indicates that one is liable for performing even part of the labor.

Lest you say:

If

we derive from the exclusionary implication of

“one of these”

that,

perhaps even if he wrote only one letter, wove only one thread, or made only one heddle in a sieve,

he will be liable.