Shabbat 102a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who throws

a stone four cubits in the public domain inadvertently, because he did not know that today was

Shabbat,

that today was Shabbat,

after it had left

the stone

his hand

and before it came to rest—

and after he remembered,

another caught

the stone, for example, that this other person uprooted himself from his place toward the stone and caught it, and it turns out that the placing is attributed to that person, and the entire labor is performed by two people; and we hold: “Two who performed it are exempt”—

Or if

it caught

the

dog

in its mouth, for this is not a placing, since a significant placing that makes one liable exists only if it was upon a place four by four cubits—

Or it was burned

and did not come to rest at all—he is

exempt

from the sin-offering. This is the explanation of the Mishna according to the initial assumption in the Gemara.

And likewise, one who

threw

some object on Shabbat inadvertently in order

to make a wound, whether in a person or in an animal, and remembered

that today was Shabbat after it had left his hand and

before a wound was made

is

exempt.

This is the general rule: All those liable for sin-offerings are not liable until

their beginning

[the beginning of the labor]

and their end

[the end of the labor] are

inadvertence.

But if

their beginning

was in

inadvertence and their end

was in

deliberateness, or if

their

beginning

was in

deliberateness and their end

was in

inadvertence,

they are

exempt

from the sin-offering,

until their beginning and their end

are in

inadvertence.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand, another catches it, a dog catches it, or it is burned, is exempt:

And we raise an objection against the Mishna, that it does not exempt him merely because he remembered, אלא if another caught it, or the dog, or it was burned, and there is no placing; and it implies:

indeed,

if

it came to rest

the stone in a place for which one is liable, and another or the dog did not catch it—he is

liable!?

But he remembered

before it came to rest,

and we learned

in the continuation of our Mishna:

All those liable for sin-offerings are not liable until their beginning and their end are in inadvertence.

And this one, since he remembered before it came to rest, his labor’s end was not in inadvertence!?

Said

he answered:

Rav Kahana: The latter clause

which exempts him when he remembered before it came to rest

comes to teach

a case where he threw by means of

a wooden clasp and a cord.

That is, the Mishna does not exempt him when he remembers אלא when, at the time of remembering, he can prevent the object from coming to rest, because the object is attached to a cord in the thrower’s hand. But when one throws an object, his remembering is of no benefit after the stone has left his hand, since he can no longer prevent it from coming to rest; therefore the Mishna exempted him in the first clause only when a dog caught it.

And we raise an objection to this:

A wooden clasp and a cord!?

Does he become liable even if he did not remember when the throwing was by means of a wooden clasp and a cord? But

it is bound in his hand!?

That is, how are we to explain the continuation of the Mishna as referring to a wooden clasp and a cord? In these cases he is exempt even if he did not remember, since the binding of the thrown object is in his hand!?

And we answer: Indeed, regarding throwing four cubits in the public domain, one cannot find what we learned in the latter clause, that he is exempt when the end was not in inadvertence. For if the stone left his hand, this is like a beginning and an end in inadvertence; and if he threw by means of a wooden clasp and a cord, he is exempt even if the end was in inadvertence. The latter clause, which exempts him when he remembered in the middle of the labor, applies specifically

to a case where

he threw a stone by means of a wooden clasp and a cord and

intended to make a wound,

for in this case it is not possible to exempt him because it is bound in his hand.

And we raise an objection to this:

indeed,

one who throws in order to make a wound and remembers—

it is explicitly taught

[this law is stated explicitly in the Mishna]:

For we learned in our Mishna:

One who throws in order to make a wound, whether in a person or in an animal, and remembers before

a wound is made, is exempt.

Thus, the law of one who throws in order to make a wound and remembers, that he is exempt, is explicitly taught in our Mishna. If so, necessarily the latter clause, “This is the general rule,” is not dealing with making a wound, אלא with throwing four cubits in the public domain. Nevertheless, we learned that he is exempt when he remembers before it comes to rest. If so, the difficulty against the first clause of our Mishna returns: it does not exempt him when he remembers אלא when another or a dog caught it, or it was burned!?

Rather, Rava said

to resolve the first clause of the Mishna: What we learned in the latter clause of our Mishna, that if the end was in inadvertence he is exempt, refers to

one who carries

four cubits in the public domain without throwing, and only in this manner, if he remembered before he put it down, is he not liable for a sin-offering. But in the case of one who throws, he is not exempt even if he remembered, since he can no longer prevent it. Therefore we learned in the first clause of our Mishna that he is not exempt unless another or a dog caught it, or it was burned. And we raise an objection to this:

But the statement

But “This is the general rule,” which is taught

in the latter clause, that he is exempt when he remembers,

is taught regarding throwing,

for after the Mishna taught the law of one who throws in order to make a wound, it taught: “This is the general rule.” If so, it implies that also in throwing he is exempt if he remembers!?

Rather, Rava said

to explain the first clause: In fact, even one who throws, who can no longer prevent the object from coming to rest, is exempt if he remembers. And what we learned in the first clause, “a dog caught it,” does not mean that after he remembered the dog caught it, אלא

two

separate laws

it teaches

in the first clause:

A.

One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand—

B.

Alternatively,

even

if he did not remember, and another caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned—

in these two cases he is

exempt.

Rav Ashi said

that he too holds that remembering exempts even if he can no longer prevent the object from coming to rest. However, he explains the wording of the Mishna differently:

The Mishna is incomplete

our Mishna,

and this is what it teaches: One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand,

and then

another caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned,

he is

exempt—

if it came to rest,

he is

liable.

When do these words apply, when he again forgot,

and it turns out that the beginning and the end of the labor were in inadvertence.

But if he did not again forget,

he is

exempt, for all those liable for sin-offerings are not liable until their beginning and their end are in inadvertence.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general rule: all those liable for sin-offerings

are not liable until their beginning and their end are in inadvertence:

It was stated:

One who carries in the public domain

two cubits inadvertently,

and remembers, and the object passed

two cubits

additional

deliberately,

and the object passed another

two cubits inadvertently:

Rabba said: He is exempt.

Rava said: He is liable.

And the Gemara explains their statements:

We learned in the Mishna below, 105a: One who writes two letters [which are the measure of writing for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering] during two periods of unawareness [that is, he remembered between one letter and the other that he had written it inadvertently, and then forgot again], Rabban Gamliel holds him liable, while the Sages exempt him. And the Gemara explains there: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabban Gamliel holds, “There is no knowledge for half a measure” [to divide the period of unawareness into two periods of unawareness, so that the other half will not join with it for liability to a sin-offering]. And the Rabbis hold, there is knowledge for half a measure.

Rabba said: He is exempt,

because

even according to Rabban Gamliel, who says, “There is no knowledge for half a measure,”

and according to him it would be possible to say that the knowledge that came to him in the middle of the throwing does not divide it, nevertheless here he is exempt, because

only there,

in the case of one who wrote two letters and had knowledge between them,

he

is liable, and the knowledge between them does not divide them, because

when he completed the measure, he completed it in inadvertence.

When he wrote the second letter that completes the measure of writing, he wrote it inadvertently, and it is fit to join; and as for the fact that he knew in the meantime, according to his view, “there is no knowledge for half a measure”—

But here, when

he performed the second two cubits after the first two cubits that he had performed inadvertently, he performed them

deliberately.

He performed them and

is not

liable. And although afterward he performed another two cubits inadvertently, nevertheless the measure was completed in the first four cubits, and since he performed their second part deliberately, he is therefore not liable for a sin-offering.

But the Gemara discusses:

And with what

case are we dealing?

If it is with one who throws,

then

he is inadvertent

at the completion of the labor. Since he cannot prevent it, the labor is not completed until it comes to rest; and before the placing there were two additional cubits, which were performed inadvertently!?

Rather,

with what are we dealing here?

With one who carries

the six cubits without throwing. Since he can complete the labor after four cubits, if he puts it down, the measure is completed at the end of the first four cubits. But he performed part of them deliberately, and therefore he is exempt.

Rabba said: He is liable, and even according to the Rabbis, who say, “There is awareness for half a measure

and we would have said that the awareness divides, and he will not be liable, nevertheless, there is a basis for dividing and making him liable here. For only

there

[with regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat in two periods of unawareness]

is it

that the Sages exempted him from an offering, because

it is in his power

to stop the labor when it became known to him.

But here, where it is not in his power

to stop the labor at the time of the awareness,

the awareness does not

divide, and he is liable.

And the Gemara discusses:

And with what are we dealing? If with one who carries

without throwing,

then

even here

it is in his power

to stop the labor when it became known to him.

Rather,

Rabba said that he is liable only

when throwing,

when it is not in his power to stop the labor.

And it emerges that Rava exempted in the case of throwing, while Rabba made liable in the case of carrying, and they did not disagree at all; rather, this one stated his ruling in one manner, and that one in a second manner.

Rabba said: If he threw

an object from a private domain into a public domain, or from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits,

and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or in the mouth of a furnace,

where a flame caught it and it was burned, he is

liable

if from the outset he intended this.

And we challenge:

But did we not learn

in our Mishna:

“Another caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned,”

he is

exempt!?

And we answer:

There,

in our Mishna, we are dealing with a case in which

he did not intend

that it should come to rest in the place where it came to rest; therefore he is exempt when it came to rest in the mouth of a dog, for that is not a place of four, and likewise when it was burned he is exempt because the object did not come to rest at all.

But

here,

in Rabba’s words, we are dealing with a case in which

he indeed

intended

that it should come to rest there, and his intention makes it a place.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye said: We too have learned

[we too learned in a Mishna in Keritot] that “his intention makes it a place”: for we learned,

There is one who eats one eating, and is liable for it for four sin-offerings, and one

guilt-offering.

How so?

The impure person

who ate from consecrated food [and for eating it in impurity he is liable for a sin-offering],

who ate forbidden fat [his liability is a sin-offering]

[for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering],

and it is leftover [his liability is a sin-offering]

[for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering],

from the consecrated food [his liability is a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property],

[for which he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property],

on Yom Kippur [his liability is a sin-offering].

[for which he is liable to bring a sin-offering].

Rabbi Meir says:

You have another sin-offering to add:

even if it was Shabbat

and he carried it out with his mouth,

he is

liable

for an additional sin-offering because of carrying out. That is, there are times when he is liable for more sin-offerings, for example, when it was Shabbat and he carried it out with his mouth.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Meir:

It is not of the same category,

this sin-offering is not because of eating, but because of carrying out, and it should not be counted together with the other liabilities that depend on eating.

It is thus explained that according to everyone he is liable because of carrying out when he carried it out with his mouth.

And why

is he

liable? For this is not the usual manner of carrying out!?

Rather,

necessarily,

since he indeed intended, his intention

that he needed to eat it while walking, and he regarded this carrying out in his mouth as significant,

makes it a place.

Here too,

when he threw and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or a furnace,

since he indeed intended

to place it in the mouth of the dog or in the mouth of the furnace,

his intention makes it a place.

We shall return to you, The Chapter of One Who Throws