Shabbat 102a (קב.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who throws

a stone four cubits in the public domain unwittingly, because he did not know that it was Shabbat today,

and remembered

that today was Shabbat

after it had left

the stone

his hand

but before it came to rest—

and after he remembered,

another caught

the stone—for example, that other person uprooted himself from his place toward the stone and caught it— with the result that the placing is attributed to that person, and the entire labor was performed by two people; and we have established: “When two perform it, they are exempt”—

Or

a

by

dog caught it

in its mouth, for this is not considered placing, since significant placing that creates liability occurs only when the object is on a surface measuring four by four handbreadths—

Or it was burned

and never came to rest at all—he is

exempt

from bringing a sin-offering. This is the interpretation of the Mishna according to the initial assumption of the Gemara.

And similarly, one who

throws

some object on Shabbat unwittingly in order

to inflict a wound, whether in a person or in an animal, and remembers

that today is Shabbat after it has left his hand but

before a wound has been inflicted,

he is

exempt.

This is the general rule: All those liable to bring sin-offerings are not liable until

their beginning

[the beginning of the labor]

and their end

[the end of the labor] were

unwitting.

But if

their beginning

was

unwitting and their end

was

deliberate, or if

their

beginning

was

deliberate and their end

was

unwitting,

they are

exempt

from a sin-offering,

until their beginning and their end

are

unwitting.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand, another catches it, a dog catches it, or it is burned, is exempt:

The Gemara raises a difficulty against the Mishna: It exempts him despite his having remembered only if another or a dog catches it, or it is burned, so that there is no placing; this implies:

indeed,

if

it came to rest

in a place for which he would be liable, and another or a dog did not catch it, he would be

liable!?

But he remembered

before it came to rest,

and we learned

later in our Mishna:

All those liable to bring sin-offerings are not liable until their beginning and their end are unwitting.

Since he remembered before it came to rest, the end of the labor was not unwitting!?

Rav

replied:

The latter clause

which exempts him when he remembered before it came to rest

we are dealing with

a case where he threw it by means of

a latch and a cord.

That is, the Mishna does not exempt him when he remembered unless, at the time he remembered, he could prevent the object from coming to rest, because the object is attached to a cord in the thrower’s hand. But when one throws an object, remembering after the stone has left his hand is ineffective, since he can no longer prevent it from coming to rest; therefore, the first clause of the Mishna exempts him only when a dog catches it.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this:

A latch and a cord!?

Are you saying that he is liable even if he did not remember when the throwing was performed by means of a latch and a cord? But

the object remains attached to his hand!?

That is, how are we to interpret the latter part of the Mishna as referring to a latch and a cord? In such a case he is exempt even if he did not remember, since the object’s attachment remains in his hand!?

The Gemara answers: Indeed, with regard to throwing four cubits in the public domain, we cannot find a case corresponding to what the latter clause teaches—that he is exempt when the end was not unwitting. If the stone has left his hand, that is a case in which both the beginning and the end were unwitting. And if he threw it by means of a latch and a cord, he is exempt even when the end was unwitting, because the object remains attached to his hand. The latter clause, which exempts him when he remembered in the middle of the labor, must therefore refer specifically to

a case where

he threw a stone by means of a latch and a cord and

intended to inflict a wound,

for in this case it is impossible to exempt him on the grounds that the object remains attached to his hand.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this:

Indeed,

one who throws in order to inflict a wound and remembers—

it is taught explicitly

[this law is stated explicitly in the Mishna]:

For we learned in our Mishna:

One who throws in order to inflict a wound, whether in a person or in an animal, and remembers before

a wound has been inflicted, is exempt.

Thus, the law that one who throws in order to inflict a wound and remembers is exempt is explicitly stated in our Mishna. Consequently, the latter clause, “This is the general rule,” must necessarily concern throwing four cubits in the public domain and not inflicting a wound. Nevertheless, it teaches that he is exempt when he remembers before the object comes to rest. If so, the difficulty with the first clause of our Mishna returns: Why does it exempt him upon remembering only when another or a dog catches it, or it is burned!?

Rather, Rava said

to resolve the first clause of the Mishna: The case taught in the latter clause of our Mishna, that if the end was unwitting he is exempt, is

one who carries

four cubits in the public domain without throwing. Only in this case, if he remembers before putting it down, is he not liable to bring a sin-offering. But in the case of one who throws, he is not exempt even when he remembers, since he can no longer prevent the object from coming to rest. Therefore, the first clause of our Mishna teaches that he is exempt only if another or a dog catches it, or it is burned. The Gemara raises a difficulty against this:

But the statement

But the “general rule” that it teaches

in the latter clause, exempting him when he remembers,

is taught with regard to throwing,

since after the Mishna taught the law of one who throws in order to inflict a wound, it teaches: “This is the general rule.” This implies that also in the case of throwing he is exempt if he remembers!?

Rather, Rava said

to explain the first clause: In fact, even one who throws, who can no longer prevent the object from coming to rest, is exempt if he remembers. And what the first clause teaches, “a dog caught it,” does not mean that the dog caught it after he remembered. Rather,

two

separate laws

it teaches

in the first clause:

a.

One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand—

b.

Alternatively,

even

if he did not remember, and another caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned—

in both of these cases he is

exempt.

Rav Ashi said

that remembering exempts him even if he can no longer prevent the object from coming to rest. However, he interprets the wording of the Mishna differently:

The Mishna is incomplete,

our Mishna,

and this is what it teaches: One who throws and remembers after it has left his hand,

and afterward

another catches it, or a dog catches it, or it is burned,

he is

exempt—

if it came to rest,

he is

liable.

When are these words applicable? When he forgot again,

so that the beginning and the end of the labor were unwitting.

But if he did not forget again,

he is

exempt, for all those liable to bring sin-offerings are not liable until their beginning and end are unwitting.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the general rule: All those liable to bring sin-offerings

are not liable until their beginning and end are unwitting:

It was stated:

One who carries in the public domain

two cubits unwittingly,

and remembers, and the object passes

two cubits

more

deliberately,

and the object passes another

two cubits unwittingly:

Rabba said: He is exempt.

Rava said: He is liable.

The Gemara explains their statements:

We learned in the Mishna below, on page 105a: One who writes two letters [which is the measure of writing for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering] during two periods of unawareness [that is, he remembered between writing one letter unwittingly and writing the other, and then forgot again], Rabban Gamliel deems him liable, while the Sages deem him exempt. The Gemara explains there: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabban Gamliel maintains that “there is no awareness for half a measure” [to divide the period of unawareness into two periods, preventing the second half from joining the first for liability to a sin-offering]. And the Rabbis maintain that there is awareness for half a measure.

Rabba said: He is exempt,

because

even according to Rabban Gamliel, who says, “there is no awareness for half a measure,”

and according to him one might say that the awareness he experienced in the middle of the throwing does not divide the act, nevertheless he is exempt here, because

only there,

in the case of writing two letters with awareness between them,

is it

that he is liable, and the awareness between them does not divide the act, because

when he completed the measure, he completed it unwittingly. When he wrote the second letter, which completed the measure of writing, he wrote it unwittingly, and it is fit to join with the first. As for the fact that he had become aware in the meantime, according to Rabban Gamliel, “there is no awareness for half a measure.”

When he wrote the second letter that completes the measure of writing, he wrote it inadvertently, and it is fit to join; and as for the fact that he knew in the meantime, according to his view, “there is no knowledge for half a measure”—

But here, since

he performed the second two cubits, after the first two cubits that he performed unwittingly,

deliberately,

he performed them,

he is not

liable. Although he subsequently performed two additional cubits unwittingly, the measure was completed with the first four cubits; since he performed the second part of those four deliberately, he is not liable to bring a sin-offering.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

In what

circumstances are we dealing?

If it is a case of throwing,

then

he is unwitting

when the labor is completed. Since he cannot prevent the object from coming to rest, the labor is not completed until it comes to rest; and before the placing, the additional two cubits were performed unwittingly!?

Rather,

in what case are we dealing

with one who carries

the six cubits without throwing. Since he can complete the labor after four cubits by putting the object down, the measure was completed at the end of the first four cubits. He performed part of those four deliberately, and therefore he is exempt.

Rabba said: He is liable, even according to the Rabbis, who say, “There is awareness for a half-measure”,

and we would have said that the awareness divides the acts, and he would not be liable; nevertheless, a distinction must be made and he is liable here. For only

there

with regard to one who writes two letters on Shabbat in two periods of unawareness

is it

that the Sages exempted him from a sacrifice, because

it is in his power

to interrupt the labor when he becomes aware of it.

But here, since it is not in his power

to interrupt the labor at the time of the awareness,

the awareness does not

divide the acts, and he is liable.

The Gemara asks:

And with what are we dealing? If it is with one who carries

without throwing,

then

here too

it is in his power

to interrupt the labor when he becomes aware of it.

Rather,

Rabba said that he is liable only

when throwing,

since it is not in his power to interrupt the labor.

It follows that Rava exempted one who throws, while Rabba held one who carries liable; they did not disagree at all. Rather, one stated his ruling with regard to one case, and the other with regard to a different case.

Rabba said: If one threw

an object from the private domain into the public domain, or from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits,

and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or in the mouth of a furnace

where a flame caught it and it was burned, he

is liable

if he had intended this from the outset.

And we object:

But did we not learn

in our Mishna:

“If another caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned”,

he

is exempt!?

And we answer:

There,

in our Mishna, we are dealing with a case in which

he did not intend

that it should come to rest in the place where it came to rest. Therefore, he is exempt when it comes to rest in the mouth of a dog, since that is not a place four handbreadths in size; and likewise, when it is burned, he is exempt because the object did not come to rest at all.

But

here,

in Rabba’s statement, we are dealing with a case in which

he did

intend

that it should come to rest there, and his intention establishes it as a place.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: We too have learned this

even in the Mishna in Keritot, that “his intention establishes it as a place”: For we learned:

There is one who eats one eating and is liable to bring four sin-offerings and

one

guilt-offering.

The impure person

who ate from consecrated food [and is liable to bring a sin-offering for eating it while impure],

who ate forbidden fat

his liability is a sin-offering,

and it was notar

his liability is a sin-offering,

from consecrated food

his liability is a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property,

on Yom Kippur

his liability is a sin-offering.

Rabbi Meir says:

There are additional sin-offerings:

Even if it was Shabbat

and he carried it out in his mouth,

he

is liable

to bring an additional sin-offering for carrying out. That is to say, there are times when he is liable to bring more sin-offerings—for example, when it was Shabbat and he carried it out in his mouth.

They said to him

the Sages said to Rabbi Meir:

It is not of the same category,

this sin-offering is not for eating but for carrying out, and it should not be counted together with the other obligations that depend on eating.

It is therefore clear that everyone agrees that he is liable for carrying out when he carries it out in his mouth.

But why

is he

liable? Is this not an uncustomary manner of carrying out!?

Rather,

necessarily,

since he intends it, his intention,

that he needs to eat it while walking, renders this carrying out in his mouth significant,

and establishes it as a place.

Here too,

when one throws it and it comes to rest in the mouth of a dog or in the mouth of a furnace,

since he intends

to place it in the mouth of the dog or in the mouth of the furnace,

his intention establishes it as a place.

We shall return to you, chapter “One who throws.”