Shabbat 101b (קא:) — the Talmud in English

And he said to him

Rav said to Rabbi Tavla:

A suspended partition does not permit

except in water.

As in this case, which they taught in tractate Eruvin 87b, concerning a balcony that is elevated above the sea: one makes a suspended partition at the balcony and draws water through it. And we find another such case there, on 86a, where the Sages permitted drawing water from a pit located between two courtyards by means of a suspended partition, because

the Sages were lenient with regard to water;

but they did not permit this in a ruin.

And

behold,

why

does a suspended partition help to permit carrying in water?

Is there not the passage of fish?

That is to say, it is necessarily the case that the suspended partition is effective because we say, “Lower the partition” until it reaches the ground. But if the passage of fish is considered passage, this partition has thereby been nullified.

Rather, conclude from this that the passage of fish is not considered passage.

We learned in the Mishna:

Boats tied

to one another: one may carry from one to the other. If they are not tied, even though they are enclosed, one may not carry from one to the other:

The Gemara assumed that the boats belonged to one person. When they are not tied to one another, it is forbidden to carry from one to the other, lest the second boat move—while the object is being transferred from one boat to the other—and the object fall into the sea. One must then be concerned that he may bring it from the sea, which is a karmelit, into the boat, which is a private domain. Therefore, we ask:

Is it not obvious

that if they are tied to one another, and there is no concern that the object will fall and be brought in, it is permitted to carry from one to the other, since there is no prohibition against carrying from one private domain to another when both belong to one person?!

Rava said

he answered:

Our Mishna was necessary only

to permit

a small boat

to permit a small boat [

[a small boat]

that

is situated

between them

the boats. That is to say, if the boats are tied to one another, it is permitted to carry from one to the other even by way of the small boat between the two large boats, although the small boat itself is not tied.

Rav Safra said

he challenged

Rava

:

Moses

[that is, “Our master in his generation is like Moses in his generation”]

you have spoken well

[you have spoken correctly]?! But

“one may carry from one to the other

we learned.

This implies that there is no other boat interrupting between them into which this object could enter?!

Rather, Rav Safra said

to explain the novel point in our Mishna, which permits carrying from one boat to another when they are tied:

Our Mishna was necessary only

to permit carrying from one boat to another when they are tied to one another,

but

when the two boats belonged to two people, and

to establish an eruv and carry from one to the other.

That is to say, our Mishna comes to teach that the owners of the two boats can establish an eruv between them and carry from one to the other, for I might have thought that an eruv is ineffective in boats, since they are not fixed in place.

As it was taught in a beraita: Boats tied to one another: one establishes an eruv and carries from one to the other.

And if

they became severed

from their mooring,

they became prohibited

for carrying from one to the other.

They returned

the boats

and became tied again: whether

they were tied

unwittingly,

because they did not know that it was Shabbat or that tying was one of the labors of Shabbat,

or whether

they were tied

intentionally, whether

they were

under duress

while tying them,

or whether

they were

mistaken,

that is, they were occupied with another matter, tying it, and the boats became tied—

they returned

the boats

to their original permitted status.

And likewise, mats spread across the public domain,

that is, mats from which many partitions were made in the public domain, with individuals spending Shabbat among them, each in his own area,

the people

residing between the mats establish courtyard eruvin

and carry

by means of them

from one to the other.

And if

the mats were rolled up

and the areas set apart from one another were breached,

they became prohibited.

They were spread out again, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether

under duress or mistakenly, they returned to their original permitted status—

for any partition made on Shabbat, whether unwittingly or intentionally, is considered a partition.

And we challenge this:

Is that so?!

How can we have learned that a partition made in violation of Shabbat is considered a partition, permitting one to carry by means of it?!

But did Rav Naḥman not say: It was taught

that a partition made in violation of Shabbat is considered a partition

only

to be stringent, with regard to

throwing

from the public domain into the area enclosed by the partition, for which one is liable.

But

to be lenient,

to carry

by means of a partition made in violation of Shabbat,

is forbidden.

And we answer:

When Rav Naḥman’s statement was said,

that a partition does not permit carrying when it was made in violation of Shabbat,

it was intentional

alone

that was stated.

For a partition made intentionally does not permit carrying, because this is a penalty imposed by the Sages. But in the other cases mentioned in the beraita, although the partition was made in violation of Shabbat, it is a partition even to be lenient and carry by means of it.

Shmuel said:

This statement that we learned in our Mishna—“Boats tied to one another: one may carry from one to the other”—means:

even if they are tied with the cord of a garment

[a cord threaded through the collar of a garment in order to tighten the garment around the neck].

We challenge this:

What are the circumstances

[what case is Shmuel discussing]?!

If the cord can

the garment cord

hold them in place

the boats, so that they do not separate from one another,

it is obvious,

for what difference does it make with what cord they are tied, since they cannot separate from one another?!

And

if it cannot

that cord

hold them in place

so that they do not separate from one another,

why,

what use is this cord?!

And we answer:

Actually,

here we are dealing with a case in which

it can

that cord

hold them in place

so that they do not separate.

And

as for your difficulty—“it is obvious”—I can say to you:

Shmuel

needed to teach us that even a garment cord is effective to permit carrying between the boats;

he is stating this to refute his own earlier position

[he comes to contradict his own statement]—

That is to say, since we find that Shmuel himself said concerning boats [with regard to another matter in which the Sages required tying with an object capable of holding the boat in place]: “The Sages said this only when it was tied with something customarily used to hold it in place,” Shmuel therefore needed to teach us that, with regard to Shabbat, when the Sages required tying with something capable of holding the boat in place, it is not necessary to tie it specifically with something customarily used for that purpose. Rather, any tie that holds the boats in place so that they do not separate is considered a tie, and carrying from one to the other is permitted.

As we learned: If one tied

the boat to a tent containing a corpse

with something that holds it in place,

it

brings ritual impurity to it,

because the cable with which he tied the boat became impure, and it renders the boat itself impure; the boat then renders the vessels inside it impure.

But if he tied it

with something that does not hold it in place, it does not

bring ritual impurity to it,

as the reason is explained below.

And Shmuel said: This applies when it is tied

the boat

with an iron chain,

which is customarily used to hold the boat in place. That is to say, when the Sages said “with something that holds it in place,” they did not mean every tie capable of holding the boat in place, but a tie with an object customarily used to hold the boat in place, namely, an iron chain, as the reason is explained below.

A vessel that becomes impure through contact with a corpse becomes a primary source of ritual impurity. However, a metal vessel that becomes impure through contact with a corpse has the status of the corpse itself; anything that becomes impure through this vessel becomes a primary source of ritual impurity, as though it had become impure through contact with the corpse itself. For this is how the Sages expounded the verse, “And whoever touches upon the open field one slain with a sword or one who died naturally”: to teach you that the sword with which the corpse was killed—and likewise other metal vessels that became impure through contact with a corpse—has the status of the corpse itself, which is the primary source of all ritual impurity.

And this is what Shmuel taught us:

with regard to ritual impurity, it

because

it is written, “with a slain person, with a sword

” and we expound:

“A sword has the status of a corpse

”—

no, in this case it is indeed necessary to tie it specifically with an iron chain, because the cable assumes the status of the corpse itself and renders the boat a primary source of ritual impurity, while the boat renders the vessels inside it first-degree impure. But when it is not tied with a metal chain, the cable becomes a primary source of ritual impurity and renders the boat first-degree impure, and something first-degree impure does not render vessels impure.

But with regard to Shabbat, since it can

the cord

hold it in place, even if

it holds it in place

with a garment cord,

carrying by means of this tie is permitted.