Sanhedrin 88a — the Talmud in English

It was stated: "

baldness and bald patch"

was stated "

baldness and bald patch"

in garments,

and we learn by a gzera shava:

just as there

in a person

if it spread over all of it, it is pure, so here

in garments

if it spread over all of it, it is pure.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Jonathan ben Avtulmos, for in garment afflictions, even if it spread over all of it, it is impure.

And if a person brings such a garment, in which the affliction spread over all of it, into the Temple, or if he touches this garment and enters the Temple, then according to the Rabbis he is liable for karet, whereas according to Rabbi Jonathan ben Avtulmos he is exempt from karet. "

The words"—

these are valuations, herems, and consecrations.

Valuations

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis—

as it was taught: One who valuates one less than a month old,

who said of a baby less than a month old, “Its valuation is upon me.” For in the passage of valuations in the Torah it is stated that only from one month old and above does he have a “valuation,” which the one who valuates must give according to the fixed amount stated there in the passage—

Rabbi Meir says: He gives its value,

the one who valuates must give to the Temple treasury the value of the baby, as though it were sold in the market as a slave.

And the Sages say: He has said nothing,

and he is not liable to give anything.

And there is a practical difference in this dispute with regard to the prohibition punishable by karet, in a case in which the treasurer comes and takes that person as security, the one who vowed in this manner: according to Rabbi Meir, the security is consecrated property and it is impossible to betroth a woman with it; according to the Rabbis, the security remains in the owners’ possession and he can betroth a woman with it. It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman.

And there is another practical difference: according to Rabbi Meir, who says that the security is consecrated property, if a person derives benefit from it, he becomes liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property; and if a ritually impure person eats from that guilt-offering, he becomes liable for karet. But according to the Rabbis, who say that the security is not consecrated property and it is permitted to derive benefit from it, that guilt-offering is non-sacred property, and there is no liability for karet for that person who ate from it while he was impure.

The herems

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Judah ben Bateira and the Rabbis—

as we learned

in tractate Arakhin [28b]:

Rabbi Judah ben Bateira says: Unspecified herems,

when one said of an item of his property, “This is herem,” but did not specify whether it was for the Temple repairs or for the priests—are given

for the Temple repairs, as it is stated [Leviticus 27:28]: “

Every herem, it is most holy to the Lord.”

is most holy to the Lord.”

And the Sages say: Unspecified herems

are given

to a priest, as it is stated concerning one who consecrated the field of his inheritance [there, 21]: “

Like a field of herem, to the priest shall be his inheritance,”

meaning that unspecified herems are for a priest.

If so,

that unspecified herems are for a priest,

what does the verse teach: “

Every herem,

it is most holy to the Lord,” which implies that an unspecified herem is consecrated property?

To teach

that

a herem given to priests

takes effect upon

offerings that are

most holy offerings, and upon

offerings that are

lesser holiness.

And according to Rabbi Judah ben Bateira, that item which was made an unspecified herem is consecrated for the Temple repairs, and one who derives benefit from it is liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. But according to the Sages, who say that it is given to priests, it has no sanctity, and there is no liability for a guilt-offering upon one who derives benefit from it. Thus, the matter concerns a prohibition punishable by karet, as explained above.

Consecrations

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob and the Rabbis—

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: Even a small fork

with which gold is spun

belonging to consecrated property requires ten people

appraisers who will assess its value in order

to redeem it

from consecrated property.

And the Rabbis disagree with him, holding that only three appraisers are required in order to redeem movable property from consecrated property.

And if an object belonging to consecrated property was redeemed by only three appraisers, then according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob the object remains consecrated property, whereas according to the Rabbis it has gone out to non-sacred status. If so, the matter concerns the prohibition punishable by karet, in a case in which they derive benefit from this object and bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property on its account. "

Quarrels"—

this is the drinking of the sota, the breaking of the heifer’s neck, and the purification of the afflicted person.

The drinking of the sota

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua—

as we learned

at the beginning of tractate Sota:

One who warns his wife,

one who warns his wife not to seclude herself with a certain man—

Rabbi Eliezer says: He warns her on the basis of two,

the warning must be given in the presence of two witnesses; and if he did not warn her in the presence of two witnesses, she is not forbidden to him even if she secluded herself with that man, and he also cannot have her drink the bitter waters.

But

he has her drink on the basis of one witness,

in order to have her drink the bitter waters, one witness who testifies that she secluded herself with that man is sufficient,

or on the basis of himself,

for the husband himself comes and says that he saw that she secluded herself with that man after he warned her; even this is sufficient to forbid her to him until she drinks the bitter waters.

Rabbi Joshua says: He warns her on the basis of two, and has her drink on the basis of two,

the seclusion too must be established on the basis of two witnesses who testify that she secluded herself with that man; if not, he cannot have her drink, and she is not forbidden to him on account of the seclusion.

And this woman, concerning whom there is only one witness that she secluded herself with that man, according to Rabbi Eliezer is forbidden to her husband so long as she does not drink the bitter waters to determine whether she became impure or not.

And if she does not wish to drink, her husband is obligated to divorce her without paying her ketuba.

But according to Rabbi Joshua, she is permitted to her husband, and if he wishes to divorce her, he is obligated to give her ketuba.

And when this woman sells her ketuba to another person, and he seizes the husband’s money as payment for the ketuba, then according to Rabbi Eliezer the money in his possession is stolen property, and the woman whom he betroths with this money is not betrothed; whereas according to Rabbi Joshua the money belongs to him, and the woman is betrothed.

It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman, whose punishment is karet.

The breaking of the heifer’s neck

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva—

as we learned [there, 45b]:

45b]:

From where,

from which place on the body of the corpse found in the field

would they measure

the distance from it to the surrounding cities, in order to know which of them was the closest and obligated to bring a beheaded heifer?

Rabbi Eliezer says: From its navel,

of the corpse.

Rabbi Akiva says: From its nose.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob says: From the place where it became a corpse,

that is,

from its neck,

as it is stated [Ezekiel 21:34]: “To give you over the necks of the corpses of the wicked.” And from here, an ordinary corpse is from the neck. Therefore, they measure from there, for it is stated in the passage of the beheaded heifer: “The city that is nearest to the corpse.”

And a beheaded heifer is forbidden to derive benefit from, and a woman betrothed with a beheaded heifer is not betrothed.

It follows that the dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman, in a case in which one city was closer to the navel of the corpse and the other was closer to its nose, and both brought a beheaded heifer, each one. For only one of the heifers has the status of a beheaded heifer, which is forbidden to derive benefit from, whereas the other is completely non-sacred property and it is permitted to derive benefit from. And if a person betroths a woman with one of the heifers, the status of this woman depends upon the dispute concerning the measurement for a beheaded heifer: according to this tanna she is betrothed, and according to the other tanna she is not betrothed.

The purification of the afflicted person

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis—

as we learned

in tractate Nega’im [14:9]: If

he does not have

the afflicted person

a right thumb,

or

a right big toe,

or

a right ear

upon which to place some of the blood and oil of his offerings, then

he does not have

this afflicted person

everlasting purification.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He places it

the blood and the oil

upon its place,

of the right thumb and right ear,

and he fulfills

his obligation thereby.

Rabbi Shimon says: He places it upon

a thumb and ear

of the left side, and he fulfills.

And as long as the afflicted person has not achieved atonement according to the law, he remains in his impurity, and he is forbidden to enter the Temple and to eat sacred offerings.

It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition punishable by karet of impurity of the Temple. "

Within your gates"—

this is gleanings, forgotten produce, and the corner of the field.

Gleanings

perhaps they disagree in this,

as we learned

in tractate Pe’a [6:5]:

Two stalks

that fell during the harvest have the status of

gleanings,

and they belong to the poor. But if

three

stalks fell,

they are not gleanings,

rather, they belong to the owner of the field. [

And immediately the Gemara will bring the words of the School of Shammai, who disagree with this.]

Forgotten produce

perhaps they disagree in the continuation of the Mishna:

Two sheaves

that were forgotten in the field have the status of

forgotten produce

and belong to the poor.

Three

sheaves that were forgotten

are not forgotten produce,

rather, they belong to the owner of the field.

And concerning all of them,

concerning all those taught in the Mishna [there, in tractate Pe’a, the Mishna contains additional cases in which, according to the first tanna, only two belong to the poor and not three],

the School of Shammai says:

that even

three

are

for the poor, and

only

four are for the owner of the field.

And if the poor person gathers three from the gleanings or from the forgotten produce, and the owner of the field comes and takes them from him,

according to the first tanna, this is the property of the owner of the field, and if he betroths a woman with it, she will be betrothed; whereas according to the School of Shammai, it is stolen property in the hands of the owner of the field, and the woman is not betrothed.

The corner of the field

perhaps they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and the Rabbis—

as it was taught: The mitzva of the corner of the field is to separate it from the standing grain,

while the stalks are still standing in the field and have not been harvested, as it is stated: “You shall not finish off the corner of your field when you harvest,” implying: leave the remainder for the poor, who will harvest the corner.

If he did not separate it from the standing grain, he shall separate

the corner of the field

from the sheaves,

from bundles of cut stalks.

If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he shall separate it from the grain heap,

from the pile of wheat,

before he smooths it,

as long as he has not begun smoothing the pile, for that is the completion of its work with regard to the obligation of tithe; until then he can give the poor person the corner of the field without having to tithe it first.

But if he has already

smoothed it,

the obligation to separate tithes takes effect upon the grain heap, and therefore

he tithes,

he must first separate all the tithes from the grain heap,

and

only afterward

he gives it to him,

the poor person, the corner of the field, so that the poor person should not suffer because he delayed giving him the corner of the field until it became subject to tithe. For had he given it to him before smoothing, the poor person would not have had to tithe the corner of the field, because the corner of the field is exempt from tithe; but now that it has already become subject to tithe while in the owner’s possession, the poor person too will have to tithe it. And if he did not separate it from the grain heap, but he ground the wheat and made dough from the flour, he is exempt from separating the corner of the field from it, because he acquired it through a change.

In the name of Rabbi Ishmael they said: Even

if he did not separate the corner of the field until he made dough from the wheat,

he separates

the corner of the field

from the dough,

because a change does not effect acquisition, and the wheat still belongs to the poor even after it changed and became dough.

And if the poor person came and took the corner of the field himself from the dough, then according to the first tanna it is stolen property in his possession, and if he betroths a woman with it, she will not be betrothed; whereas according to Rabbi Ishmael, she will be betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

There were three courts

there.

Rav Kahana said: He says,

if the rebellious elder says that what he rules as law is

from received teaching,

that he received it from his teachers,

and they say: From received teaching,

the Great Court says that they received the opposite from their teachers,

he is not executed.

And likewise, when

he says: Thus it appears to me,

that this is how the law appears to me, and not that I received it from my teachers,

and they say: Thus it appears to us,

that it appears to us that the law is otherwise,

he is not executed.

And all the more so

when

he says: From received teaching, and they say: Thus it appears to us,

that

he is not executed.

Until he says,

the rebellious elder:

Thus it appears to me, and they say: From received teaching.

Know

that this is so,

for they did not execute Akavya ben Mahalalel,

who disagreed with the Sages in the Chamber of Hewn Stone concerning several matters; and necessarily, the reason is that he said that he had received this from his teachers.

And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if he says: From received teaching, and they say: Thus it appears to us,

he

is executed, so that disputes should not increase in Israel!

And if you say: For what reason did they not execute Akavya ben Mahalalel?

Because he did not rule a practical halakha,

contrary to the opinion of the Sages.

We learned

in our Mishna a proof against Rav Kahana: And it says:

“Thus I expounded, and thus my colleagues expounded; thus I taught, and thus my colleagues taught.”

What, is it not

asking whether it is speaking

of his saying: From received teaching, and their saying: Thus it appears to us

and nevertheless he becomes a rebellious elder, which is a difficulty against Rav Kahana?

And the Gemara answers:

No!

Rather, it is speaking of

his saying: Thus it appears to me, and their saying: From received teaching.

Come and hear

a difficulty against Rav Kahana:

For Rabbi Josiah said: Zeira told me three matters from the people of Jerusalem:

1.

A husband who withdraws his warning,

who gave his wife permission to seclude herself with that man with whom he had warned her not to seclude herself,

his warning is withdrawn,

and even if she secludes herself with that man, she is not forbidden to him.