Sanhedrin 88a (פח.) — the Talmud in English

It is stated: “

baldness and baldness”

with regard to a person, and it is stated: “

baldness and baldness”

with regard to garments.

And we derive by means of a gezeira shava:

Just as there

is a person,

if the affliction spread over all of him he is pure, so too here

with regard to garments,

if the affliction spread over all of it, it is pure.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtulmos, for with regard to afflictions of garments, even if the affliction spread over the entire garment, it is impure.

And if a person brings such a garment, whose affliction spread over all of it, into the Temple, or if he touches this garment and enters the Temple, according to the Rabbis he is liable for karet, whereas according to Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtulmos he is exempt from karet. “

The words” —

these are valuations, dedicated property, and consecrated property.

Valuations

possibly are subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis —

As it was taught: One who assigns a valuation for a child less than one month old

who said about a child less than one month old, “Its valuation is upon me.” Yet in the passage concerning valuations in the Torah it is stated that only from one month of age and onward does a person have a “valuation,” which the one who assigns the valuation must give according to the amount prescribed there in the passage —

Rabbi Meir says: He gives its monetary value

the one who assigned the valuation must give to the Temple treasury the value of the child, as it would be worth if sold in the marketplace as a slave.

And the Sages say: He has said nothing

and he is not obligated to give anything.

And this dispute has a practical consequence with regard to a prohibition punishable by karet, in a case where the Temple treasurer comes and seizes property from the person who made such a vow. According to Rabbi Meir, the seized property is consecrated and it is impossible to betroth a woman with it; according to the Rabbis, the seized property remains in the possession of its owner, and he can betroth a woman with it. It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman.

There is another practical consequence: according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the seized property is consecrated, if a person derives benefit from it, he is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property; and if an impure person eats from that offering, he is liable for karet. But according to the Rabbis, who hold that the seized property is not consecrated and one may derive benefit from it, that offering is non-sacred property, and there is no liability for karet for the person who ate from it while impure.

Dedicated property

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and the Rabbis —

As we learned

in tractate Arakhin [28b]:

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Unspecified dedicated property

where one said about an item of his property, “This is dedicated property,” without specifying whether it was for Temple maintenance or for the priests — is given

for Temple maintenance, as it is stated Leviticus 27:28: “

All dedicated property

Every dedicated thing is most holy to the Lord.”

And the Sages say: Unspecified dedicated property

is given

to the priest, as it is stated regarding one who consecrated his ancestral field [there, 21]: “

As a field of dedicated property,

his ancestral property shall be the priest’s,” which indicates that unspecified dedicated property is for the priest.

If so,

that unspecified dedicated property is for the priest,

what is the meaning of the verse “

Every dedicated thing

is most holy to the Lord,” which implies that unspecified dedicated property is consecrated property?

To teach

that

dedicated property given to the priests

takes effect upon

offerings that are

most sacred offerings, and upon

offerings that are

lesser sacred offerings.

According to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, then, the item dedicated without specification is consecrated for Temple maintenance, and one who derives benefit from it is obligated to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. According to the Rabbis, who hold that it is given to the priests, it has no sanctity, and one who derives benefit from it is not liable for such a guilt-offering. Thus, the matter concerns a prohibition punishable by karet, as explained above.

Consecrated property

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov and the Rabbis —

As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: Even a small fork

used for spinning gold

belonging to consecrated property requires ten people

appraisers, who assess its value in order

to redeem it

from consecrated property.

And the Rabbis disagree with him, holding that three appraisers alone suffice to redeem movable property from consecrated property.

If an item of consecrated property was redeemed by only three appraisers, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov the item remains consecrated property, whereas according to the Rabbis it has become non-sacred. Thus, the matter concerns a prohibition punishable by karet in a case where people derive benefit from this item and bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property on its account. “

Disputes” —

this refers to the drinking of the sota waters, the decapitation of the heifer, and the purification of the metzora.

The drinking of the sota waters

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua —

As we learned

at the beginning of tractate Sota:

One who warns his wife

one who warns his wife not to seclude herself with a certain man —

Rabbi Eliezer says: He warns her on the basis of two

the warning must take place in the presence of two witnesses. If he did not warn her in the presence of two witnesses, she is not forbidden to him even if she secluded herself with that man, and he also cannot make her drink the bitter waters.

But

he makes her drink on the basis of one witness

to make her drink the bitter waters, one witness who testifies that she secluded herself with that man is sufficient,

or on the basis of his own testimony

if the husband himself comes and says that he saw that she secluded herself with that man after he had warned her; this too is sufficient to prohibit her to him until she drinks the bitter waters.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: He warns her on the basis of two, and makes her drink on the basis of two

the seclusion also requires two witnesses who testify that she secluded herself with that man. If not, he cannot make her drink, and she is not forbidden to him on account of the seclusion.

This woman, about whom there is only one witness that she secluded herself with that man, is, according to Rabbi Eliezer, forbidden to her husband as long as she does not drink the bitter waters to determine whether or not she became impure.

If she does not wish to drink, her husband must divorce her without paying her ketuba.

According to Rabbi Yehoshua, however, she is permitted to her husband, and if he wishes to divorce her, he must give her the ketuba.

When this woman sells her ketuba to another person, and he seizes the husband’s property as payment for the ketuba, according to Rabbi Eliezer the property in his possession is stolen property, and a woman whom he betroths with this property is not betrothed. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, the property belongs to him, and the woman is betrothed.

It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman, whose punishment is karet.

The decapitation of the heifer

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva —

As we learned there, 45b:

45b]:

From where

from which place on the body of the slain person found in the field

would they measure

the distance from him to the surrounding cities, in order to determine which of them was the nearest and therefore obligated to bring a decapitated heifer?

Rabbi Eliezer says: From his navel

of the slain person.

Rabbi Akiva says: From his nose.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says: From the place where he became a slain person

that is,

from his neck

as it is stated [Ezekiel 21:34], “To give you over to the necks of the slain of the wicked.” This indicates that an unspecified slain person is one whose neck was struck. Therefore, they measure from there, as it is stated in the passage concerning the decapitated heifer, “the city nearest the slain person.”

A decapitated heifer is forbidden to derive benefit from, and a woman betrothed with a decapitated heifer is not betrothed.

It follows that the dispute concerns the prohibition of a married woman, in a case where one city was closer to the navel of the slain person and the other was closer to his nose, and both brought a decapitated heifer. Only one of the heifers has the status of a decapitated heifer and is forbidden to derive benefit from; the other is entirely non-sacred property and one may derive benefit from it. If a person betroths a woman with one of the heifers, the woman’s status depends on the dispute concerning the measurement for the decapitated heifer: according to one tanna she is betrothed, and according to the other tanna she is not betrothed.

The purification of the metzora

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis —

As we learned

in tractate Nega’im [14:9]: If

he does not have

the metzora

a right thumb,

or

a right big toe,

or

a right ear

upon which to place some of the blood and oil of his offerings, then

he does not have

this metzora

everlasting purification.

Rabbi Eliezer says: He places it

the blood and oil

in its place

of the right thumb and ear,

and he thereby fulfills

his obligation.

Rabbi Shimon says: He places it on

the left thumb and ear

and fulfills his obligation.

As long as the metzora has not achieved atonement in accordance with the law, he remains in his state of impurity, and he is forbidden to enter the Temple or eat sacrificial food.

It follows that this dispute concerns the prohibition of entering the Temple while impure, which is punishable by karet. “

Within your cities” —

this refers to gleanings, forgotten produce, and the corner of the field.

Gleanings

possibly are subject to a dispute concerning this matter,

as we learned

in tractate Pe’a [6:5]:

Two stalks

that fell during harvesting have the status of

gleanings

and belong to the poor. But if

three

stalks

fell, they are not gleanings

but belong to the landowner.

The Gemara will immediately bring the statement of Beit Shammai, who disagree with this.

Forgotten produce

possibly is subject to a dispute concerning the continuation of the Mishna:

Two sheaves

that were forgotten in the field have the status of

forgotten produce

and belong to the poor.

Three

forgotten sheaves

are not forgotten produce

but belong to the landowner.

And with regard to all of them

with regard to all those cases taught in the Mishna [there, in tractate Pe’a, the Mishna contains additional cases in which, according to the first tanna, two belong to the poor but three do not]

Beit Shammai say:

even

three

belong

to the poor, and

only

four belong to the landowner.

If a poor person collected three stalks of gleanings or three forgotten sheaves, and the landowner came and took them from him, according to the first tanna they are the landowner’s property, and if he betroths a woman with them, she is betrothed. According to Beit Shammai, however, they are stolen property in the landowner’s possession, and the woman is not betrothed.

according to the first tanna, this property belongs to the landowner, and if he betroths a woman with it, she is betrothed. According to Beit Shammai, however, it is stolen property in the landowner’s possession, and the woman is not betrothed.

The corner of the field

possibly is subject to a dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and the Rabbis —

As it was taught: The mitzva of the corner of the field is to separate it from standing grain

while the stalks are still standing in the field and have not been harvested, as it is stated, “You shall not finish off the corner of your field when harvesting,” which indicates that the remainder is for the poor, who harvest the corner.

If he did not separate it from the standing grain, he shall separate

the corner

from the sheaves

from bundles of harvested stalks.

If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he shall separate it from the heap

from the pile of grain,

before he smooths it

as long as he has not leveled the heap, which is the completion of its processing with regard to the obligation of tithing. Until then, he can give the poor person the corner without first tithing it.

But if he has already

smoothed it,

the obligation to separate tithes takes effect upon the heap. Therefore

he tithes

he must first separate all the tithes from the heap,

and

only afterward

he gives it

to the poor person as the corner, so that the poor person does not suffer because he delayed giving him the corner until it became subject to tithing. Had he given it to him before smoothing, the poor person would not have had to tithe the corner, since the corner of the field is exempt from tithing; now that it has already become subject to tithing while in the landowner’s possession, the poor person must also tithe it. If he did not separate it from the heap, but instead ground the grain and made the flour into dough, he is exempt from separating the corner from it, because he acquired it through a change in its form.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said: Even

if he did not separate the corner until he made the grain into dough,

he separates

the corner

from the dough,

because a change in form does not effect acquisition, and the grain still belongs to the poor even after it changed and became dough.

If the poor person came and took the corner himself from the dough, according to the first tanna it is stolen property in his possession, and if he betroths a woman with it, she is not betrothed; according to Rabbi Yishmael, she is betrothed.

We learned in the Mishna:

There were three courts of law

there.

Rav Kahana said: He says

if the rebellious elder says that what he teaches as halakha is

from what he heard

that this is what he received from his teachers,

and they say: From what we heard

the High Court says that it received the opposite from its teachers,

he is not executed.

Likewise, when

he says: This is how it appears to me

that this is how the law appears to me, and not that I received it from my teachers,

and they say: This is how it appears to us

that it appears to us that the law is otherwise,

he is not executed.

And all the more so

when

he says: From what I heard, and they say: This is how it appears to us,

that

he is not executed.

Until he says

the rebellious elder:

This is how it appears to me, and they say: From what we heard.

Know

that this is so,

for they did not execute Akavya ben Mahalalel

who disagreed with the Sages in the Chamber of Hewn Stone on several matters; necessarily, the reason was that he said that he had received this from his teachers.

And Rabbi Elazar says: Even if he says: From what I heard, and they say: This is how it appears to us,

he

is executed, so that disputes will not proliferate among Israel!

And if you say: Why did they not execute Akavya ben Mahalalel?

Because he did not issue a practical ruling

contrary to the opinion of the Sages.

We learned

in our Mishna a proof against Rav Kahana: And it says:

“This is what I expounded, and this is what my colleagues expounded; this is what I taught, and this is what my colleagues taught.”

What, is it not

speaking

of a case where he said: From what I heard, and they said: This is how it appears to us and nevertheless he becomes a rebellious elder, which is a difficulty for Rav Kahana?

and nevertheless he becomes a rebellious elder? This is a difficulty against Rav Kahana.

And the Gemara answers:

No!

Rather, it is speaking of a case where

he says: This is how it appears to me, and they say: From what we heard.

Come and hear

a difficulty against Rav Kahana:

For Rabbi Yoshiyya said: Ze’ira told me three matters in the name of the people of Jerusalem:

1.

A husband who withdraws his warning

who gave his wife permission to seclude herself with the man whom he had warned her not to be alone with

has withdrawn his warning,

and even if she secludes herself with that man, she is not forbidden to him.