Sanhedrin 88b (פח:) — the Talmud in English

b.

If the defiant and wayward son’s father and mother wish to forgive him

even after he has sinned for the second time, they wish to forgive him and not bring him before the court,

they may forgive him

and he is not stoned, because Scripture made the matter dependent on their will, as it is stated: “And his father and his mother shall seize him.”

c.

If the court of the rebellious elder wishes

to forgive him

for having rebelled against their word,

they may forgive him

and they do not put him to death.

When I came to my colleagues in the South,

regarding the first two,

cases,

they agreed with me;

whereas

regarding the rebellious elder, they did not agree with me

that the court can forgive him

in order that disputes not increase among Israel.

Thus, the entire reason for the law of the rebellious elder is that disputes not increase among Israel. If so, even when he says that he is acting on the basis of a tradition he heard, while they say, “This is our view,” it is logical that he should be put to death.

And this is difficult for Rav Kahana?

And the Gemara concludes:

Tiyuvta!

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei said: At first,

in the earlier generations,

they did not have many disputes among Israel, for there was only a court of seventy-one

judges

sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, and two courts of twenty-three

judges,

one

of them

sitting at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one

of them

sitting at the entrance to the Temple courtyard; and the other courts of twenty-three

judges

were sitting in every town of

Israel.

When a question arose concerning a particular law and

it became necessary to ask, they would ask the court in their town.

If

that court

had heard

and received from its teachers how the law was to be decided in this halakhic matter,

they would tell them.

And if not,

if they had heard nothing concerning this halakha,

they would come to

the

court adjacent to their town.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, they would come to

the

court at the entrance to the Temple Mount.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, they would come to

the

court at the entrance to the Temple courtyard.

And he would say: This is what I expounded, and this is what my colleagues expounded; this is what I learned, and this is what my colleagues learned

that is, the questioner would state the alternatives of the doubt.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, both these and those

would come to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where the judges would sit

the judges

from

the time of

the morning daily offering until

the time of

the afternoon daily offering.

And on Shabbatot and Festivals,

they

would sit in the rampart

a place on the Temple Mount outside the Temple courtyard.

A question was

asked

before them.

If they had heard, they would tell them

immediately;

and if not, they would stand

the judges

for a vote—

If

those declaring it impure were the majority,

they declared it impure.

And if

those declaring it pure were the majority,

they declared it pure.

Once the disciples of Shammai and Hillel who had not served their teachers sufficiently became numerous, disputes increased among Israel, and the

Torah became

like two Torahs.

And the beraita continues concerning the Great Sanhedrin in the Chamber of Hewn Stone:

From there they would write and send throughout all the localities: Whoever is wise, humble, and well regarded by people, let him be a judge in his town!

From there,

from the court in his town,

they would promote him to

be a judge in the court on

the Temple Mount

when one of the judges there died.

From there,

they would promote him

to

the court in the

Temple courtyard.

From there,

they would promote him

to

the Great Court in the

Chamber of

Hewn Stone.

They sent word from there,

from the Land of Israel:

Who is destined for the World to Come?

One who is humble, lowly, who enters quietly and leaves quietly,

enters the beit-midrash and leaves bent over, out of humility,

and is constantly engaged in Torah,

always applying himself to Torah,

and does not take credit for himself

he does not regard himself as deserving credit for this [that is, he does not become arrogant].

The Sages cast their eyes

upon

Rav Ulla bar Abba,

who possessed these virtues.

We learned in the Mishna:

He returned to his town and taught.

The Sages taught:

A rebellious elder

is not liable

to die

until he acts in accordance with his ruling, or instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling.

And the Gemara analyzes this:

Granted, “

he instructs others and they act in accordance with his ruling,”

is understandable, for

initially,

before the elder came to ask the Great Court,

he was not liable to execution

he was not liable to die for having instructed others to act, even if he instructed them to transgress an offense for which one is liable to execution,

but

if

now,

after he has instructed them to act accordingly despite the ruling of the Great Court,

he is liable to execution

for this act.

But “

until he acts in accordance with his ruling”

is difficult, for

initially, too, he was liable to execution

even before he came to ask the Great Court, if he acted contrary to its view, he was liable to die for the very offense that he committed, an offense for which the court imposes execution?

This works out when he instructed

against the Great Court

regarding

the prohibition of

forbidden fat and blood, for initially he was not liable to execution,

since these offenses do not carry a death penalty,

but

only

now,

because he rebelled against the word of the court,

is he liable to execution.

But when he instructed regarding offenses punishable by execution imposed by the court,

then

initially, too, he was liable to execution?

The Gemara answers:

Initially, a warning is required,

before he came to ask the Great Court, he was liable to execution only if they warned him at the time he committed the offense; whereas

now,

after he asked and committed the offense,

a warning is not required,

but he is executed even without a warning.

The Gemara asks: What can be said in a case where the rebellious elder was

an inciter

to worship idolatry, since he merely ruled that it was permitted, and this wording is not considered incitement,

for he does not require a warning,

as an inciter is liable to execution even without a warning?

What is there to say?

For in his case there is no difference: even before he asked the court, he was liable to execution for incitement without a warning. What, then, is newly established by his rebellion against the court and his continuing to incite?

The Gemara answers:

Initially,

before he became a rebellious elder,

if he stated a reason,

if, before the court that judged him for incitement, he presented an argument in his defense,

we would accept it from him; whereas

now,

once he has become a rebellious elder, even

if he states a reason, we do not accept it from him,

since he heard from the Great Court that he must not act in this way, and nevertheless rebelled against its word.

Mishna:

The words of the Sages are more stringent

than

the words of Torah

With regard to the rebellious elder, the words of the Sages—that is, what the Sages interpreted concerning the mitzva—are more stringent than the mitzva itself as explicitly stated in the Torah. If the elder ruled concerning the words of the Sages, he is liable to die, whereas if he ruled concerning the words of Torah, he is exempt from death.

How so?

A rebellious elder

who says: There are no phylacteries,

meaning that he ruled that phylacteries should not be worn at all,

in order to transgress the words of Torah,

that is, he seeks to uproot a matter explicitly stated in the Torah,

is exempt

from death, because this is not considered a ruling, for “go and read it in the schoolhouse” [everyone knows that this is not correct].

But if he ruled that the head phylacteries should have

five compartments,

five compartments, even though he seeks only

to add to the words of the Sages

who expounded from the verses that the head phylacteries must have only four compartments,

he is liable

to die.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said:

A rebellious elder

is liable only for a matter whose basis is in the words of Torah

whose essential requirement is explicit in the Torah

but whose interpretation is in the words of the Sages,

as the Sages interpreted the details of the mitzva.

And it is possible to add to it,

there is a possibility in this mitzva of adding to what the Sages interpreted.

And if one adds, he diminishes,

the addition invalidates the entire mitzva.

If the elder came and instructed people to add to what the Sages interpreted, he is judged as a rebellious elder.

And we have only phylacteries,

only in the case of phylacteries are all these conditions fulfilled: their basis is in the words of Torah; the Sages interpreted that four compartments are required; it is possible to add a fifth compartment or more; and if one adds compartments, the entire phylacteries are thereby invalidated, as will be explained below.

And all this is stated

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds this way in the beraita above [87a], that a rebellious elder is liable only for a matter whose basis is in the words of Torah and whose interpretation is in the words of the Sages.

The Gemara analyzes this:

But there is the lulav,

for all these conditions also apply to the lulav:

its basis is in the words of Torah,

as the four species are stated explicitly in the Torah;

and its interpretation is in the words of the Sages,

as the Sages interpreted which species they are,

and it is possible to add to it,

as one can add a fifth species,

and if one adds, he diminishes,

as the lulav is invalidated because of the added species?

The Gemara answers:

With regard to the lulav,

it is impossible for all these conditions to be fulfilled, for

what is our position

concerning the question of whether the lulav requires binding?

If we hold that the lulav does not require binding,

there is no need to bind the lulav together with the other two species. If so, the lulav is not invalidated because of the additional species, even if he bound it with them, since the binding is not required by law, and therefore

this one stands independently and that one stands independently,

each species stands on its own, and one does not invalidate the other?

And if we hold that

the lulav

requires binding,

as Torah law requires the lulav to be bound together with the other species, and therefore adding a species invalidates the entire lulav, then

it is already diminished,

as the lulav was disqualified from the outset when he bound the additional species with them, whereas with regard to a rebellious elder, it must specifically be a case in which there is “diminishing”: initially it was valid, and through the addition he invalidates it.

The Gemara considers again:

But what of tzitzit—

to which all the conditions of a rebellious elder apply:

its essential requirement is from the Torah, while its interpretation is rabbinic—

as the Sages interpreted the number of threads required in each corner of the garment;

and it is possible to add to it—

one may add to the prescribed number of threads;

but if he adds, he detracts—

for by doing so he invalidates the entire tzitzit.

And why did Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Oshaya said that the category of rebellious elder applies only to tefillin?

The Gemara answers:

What is our view regarding tzitzit?

If we hold that the upper knot—

the first knot made when the threads are inserted through the hole—

is not mandated by Torah law,

then adding threads does not invalidate the tzitzit, because

this one stands independently and that one stands independently:

since the knot is not required by law, each thread is considered to stand on its own, and only what is fit for the mitzva constitutes the mitzva, while the excess is considered as though it were not there.