Sanhedrin 88b — the Talmud in English

b.

If a wayward and rebellious son whose father and mother wished to pardon him

even after he had corrupted himself a second time, and they wished to pardon him and not bring him before the court,

they pardon him

and he is not stoned, because Scripture made the matter dependent upon their will, as it is stated: “And his father and his mother shall seize him”.

c.

If the court of a rebellious elder wished

to pardon him

for having rebelled against their words,

they pardon him

and they do not kill him.

And when I came to my colleagues in the South

concerning the first two

cases,

they agreed with me,

whereas

concerning a rebellious elder they did not agree with me

that the court could pardon him

so that disputes would not increase in Israel.

It follows that the entire reason for [the law of] a rebellious elder is so that disputes would not increase in Israel. If so, also when he says [that he is ruling] from tradition and they say, “This is how it appears to us,” it is fitting that he should be killed.

And this is difficult for Rav Kahana?

And the Gemara concludes:

tiyuvta!

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei said: At first

in the earlier generations,

they did not increase disputes in Israel; rather, a court of seventy-one

judges

sat in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, and two courts of twenty-three

judges,

one

of them

sat at the entrance of the Temple Mount, and one

of them

sat at the entrance of the courtyard, and the other courts of twenty-three

judges

sat in all the towns

of Israel.

And when a doubt arose concerning a law and

the matter required inquiry, they would ask the court in their town.

If

that court

had heard

and received from its teachers how the law was in this halakha,

they would tell them.

And if not,

that they had heard nothing concerning this halakha,

they would come to

the

court that was near their town.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, they would come to

the

court that was at the entrance of the Temple Mount.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, they would come to

the

court that was at the entrance of the courtyard.

And he would say: Thus did I expound, and thus did my colleagues expound; thus did I learn, and thus did my colleagues learn [that is, the one asking states the sides of the doubt].

that is, the questioner would state the alternatives of the doubt.

If they had heard, they would tell them; and if not, both these and those

would come to the Chamber of Hewn Stone, where they would sit

the judges

from

the time of

the daily offering of dawn until

the time of

the daily offering between the evenings.

And on Shabbatot and Festivals

they

would sit in the rampart [

a place on the Temple Mount outside the courtyard].

A question was asked

the

question before them.

If they had heard, they would tell them

immediately,

and if not, they would stand

the judges

for a count—

if

those declaring impure were the majority—

they declared impure.

And if

those declaring pure were the majority—

they declared pure.

When the students of Shammai and Hillel, who had not served [their teachers] sufficiently, increased, disputes increased in Israel, and the

Torah became like two Torahs.

And the beraita continues concerning the Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone:

From there they would write and send to all places:

“Whoever is wise, humble, and of lowly bearing, and with whom people are pleased, let him be a judge in his city!”

From there,

from the court in his city,

they would raise him to

be a judge in the court of

the Temple Mount

when one of the judges there died.

From there,

they would raise him

to

the court of the

courtyard.

From there,

they would raise him

to

the Great Court in the

Chamber of

Hewn Stone.

They sent from there

from the Land of Israel:

“Who is the one who is a son of the World to Come?”

Humble, and of lowly bearing, entering quietly and leaving quietly

he enters the beit-midrash and leaves bent over, out of humility,

and constantly studies Torah

he applies himself constantly to the Torah,

and does not hold a favor for himself

he does not credit himself with merit [he does not become arrogant] on account of this.

The Sages cast their eyes upon

the scholars

upon Rav Ulla bar Abba

as one who possessed these virtues.

We learned in the Mishna:

He returned to his city and taught.

Our Sages taught:

A rebellious elder

is not liable

for death

until he acts according to his ruling, or instructs others and they act according to his ruling.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Granted, “

he instructs others and they act according to his ruling,”

that is satisfactory, for

at first

before the elder came to inquire before the Great Court,

he was not one liable to execution

he was not liable to death for having instructed others to act, even if he instructed them to transgress an offense for which one is liable to death,

but

if

now

he instructs them to act thus despite the ruling of the Great Court,

he is one liable to execution

he becomes liable to death for this.

But, “

until he acts according to his ruling,”

is difficult, for

at first also he was one liable to execution

even without his coming to inquire before the Great Court and acting contrary to their opinion, he is liable to death for the very offense that he committed, for which one is liable to death by the court?

This works out where he ruled

when he ruled against the Great Court

concerning

the prohibition of

forbidden fat and blood, for at first he was not one liable to execution

since these offenses do not entail liability for death,

but

only

now,

because he rebelled against the word of the court,

he is one liable to execution.

But where he ruled concerning offenses punishable by death by the court,

then

at first also he was one liable to execution?

And the Gemara answers:

At first, a warning was required

before he came to inquire before the Great Court, he was liable to death only if they warned him when he committed the offense, whereas

now,

after he inquired and committed the offense,

a warning is not required

but he is killed even without a warning.

And the Gemara asks: What can be said in a case where the rebellious elder was

an inciter

to worship idolatry, because he taught that it was permitted, for this wording is not considered incitement,

for he does not require a warning

since an inciter is liable to death even without a warning;

what is there to say

for, concerning him, there is no difference, since even before he inquired of the court he was liable to death for the incitement without a warning, and what has become new through his rebelling against the word of the court and continuing to incite?

And the Gemara answers:

At first,

before he was a rebellious elder,

if he stated a reason,

if, before the court that judged him for the incitement, he stated a reason in his defense,

we would accept it from him

we would accept the reason, whereas

now,

once he has become a rebellious elder, even

if he stated a reason, we would not accept it from him

since he heard from the Great Court not to do so, and nevertheless rebelled against their word.

Mishna:

The words of the Sages are more stringent

more

than the words of the Torah

Concerning a rebellious elder, the words of the Sages are more stringent—that is, what the Sages interpreted concerning the mitzva—than the mitzva itself as explicitly stated in the Torah. For if the elder ruled concerning the words of the Sages, he is liable to death, whereas when he ruled concerning the words of the Torah, he is exempt from death.

How so?

A rebellious elder

who says: There are no phylacteries,

who ruled that one should not put on phylacteries at all,

in order to transgress the words of the Torah

that is, he came to uproot a matter explicitly stated in the Torah,

is exempt

from death, because this is not a ruling, for “go and read it in the schoolhouse” [everyone knows that this is not correct].

But if he ruled that one should make, in the head phylacteries,

five compartments,

five compartments, even though he comes only

to add to the words of the Sages

who expounded from the verses that only four compartments are required in the head phylacteries,

he is liable

to death.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

A rebellious elder

is liable only for a matter whose essence is from the words of the Torah

whose essence is explicit in the Torah

and whose interpretation is from the words of the Sages

for the Sages interpreted the details of the mitzva.

And in which there is room to add

there is, in this mitzva, a possibility of adding to what the Sages interpreted.

And if he added, he detracts

and this addition invalidates the entire mitzva.

And if the elder came and ruled to add to what the Sages interpreted, he is judged as a rebellious elder.

And we have only phylacteries

only in phylacteries are all these conditions fulfilled: their essence is from the words of the Torah, the Sages interpreted that four compartments are required, it is possible to add to five compartments or more, and if one added compartments, he thereby invalidated the entire phylacteries, as will be explained below.

And all this is stated

according to Rabbi Judah

who holds this in the beraita above [87a], that a rebellious elder is liable only for a matter whose essence is from the words of the Torah and whose interpretation is from the words of the Sages.

And the Gemara discusses this:

But there is the lulav,

for in the lulav too all these conditions exist:

its essence is from the words of the Torah,

the four species are stated explicitly in the Torah,

and its interpretation is from the words of the Sages,

for the Sages interpreted what those species are,

and in it there is room to add

a fifth species can be added,

and if he added, he detracts

for the lulav is invalidated because of adding the species?

And the Gemara answers:

In the lulav,

it is impossible for all these conditions to be fulfilled, for

what do we hold

how do we hold concerning the question whether the lulav requires binding or not?

If we hold that the lulav does not require binding,

that it is not necessary to bind the lulav together with the other two species, then the lulav is not invalidated because of the additional species, even if he bound it with them, since, because the binding is not required by law,

this one stands separately and that one stands separately

each of the species stands on its own, and one does not invalidate the other?

And if we hold that the

lulav

requires binding,

that by Torah law the lulav must be bound together with the other species, and therefore the addition of the species invalidates the entire lulav, then

it is defective from the outset

for from the beginning the lulav was invalid when he bound the additional species with them, whereas concerning a rebellious elder it is specifically required that it be “detracting”: at first it was valid, and through the addition he invalidates it.

And the Gemara revisits the matter:

But there are tzitzit

to which all the conditions of a rebellious elder apply:

its principal [law] is from the words of Torah, and its interpretation is from the words of the Scribes,

who interpreted the number of threads required on each corner of the garment;

and there is [a possibility] to add

it is possible to add to the number of threads;

and if he adds, he detracts,

for thereby he invalidates all the tzitzit.

And why did Rabbi Elazar say that Rabbi Oshaya said that a rebellious elder applies only to tefillin?

And the Gemara answers:

Regarding tzitzit, what do we hold?

If we hold that the upper knot,

the first knot made when the threads are inserted through the hole,

is not mandated by Torah,

but according to Torah the tzitzit are not required to be attached to the garment, then adding threads does not invalidate the tzitzit, because

this one stands by itself and that one stands by itself,

for since the knot is not [required] by law, it follows that each thread stands on its own; only that which is fit for the mitzva is the mitzva, and the extra is as though it does not exist.