Sanhedrin 87b — the Talmud in English

Judgment" —

this is the law ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location, namely")

the law concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped,

which is learned by means of a gzera shava.

For it is not stated explicitly in the Torah that it is forbidden for a man to have intercourse with his daughter who was born to him from a woman whom he raped, but only if she is his daughter from his wife who is married to him, as it is stated [Leviticus 18:17]: "You shall not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter," for the Torah prohibited his wife's daughter [even if she was born from another husband], and included in this is also his daughter from his wife.

But in this verse it says "a woman," implying the language of marriage, that she is married to him through kiddushin, whereas his daughter from a woman whom he raped is not included in this.

Rather, there is another verse [there, verse 10]: "The nakedness of your son's daughter or your daughter's daughter you shall not uncover," and here it is not stated that she is his son's daughter or his daughter's daughter from his wife; this implies that even his son's daughter and his daughter's daughter from a woman whom he raped are forbidden.

However, in this verse no prohibition concerning a daughter from a woman whom he raped is stated, and we learn this by means of a gzera shava — "

For Rava said: Rav Yitzḥak bar Avudimi said to me: It is derived" — "

these" — "

these,"

for in the verse "the nakedness of a woman and her daughter" the word "these" is stated, and in the verse "the nakedness of your son's daughter" the word "these" is also stated. And we learn a gzera shava from one to the other: just as concerning his wife's daughter the verse prohibited her daughter as it did her daughter's daughter, so too concerning his daughter from a woman whom he raped, she is forbidden just like his daughter's daughter.

And likewise

it is derived "

lewdness" —

"lewdness,"

we learn by means of a gzera shava that one who has intercourse with his daughter is punished by burning, for in the verse "the nakedness of a woman and her daughter" the word "lewdness" is stated, and concerning the punishment of burning it is also stated [there, 20:14]: "It is lewdness; they shall burn them with fire." Just as there it is by burning, so too here it is by burning.

And as for his daughter from a woman whom he raped, we have already learned her from his daughter from his wife by means of a gzera shava, and if so, she too is punished by burning.

And if the rebellious elder disputes this gzera shava and permits his daughter from a woman whom he raped, he is permitting a matter whose punishment is karet. "

Between blood and blood" —

between menstrual blood, blood of childbirth, and blood of ziva.

Menstrual blood

they might dispute

in the dispute

of

Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Sages —

As we learned in tractate Niddah [19a]: A woman who saw

in tractate Nidda 19a: If a woman saw

green blood, Akavya ben Mahalalel declares her impure,

because it is menstrual blood.

And the Sages declare her pure,

because it is not menstrual blood.

And if the rebellious elder rules like Akavya ben Mahalalel, contrary to the court that ruled like the Sages, a karet obstacle might result from this. This is the case where the woman begins to see green blood for two days, and afterward continues seeing red blood; she begins counting seven days from the beginning of the green blood and immerses at the end of the seventh day, whereas according to the Sages she must begin counting only from the red blood, for the green blood is pure. If so, she must delay the immersion by two days, and if she does not, her immersion is ineffective and she remains a menstruating woman.

Blood of childbirth

they might dispute

in the dispute of Rav and Levi.

Every woman who gives birth is impure like a menstruating woman for seven days when she gives birth to a male, and if she gives birth to a female, she is impure for two weeks.

Afterward, the "days of purity" begin, during which the blood that she sees is pure. The days of purity continue until forty days when she gives birth to a male, and when she gives birth to a female, until eighty days.

Afterward, the blood that she sees is impure as usual.

It was stated: Rav said:

The blood issuing during the first days after childbirth, and the blood issuing during the days of purity that follow them,

come from one spring,

they come from the same spring —

The Torah rendered it impure

during the first days after childbirth,

and the Torah rendered it pure

afterward, during the days of purity, and again rendered it impure after the days of purity ended.

And Levi said: They are two springs —

The

spring

of impurity

was closed at the conclusion of the days of impurity, and then

the

spring

of purity

of the days of purity was opened.

And likewise afterward, they are two springs, when

the

spring

of purity

was closed at the conclusion of the days of purity and

the

spring

of impurity

of ordinary menstrual blood was opened.

And the Gemara in tractate Niddah [35b] explains the practical difference for halakha between Rav and Levi —

If she was issuing blood without interruption from the first days of impurity into the days of purity: according to Rav, the blood of the days of purity is pure, despite the fact that it comes as a continuation of the blood of the days of impurity, for it always comes from the same spring as the impure blood, and nevertheless the Torah rendered it pure. But according to Levi, the blood of the days of purity is also impure, since it is still from the same spring as the impure blood, unless the impure blood stopped for some time, that spring was closed, and the spring of purity was opened.

And likewise, if she issued blood from the days of purity into the subsequent days of impurity: according to Rav, the blood of the days of impurity is impure. And according to Levi, it is pure until the spring of purity is closed and the spring of impurity is opened.

And if the rebellious elder and the court dispute this dispute, the rebellious elder causes an obstacle involving karet. If he rules like Rav, he declares pure the blood at the beginning of the days of purity, when it comes as one continuous flow following the preceding days of impurity, contrary to the opinion of the court, which rules like Levi that the blood is impure. And if he rules like Levi, he declares pure the blood at the end of the days of purity, contrary to the opinion of the court, which declares it impure.

Blood of ziva

they might dispute

in the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua.

Blood that a woman sees before childbirth, when she is having difficulty giving birth and feels the pains of childbirth, and certainly blood during childbirth and afterward, does not render her impure as blood of ziva. That is, if this occurred during one of the eleven days of the days of ziva, the woman who gives birth does not become a zava. Even if she sees blood for three consecutive days, she does not need to count seven clean days after the days of childbirth; rather, she may immerse immediately after the end of her days of impurity as a woman who has given birth.

The Gemara learns this from the verse stated concerning a zava [Leviticus 15:25]: "And if a woman has a flow of her blood for many days," implying that only when it is "her blood" on account of the woman herself, and not on account of the fetus.

All this applies only if the pains continued until close to her childbirth. But if the pains stopped for a period of time and only afterward she gave birth, it is demonstrated that this blood before childbirth was not on account of the fetus, and therefore it renders her impure like ordinary blood of ziva.

And the tannaim disputed the measure of that period of time that separates blood of labor pains from childbirth —

As we learned [there, 36b]:

there, Nidda 36b]: If she

If she had difficulty giving birth

for

three days

consecutively, and on account of the difficulty she saw blood during those days, and this was

within the eleven days

of the days of ziva,

if she was relieved

she became quiet from the pains of childbirth

for a full day, and gave birth

after that full day during which she was relieved—whether the birth was difficult or whether it was easy—

she is a woman who gives birth while a zava,

for it was demonstrated that the blood before childbirth was ordinary blood of ziva, and therefore she is a zava and is not purified until she counts seven clean days,

the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says:

It is not sufficient that she be relieved for an ordinary full day; rather, the relief must specifically continue

a night and a day,

from the beginning of the night until the end of the following day,

like

the full day of

Friday night and its day.

But if the full day was from noon of this day until noon of the following day, this is not considered relief, since there was not a complete day of relief, for there was some difficulty on the first day of relief.

And this relief that we stated means

that she was relieved from the pain,

for it is sufficient that the pains stop in order to make her a zava,

and not

that she must also be relieved

from the blood;

rather, even if she continues to see blood until childbirth, the relief from the pain is considered proof that there is no connection between the earlier seeing of blood and the childbirth, and this blood is blood of ziva.

And when the rebellious elder disputes the court and rules leniently like Rabbi Yehoshua—that a woman who gives birth who was relieved for an ordinary full day is still considered to have blood of labor pains and is not a zava—it follows that he permits a prohibition involving karet. "

Between judgment and judgment" —

between civil judgments, capital judgments, and judgments of lashes.

Civil judgments

they might dispute

in the dispute of Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu —

For Shmuel said: Two

judges

who judged

civil cases,

their judgment is a judgment,

because by Torah law three judges are not required for civil cases,

but they are called "

an insolent court,"

because they violated the enactment of the Sages, who required three judges for civil cases.

And Rabbi Abbahu said:

Two who judged,

according to everyone,

even according to the view of the tannaim who hold that in order to make a compromise one judge is sufficient,

their judgment is not a judgment.

And if the rebellious elder rules according to Rabbi Abbahu, contrary to the opinion of the Great Court, which rules like Shmuel, a karet obstacle could result from this. For example, two judges rule that Reuven owes money to Shimon, take the money from Reuven, and give it to Shimon, and Shimon goes and betroths a woman with that money. According to Shmuel, the woman is betrothed; according to Rabbi Abbahu, she is not betrothed, because the money that the two judges took from Reuven was taken unlawfully and is stolen property in Shimon's possession, and we hold that if he betrothed her with stolen property, she is not betrothed.

It follows that the rebellious elder permitted a married woman, which involves karet.

And likewise in the reverse case: if the court rules like Rabbi Abbahu and the rebellious elder rules like Shmuel, and after Shimon betroths the woman with that money another man comes and gives her kiddushin as well, and the rebellious elder rules that the first kiddushin took effect, and consequently the second kiddushin is void, whereas according to Rabbi Abbahu, on the contrary, the second kiddushin took effect. It follows that the rebellious elder permits that woman to marry outside, even without receiving a bill of divorce from the second man.

Capital judgments

they might dispute

in the dispute of Rabbi

and the Sages —

As it was taught: Rabbi says:

It is stated in the Torah [Exodus 21:22]: "And when men fight and they strike a pregnant woman and her children emerge, but there is no calamity, he shall surely be punished, as the woman's husband shall impose upon him, and he shall give it through the judges [that is, the one who struck pays the husband the value of the fetuses]; but if there is a calamity [that the woman died,"

then you shall give life for life."

And Rabbi holds that the Torah's intention is that if there is a calamity, he shall pay

money

for killing the woman: they assess the woman's value, and the one who struck pays it to her heirs.

You say that "life" means

that “life” means

money, or perhaps it is actual life,

meaning that the one who struck is liable to death for killing the woman?

Behold,

it says "

giving"

above,

concerning the value of the fetuses: "and he shall give it through the judges,"

and it says "

giving"

below: "then you shall give life for life."

And we learn by means of a gzera shava:

Just as there,

just as there it is money, so here it is money.

And the Torah did not make the one who struck liable to death, because he did not intend to kill the woman, but rather his fellow with whom he was fighting; and the law is that one who intends to kill one person but kills another is exempt from death.

And the Sages dispute Rabbi and interpret "life for life" as actual life, meaning that the one who struck is liable to death, because one who intends to kill one person but kills another is liable to death.

And this dispute concerns a prohibition involving karet, in a case where the woman's heirs seized money from the one who struck as payment for killing the woman. According to Rabbi, the seizure was lawful and the money belongs to the heirs; if one of them betroths a woman with it, she is betrothed to him, and if another man comes and betroths her again, she does not need a bill of divorce from him. But according to the Sages, the money does not belong to the heirs, their kiddushin did not take effect, and she requires a bill of divorce from the second man.

It follows that the rebellious elder who ruled like Rabbi, contrary to the Great Court, which ruled like the Sages, permitted a married woman to everyone.

Judgments of lashes —

they might dispute

in the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and the Sages —

As we learned

at the beginning of the tractate:

Lashes with three,

meaning that a court of three judges judges a person and makes him liable to lashes for violating a prohibition.

In the name of Rabbi Yishmael they said:

They judge him

before

a court of

twenty-three.

And this dispute too concerns a prohibition involving karet. According to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, a court of three cannot make a person liable to lashes; and if they did so and made him liable, then the one who administered lashes to the defendant on their authority is like a person who simply injured his fellow, who is liable to pay him money. And if the injured party betroths a woman with that money, she is betrothed. But according to the Sages, there is no monetary liability here, since the lashes were administered lawfully; and if the person who was lashed seizes money from the person who administered the lashes to him, it is stolen property in his possession, and the woman whom he betroths with that money is not betrothed. "

Between affliction and affliction" —

between afflictions of people, afflictions of houses, and afflictions of garments.

Afflictions of people

they might dispute

in the dispute of Rabbi Yehoshua and the Sages —

As we learned

in tractate Negaim [4:11]:

If the bright spot preceded the white hair, he is impure,

for the law is that although the appearance of white hair within the affliction is a sign of impurity, this is so only if the bright spot preceded the white hair; but

if

the

white hair preceded the bright spot,

he is

pure.

And so it is explicit in the Torah [Leviticus 13:24]: "And behold, it has turned white in the bright spot," implying that the bright spot preceded the white hair.

And if there was

doubt,

as they do not know whether the bright spot preceded or the white hair, he is

impure.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: It is dimmed.

And the Gemara explains his words:

What does "dimmed" mean?

Rava said: It is dimmed,

meaning that it is as though the white appearance of the affliction had become dimmed, which is a sign of purity, and this person too is

pure.

And this dispute concerns a prohibition involving karet if this man enters the Temple. According to the Sages, he is liable to karet, as is an impure person who enters the Temple, whereas according to Rabbi Yehoshua, he is exempt from karet.

House afflictions

It is possible that they disagree

in the dispute between Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis—

For it was taught [

there 12:3]:

Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon says: The house is never impure

through house afflictions

until it is seen

the affliction in the measure of

like two gris on two stones

for the measure of an affliction is like one gris by one gris, but concerning house afflictions it is written [Leviticus 14:40], “And they shall remove the stones in which the affliction is,” indicating that the affliction must be on two stones, one measure of an affliction on each stone; therefore there must be two gris on two stones.

And those two stones shall be

on two walls

adjacent to one another

at a corner

one stone on this wall and the second on that wall.

Its length

of the affliction

is like two gris, and its width is one gris

and it extends along its length over the two stones; it follows that on each stone there is one gris by one gris.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon

that the stones must be specifically at a corner? Because

it is written “

wall”

in the singular [there 14:37], “And their appearance is lower than the wall.”

And it is written “

walls”

in the plural [there], “And behold, the affliction is in the walls of the house.”

Which wall is like walls?

You must say: This is a corner!

for the two walls join there into one wall.

And the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon: it is not necessary that the two stones be specifically at a corner; rather, even in the middle of the wall.

And if a person enters such a house, where the affliction extends over two stones in the middle of the wall, then according to the Rabbis he is impure, and when he enters the Temple he becomes liable for karet. But according to Rabbi Elazar bar Rabbi Shimon, he is exempt from karet.

House afflictions

may possibly be subject to dispute

in the dispute between Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolmos and the Rabbis—

For it was taught: Rabbi Yonatan ben Avtolmos says: From where ![](pamud.bmp "

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for spreading in garments

when the affliction spreads and extends over the entire garment

that it is pure?

For we find this law only concerning afflictions of a person, as it is stated [there 13:12], “And if the affliction surely spreads over the skin... he is pure.”