Sanhedrin 86a — the Talmud in English

A tannay would recite before Rav Sheshet

the scholar who was accustomed to repeat the baraitot before Rav Sheshet recited before Rav Sheshet the baraita above, that if he sold him to his father or to one of his relatives, he is liable.

He said to him

Rav Sheshet:

I recite: Rabbi Shimon says:

from that which is stated, “One who steals a person

from his brother”

it is implied that he is not liable

until he removes him from his brother’s authority

and not if he sells him to his father or to one of his relatives;

and you said

that he is

liable!?

And therefore

recite

in the baraita that he is indeed

exempt

when he sells him to his father or to one of his relatives.

And the Gemara asks:

What difficulty is there

from Rabbi Shimon against the baraita?

Perhaps this is Rabbi Shimon

and

this is the Rabbis,

for the Rabbis in the baraita disagree with Rabbi Shimon and render him liable even when he sells him to his father?

And the Gemara answers:

It does not enter your mind

that this baraita does not follow Rabbi Shimon, for

as Rabbi Yohanan said: An unattributed Mishna

every unattributed Mishna

is Rabbi Meir.

An unattributed Tosefta

is Rabbi Nehemiah.

An unattributed Sifra

Torat Kohanim

is Rabbi Yehuda.

An unattributed Sifrei

baraitot on the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy

is Rabbi Shimon.

And all of them are according to Rabbi Akiva

for all of them were disciples of Rabbi Akiva and learned from him what they said.

And if so, this baraita, which is from the Sifrei, for it speaks about the verse in the book of Deuteronomy, is certainly according to Rabbi Shimon, and Rav Sheshet’s difficulty was well-founded.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who steals

his

son,

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, renders him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason of the Rabbis

that they exempt him?

And the Gemara answers:

Abaye said: For the verse says “

When there is found”

and we expound:

excluding one who is found,

his son, who is always found with him; he is not liable for selling him.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If that is so,

that which is written [Deuteronomy 22:22], “

When a man is found lying with a married woman

and both of them shall die,”

so too

shall we expound

“

when there is found” —

excluding one who is found, such as the household of a certain man

who were frequently in their presence, for men and women lived together in one house, and the men were always found with the wives of their fellows;

so too, they are exempt

and shall we say that the Torah exempted them in a case of adultery?

He said to him

Abaye:

I am speaking from “

and he was found in his possession”

I mean

I intended to say that the exposition is from the verse, “And one who steals a person and sells him, and he is found in his possession,” and the end of the verse, “and he is found in his possession,” is superfluous, and comes to teach that only when he had not previously been found with him is he liable, but not for his son, who is always found with him.

Rava said: Therefore, these teachers of children

teachers of infants

and those who teach the Sages

those who teach scholars

are considered like those found in their hands, and are exempt

the students are always found in the teacher’s house, and if the teacher steals one of his students and sells him, he is not liable to death.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who steals one who is half

a slave and half free, Rabbi Yehuda renders him liable, and the Sages exempt him.

We learned there

in Bava Kamma [87a]:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Slaves have no embarrassment

for one who embarrasses a Canaanite slave is not liable to pay him compensation for embarrassment.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

who exempts one for the embarrassment of a slave?

And the Gemara answers: Because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 25:11], “

“

When men struggle together, a man and his brother,”

from which the obligation to pay compensation for embarrassment is learned, and we expound from “a man and his brother”: only

one who has brotherhood

who has brothers; they are liable to pay him compensation for embarrassment.

Excluded is a slave who has no brotherhood

for even his father’s sons are not considered brothers, since a Canaanite slave is “a people resembling a donkey,” who is considered an animal and has no family lineage; one is not liable for his embarrassment.

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda there and render one liable also in the case of a slave for compensation for embarrassment, hold that brotherhood applies to a slave as well, for

he is his brother with regard to mitzvot

for he is obligated in all the mitzvot in which a woman is obligated.

And the Gemara discusses:

And here, how does he expound

how does Rabbi Yehuda expound, in our matter, the verses concerning the theft of slaves?

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yehuda holds: “A man who steals a person

“When a man is found stealing a person

from his brother” —

to exclude slaves,

for Rabbi Yehuda follows his own view that slaves have no brotherhood, and therefore one is exempt for stealing slaves. And afterward it says “from his brother, from the Children of Israel,” and we expound first: “

Children of Israel” —

to exclude one who is half slave and half free

for one is not liable for stealing him.

And again we expound from the superfluous letter mem of

“

from the Children of Israel,”

which could have written “from his brother, Children of Israel” —

to exclude one who is half slave and half free.

It is

one exclusion after another exclusion,

and we have the general principle: “

There is no exclusion after an exclusion except for inclusion,”

for the verse comes to include that one who is half slave and half free is liable for his theft.

And the Rabbis,

who exempt one for stealing one who is half slave and half free, their reason is because “

from his brother” —

to exclude slaves, is not implied to them, for he is his brother with regard to mitzvot.

And only the two exclusions of “

Children of Israel” and “

from the Children of Israel” remain —

One —

to exclude a slave.

And one —

to exclude one who is half slave and half free.

And the Gemara discusses:

A warning for one who steals a person—from where

do we find that the Torah warned against this? And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yashya said: From “

You shall not steal,”

which is stated in the Ten Commandments.

Rabbi Yohanan said: From “

They shall not be sold as a slave is sold” [Leviticus 25:42].

And the Gemara explains:

And they do not disagree

the amoraim; rather,

one counts the prohibition of theft,

“You shall not steal” teaches a prohibition concerning the theft.

And one counts the prohibition of sale,

“They shall not be sold as a slave is sold” teaches a prohibition concerning the sale that follows the theft.

The Sages taught: “

You shall not steal,”

which is in the Ten Commandments —

the verse speaks of one who steals persons.

You say that it speaks of one who steals persons, or perhaps

the verse speaks

only of one who steals property?

You have said: Go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded,

one of which is

a matter learned from its context,

that if you do not know of what the verse speaks, go out and learn from the context of the passage of the verse, for it too speaks of that same matter.

And here as well,

of what does the verse speak

throughout the passage of the Ten Commandments?

Of

the laws of

persons! “You shall not murder” and “you shall not commit adultery” are offenses punishable by the court with death.

Here too,

the “You shall not steal” speaks

of

the laws of

persons, namely, one who steals a man, concerning whom death at the hand of the court is stated, for if one steals property, he is not liable to death.

то есть о похищении человека, за которое назначается смертная казнь; ведь за похищение имущества смертной казни не полагается.

Another baraita was taught: “

You shall not steal,”

which is stated in the passage of Kedoshim [Leviticus 19:11],

the verse speaks of one who steals property.

You say that it speaks of one who steals property, or perhaps

it speaks

only of one who steals persons?

You have said: Go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded,

one of which is

a matter learned from its context.

Of what does the verse speak

there, throughout the entire passage?

Of property!

Of an obligation involving property alone, such as “You shall not oppress your fellow”;

here too,

the “You shall not steal” speaks

of

an obligation involving

property, namely, one who steals property.

It was stated: The witnesses of the theft and the witnesses of the sale of a person who were proven conspiring witnesses

there were two groups of witnesses: one testified concerning a certain man that he stole the person, and the second testified concerning him that he sold him, and both groups were proven conspiring witnesses, for other witnesses came and said concerning both of them, “You were with us on that day” —

Hezekiah said: They are not put to death,

the two groups of conspiring witnesses, despite the fact that they intended to have the certain man killed through their testimony.

Rabbi Yohanan said: They are put to death.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Hezekiah follows Rabbi Akiva, who says

that Rabbi Akiva holds that every group of witnesses must testify concerning a complete matter, as it is stated, “By the mouth of two witnesses the matter shall stand,” and we expound: “

a matter”

and not half a matter!

For example, if one group testifies concerning a certain man that he held land for one year, a second group testifies that he held it for another year, and a third group testifies concerning the third year, they do not join together so that the land should remain in the possession of the holder by means of the presumption of possession for three years, because each group does not testify concerning a complete presumption of possession.

And here as well, each group does not testify concerning a complete matter, for the witnesses of the theft alone cannot render the thief liable to death without the witnesses of the sale, and the witnesses of the sale alone cannot render him liable to death, for he can claim that the one whom I sold was my slave. It follows that their testimony is not testimony, and therefore they are not put to death when they are proven conspiring witnesses.

And Rabbi Yohanan follows the Rabbis, who say “

a matter”

and even half a matter!

And the two groups join together to render the thief liable to death, despite the fact that each one testifies only concerning half a matter; therefore, when they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are put to death.

The two sets combine to render the thief liable to receive the death penalty, despite the fact that each one testifies concerning only half a matter; therefore, when they are discredited as conspiring witnesses, they are put to death.

And Hezekiah concedes concerning the final witnesses of a stubborn and rebellious son

who testify concerning him that he stole a second time money with which to buy meat and wine, and ate them, at which point he is judged to be stoned,

that when they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are put to death

despite the fact that based on their testimony alone it would not have been possible to kill the stubborn and rebellious son, except by joining with the first witnesses, who testify concerning the first theft that he committed.