Sanhedrin 86a (פו.) — the Talmud in English

A tanna recited before Rav Sheshet

The scholar who was accustomed to reciting beraitot before Rav Sheshet recited before him the above beraita, which states that one who sells the person he stole to his father or to one of his relatives is liable.

He said to him

Rav Sheshet:

I recite: Rabbi Shimon says:

The fact that it is stated, “One who steals a person

from his brother,”

indicates that he is not liable

unless he removes him from his brother’s authority

and not merely because he sells him to his father or to one of his relatives.

And you say

that he is

liable!?

Therefore,

recite

in the beraita that he is indeed

exempt

when he sells him to his father or to one of his relatives.

And the Gemara asks:

What difficulty is there

from Rabbi Shimon against the beraita?

Perhaps this

is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon,

whereas that

is the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the beraita and hold him liable even when he sells him to his father?

And the Gemara answers:

That cannot enter your mind,

that this beraita does not follow Rabbi Shimon, since

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: An unattributed Mishna

—every unattributed Mishna—

is Rabbi Meir.

An unattributed Tosefta

is Rabbi Neḥemya.

An unattributed Sifra,

the Torat Kohanim,

is Rabbi Yehuda.

An unattributed Sifrei,

the beraitot on the books of Numbers and Deuteronomy,

is Rabbi Shimon.

And all of them follow the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

as they were all Rabbi Akiva’s students and learned from him what they stated.

If so, this beraita, which is from the Sifrei, as it discusses a verse in Deuteronomy, certainly follows Rabbi Shimon, and Rav Sheshet’s difficulty is well founded.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who steals

his

son—Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, holds him liable, while the Rabbis exempt him.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason of the Rabbis,

who exempt him?

And the Gemara answers:

Abaye said: The verse states:

“When”

and we derive:

to exclude one who is regularly present;

his son, who is always present with him, does not render him liable when he sells him.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If that is so,

with regard to that which is written [Deuteronomy 22:22],

“When a man is found lying with a married woman

and both of them shall die,”

so too

should we derive

“When”—

to exclude one who is regularly present, such as the members of a certain household

who are frequently in their company,

as men and women lived together in one house, and the men were always present with the wives of their fellow residents;

so too, are they exempt—

can it really be said that the Torah exempted them in a case of adultery?

He said to him

Abaye:

I was speaking from

“and he is found in his possession”

I meant

that the derivation is from the verse “One who steals a person and sells him, and he is found in his possession.” The end of the verse, “and he is found in his possession,” is superfluous, and comes to teach that he is liable specifically when the person had not previously been regularly present with him, but not in the case of his son, who is always present with him.

Rava said: Therefore, these teachers of children

teachers of young children,

and those who teach the Sages

those who teach scholars,

are considered like those regularly present in their possession, and they are exempt

the students are always present in the teacher’s home, and if the teacher steals one of his students and sells him, he is not liable to receive the death penalty.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who steals one who is half

a slave and half a free man—Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable, while the Rabbis exempt him.

We learned there

in Bava Kamma [87a]:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Slaves have no claim for humiliation,

as one who humiliates a Canaanite slave is not liable to pay him compensation for humiliation.

And the Gemara discusses:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda,

who exempts one who humiliates a slave from paying compensation for humiliation?

And the Gemara answers: Because

the verse states [Deuteronomy 25:11]:

“

When men fight together, a man and his brother,”

from which the obligation to pay compensation for humiliation is derived; and we derive from “a man and his brother” that only

one who has brotherhood,

who has brothers, is one for whose humiliation they are obligated to pay.

This excludes a slave, who has no brotherhood,

as even his paternal brothers are not considered his brothers, since a Canaanite slave is “a people resembling a donkey,” considered like an animal, and has no familial lineage; therefore, one is not liable for his humiliation.

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda there and hold that one is liable to pay compensation for humiliating a slave as well, maintain that brotherhood applies to a slave too, since

he is his brother with regard to mitzvot,

as he is obligated in all the mitzvot in which a woman is obligated.

And the Gemara discusses:

And here, how does he derive

the verses concerning the stealing of slaves?

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yehuda holds:

“When a man is found stealing a person

from his brother”—

to exclude slaves,

as Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning that slaves do not have brotherhood; therefore, one is exempt for stealing slaves. And afterward it says, “from his brother, from the Children of Israel,” and we first derive:

“

the Children of Israel”—

to exclude one who is half a slave and half a free man,

for one is not liable for stealing him. And again we derive from the superfluous letter mem in

“from the Children of Israel”,

as it could have written, “from his brother, the Children of Israel,”

to exclude one who is half a slave and half a free man.

This constitutes one exclusion following another,

and we have a principle:

“There is no exclusion following another exclusion except to include”,

so the verse comes to include one who is half a slave and half a free man, establishing that one is liable for stealing him.

And the Rabbis,

who exempt one for stealing one who is half a slave and half a free man, explain that

“

from his brother”—

to exclude slaves—does not appear to them to have that meaning, since

he is his brother with regard to mitzvot. They are left only with the two exclusions of

“the Children of Israel” and

“from the Children of Israel”—

One—

to exclude a slave.

And one—

to exclude one who is half a slave and half a free man.

From where is there a warning concerning one who steals a person?

Where do we find that the Torah warned against this? And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yoshiya said: From

“You shall not steal”,

the statement in the Ten Commandments.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From

“They shall not be sold as a slave is sold”

[Leviticus 25:42].

And the Gemara explains:

They do not disagree—

the amoraim—but

one counts the prohibition of theft,

as from “You shall not steal” we learn a prohibition concerning the theft.

And one counts the prohibition of sale,

as from “They shall not be sold as a slave is sold” we learn a prohibition concerning the sale that follows the theft.

The Sages taught:

“You shall not steal”,

which is stated in the Ten Commandments—

the verse is speaking of one who steals persons.

You say that it is speaking of one who steals persons; or perhaps

the verse

is speaking only of one who steals money?

You can say: Go and learn from the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded,

one of which is

“a matter derived from its context”,

that if you do not know what the verse is discussing, you should learn from the context of the passage that the verse too is discussing that same subject.

And here as well,

what is the verse speaking of

throughout the passage of the Ten Commandments?

Of

the laws of

capital cases!

“You shall not murder” and “You shall not commit adultery” involve offenses punishable by a court with the death penalty.

Here too,

“You shall not steal” is speaking

of

the laws of

capital cases—namely, one who steals a person, concerning whom the death penalty is stated, whereas one who steals money is not liable to receive the death penalty.

It was taught in another beraita:

“You shall not steal”,

which is stated in the passage of Leviticus [19:11],

the verse is speaking of one who steals money.

You say that it is speaking of one who steals money; or perhaps

it is

speaking only of one who steals persons?

You can say: Go and learn from the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded,

one of which is

“a matter derived from its context.”

What is the verse speaking of

there, throughout the passage?

Of money!

It deals exclusively with monetary liability, for example, “You shall not oppress your fellow.”

Here too,

“You shall not steal” is speaking

of

a monetary

obligation—

namely, one who steals money.

It was stated: With regard to witnesses to the theft and witnesses to the sale in a case of stealing a person who were discredited as conspiring witnesses,

there were two sets of witnesses: one testified that a certain man stole the person, and the other testified that he sold him; and both sets were discredited when other witnesses came and said to both of them, “You were with us on that day”—

Ḥizkiya said: They are not put to death,

the two sets of conspiring witnesses, despite the fact that through their testimony they sought to have the certain man executed.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: They are put to death.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Ḥizkiya follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who says

that Rabbi Akiva holds that each set of witnesses must testify concerning a complete matter, as it is stated: “By the mouth of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” and we derive:

“A matter”

and not half a matter!

For example, if one set testifies that a certain person possessed land for one year, a second set testifies that he possessed it for another year, and a third set testifies concerning the third year, they do not combine to establish that the land remains in the possessor’s hands by virtue of a presumption of ownership lasting three years, because each set does not testify concerning a complete presumption of ownership.

Here too, each set does not testify concerning a complete matter, since the witnesses to the theft alone cannot render the thief liable to receive the death penalty without the witnesses to the sale, and the witnesses to the sale alone likewise cannot render him liable to receive the death penalty, as he could claim that the person whom he sold was his slave. Consequently, their testimony is not testimony, and therefore they are not put to death when they are discredited as conspiring witnesses.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who say:

“A matter”

and even half a matter!

The two sets combine to render the thief liable to receive the death penalty, despite the fact that each one testifies concerning only half a matter; therefore, when they are discredited as conspiring witnesses, they are put to death.

And Ḥizkiya concedes with regard to the later witnesses of a wayward and rebellious son,

who testify that he stole money a second time in order to purchase meat and wine, and ate them, in which case he is judged to be stoned,

that when they are discredited as conspiring witnesses, they are put to death,

despite the fact that on the basis of their testimony alone it would not have been possible to execute the wayward and rebellious son, but only in conjunction with the first witnesses, who testified concerning the first theft he committed.