Sanhedrin 86b — the Talmud in English

And the reason for this is

because the

witnesses

first ![](pamud.bmp "

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can say: “We came to have him flogged.”

We did not know that he would steal a second time, and we intended only that he receive lashes as punishment for the first theft. Since the testimony of the first group is effective on its own, even without the second testimony, therefore

these latter ones,

the second group, too,

establish a complete matter for him: their testimony is considered complete testimony sufficient to render him liable to death, and if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

their testimony bears the status of complete testimony to obligate him in execution, and if they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this: If so, the witnesses to the sale should also be executed.

We should likewise impose the death penalty here on the witnesses to the sale of the person when they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, for the same reason:

because the witnesses to the theft,

the first witnesses who testify that he stole the person, can

say: “We came only to have him flogged,”

for the theft alone; we did not know that he would later sell him. Therefore, the testimony concerning the sale is also a complete matter. Why, then, does Hezekiah say that witnesses to the sale who are exposed as conspiring witnesses are not executed?

And if you would say that Hezekiah holds that he is not flogged—

that one who merely steals a person but does not sell him is not flogged for the theft, because the prohibition against stealing a person is a prohibition that can serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty: if he subsequently sells him, he becomes liable to death for that same prohibition. Therefore, the witnesses to the theft are not considered to have independent testimony, and consequently the witnesses to the sale are also considered to have testified only to half of a matter?

But it was stated: With regard to witnesses to the theft of a person—

witnesses who testified that a certain man stole the person—

who were exposed as conspiring witnesses,

there is a dispute between

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan:

One says:

the witnesses

are flogged

because they gave false testimony.

And one says: They are not flogged.

And we say: It can be established—

it can be proven—

that Hezekiah

is the one

who says: They are flogged.

This follows from what Hezekiah said:

even if, after the witnesses to the theft, additional witnesses come and testify about the sale, and afterward other witnesses come and expose both groups as conspiring witnesses, nevertheless

the witnesses to the theft are not executed.

Therefore, the witnesses to the theft can be flogged, since they will never be punished with a court-imposed death penalty for this testimony, and this is not a prohibition that can serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty.

For if it is Rabbi Yohanan, since he says

that both groups

are executed

when they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, then even when the witnesses to the theft are exposed before the witnesses to the sale have had time to arrive, it is impossible to flog them for violating the prohibition “You shall not bear false witness against your fellow,” because

this prohibition would be

for them

a prohibition that can serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty:

if they are not exposed now, but only after the witnesses to the sale arrive and the thief’s sentence of death is finalized, and then both groups are exposed together, both groups will be executed on the basis of this prohibition.

And for every prohibition that can serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty, one is not flogged.

And since we have demonstrated that Hezekiah holds that witnesses to the theft who are exposed as conspiring witnesses are flogged, how can it be said that the thief himself is not flogged for the theft? If

he,

the thief,

is not flogged, how can

the witnesses

be flogged?

For there is no fulfillment here of “as he plotted to do”! The question therefore remains: Why are the witnesses to the sale who are exposed as conspiring witnesses not sentenced to death, since the witnesses to the theft can say, “We came to have him flogged”?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, Rav Pappa said: With regard to the witnesses to the sale, everyone agrees that they are executed

that they are executed if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses.

When they disagree

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan

is with regard to the witnesses to the theft

whether witnesses to the theft who are exposed as conspiring witnesses are executed.

Hezekiah said: They are not executed

because

the theft stands independently, and the sale stands independently.

Each one stands on its own, and each one has a separate prohibition. The prohibition against stealing a person cannot serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty; rather, the thief is flogged for it [if he does not sell him afterward]. Therefore, the witnesses to the theft are likewise not executed, since they can claim that they intended only to make him liable to lashes, not to kill him.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

the witnesses to the theft as well

are executed,

because

the theft is the beginning of the sale.

The prohibition against theft can also serve as a warning for a court-imposed death penalty, and the thief is never flogged. Therefore, the witnesses to the theft cannot claim that they came only to make him liable to lashes. Rather, they certainly came to have him executed, and therefore they are executed when exposed as conspiring witnesses.

And Rabbi Yohanan concedes with regard to the first witnesses concerning a stubborn and rebellious son

who testify about his first theft,

who are exposed as conspiring witnesses

after the second witnesses came and testified about the second theft, and his sentence of death was finalized on the basis of their testimony,

that they are not executed, because they can say—

the first witnesses:

“We came to have him flogged,”

and not to have him killed, since they can certainly make him liable to lashes, as it says: “They shall chastise him.”

Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son, and everyone agrees with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son.

That is, there is one circumstance involving a stubborn and rebellious son in which everyone agrees that witnesses exposed as conspiring witnesses are exempt from death, and there is another circumstance in which everyone agrees that the witnesses are liable to death.

And there is also a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son

there is also a circumstance in which Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree whether witnesses exposed as conspiring witnesses are executed.

Abaye explains:

Everyone agrees with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son: concerning the first witnesses

who are exposed as conspiring witnesses,

that they are not executed, because they can say: “We came to have him flogged.”

And everyone agrees with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son: concerning the last witnesses

who testified about the second theft and were exposed as conspiring witnesses,

that they are executed, because the first witnesses can say: “We came to have him flogged.”

It follows that the first witnesses’ testimony is independent testimony. Therefore,

these latter witnesses,

the last group,

establish a complete matter for him:

their testimony is considered complete testimony, not half a matter.

And there is a dispute with regard to a stubborn and rebellious son: two witnesses say, “In our presence he stole”

for a second time, money from his father to buy meat and wine,

and two witnesses say, “In our presence he ate”

the meat and wine. The two groups need each other in order to have him sentenced to stoning, [and the first group does not make him liable to lashes, so that we could regard its testimony as independent testimony]. This is therefore half a matter. Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree about this: Hezekiah holds that a complete matter is required, not half a matter, and therefore their testimony is not valid testimony, so if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, they are not executed. Rabbi Yohanan holds that a complete matter, even half a matter, is valid, and the two groups join together to have him stoned; therefore, if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

Rav Asi said: With regard to witnesses to the sale of a person

who came and testified only that he sold the person, with no witnesses having testified beforehand that he had stolen him,

if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses, they are not executed, because the seller can

the seller

say: “I sold my slave!”

and he was not stolen.

Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whose opinion does this statement of Rav Asi accord?

With Rabbi Akiva, who says: “

a complete matter, but not half a matter”!

Therefore, the witnesses to the sale are not executed.

Abaye said to him,

to Rav Yosef: Do they not refrain from executing the witnesses only according to Rabbi Akiva?

For if it were according to the Sages,

who say, “A complete matter, even half a matter,” would they be

executed?!

But “

because”

is what he said.

Rav Asi says that they are not executed because the seller could have saved himself from death by claiming that he was his slave. Thus, there is not even a half matter here, and the Sages also agree that the witnesses are exempt.

Rather,

Abaye said:

You may even say that this is according to the Sages,

who, as stated, also agree that the witnesses are exempt,

and the case is one in which the witnesses to the theft did not come

because Rav Asi is speaking of a case in which no witnesses to the theft came at all, and the seller can therefore claim that he is his slave.

The Gemara asks:

If so, what is the point of stating this?

What is Rav Asi teaching us? It is obvious that the witnesses to the sale are not executed, since no witnesses to the theft came at all.

The Gemara answers:

It is necessary—

Rav Asi is teaching us only

that even though they came afterward

after the witnesses to the sale testified, witnesses came and testified that the person he sold had been stolen, and the thief’s sentence was finalized on the basis of both testimonies, and afterward the witnesses were exposed as conspiring witnesses, nevertheless the witnesses to the sale are not executed.

The Gemara asks:

But still, what is the point of stating this?

It is still obvious that the witnesses to the sale are not executed, because at the time they testified, the judgment was not fit to be finalized on their basis. They can claim: We did not know that witnesses to the theft would come after us and that our testimony would cause him to become liable to death.

The Gemara answers:

It is necessary: the two groups were hinting to each other

the two groups exchanged hints.

Lest you say that a hint is considered significant

and it is as though the witnesses to the sale knew that witnesses to the theft would testify after them,

it teaches us that a hint is worth nothing!

Mishna:

A rebellious elder on the authority of the court

a Torah scholar from among the Sages of Israel who rebels against the ruling of the Great Court. We learned in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter that his punishment is strangulation. His matter is explained in the Torah:

as it is stated [

Deuteronomy 17:5] “

If a matter of judgment is hidden from you ...

you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose ... and you shall act according to the matter that they tell you from that place ... and the man who acts presumptuously, refusing to listen to the koen ... or to the judge, that man shall die.”

And this is his procedure:

There were three courts there

in Jerusalem, concerning which it is stated: “You shall arise and go up.”

The court

one

was

sitting at the entrance of the Temple Mount

at the eastern gate, before the Women's Courtyard.

And one was sitting at the entrance of the Courtyard

farther inward, before the Israelites' Courtyard.

And one was sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone

farther inward, within the Courtyard itself; half of it was built in the sacred area and half of it was built in the unconsecrated area. And this court was the Great Court of seventy-one.

And when this elder ruled a certain halakha in his city, and the court of his city disagreed with him, the Torah commanded that he and they go up to Jerusalem and inquire at the courts there—

they

come to the

court

that is at the entrance of the Temple Mount

, at which they encounter first.

And he says

before them, the elder:

“Thus I expounded

the law by one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded,

and thus my colleagues expounded! Thus I taught

and instructed the people,

and thus my colleagues taught!”

If

the court at the entrance of the Temple Mount

heard

from their teachers and received [the tradition of] what the law is in this halakha, then

he said [

say ]

to them

the law according to what they heard.

And if not

, that they did not hear from their teachers what the law is in this halakha,

they come to those

judges

who are at the entrance of the Courtyard

. And

the elder says again:

“Thus I expounded, and thus my colleagues expounded! Thus I taught, and thus my colleagues taught!”

If they heard, he said [

say ]

to them; and if not, both these and those

—the elder and his colleagues, and also the courts that were asked and did not know how to answer—

come to the Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah goes forth

to all Israel

. And all are obligated to act according to their ruling,

as it is stated: “

And you shall act according to the matter that they declare to you

from that place that the Lord will choose

.”

The elder returned

to

his city, repeated and learned [

taught ]

in the manner in which he had learned

, that is, he did not retract his opinion despite the ruling of the Great Court; therefore he is

exempt

from strangulation.

But if he instructed [others] to act

according to his opinion, he is

liable

to strangulation.

As it is stated: “

And the man who acts defiantly

is not liable

to death

until he instructs [others] to act!”

he is not liable

A student

who has not reached the level of issuing rulings,

who instructed [others] to act

contrary to the ruling of the Great Court, is

exempt

because in any event they do not rely upon his ruling, and the Torah made liable only one who has reached the level of issuing rulings.

It follows that his stringency

—that they were stringent concerning him, that he is not fit to issue rulings until he is forty years old—

is his leniency

, for this exempts him now from death.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated: “

When a matter is too difficult for you

for judgment, between blood and blood, between law and law, and between affliction and affliction, matters of dispute within your gates; then you shall arise and ascend to the place that the Lord your God will choose.”

And we expound this entire verse: