Sanhedrin 86b (פו:) — the Talmud in English

And the reason for this is

because they can say

the

first

exact page location

We came to have him flogged

We did not know that he would steal a second time, and our sole intention was that he receive the punishment of lashes for the first theft. And since the testimony of the first group is effective in its own right, even without the second testimony, therefore

these other ones

the second group, also

are doing a complete matter for him

their testimony bears the status of complete testimony to obligate him in execution, and if they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to this: If so, the witnesses to the sale should also be executed

Let us likewise obligate the witnesses to the sale, who were proven conspiring witnesses, to execution, for the same reason:

because the witnesses to the theft

the first witnesses, who testify that he stole the person, can

say: We came to have him flogged

for the theft alone, and we did not know that he would subsequently sell him. Therefore, the testimony concerning the sale is also a complete matter. And why, then, does Hezekiah say that witnesses to the sale who were proven conspiring witnesses are not executed?

And if you would say that Hezekiah holds that he is not flogged

that one who steals a person but does not sell him is not flogged for the theft, because the prohibition against stealing a person is a prohibition for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued, as, if he subsequently sells him, he is liable to execution for that same prohibition; therefore, the witnesses to the theft do not have the status of independent testimony, and consequently the witnesses to the sale are also considered to have testified concerning half a matter?

But it was stated: Witnesses to the theft of a person

witnesses who testified concerning a certain man that he stole the person

who were proven conspiring witnesses,

they disputed this matter,

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan—

One said:

the witnesses

are flogged

for having testified falsely.

And one said: They are not flogged.

And we say: It can be established

it can be proven

that Hezekiah

is the one

who said: They are flogged.

As Hezekiah said

that even if, after the witnesses to the theft, additional witnesses came and testified concerning the sale, and afterward other witnesses came and proved both groups to be conspiring witnesses, nevertheless

they are not executed

the witnesses to the theft. Therefore, it is possible to give the witnesses to the theft lashes, since they will never be punished by execution of the court for this testimony of theirs, and this is not a prohibition for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued.

For if it were Rabbi Yohanan, since he said

that both groups

are executed

when they are proven conspiring witnesses, then even when the witnesses to the theft are proven conspiring witnesses before the witnesses to the sale had time to arrive, it is impossible to give them lashes for violating the prohibition of “You shall not bear false witness against your fellow,” since

it would be

this prohibition, with regard to them,

a prohibition for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued

for if they were not proven conspiring witnesses now, but only after the witnesses to the sale came and established the thief’s liability to execution, and afterward both groups were proven conspiring witnesses together, both groups would be executed on the basis of this prohibition,

and anyone who violates a prohibition for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued is not flogged.

And once we have proved that Hezekiah holds that witnesses to the theft who were proven conspiring witnesses are flogged, how can one say that the thief himself is not flogged for the theft? For if

he

the thief

is not flogged, they

the witnesses

how are they flogged

for there is no “as he plotted” here!? And the question remains: Why are the witnesses to the sale who were proven conspiring witnesses not liable to execution, since the witnesses to the theft can say, “We came to have him flogged”?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, Rav Pappa said: With regard to the witnesses to the sale, everyone agrees that they are executed

they execute them if they are proven conspiring witnesses.

They disagree

Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan

with regard to the witnesses to the theft

whether the witnesses to the theft who were proven conspiring witnesses are executed—

Hezekiah said: They are not executed

because

the theft stands on its own and the sale stands on its own

each stands independently, and there is a separate prohibition for each one. The prohibition against stealing a person is not one for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued; rather, the thief is flogged for it [if he does not subsequently sell him]. Consequently, the witnesses to the theft are also not executed, since they can claim that they did not intend to have him executed, but only to obligate him to receive lashes.

Rabbi Yohanan said:

The witnesses to the theft as well

are executed

because

the theft is the beginning of the sale

the prohibition against theft too is one for which a warning of execution by a court can be issued, and the thief is never flogged. Consequently, the witnesses to the theft cannot claim that they came only to obligate him to receive lashes; rather, they certainly came to have him executed, and therefore they are executed when proven conspiring witnesses.

And Rabbi Yohanan concedes with regard to the first witnesses of a wayward and rebellious son

who testify concerning his first theft,

who were proven conspiring witnesses

after the second witnesses came and testified concerning the second theft, and he was sentenced to execution on their testimony,

that they are not executed, because they can say

the first witnesses:

We came to have him flogged

and not to have him executed, since they certainly can obligate him to receive lashes, as it is stated: “They shall discipline him.”

Abaye said: Everyone agrees with regard to a wayward and rebellious son, and everyone agrees with regard to a wayward and rebellious son

meaning, there is one case concerning a wayward and rebellious son in which everyone agrees that witnesses who were proven conspiring witnesses are exempt from execution, and there is another case in which everyone agrees that the witnesses are liable to execution.

And there is a dispute with regard to a wayward and rebellious son

and there is also a case in which Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree whether witnesses who were proven conspiring witnesses are executed.

And Abaye explains:

Everyone agrees with regard to a wayward and rebellious son: With regard to the first witnesses

who were proven conspiring witnesses,

that they are not executed, because they can say: We came to have him flogged.

And everyone agrees with regard to a wayward and rebellious son: With regard to the latter witnesses

who testified concerning the second theft and were proven conspiring witnesses,

that they are executed, because the first witnesses can say: We came to have him flogged

and it follows that their testimony is independent testimony. Therefore, also

these

the latter group

are doing a complete matter for him

their testimony has the status of complete testimony and not half a matter.

And there is a dispute with regard to a wayward and rebellious son: Two say: In our presence he stole

a second time, money from his father in order to purchase meat and wine,

and two say: In our presence he ate

the meat and wine. The two groups require one another in order to judge him liable to stoning, [and the first group does not obligate him to receive lashes, so that we could say that its testimony is independent testimony], and this is half a matter. Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan dispute this: Hezekiah holds “a complete matter and not half a matter,” and therefore their testimony is not testimony, so if they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are not executed. Rabbi Yohanan holds “a complete matter and even half a matter,” and the two groups join together to stone him; therefore, if they are proven conspiring witnesses, they are executed.

Rav Asi said: The witnesses to the sale of a person

who came with testimony only that he sold the person, and there were no witnesses that he had stolen him beforehand,

who were proven conspiring witnesses are not executed, because the seller can

the seller

say: I sold my slave!

He was not stolen.

Rav Yosef said: In accordance with whom does this statement of Rav Asi proceed?

In accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who says “

a complete matter and not half a matter”!

And therefore the witnesses to the sale are not executed.

Abaye said to him

to Rav Yosef: Is it only according to Rabbi Akiva that they are not executed?

For if it were according to the Rabbis

who say “a complete matter and even half a matter,” would they

be executed!?

Here “

because”

he says

Rav Asi says that they are not executed because the seller could have saved himself from execution by claiming that the person was his slave; therefore, there is not even “half a matter” here, and the Rabbis too agree that the witnesses are exempt?

Rather

said Abaye:

Even if you say it is according to the Rabbis

who, as stated, also agree that they are exempt,

and when the witnesses to the theft did not come

because Rav Asi is speaking of a case in which no witnesses to the theft came at all, and the seller can claim that the person was his slave.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, what is the point of stating this

what is the novel element in Rav Asi’s statement? It is obvious that the witnesses to the sale are not executed, since no witnesses to the theft came at all.

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary

for Rav Asi to teach us only

that even though they eventually came

that after the witnesses to the sale testified, witnesses arrived who testified that the person he sold had been stolen, and the thief was sentenced on the basis of both testimonies, and afterward the witnesses were proven conspiring witnesses, nevertheless the witnesses to the sale are not executed.

And the Gemara asks:

But still, what is the point of stating this

for it is still obvious that the witnesses to the sale are not executed, because at the time they testified, it was not appropriate for the sentence to be completed on the basis of their testimony, and they can claim: We did not know that witnesses to the theft would come after us and that our testimony would cause him to become liable to execution.

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary: They subtly signaled to one another

the two groups subtly signaled to one another.

Lest you say that a signal is significant

and it is as though the witnesses to the sale knew that the witnesses to the theft would testify after them.

It teaches us this: A signal is of no consequence!

Mishna:

An elder who rebels against the ruling of the court

a scholar from among the Jewish sages who rebels against the ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, as we learned in the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter, whose punishment is execution by strangulation. Its matter is explained in the Torah:

As it is stated [

Deuteronomy 17:5 ] “

If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you ...

you shall rise and ascend to the place that the Lord your God will choose ... And you shall act in accordance with the matter that they tell you from that place ... But the man who acts presumptuously, refusing to heed the priest ... or the judge, that man shall die.”

And this is its law:

There were three courts there

in Jerusalem, concerning which it is stated: “You shall rise and ascend.”

A court

one

was

sitting at the entrance to the Temple Mount

at the eastern gate, before the Women's Courtyard.

And one was sitting at the entrance to the Courtyard

farther inside, before the Israelites' Courtyard.

And one was sitting in the Chamber of Hewn Stone

farther inside, within the Courtyard itself; half of it was built in the sacred area and half of it was built in the unconsecrated area. This court was the Great Court of seventy-one judges.

And when this elder issued a ruling concerning a particular matter in his city, and the court of his city disagreed with him, the Torah instructed that he and they should go up to Jerusalem and inquire at the courts there—

they

come to

the court

that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount

where they encounter a court first.

And he says

before them:

“This is how I expounded the law,

by means of one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded,

and this is how my colleagues expounded it! This is how I taught

and instructed the people,

and this is how my colleagues taught it!”

If

the court at the entrance to the Temple Mount

had heard

from their teachers what the law is in this halakhic matter, then

it says [they say]

[that is, had heard]

to them

the law in accordance with what they had heard.

But if not

—if they had not heard from their teachers what the law is in this halakhic matter—

they come to those

judges

who are at the entrance to the Courtyard.

And

the elder says

again: “This is how I expounded it, and this is how my colleagues expounded it! This is how I taught it, and this is how my colleagues taught it!”

“If they heard,” he said [they say]

the elder

“to them; and if not, both these

—the elder and his colleagues, as well as the courts that were consulted and did not know how to answer—

come to the Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah proceeds

to all Israel.

And all are obligated to act in accordance with its ruling,

as it is stated: “

And you shall act in accordance with the matter that they will tell you

from that place that Hashem will choose.”’”

to all Israel. And all are obligated to act in accordance with their ruling,

The elder returned

to

his city, reviewed and taught [taught]

taught ]

in the manner in which he had learned,

not retracting his view despite the ruling of the Great Court; he is

exempt

from strangulation.

But if he instructed others to act

according to his view, he is

liable

to strangulation.

As it is stated: “

And the man who acts presumptuously”—

he is not liable

to death

until he instructs others to act!”

he is not liable

A student

who has not reached the level of issuing rulings

who instructed others to act

contrary to the ruling of the Great Court is

exempt

because in any event no one relies on his ruling, and the Torah made liable only one who has reached the level of issuing rulings.

It follows that his stringency

—the fact that they were stringent with regard to him, deeming him unfit to issue rulings until he reaches the age of forty—

is his leniency,

as this exempts him now from the death penalty.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated: “

When a matter is too difficult for you

for judgment, between blood and blood, between law and law, and between affliction and affliction; matters of dispute in your gates, then you shall arise and ascend to the place that Hashem your God will choose to be there.”

And we expound this entire verse: