Sanhedrin 85b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

It is just as with after death

for the son is liable for cursing his father even if the father is not fit to remain alive, since he is also liable for cursing his deceased father; and all the more so if he is merely not fit to remain alive.

And the Gemara concludes:

What has become of it?

What is the halakha regarding the question at the beginning of the discussion: does a son become an agent of the court to flog and excommunicate his father, or not?

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: And likewise was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: For all

transgressions

the son does not become an agent for his father to strike him or curse him,

except for an inciter

to worship idolatry, in which case the son becomes an agent for his father to strike him and curse him,

for the Torah said [Deuteronomy 13:9] “

Do not spare him or conceal him.”

You shall neither pity him nor conceal him.”

Mishna:

One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable

to the death penalty

until he makes a wound in them.

This is a stringency of one who curses over one who strikes

in this matter, one who curses his father or mother is treated more stringently than one who strikes his father or mother—

for one who curses after death

who cursed his father or mother after their death

is liable,

for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara,

whereas

if

one who strikes

them

after death, he is exempt,

for after death a wound is not applicable.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated [Leviticus 20:9], “For any man who curses his father or his mother shall surely be put to death; he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood is upon him.” And from the superfluous ending of the verse, “

He has cursed his father and his mother,”

we expound that he is liable also

after death.

One might have thought

I should say:

Since he is liable for striking

his father

and he is liable for cursing

his father,

just as one who strikes is liable only during life, so one who curses is liable only during life.

And furthermore,

for this is

a kal va-chomer: Just as one who strikes

his father

for whom it made “not among your people” like “among your people”

for with regard to striking, “among your people” was not stated, that it applies only to one who performs the deeds of your people, and nevertheless

he is not liable for him after death, so one who curses, for whom it did not make “not among your people” like “among your people”

for “among your people” was stated concerning him,

is it not certainly the case that he is not liable

for him after death?

The verse states “

He has cursed his father and his mother,”

to include that even

after death.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to Rabbi Yonatan, for the verse is superfluous for him

the phrase

“his father and his mother”

“He has cursed”; therefore it is possible to expound from it that even after death one who curses his father is liable,

but according to Rabbi Yashya,

who requires this verse for another exposition,

what is there to say

from where does he derive that one who curses is liable even after death?

For it was taught:

It is stated [there], “

Any man

who curses his father or his mother.”

What does

“any man”

in this doubled expression

come to teach?

To include a daughter

or a tumtum and an androgynos

who cursed their father, for they too are liable to the death penalty, and not only a male who cursed his father.

And from what is stated, “

who curses his father or his mother,”

I have only

learned

that

he is not liable until he curses

his father and his mother,

both of them together; but if he cursed only

his father and not his mother,

or

his mother and not

his father, from where

do we know that he is liable?

The verse states at the end of the verse,

“

He has cursed his father and his mother,”

which implies:

his father

alone

he has cursed, and his mother

alone

he has cursed!

At the beginning of the verse the cursing is attached to his father, and at the end it is attached to his mother; this implies that he is liable for each one of them individually,

the words of Rabbi Yashya.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

There is no need for the end of the verse to teach that one is liable for each of them separately; from the beginning alone it is possible to learn this, since

it implies

from “his father and his mother” that specifically

both together, and it implies

also each

one individually.

Therefore we say that

until the verse explicitly specifies for you

“together”,

as with plowing with an ox and a donkey, where the Torah explicitly wrote, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together,” so that we would not mistakenly say that it is forbidden to plow with an ox alone and with a donkey alone; from this it is evident that where “together” is not written, it implies each one separately. Here too, one is liable for his father alone and for his mother alone.

And if so, since Rabbi Yashya requires the exposition “He has cursed his father and his mother” to learn that one is liable for each of them separately,

from where does he have it

that one who curses his father and mother is liable also after death?

And the Gemara answers: Rabbi Yashya

derives it from

what is stated in the portion of Mishpatim [Exodus 21:17],

“And one who curses his father and his mother shall surely be put to death,”

which is superfluous and comes to teach that one is liable even after death.

And the Gemara asks:

And the other

Rabbi Yonatan, who learns the law of after death from “He has cursed his father and his mother”—what does he expound from the verse “And one who curses his father and his mother”?

And the Gemara answers:

That verse is needed for him to include a daughter

and

a tumtum and an androgynos

who cursed their father.

And the Gemara asks:

And let him derive it from “

any man,”

as explained in the baraita above?

And the Gemara answers: Rabbi Yonatan holds that the doubled expression is not coming for any exposition, but

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings!

And the Gemara asks concerning the Mishna, which says, “This is a stringency of one who curses over one who strikes,”

and let it also teach

that the Mishna should also say that there is

a stringency of one who strikes over one who curses, for with regard to one who strikes it made ‘not among your people’ like ‘among your people,’

so that it is not necessary that he specifically perform the deeds of your people,

unlike one who curses,

who specifically must perform the deeds of your people?

And the Gemara answers:

He holds

the tannai of the Mishna:

we compare striking to cursing,

and even with regard to striking it is necessary that he specifically perform the deeds of your people.

And the Gemara analyzes:

Let us say that these tannaim

the tannaim of the two baraitot below disagree in the same dispute

as those tannaim

as the dispute between the tannai of the Mishna, who holds that we compare striking to cursing regarding performing the deeds of your people, and the tannai of the baraita above, who makes a kal va-chomer from striking to cursing, that with striking it is not necessary that he perform the deeds of your people, because he does not compare striking to cursing?

For one [baraita] teaches: You are commanded regarding striking a Cuthean,

which means that it is forbidden to strike him,

but you are not commanded regarding cursing him,

for there is no prohibition against cursing him.

And another [baraita] teaches:

A Cuthean

you are commanded neither regarding cursing him nor regarding striking him.

They supposed

the members of the academy supposed:

Everyone

that both tannaim hold:

Cutheans are genuine converts,

who were initially complete converts and have now become wicked and do not perform the deeds of your people; therefore all agree that one is exempt for cursing them, but they disagree regarding striking.

What, is it not

the case that

they disagree in this

the two baraitot—

one Master holds: We compare striking to cursing,

and one is exempt even for striking a Cuthean, because he does not perform the deeds of your people,

and one Master holds: We do not compare striking to cursing,

and one is exempt for cursing a Cuthean, but not for striking him?

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

Rather,

everyone

holds:

We do not compare striking to cursing.

And here they disagree in this—

one Master holds: Cutheans are genuine converts,

and they are Israelites, except that they do not perform the deeds of your people; therefore one is exempt only for cursing them, but not for striking them.

And one Master holds: Cutheans are converts out of fear of lions,

for they converted only out of fear of the lions that the Lord sent against them, and they did not intend [to convert] for the sake of Judaism. Therefore their conversion is not a conversion, and they are complete gentiles; consequently one is exempt even for striking them.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, this is what was taught concerning it

in that same baraita that exempts one also from striking them:

“And its ox is like an Israelite’s”

so that if our ox gored the ox of a Cuthean, or conversely, its law is like that of an Israelite: an innocuous ox pays half the damage, and a forewarned ox pays the full damage.

But the law of a gentile is different from that of an Israelite: if his ox gored our ox, even an innocuous ox pays the full damage, while if our ox gored his ox, it is entirely exempt.

And how is it possible to say that this tannai holds that Cutheans are converts out of fear of lions?

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather, conclude from it:

everyone holds that Cutheans are genuine converts, and

they disagree regarding the comparison,

and they disagree only whether we compare striking to cursing or not.

Conclude from it!

Mishna:

One who kidnaps a person from Israel is not liable

to the death penalty

until he brings him into his own domain,

before selling him, for it is stated regarding one who kidnaps a person [Exodus 21:16], “And he is found in his hand,” and “his hand” means his domain.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He is not liable

until he brings him into his own domain and uses him,

before the sale,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 24:7] “When a man is found kidnapping a person from his brothers, from the children of Israel,

and he makes use of him and sells him.”

One who kidnaps his son

and sells him

—

Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, holds him liable

the father, to the death penalty.

And the Sages exempt.

If he kidnapped

one

who is half a slave and half free—

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable.

And the Sages exempt.

Gemara:

And the Gemara analyzes:

And

if

the first tannai

of Rabbi Yehuda

does not require use,

that the kidnapper use the slave before selling him—yet it is explicitly stated, “And he makes use of him and sells him”?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said: Use worth less than a peruta is the difference between them—

Rabbi Yehuda holds that the use must specifically be worth at least a peruta, whereas the first tannai holds that even use worth less than a peruta is sufficient.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked: If he kidnapped him and sold him

while he was

asleep, what is the law?

Rabbi Yirmeya further raised a question:

If he sold a woman together with her fetus,

who kidnapped a pregnant woman and sold only her fetus and not her herself,

what is the law?

And the sides of the two questions are: whether

there is a manner of use in this, or there is no manner of use in this.

The Gemara asks:

And let him derive that there is no use at all,

for he did not use either the sleeping person or the fetus at all; how could he be liable for them?

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary:

rather, it concerns a

sleeping person,

and for example

he leaned upon him,

that he leaned on him while he was asleep, and through this he used him.

And the question regarding

a woman

concerns a case in which

he positioned her before the wind,

that he positioned her to protect him from the wind; and the thicker she is, the more useful she is for protecting him, and it follows that he used the fetus.

And the uncertainty is only whether

this is a manner of use

to use [him] in such a manner

or this is not a manner of use.

What is it?

And the Gemara concludes:

teyku!

The Sages taught:

It is stated, “

When a man is found stealing a person

from among his brothers”;

I have derived only

from this

a man who stole

who is liable to death.

A woman

who stole a person—

from where

is it derived that she is liable?

The verse states [Exodus, there], “

And one who steals a man and sells him and he is found in his possession shall surely be put to death,” which indicates that it is so whether the thief is a man or whether he is a woman.

and sells him, and he is found in his possession, shall surely be put to death.” This indicates that it makes no difference whether the thief is a man or whether she is a woman.

I have derived only that a man who stole either

the

woman or

the

man, for when the thief is a man, it is stated, “When a man is found stealing a person,” indicating every person, even a woman;

since when the thief is a man, it is stated: "When a man is found stealing a person," indicating any person, even a woman;

and

so

a woman who stole

the

man, for from where did we derive the case of a woman who stole? It is stated, “And one who steals a man,” indicating specifically when she stole a man.

since the source from which we learned that a woman who stole is liable states: "And one who steals a man," indicating specifically when she stole a man.

A woman who stole a woman—from where

is it derived that she is liable?

The verse states at the end of the verse “When a man is found stealing

and that thief shall die,”

indicating

in any event,

that even a woman who stole a woman is liable to death.

Another teaching was taught:

It is stated, “

When a man is found stealing a person from among his brothers,”

indicating every person—

whether one who steals the man [A0045]that is, whether he steals the man,

that is, whether he steals a man,

or whether one who steals the woman, or whether

he steals the

convert, or whether

he steals a

freed slave,

or

he steals the

minor—

in all of them he is

liable.

If he stole him but did not sell him,

or if he

sold him while he is still in his possession,

meaning that the stolen person is still in his own possession, since the thief did not manage to bring him into his possession before selling him,

he is exempt,

for here there is a sale without theft.

If he sold him to his father

of the stolen person,

or to his brother, or to one of his relatives

of his,

he is liable.

One who steals the slaves

the Canaanite ones who are not emancipated

is exempt.