Sanhedrin 85b (פה:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

It is analogous to after death

, as the son is liable for cursing his father even if the father is not fit to remain alive, since he is also liable for cursing his deceased father; all the more so if the father is merely not fit to remain alive.

And the Gemara concludes:

What has been decided concerning it

—what is the halakha regarding the question raised at the beginning of the discussion: Can a son serve as an agent of the court to administer lashes to and excommunicate his father, or not?

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: And so it was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: In all

transgressions,

the son does not become an agent for his father to strike or curse him,

except in the case of an inciter

to worship idolatry, in which case the son does become an agent for his father to strike and curse him,

as the Torah said

Deuteronomy 13:9, “

You shall neither pity him nor conceal him.”

Mishna:

One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable

to the death penalty

until he causes them a wound.

This is a stringency concerning one who curses as compared with one who strikes

, in this matter one who curses his father or mother is treated more stringently than one who strikes his father or mother—

One who curses them after death

, having cursed his father or mother after their death,

is liable

, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara;

but

if

one who strikes

them

does so after death, he is exempt

, since after death a wound is not relevant.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated, Leviticus 20:9: “For any person who curses his father or his mother shall be put to death; he has cursed his father or his mother, his blood is upon him.” And from the superfluous wording at the end of the verse, “

He has cursed his father or his mother,”

we derive that he is liable even

after death.

One might have thought

that I should say:

Since he is liable for striking

his father

and is liable for cursing

his father,

just as one who strikes is liable only while he is alive, so one who curses is liable only while he is alive.

Furthermore,

he is liable by means of a

kal va-chomer: Just as one who strikes

his father

for whom the phrase ‘among your people’ is treated as though it were not written

, since regarding striking it is not stated that the person must be one who performs the actions of your people, nevertheless

he is not liable for striking him after death, whereas one who curses, for whom the phrase ‘among your people’ is not treated as though it were not written

, since it is stated concerning him, “among your people,”

is it not logically inferred that he is not liable

for cursing him after death?

The verse states: “

He has cursed his father or his mother,”

to include that even

after death he is liable.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to Rabbi Yonatan, for whom the verse is superfluous

concerning

“his father or his mother

he has cursed,” and therefore it is possible to derive from it that one is liable for cursing his father even after death.

But according to Rabbi Yoshiyya,

who requires this verse for another exposition,

what can be said

? From where does he derive that one who curses is liable even after death?

As it was taught:

It is stated [there], “

Any person

who curses his father or his mother.”

Why must the verse say

“any person”

in duplicate?

To include a daughter

who cursed her father, or

a tumtum or an androgynos

who cursed their father—that they too are liable to the death penalty, and not only a male who cursed his father.

And from the fact that it is stated, “

who curses his father or his mother,”

I have derived

only

that

he is not liable unless he curses

his father and his mother

both together. But if he cursed only

his father and not his mother,

or

his mother and not

his father, from where

do we know that he is liable?

The verse states at the end of the verse,

“

He has cursed his father or his mother,”

which indicates:

his father

alone

he has cursed, and his mother

alone

he has cursed!

At the beginning of the verse, the curse is associated with his father, while at the end it is associated with his mother; this indicates that he is liable for each of them individually.

These are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyya.

Rabbi Yonatan says:

There is no need for the end of the verse to teach that one is liable for each of them separately. It can be derived from the beginning alone, since

it implies

from “his father and his mother” that specifically

both together, and it implies

also each

one individually.

Therefore, we say that

until the verse specifies for you

“together”

, as in the case of plowing with an ox and a donkey, where the Torah explicitly wrote, “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together,” so that we would not mistakenly say that it is forbidden to plow with an ox alone and with a donkey alone. This proves that wherever “together” is not written, the meaning is each one separately. Here too, one is liable for cursing his father alone and his mother alone.

And if so, since Rabbi Yoshiyya requires the exposition of “he has cursed his father or his mother” to teach that one is liable for each of them separately,

from where does he derive

that one who curses his father or mother is liable even after death?

And the Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiyya

derives it from

what is stated in the portion of Mishpatim, Exodus 21:17: “

And one who curses his father or his mother shall surely be put to death,”

which is superfluous and comes to teach that one is liable even after death.

And the Gemara asks:

And the other one

, Rabbi Yonatan, who derives the law concerning after death from “he has cursed his father or his mother”—what does he derive from the verse “And one who curses his father or his mother”?

And the Gemara answers:

That verse is needed to include a daughter

and

a tumtum and an androgynos

who cursed their father.

And the Gemara asks:

And let him derive it from “

any person

,” as explained in the earlier beraita?

And the Gemara answers: Rabbi Yonatan maintains that the repetition of the wording serves no exposition; rather,

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings!

The Gemara asks concerning the Mishna, which says, “This is a stringency concerning one who curses as compared with one who strikes”:

And let it teach

also that the Mishna should state that there is

a stringency concerning one who strikes as compared with one who curses, since with regard to one who strikes the phrase ‘among your people’ is treated as though it were not written

, so it is not necessary that the person specifically perform the actions of your people,

unlike one who curses

, for whom it is necessary that he specifically perform the actions of your people?

And the Gemara answers:

He maintains

, the tanna of the Mishna, that

striking is juxtaposed to cursing

, and even with regard to striking it is necessary that the person specifically perform the actions of your people.

The Gemara analyzes:

Shall we say that these tannaim

, the tannaim of the two beraitot below, disagree over the same dispute as

those tannaim

—the dispute between the tanna of the Mishna, who maintains that striking is juxtaposed to cursing with regard to the requirement that the person perform the actions of your people, and the tanna of the earlier beraita, who derives by a kal va-chomer from striking to cursing that striking does not require the person to perform the actions of your people, because he does not juxtapose striking to cursing?

For it was taught in one [beraita]:

A Samaritan—you are commanded with regard to striking him,

but you are not commanded with regard to cursing him

, as there is no prohibition against cursing him.

And it was taught in another [beraita]:

A Samaritan—

you are commanded neither with regard to cursing him nor with regard to striking him.

They assumed

, the members of the academy assumed:

Everyone

—both tannaim—maintains:

Samaritans are true converts

, who were initially complete converts but have now become wicked and do not perform the actions of your people. Therefore, everyone agrees that one is exempt for cursing them, but they disagree with regard to striking them.

Is it not

that

they disagree about this

, these two beraitot—

One Master maintains: Striking is juxtaposed to cursing

, and one is exempt even for striking a Samaritan because he does not perform the actions of your people.

And the other Master maintains: Striking is not juxtaposed to cursing

, and one is exempt for cursing a Samaritan, but not for striking him?

The Gemara rejects this:

No!

Rather,

everyone

maintains:

Striking is not juxtaposed to cursing.

And here they disagree about this—

One Master maintains: Samaritans are true converts

, and they are Jews, except that they do not perform the actions of your people; therefore, one is exempt only for cursing them, but not for striking them.

And the other Master maintains: Samaritans are converts out of fear of lions

, for they converted only out of fear of the lions that God sent against them, and they did not intend to convert for the sake of Judaism. Therefore, their conversion is not a conversion, and they are complete gentiles; consequently, one is exempt even for striking them.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, this is what was taught concerning it

in that same beraita that exempts one even from striking them:

And its ox is like that of a Jew

, so that if our ox gored the Samaritan’s ox, or vice versa, it has the same status as an ox belonging to a Jew: An innocuous ox pays half the damage, and a forewarned ox pays the full damage.

But a gentile has a different status from a Jew: If his ox gores our ox, even an innocuous ox pays the full damage, while if our ox gores his ox, we are entirely exempt.

How, then, could it be said that this tanna maintains that Samaritans are converts out of fear of lions?

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather, conclude from this

that everyone maintains that Samaritans are true converts, and

they disagree over the juxtaposition

, disagreeing only over whether striking is juxtaposed to cursing.

Conclude from this!

Mishna:

One who kidnaps a person from among the Jewish people is not liable

to the death penalty

until he brings him into his domain

, before selling him, for it is stated concerning one who kidnaps a person, Exodus 21:16, “And he is found in his hand,” and “his hand” means his domain.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He is not liable

until he brings him into his domain and uses him

before the sale,

as it is stated Deuteronomy 24:7: “When a man is found kidnapping a person from among his brothers, from the children of Israel,

and he subjugates him and sells him.”

One who kidnaps his son

and sells him—

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, holds him liable

to the death penalty.

But the Sages exempt him.

If he kidnapped

a

person who is half slave and half free—

Rabbi Yehuda holds him liable.

But the Sages exempt him.

Gemara:

The Gemara analyzes:

And

does the

first tanna

of Rabbi Yehuda

not require subjugation

, meaning that the kidnapper must use the slave before selling him? But it is explicitly stated, “And he subjugates him and sells him”!

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said: The difference between them is use (imor) worth less than a peruta—

Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the use must specifically be worth at least a peruta, whereas the first tanna maintains that even use worth less than a peruta is sufficient.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question: If he kidnapped him and sold him

while he was

asleep, what is the halakha?

Rabbi Yirmeya further raised a question:

If he sold a woman for the sake of her fetus

, having kidnapped a pregnant woman and sold only her fetus and not the woman herself,

what is the halakha?

The two sides of these questions are: Is there

a manner of subjugation in such a case, or is there no manner of subjugation in such a case?

The Gemara asks:

But let him derive that there is no subjugation at all

, since he did not use either the sleeping person or the fetus at all; how could he be liable for them?

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary

—rather, it is referring to one who is

asleep,

and, for example,

he leaned upon him

while he was sleeping, and thereby used him.

And the question concerning the

woman

is referring to a case where

he positioned her before the wind

, setting her up to shield him from the wind. The thicker she is, the more effective she is at shielding him, and it follows that he used the fetus.

The question is only whether there is

a manner of subjugation in this case

, using him in such a manner,

or whether there is no manner of subjugation in this case.

What is it?

And the Gemara concludes

teiku!

The Sages taught:

It is stated, “

When a man is found stealing a person

from among his brothers,”

I have derived only

from this

a man who steals

who is liable to be put to death;

a woman

who steals a person,

from where

do we derive that she is liable?

The verse states [Exodus, ibid.], “

And one who steals a man

and sells him, and he is found in his possession, shall surely be put to death.” This indicates that it makes no difference whether the thief is a man or whether she is a woman.

I have derived only that a man who steals either

a

woman or

a

man

—for when the thief is a man, it is stated: “When a man is found stealing a person,” indicating any person, even a woman—

and

likewise

a woman who steals

a

man

—for from where we derived the case of a woman who steals, it is stated: “And one who steals a man,” indicating specifically when she steals a man—

a woman who steals a woman, from where

do we derive that she is liable?

The verse states at the end of the verse, “When a man is found

and that thief shall die,”

indicating

in any event

that even a woman who steals a woman is liable to be put to death.

Another beraita was taught:

It is stated, “

When a man is found stealing a person from among his brothers,”

indicating any person—

whether one who steals a man that is, whether he steals a man,

that is, whether he steals a man,

or whether one who steals a woman, or whether

one who steals a

convert, or whether

one who steals a

freed slave,

and

steals a

minor,

in all these cases he is

liable.

If he kidnapped him but did not sell him,

or if he

sold him while he was still in his possession

—meaning that the kidnapped person was still in his own possession, as the thief had not managed to bring him into his possession before selling him—

he is exempt,

for this is a sale without kidnapping.

If he sold him to his father

of the kidnapped person,

or to his brother, or to one of his relatives

of the kidnapped person,

he is liable.

One who steals slaves

the Canaanite slaves who have not been emancipated

is exempt.