Sanhedrin 85a — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Shimon—he said

for he himself holds that

any labor that is not needed for its own purpose

where the person does not need the labor itself [such as removing a corpse from one domain to another, for his entire intention is only to remove the corpse from upon him, and it would be more convenient for him had he had no corpse at all]

he is exempt for it.

And here as well, he does not need the wounding; on the contrary, he would want not to wound himself at all. Therefore, he is permitted to remove the thorn on Shabbat, for he will never come to a prohibition of Shabbat by Torah law.

They asked Rav Sheshet: Son, what is the law that he should serve

as an agent against his father, to strike him and curse him

if his father became liable for lashes or excommunication—may the son serve as an agent of the court and administer the lashes to him and excommunicate him?

He said to them

Rav Sheshet:

And

for if a person

another, who permitted him

to strike and curse his fellow? For it is forbidden to strike and curse an ordinary Israelite, and how is it permitted for an agent of the court to administer lashes and excommunicate?

Rather

it must necessarily be said:

the honor of Heaven is preferable

for since it is a mitzva incumbent upon an agent of the court to administer lashes and excommunicate one who is liable for this, there is therefore no prohibition in it.

Here too

even if he is his son, it is permitted, because

the honor of Heaven is preferable.

He raised an objection:

It was taught in a beraita: From where do we have a warning from the Torah concerning one who strikes his father or mother?

And if one whom he is commanded to strike

an agent of the court, who is commanded to administer lashes to one liable for lashes,

he is commanded not to strike him

even one blow more than necessary, as it is stated: “Forty he shall strike him; he shall not add,”

one whom he is not commanded to strike

his son, who is forbidden to serve as an agent of the court to administer lashes to his father even where there is a mitzva,

is it not an inference that he is commanded not to strike him

where there is no mitzva? And from here we learn a warning concerning one who strikes his father or mother.

And the Gemara concludes the objection:

What, is it not that both this and that

even “one whom he is not commanded to strike” means

in a place of mitzva

when it is necessary to administer lashes to one who is liable for lashes in court, and nevertheless he is not commanded to administer lashes to him, because, as stated,

this is concerning his son

and

this is concerning another

for only another person is commanded and permitted to serve as an agent of the court for lashes, whereas his son is forbidden to serve as an agent of the court to administer lashes to his father.

And this is difficult for Rav Sheshet?

And the Gemara answers:

No!

Rather,

both this and that—there is no difference whether his son or whether another person

for both the one who is commanded and the one who is not commanded are possible both in the case of his son and in the case of another person.

And it is not difficult

how can it be possible for one person to be both commanded and not commanded? Because

here it is in a place of mitzva, and here it is not in a place of mitzva.

And this is how it teaches

the beraita:

And if, in a place of mitzva, where he is commanded to strike him

the one liable for lashes, nevertheless

he is commanded not to strike him

more than necessary,

where there is no mitzva

that is,

he is not commanded to strike him

a person who is not liable for lashes,

is it not an inference that he is commanded not to strike him?

And from here we learn a warning both concerning one who strikes his father and concerning one who strikes any Israelite.

And indeed, in a place of mitzva, it is permitted even for a son to administer lashes to his father, and it is not difficult for Rav Sheshet.

Come and hear

an objection to Rav Sheshet: It was taught:

One who is being led out to be executed

by a court-imposed death,

and his son came and struck him and cursed him, he is liable

for death, like anyone else who strikes his father or curses his father.

Another person came

a person

and struck him and cursed him, he is exempt

from lashes for striking his fellow and cursing his fellow.

And we raised the matter: What is different about his son, and what is different about another

what is the difference between them, that this one is liable and that one is exempt?

And Rav Hisda said:

The case is

when they are urging him

they ask him

to leave

for the place of execution by the court,

and

he

does not leave. Therefore, another person is permitted to compel him as an agent of the court and strike and curse him until he agrees to leave, whereas his son is forbidden to serve as an agent of the court for this.

And this is difficult for Rav Sheshet, who permits a son to serve as an agent of the court to strike and excommunicate his father?

And this is difficult for Rav Sheshet, who permits a son to serve as an agent of the court to strike and excommunicate his father?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Sheshet establishes it as referring to a case where they are not urging him to leave

but he agrees to go out to be executed; therefore, his son is forbidden to strike and curse him without a specific authorization.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, another person also

why is he exempt for striking and cursing him? The Gemara answers:

Another person—he is a dead man

for he is in any event destined to be executed, and therefore they are exempt for striking and cursing him; this is not so with his son, who is liable for striking and cursing his father even if he is a dead man.

And the Gemara asks:

But Rav Sheshet said: If he humiliated him

his fellow while he was

sleeping, and he died

during his sleep, so that although he did not have time to become humiliated by him,

he is liable

to pay him compensation for humiliation because he humiliated the deceased’s sons.

If so, even in the case of one being led out to execution, he should be liable for striking and cursing him because of the honor of his sons?

The Gemara answers:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where he struck him with a blow that is not worth a peruta

and therefore another person is exempt from paying him for striking him, since it is not worth a peruta, whereas his son is liable for death for striking his father even if it is not worth a peruta.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he struck him with a blow that is not worth a peruta, he receives lashes

for the prohibition of “he shall not add,” and why does the beraita say that another person is entirely exempt?

And the Gemara answers:

What

“exempt”

is it saying

the beraita?

Exempt from monetary payment

alone, but he is indeed liable for lashes.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

It follows that his son

about whom the beraita says that he is liable for striking his father, means

liable for monetary payment?

But we said that the case is one where the blow is not worth a peruta, so how can we make him liable for money?

Rather

it must necessarily be that the liability of his son is

according to his penalty

that is, death; if so,

here too

the exemption of another person is

according to his penalty

that is, from lashes, for which he would have been liable had the other person not been being led out to execution.

And the difficulty returns: What is the difference between his son and another person, that this one is liable for his prescribed penalty and that one is exempt from his prescribed penalty?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, concerning another person, this is the reason

that he is exempt

from lashes: because

the verse says [Exodus 22:27],

“

“And a prince among your people you shall not curse,”

and we derive from “among your people” that only

one who performs the deed of your people

is forbidden to curse; whereas this person, who committed an offense for which he is liable to death, is not included in “one who performs the deed of your people,” and therefore they are exempt for cursing him.

And the Gemara asks:

Granted, cursing

for he is exempt because “among your people” is stated concerning it, but

from where do we derive striking

that he is exempt for one who does not perform the deed of your people?

And the Gemara answers: Because

we compare striking to cursing

so that concerning striking as well, one is liable only specifically for one who performs the deed of your people, as with cursing.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, his son also

should be exempt for cursing his father who is being led out to execution, because he does not perform the deed of your people? And the Gemara answers:

As Rav Pinehas said [

in tractate Hagigah concerning another matter]:

When he repented.

Here too

the case is

when he performed

the father

repentance

and therefore his son is liable for cursing and striking him.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, another person also

should be liable for striking and cursing him, since he repented?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Mari said:

“Among your people”

we derive that it is specifically

one established among your people!

that is fit to continue existing; whereas one being led out to execution, who is not fit to continue existing, is not liable for cursing him.

And the Gemara asks:

If so, his son also

why is he liable for cursing his father who is being led out to execution?