Sanhedrin 85a (פה.) — the Talmud in English

And Rabbi Shimon—he says

he himself holds that

any labor that is not needed for its own purpose

where the person does not need the labor itself—for example, removing a corpse from one domain to another, where his sole intention is merely to remove the corpse from himself, and he would prefer not to have a corpse at all

one is exempt for performing it.

And here too, he does not need the wound; on the contrary, he would prefer not to wound himself at all. Therefore, he is permitted to remove the thorn on Shabbat, since he will never come to a Torah prohibition of Shabbat.

They asked Rav Sheshet: Son, may he serve

as an agent of his father, to strike him and curse him

if his father became liable to lashes or excommunication, is the son permitted to act as an agent of the court and administer the lashes or excommunicate him?

He said to them

Rav Sheshet:

And

a person

other than him—who permitted him

to strike and curse his fellow? It is prohibited to strike and curse an ordinary Jewish man, so how is it permitted for an agent of the court to administer lashes and excommunicate?

Rather

one must necessarily say:

the honor of Heaven takes precedence

Since it is a mitzva for an agent of the court to administer lashes and excommunicate one who is liable for it, there is no prohibition in doing so.

Here too

even if he is his son, it is permitted, because

the honor of Heaven takes precedence.

The Gemara raises an objection:

It was taught in a beraita: From where do we derive a warning from the Torah against one who strikes his father or mother?

And if one whom he is commanded to strike

an agent of the court, who is commanded to flog one liable to lashes

he is commanded not to strike

even one blow more than necessary, as it is stated: “He shall flog him forty times; he shall not add”;

one whom he is not commanded to strike

a son, who is prohibited from acting as an agent of the court to flog his father even where there is a mitzva

is it not all the more so that he is commanded not to strike him

where there is no mitzva? From here we learn a warning against one who strikes his father or mother.

The Gemara concludes the objection:

Does it not mean that both this and that

that “one whom he is not commanded to strike” means

where there is a mitzva

when one must flog someone liable to lashes in court, and nevertheless he is not commanded to flog him, for the reason stated above:

this refers to his son

and

this refers to another person

Only another person is commanded and permitted to serve as an agent of the court for lashes, whereas his son is prohibited from serving as an agent of the court to flog his father.

This is a difficulty for Rav Sheshet?

The Gemara answers:

No!

Rather,

both this and that, it makes no difference whether it is his son or another person

Both the case in which he is commanded and the case in which he is not commanded can apply to his son as well as to another person.

And it is not difficult

How can one person be both commanded and not commanded?

Here, where there is a mitzva; there, where there is no mitzva.

And this is what the beraita teaches

the beraita:

And if, where there is a mitzva, when he is commanded to strike him

the one liable to lashes, nevertheless

he is commanded not to strike him

more than necessary,

where there is no mitzva

that is,

where he is not commanded to strike him

a person who is not liable to lashes,

is it not all the more so that he is commanded not to strike him?

From here we learn a warning both concerning one who strikes his father and concerning one who strikes any Jewish person.

Thus, where there is a mitzva, even a son is permitted to flog his father, and this is not a difficulty for Rav Sheshet.

Come and hear

a difficulty for Rav Sheshet: It was taught:

One who is being led out to be executed

by court-imposed death,

and his son came and struck him and cursed him, he is liable

for death, like anyone else who strikes or curses his father.

If

another person

came and struck him and cursed him, he is exempt

from lashes for striking or cursing his fellow.

And we considered this: What is different about his son, and what is different about another person

What is the difference between them, such that the one is liable and the other exempt?

And Rav Hisda said:

This is referring

to those who are urging him

requesting that he

leave

for the place of execution by the court,

and

he

does not leave.

Therefore, another person is permitted to compel him, as an agent of the court, and strike and curse him until he agrees to leave, whereas his son is prohibited from serving as the agent of the court for this purpose.

This is a difficulty for Rav Sheshet, who permits a son to serve as an agent of the court to strike and excommunicate his father?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Sheshet establishes it as referring to a case where they are not urging him to leave

Rather, he agrees to go out to be executed, and therefore his son is prohibited from striking and cursing him without cause.

The Gemara asks:

If so, another person as well

Why is he exempt for striking and cursing him? The Gemara answers:

Another person—he is a dead man

He is destined to be executed in any event, and therefore one is exempt for striking and cursing him; this is not so with regard to his son, who is liable for striking and cursing his father even if he is already a dead man.

The Gemara asks:

But Rav Sheshet said: If he humiliated him

his fellow while he was

sleeping, and he died

during his sleep, so that although he did not have time to feel humiliated by him,

he is liable

to pay him compensation for humiliation because he humiliated the deceased’s sons.

If so, even in the case of one being led out to execution, he should be liable for striking and cursing him because of the honor of his sons?

The Gemara answers:

What are we dealing with here? With a case where he struck him with a blow that is not worth a peruta

Therefore, another person is exempt from paying him for the blow, since it is not worth a peruta, whereas his son is liable to death for striking his father even if the blow is not worth a peruta.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

But Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said: If he struck him with a blow that is not worth a peruta, he receives lashes

for violating the prohibition “he shall not add,” so why does the beraita say that another person is entirely exempt?

The Gemara answers:

What

does “

exempt

”

that the beraita states

mean? He is exempt only from monetary payment, but he is indeed liable for lashes.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

This implies that his son

whom the beraita says is liable for striking his father—is

liable for monetary payment?

But we said that the case involves a blow that is not worth a peruta; how can we make him liable for monetary payment?

Rather

one must necessarily say that the son’s liability is

according to his prescribed punishment

that is, death. If so,

here too

the exemption of another person is

according to his prescribed punishment

that is, from lashes, for which he would have been liable had the other person not been one being led out to execution.

The question therefore returns: What is the difference between his son and another person, such that the one is liable for his prescribed punishment and the other is exempt from his prescribed punishment?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, as for another person, this is the reason

that he is exempt

from lashes:

because the verse says

[Exodus 22:27], “

You shall not curse a ruler among your people.”

And we derive from the phrase “among your people” that only

one who acts as a member of your people

may not be cursed; but this person, who committed a transgression for which he is liable to death, is not included among “those who act as a member of your people,” and therefore one is exempt for cursing him.

The Gemara asks:

That works with regard to cursing

for which he is exempt because “among your people” is stated concerning it; but

from where do we derive striking

that one is exempt for striking someone who does not act as a member of your people?

The Gemara answers: Because

we juxtapose striking to cursing

so that one is liable for striking only one who acts as a member of your people, just as in the case of cursing.

The Gemara asks:

If so, his son as well

should be exempt for cursing his father who is being led out to execution, since he does not act as a member of your people. The Gemara answers:

As Rav Pinehas said

[in tractate Hagiga, concerning another matter]:

When he repented.

Here too

the case is

when he

the father

repented,

and therefore his son is liable for cursing and striking him.

The Gemara asks:

If so, another person as well

should be liable for striking and cursing him, since he repented?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Mari said: “

Among your people”

is expounded to mean that only

one who is destined to remain among your people!

that is, one who is fit to continue living, is included. But one who is being led out to execution, who is not fit to continue living, is excluded, and one is exempt for cursing him.

The Gemara asks:

If so, his son as well

why is he liable for cursing his father who is being led out to execution?