Sanhedrin 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

These are the ones subject to strangulation

transgressions for which one is liable to death by strangulation—

One who strikes

or

his father

or

his mother.

And one who kidnaps a person from Israel

who kidnaps a person from Israel and sells him.

And a rebellious elder against the ruling of the court

a sage from among the sages of Israel who rebels against the ruling of the Great Court in the Chamber of Hewn Stone and rules halakha contrary to its decision.

And a false prophet

who prophesies something he did not hear and was not told by the Holy One, blessed be He.

And one who prophesies in the name of idolatry.

And one who has intercourse with a married woman.

And the conspiring witnesses concerning a married daughter of a priest

witnesses who falsely testified that a married daughter of a priest committed adultery, and who were discredited by the testimony of other witnesses. They are not sentenced to the death that they plotted to impose upon her, namely burning, but to the death that they plotted to impose upon her paramour, namely strangulation, as explained below in the Mishna.

The reason is that it is stated concerning conspiring witnesses: “As he plotted to do to his brother,” and it is expounded: “to his brother,” but not to his sister. Whenever through their testimony they render a man and a woman liable, and the law of the man differs from that of the woman, the witnesses are judged according to the man’s law and not according to the woman’s.

And her paramour

the paramour of the daughter of the priest, whose punishment is strangulation, like anyone who has intercourse with a married woman, and not burning like her, because it is stated: “And a daughter of a priest, if she profanes herself through fornication, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire,” and it is expounded: “she” shall be burned, but not her paramour.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this:

One who strikes his father or his mother— from where do we derive

that he is subject to strangulation?

The Gemara answers:

As it is written

Exodus 21:15], “

One who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death.”

And every death stated anonymously in the Torah is strangulation!

The Gemara asks:

Say

perhaps it should be said that one is not liable to death for striking his father or mother

until he kills him by killing

that is, until he kills them through his blow; and from where do we know that one is liable merely for striking them?

The Gemara answers: Is it conceivable that

one who kills another

an ordinary person would be sentenced

by the sword, while

if he killed

his father

he would be sentenced only

to strangulation,

which is a lighter form of death!?

It necessarily follows that what the Torah said concerning one who strikes his father, that he is liable only to strangulation, refers to one who merely struck him and did not kill him.

The Gemara asks:

That works according to the one who says: strangulation is lenient

compared to the sword,

but according to the one who says: strangulation is severe

compared to the sword,

what can be said

for then it is once again possible to say that “one who strikes his father” refers specifically to one who killed him through his blow, and the Torah made his punishment more severe, sentencing him to the more severe death of strangulation rather than to the sword, the usual punishment for killing a person?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, as it is written

there, verse 12], “

One who strikes a man and he dies shall surely be put to death,”

and it is written

Numbers 35:21], “

Or he struck him with enmity with his hand, and he died,”

where the Torah explicitly wrote that the striking was to the point that he died.

Conclude from here: Wherever there is

in the Torah

an unspecified striking, it does not mean death!

The Gemara interprets the verses that speak of ordinary homicide:

And it was necessary to write “

One who strikes a man

and he dies shall surely be put to death,”

and it was necessary to write “

Anyone who strikes a person.”

For had the Merciful One written “

One who strikes a man and he dies

shall surely be put to death,”

I would have said

that only when he struck

a man subject to mitzvot

who is an adult and obligated in mitzvot,

not

only then would he be liable to death; but if he struck

a minor, he would not

be liable to death.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “

Anyone who strikes a person,”

which implies any person, even a minor.

And had the Merciful One written “

Anyone who strikes a person,”

I would have said even

if he struck

a nonviable fetus [whether born after nine months but unfit to live because it was born with a sealed head or with two backs], or

born after nine months but incapable of living because it was born with a sealed head or with two backs ], or

even

if he struck a nonviable fetus born after

eight months

that is, even then he would be liable to death, since they too are included in “person.”

Therefore

both verses are necessary: “One who strikes a man,” teaching that liability applies only to a man and not to a nonviable fetus.

The Gemara discusses this:

The Gemara discusses this:

And say

perhaps one who strikes his father is liable

even though he did not inflict a wound upon him, since the Torah did not say that he must inflict a wound?

since the Torah did not say that he must inflict a wound?

But did we not learn

in the following Mishna:

One who strikes his father or mother is not liable until he inflicts a wound upon them?

The Gemara answers:

The verse says “

One who strikes a person”

and “

one who strikes an animal,”

both of which are stated in a single verse [Leviticus 24:21]: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death.”

And the verse juxtaposed these one to the other—

Just as one who strikes an animal

is not liable for payment

until he inflicts a wound upon it,

because

it is written concerning it “

person,”

as it was stated previously: “One who strikes the life of an animal shall pay for it,” and “life” signifies blood, namely a wound,

so too one who strikes a person

that is, his father or mother is not liable

until he inflicts a wound.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection to this: If so

that you say that striking an animal refers only to one who inflicts a wound upon it,

if he weakened it with stones

by loading stones upon it until it became weakened and lost some of its blood

is it likewise the case that he is not liable,

because he did not inflict a wound upon it!?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, if it is not applicable to the life of an animal

since it is impossible to interpret the “life” stated with regard to an animal as referring to the animal itself,

assign it to the life of a person

referring to his father and mother, teaching that he must specifically inflict a wound upon them.

The Gemara asks:

But why do I need the juxtaposition

then? Why is the juxtaposition of a person to an animal necessary, since we learned the law of a wound in the case of one’s father and mother through the principle that a verse applies elsewhere?

The Gemara answers: The juxtaposition comes

for that which was taught by the school of

Hezekiah

above, 79b]: A person was juxtaposed to an animal. Just as with an animal there is no distinction between unintentional and intentional damage, and one is always liable for payment of the damage, so too with a person one is always exempt from monetary payment, even when the death was caused unintentionally.

The Gemara asks:

That works according to the one who holds

the exposition of

the tanna of the school of Hezekiah, but according to the one who does not hold

the exposition of

the tanna of the school of Hezekiah, what do I need the juxtaposition for?

The Gemara answers: According to that other opinion, the juxtaposition comes to teach:

Just as one who strikes an animal for medical treatment

for example, he lets blood from it for medical purposes,

is exempt

from payment, since he did not damage it,

so too one who strikes a person

his father or mother

for medical treatment is exempt

from death, even though he inflicts a wound.

The Sages raised a dilemma: What is the law regarding a son letting blood from his father?

Rav Mattana said:

It is permitted, for it is stated, “

And you shall love your fellow as yourself.”

The Jewish people were prohibited from doing to others only something that a person would not want done to himself; therefore, it is permitted to let blood from one’s father.

Rav Dimi bar Hinnana said:

From here we learn that it is permitted: It is stated, “

One who strikes a person”

and “

one who strikes an animal”;

just as one who strikes an animal for medical treatment is exempt, so too one who strikes a person for medical treatment is exempt.

Rav did not allow his son to remove a splinter for him

he did not permit his son to extract a thorn from his body.

Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to open an abscess for him

to open his boil in order to remove the pus from it.

Perhaps he will injure him

perhaps he will unintentionally cause an injury to him,

and it would be an unwitting violation

and he would unwittingly transgress the prohibition against striking his father or mother. And the Gemara asks:

If so,

a person

other than his son, too,

should not open an abscess for him, lest he unwittingly injure him. After all, every Jew is warned by a prohibition against injuring another, as it is stated with regard to lashes: “He shall not add”

And the Gemara answers: A person

other than his son is subject only to an unwitting violation of a prohibition,

whereas

his son is subject to an unwitting violation carrying a capital penalty

—strangulation.

And the Gemara asks:

But we learned

in tractate Shabbat [122b]: A

hand needle

a small needle used for sewing garments may be moved on Shabbat despite being muktzeh, in order

to remove a thorn with it.

And how is it permitted to remove a thorn from the body on Shabbat?

Let us be concerned that perhaps he will injure him,

perhaps he will cause an injury,

and it will be an unwitting violation punishable by stoning,

for he would have transgressed the prohibition against desecrating Shabbat?

And the Gemara answers:

There,

even if he injures himself, he will not transgress a Torah prohibition involving the desecration of Shabbat, since

it is a destructive act.

A destructive act is exempt with regard to the labors of Shabbat, because it is not “creative labor”; therefore, it is permitted to remove a thorn on Shabbat.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to the one who says that a destructive act

is exempt,

even when it is a destructive act involving an injury—that is, even with regard to the labor of injuring, there is an exemption for a destructive act.

But according to the one who says:

a destructive act involving an injury

is liable,

because the labor of injuring differs from all the other labors of Shabbat, and one is liable for it even when it is destructive,

what can be said?

How can one remove a thorn on Shabbat?

And the Gemara answers:

Who is the one from whom you heard

who is the tanna

who says that one is liable for a destructive act involving an injury?

It is Rabbi Shimon!