Sanhedrin 84b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

These Are Those Who Are Strangled

transgressions for which one is liable to death by strangulation—

One who strikes

or

his father

or

his mother.

And one who steals a person from Israel

who stole a person from Israel and sold him.

And a rebellious elder against the ruling of the court

a sage of the sages of Israel who rebelled against the word of the Great Court that was in the Chamber of Hewn Stone and ruled halakha contrary to their ruling.

And the false prophet

who prophesies what he did not hear and what was not said to him by the Holy One, blessed is He.

And one who prophesies in the name of idolatry.

And one who has intercourse with a married woman.

And false witnesses against a priest’s daughter

witnesses who falsely testified concerning a married priest’s daughter that she had committed adultery, and they were refuted; they are not given the death that they schemed to inflict upon her, namely burning, but the death that they schemed to inflict upon her paramour, which is strangulation, as explained below in the Mishna.

And the reason is because it is stated concerning conspiring witnesses: “As he schemed to do to his brother,” and they expound: “to his brother,” but not to his sister. Wherever through their testimony they make a man and a woman liable, and the law of the man differs from that of the woman, the witnesses are judged according to the man and not according to the woman.

And her paramour

of the priest’s daughter, whose law is strangulation like anyone who has intercourse with a married woman, and not burning like her, because it is stated: “And a priest’s daughter, when she profanes herself by whoring, she profanes her father; in fire shall she be burned,” and they expound: “she” shall be burned, but not her paramour.

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses:

One who strikes his father and his mother—from where do we derive it

that he is punished by strangulation?

And the Gemara answers:

For it is written [Exodus 21:15] “

Exodus 21:15 ] “

One who strikes his father and his mother shall surely be put to death.”

And every death stated anonymously in the Torah is only strangulation!

And the Gemara asks:

Let us say

perhaps we should say that he is not liable to death for striking his father and his mother

until he kills him by killing

that he kills them through his blow; and from where do we know that one is liable for striking them alone?

And the Gemara answers: And is it conceivable that

he killed an ordinary person

if he killed an ordinary person, they would judge him

by the sword, and

but if he killed

his father

they would judge him only

by strangulation

which is a lighter death!?

It must be that what the Torah said concerning one who strikes his father, that he is liable only to strangulation, refers to a case in which he merely struck him and did not kill him.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to the one who says: strangulation is light

than the sword,

but according to the one who says: strangulation is severe

than the sword,

what is there to say

for if so, it is still possible to say that “one who strikes his father” refers specifically to one who killed him through his blow, and the Torah made his punishment severe, to judge him by severe strangulation and not by the sword, as an ordinary killer is judged?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, because it is written [there, verse 12] “

there, verse 12 ] “

One who strikes a man and he dies shall surely be put to death,”

and it is written [Numbers 35:21] “

Numbers 35:21 ] “

or he struck him with his hand in enmity and he died”

for the Torah explicitly wrote that the striking was until he died.

Conclude from it: Wherever there is

in the Torah

an unspecified striking, it is not death!

And the Gemara explains the verses that speak of ordinary killing:

And it was necessary to write “

One who strikes a man

and he dies shall surely be put to death,”

and it was necessary to write “

Everyone who strikes a person.”

For had the Merciful One written “

One who strikes a man and he dies

shall surely be put to death,”

I would have thought

that specifically when he struck

a man subject to mitzvot

who is an adult and obligated in mitzvot,

not

only then is he liable to death; but if he struck

a minor, not

he is not liable to death.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “

Everyone who strikes a person”

to imply every person, even a minor.

And had the Merciful One written “

Everyone who strikes a person,”

I would have thought even

if he struck

a nonviable fetus [

born after nine months but not fit to live because it was born with a sealed head or with two backs], or

even

if he struck a nonviable fetus born

after eight

months, even then he would be liable to death, since they too are included in “person.”

Therefore

it is necessary to write “one who strikes a man,” that one is liable only for a man and not for a nonviable fetus.

And the Gemara discusses:

And let us say

perhaps we should say that one who strikes his father is liable

even though he did not make a wound in him,

even though he did not make a wound in him

for the Torah did not state that he needs to make a wound?

Why, then, did we learn

in the following Mishna:

One who strikes his father and his mother is not liable until he makes a wound in them?

And the Gemara answers:

The verse says “

One who strikes a person”

and “

one who strikes an animal,”

for both are stated in one verse [Leviticus 24:21]: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death.”

And Scripture juxtaposed one to the other—

Just as one who strikes an animal

is not liable for payment

until he makes a wound in it,

because

it is written concerning it “

person,”

as it was stated previously, “One who strikes the person of an animal shall pay for it,” and “person” implies blood, namely a wound,

so, too, one who strikes a person [

namely, his father and his mother ] is not liable

until he makes a wound.

Rabbi Jeremiah raised an objection against it: Rather, from now on

that you say that striking an animal means only when one makes a wound in it,

if he weakened it with stones

by loading stones upon it until it became weakened and diminished in blood,

is it also the case that he is not liable

because he did not make a wound in it!?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, if it is not relevant to the person of an animal

for it is impossible to establish the “person” stated concerning an animal as referring to the animal itself,

for even if he weakened it with stones he is liable, apply it to the person of a human

to his father and his mother, that specifically he must make a wound in them.

And the Gemara asks:

But why do I need the juxtaposition

if so, why do I need the juxtaposition of a person to an animal, since we learned the law of a wound in his father and mother from “if it is not relevant”?

And the Gemara answers: The juxtaposition comes

for that which was taught in the school of

Hezekiah [

above 79b], that a person was juxtaposed to an animal: just as with an animal there is no distinction between inadvertent and intentional, and one is always liable for payment for the damage, so with a person one is always exempt from monetary payment, even if he was inadvertent concerning the death.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to the one who holds

that he accepts the exposition of

the tanna of the school of Hezekiah, but according to the one who does not hold

the exposition of

the tanna of the school of Hezekiah, why do I need the juxtaposition?

And the Gemara answers: According to that authority, the juxtaposition comes to teach:

Just as one who strikes an animal for healing

such as when he let its blood for the purpose of healing

is exempt

from payment, since he did not damage it,

so, too, one who strikes a person [

his father and his mother]

for healing is exempt

from death, even though he makes a wound.

This was the dilemma posed to them: What is the law concerning a son letting blood for his father?

Rav Mattana said:

It is permitted, for it is stated: “

And you shall love your fellow as yourself,”

Israel was warned against doing to their fellows only something that one does not wish to do to himself; therefore, it is permitted to let blood for his father.

Rav Dimi bar Hinnana said:

From here we learn that it is permitted. It is stated: “

One who strikes a person”

and “

one who strikes an animal”;

just as one who strikes an animal for healing is exempt, so, too, one who strikes a person for healing is exempt.

Rav did not allow his son to remove a thorn for him

he did not allow his son to remove a thorn from his body.

Mar, son of Ravina, did not allow his son to open a blister for him

to open his boil in order to remove the pus from it.

Perhaps he will wound him

perhaps he will unintentionally make an injury in him

and it will be an unwitting violation of a prohibition

and he will unwittingly violate [the prohibition against] striking his father and mother. And the Gemara asks:

If so:

a person

another also

should not open a blister for him, lest he wound him inadvertently; for every Israelite is warned by a prohibition not to wound his fellow, as it is stated concerning lashes, “he shall not add”?

And the Gemara answers: A person

another—the unwitting violation of a prohibition

alone is involved, whereas

his son—the unwitting violation of a prohibition punishable by strangulation

is involved.

And the Gemara asks:

And we learned

in tractate Shabbat [122b]:

a hand needle

a small needle with which garments are sewn may be moved on Shabbat, despite being muktzeh, in order

to remove a thorn with it.

And how is it permitted on Shabbat to remove a thorn from the body?

Let us be concerned: perhaps he will wound

perhaps he will make an injury

and it will be an unwitting violation punishable by stoning

for having violated the desecration of Shabbat?

And the Gemara answers:

There

even if he wounds himself, he will not violate the desecration of Shabbat by Torah law, since

he is damaging

and one who damages is exempt in the labors of Shabbat because it is not “a planned labor”; therefore it is permitted to remove a thorn on Shabbat.

And the Gemara asks:

This works according to the one who says: one who damages

is exempt

even one who damages through making an injury—that is, even in the labor of injuring there is an exemption for one who damages.

But according to the one who says:

one who damages through making an injury

is liable,

for the labor of injuring differs from all the labors of Shabbat, and in it one is liable even when damaging,

what is there to say

how is it possible to remove the thorn on Shabbat?

And the Gemara answers:

Whom do you hear saying

who is the tanna

that one who damages through making an injury is liable?

It is Rabbi Shimon!