Sanhedrin 79a — the Talmud in English

And it had in it enough to kill

if he had indeed struck

upon his heart, and

but

it went

the blow

upon his loins, and it did not have in it enough to kill

with this blow that he struck

upon his loins, and he died, he is exempt,

for he struck him with a blow that did not have in it enough to kill. And likewise if

he intended to strike

the

adult, and it did not have in it enough to kill

the

adult

had he indeed struck him,

and it went

the blow

upon the minor, and it had in it enough to kill the minor, and he died,

this one is

exempt,

because it is an “uncertain warning.”

And likewise if

he intended to strike the minor, and it had in it enough to kill the minor, and

but

it went upon the

blow

the adult, and it did not have in it enough to kill the adult, and he died,

this one is

exempt,

for he did not strike him with a blow that had in it enough to kill.

But

if

he intended to strike upon his loins, and it had in it enough to kill upon his loins

had it struck them,

and it went

the blow

upon his heart, and it had in it enough to kill upon his heart, and he died, he is liable,

for it is a “certain warning,” since in either event he would have been killed.

And likewise if

he intended to strike the adult, and it had in it enough to kill the adult, and it went upon the minor

and it had in it enough to kill the minor,

and he died, he is liable,

for it is a “certain warning,” since in either event he would have become liable.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one, and he killed that one, he is exempt;

and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon’s words came to dispute the words of the first tanna at the beginning, who holds: specifically, if he intended to kill one for whose killing he would be exempt, and he struck another, he is exempt; but if he intended to kill one for whose killing he would be liable, and he struck another, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon came to dispute this.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one but killed that one, he is exempt:

The Gemara asks:

Rabbi Shimon ahayya

with regard to which clause of our Mishna did he come to dispute?

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one and killed that one, he is exempt:

The Gemara asks:

Rabbi Shimon—concerning what

part of our Mishna did he come to dispute?

If we say, concerning the final clause, in which we learned: “He intended to strike the adult, and it had in it enough to kill the adult, and it went upon the minor, and he died, he is liable,” and Rabbi Shimon came to dispute and say: Since he intended to kill this one and killed that one, he is exempt—if so: “ Rabbi Shimon exempts” he should have had to say

the tanna.

“If he intended to kill an animal but killed a person, or a gentile but killed a Jew, or a miscarried fetus but killed a viable child, he is exempt,”

and the implication is: He is exempt specifically in this manner, when he intended to kill one for whose death he would not be liable—

but if he intended to kill this one

a Jew or viable child

Rather, concerning the beginning, Rabbi Shimon came to dispute, for we learned at the beginning: “He intended to kill the animal and killed the person, a gentile and killed an Israelite, a fetus and killed a viable child, he is exempt,”

and it implies: only in this case, when he intended to kill one for whose killing he is not liable to death, is he exempt—

but if he intended to kill this one

an Israelite and a viable child and killed that one,

this one is

liable—

And concerning this we learned: Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one and killed that one, he is exempt.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s position:

is obvious:

If

Reuben and Shimon are standing [

before him ],

and he said

the killer, who killed Shimon: “

I am aiming at Reuben; I am not aiming at Shimon,”

This matter is

obvious:

If

Reuben and Shimon are standing

before him, and

the killer, who killed Shimon, said: “

I am aiming at Reuben; I am not aiming at Shimon,”

this is their dispute

[this is the matter over which they dispute], and it is in such a case that Rabbi Shimon exempts. But there is a doubt concerning Rabbi Shimon’s view: If he said: “

I am aiming at one of them”

[at one of them, whoever is struck—I aimed],

what

does Rabbi Shimon say? Does he exempt even in this case?

and wanted to kill him,

but it turned out

that he was

Alternatively, this is the doubt: He intended to kill a particular person,

thinking that

he was

Reuben

and wanted to kill him,

but it turned out

that he was

Shimon; what

does Rabbi Shimon say? Does he exempt even in this case?

Come and hear

from this as it is taught: Rabbi Shimon says: Until he says, “ I am intending for so-and-so”— the one who was ultimately killed— and he indeed killed that so-and-so, but when he said “for one of them,” he did not single him out; and likewise, when he thought it was Reuben and it turned out to be Shimon, this is not the so-and-so for whom he intended.

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

Because

the verse states [Deuteronomy 19:11]: “When a man hates his fellow,

and he lies in wait for him and rises against him

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

Because

the verse says [Deuteronomy 19:11]: “But if there is a man who hates his fellow, and he lies in wait for him, and rises against him,”

and strikes him mortally and he dies … and they shall hand him over to the blood-avenger, and he shall die.” It need only have said, “and he rises against him”; why did Scripture add “and he lies in wait for him”? To teach:

until he intends for him.

And the Rabbis, who dispute Rabbi Shimon, what do they expound from the verse “and he lies in wait for him and rises against him”?

They say—the scholars of

the school of Rabbi Yannai

explained: The verse came to teach:

to exclude one who throws a stone into a crowd

of people among whom there are gentiles, and the Israelite among them is killed; this is what Scripture exempts. But one who intends to kill a viable Israelite and kills another Israelite is liable.

And we explain:

What are the circumstances of “one who throws a stone into a crowd”?

But

if we say that there are nine gentiles and one Israelite among them, and this is the case concerning which Scripture exempts, this cannot be said, for:

It follows that they are mostly gentiles,

and there is no need for a verse to exclude him from liability to death!

Alternatively,

even in a case in which there were

half

Israelites

and half

gentiles, even in this case there is no need for a verse to exclude him, since, as he can say, “I intended for the gentiles,” you must exempt him because of “[A0165]a doubt concerning life is treated leniently”!

gentiles there, no verse is needed to exclude him, since, as he can say, “I intended to kill a gentile,” you should exempt him because

a matter of possible danger to life is treated leniently!?

Rather,

Rather,

it is necessary

for Scripture to exclude only in a case such as

where there are

in that group

nine Israelites and one gentile

among them, and to teach that although they are mostly Israelites, he is exempt, because:

For

the

gentile

is

there

fixed,

and every

minority that is

fixed

is not judged as a minority in relation to the majority, but

is considered like half and half

[as though the minority had increased and become half],

and consequently a doubt concerning life is treated leniently.

And we challenge: Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say: “ He intended to kill this one and killed that one, he is liable,”

this is

as it is written: “

this is

as it is written: “

When men quarrel” [

And when men fight”

[among themselves],

and they strike a pregnant woman,

and her children emerge and there is no calamity [to the woman, who did not die, but only miscarried], he shall surely be punished [financially, for the value of the fetuses], as the woman’s husband shall impose upon him, and he shall give through the judges. But if there is a calamity [to the woman, who dies], and you shall give a life for a life [the one who struck shall be killed]”—

And

as

Rabbi Elazar said: This that Scripture says, “when men fight,”

the verse speaks of a fight involving matters punishable by death,

namely, one intended to kill his fellow,

for

it is

written: “

But if there is a calamity, then you shall give a life for a life,” and if he did not intend to kill at all, he is not liable to death according to everyone—

And since he intended to kill, it is understandable that he is liable for killing the woman.

But according to Rabbi Shimon,

since he certainly did not intend for the woman,

this “

and you shall give a life for a life”

what does he do with it,

how does he make it impose death, when even if he intended to kill his fellow, as Rabbi Elazar explained, since the blow went upon the woman, for whom he did not intend, he is exempt!?

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon will explain what Scripture said, “and you shall give a life for a life,” as meaning that Scripture does not intend to make him liable to death, but to make him liable to give her heirs

money

the value of the woman’s life—

And this is like Rabbi,

who explains the verse this way

; for it is taught:

Rabbi says: This that Scripture said, “

and you shall give a life for a life,” means that he shall pay

money

for the woman to her heirs.

You say:

that the verse intended

“

money,”

or perhaps it is only

“

an actual life,”

and he shall be killed; do not say so, for:

“Giving”

is stated below,

namely, in this verse, “and you shall give a life for a life”—

and “giving” is stated

above.

and

“giving” is stated