Sanhedrin 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

And it was capable of causing death

had he indeed struck him

on his heart, and

however

it went

the blow

to his loins, and it was not capable of causing death

with this blow that he struck

to his loins, and he died, he is exempt,

since he struck him with a blow that was not capable of causing death. And likewise, if

he intended to strike

the

adult, and it was not capable of causing death

to the

adult

had he actually struck him,

and it went

the blow

to the minor, and it was capable of causing the minor’s death, and he died,

he

is exempt,

because this is a case of “doubtful warning.”

And likewise, if

he intended to strike the minor, and it was capable of causing the minor’s death, and

however

it went

the blow

to the adult, and it was not capable of causing the adult’s death, and he died,

he

is exempt,

since he did not strike him with a blow capable of causing death.

But

if

he intended to strike him on his loins, and it was capable of causing death on his loins

had it struck them,

and it went

the blow

to his heart, and it was capable of causing death at his heart, and he died, he is liable,

because this is a “definite warning,” since in either event he would have been killed.

And likewise, if

he intended to strike the adult, and it was capable of causing the adult’s death, and it went to the minor

and it was capable of causing the minor’s death,

and he died, he is liable

because this is a “definite warning,” since in either event he would have incurred liability.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one, but killed that one, he is exempt;

and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Shimon’s statement was made to dispute the statement of the first tanna in the first clause, who holds: It is specifically when he intended to kill one for whose death he would not be liable, but struck another, that he is exempt; but if he intended to kill one for whose death he would be liable, and struck another, he is liable—and Rabbi Shimon came to dispute this.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one but killed that one, he is exempt:

The Gemara asks:

Rabbi Shimon ahayya

with regard to which clause of our Mishna did he come to dispute?

If you say it is with regard to the final clause,

where we learned: “If he intended to strike the adult, and it was capable of causing the adult’s death, but it went to the minor, and he died, he is liable,” and Rabbi Shimon came to dispute this and say: Since he intended to kill this one but killed that one, he is exempt—if so: “

Rabbi Shimon exempts”

he should have said

the tanna.

Rather, it is with regard to the first clause

that Rabbi Shimon came to dispute, as we learned in the first clause:

“If he intended to kill an animal but killed a person, or a gentile but killed a Jew, or a miscarried fetus but killed a viable child, he is exempt,”

and the implication is: He is exempt specifically in this manner, when he intended to kill one for whose death he would not be liable—

but if he intended to kill this one

a Jew or viable child

but killed that one,

he

is liable—

an Israelite and a viable child and killed that one,

And it is concerning this that we learned:

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he intended to kill this one but killed that one, he is exempt.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s position:

This matter

is obvious:

If

Reuben and Shimon are standing [

before him ],

and he said

the killer, who killed Shimon: “

I am aiming at Reuben; I am not aiming at Shimon,”

this is their dispute [

this is the matter concerning which they dispute], and it is in such a case that Rabbi Shimon exempts; but the question arises concerning Rabbi Shimon’s opinion:

If

he said, “I am aiming at

one of them”

[I am aiming at one of them, whoever is struck],

what

did Rabbi Shimon say—does he also exempt in this case?

Alternatively, this is another matter requiring clarification: He intended to kill a particular person,

believing

that

he was

Reuben

and wanted to kill him,

but it turned out

that he was

Shimon; what

did Rabbi Shimon say—does he exempt in this case as well?

Ta shma

from that

as it was taught:

Rabbi Shimon says: Until he says, “I am aiming at

so-and-so”—

the person who was ultimately killed—“

I am intending,” and he indeed killed that so-and-so. But when he said “one of them,” he did not single him out; and likewise, when he believed the person was Reuben but it turned out to be Shimon, this is not the so-and-so whom he intended to kill.

And we explain:

What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

Because

the verse states [Deuteronomy 19:11]: “When a man hates his fellow,

and he lies in wait for him and rises against him

and strikes him mortally

and he dies … and they shall hand him over to the avenger of blood, and he shall die.” The verse could have said only, “and he rises against him”; therefore Scripture added, “and he lies in wait for him,” to teach:

until he intends to kill him.

And the Rabbis,

who dispute Rabbi Shimon—what do they derive from the verse “and he lies in wait for him and rises against him”?

They said

that

the school of Rabbi Yannai explained:

The verse comes to teach:

to exclude one who throws a stone into a group [

into a group of people that includes gentiles, and the Jew among them is killed; it is this person whom Scripture exempts. But one who intended to kill a viable Jew and killed another Jew is liable].

And we explain:

What are the circumstances of “one who throws a stone into a group”?

But

if you say that there were nine gentiles and one Jew among them,

and it is in such a case that Scripture exempts him, this cannot be said, because:

It follows that they are mostly gentiles,

and no verse is needed to exclude him from liability for execution!

Alternatively,

even if there were

half

Jews

and half

gentiles there, no verse is needed to exclude him, since, as he can say, “I intended to kill a gentile,” you should exempt him because

a matter of possible danger to life is treated leniently!?

Rather,

it is necessary

for the verse to exclude only a case such as

where there were

in that group

nine Jews and one gentile

among them,

and to teach that although the majority are Jews, he is exempt, because:

the

gentile

there

is

a

“fixed”

minority

there,

and every

minority that is

“fixed”

is not judged as a minority in relation to the majority, but

is considered as half and half [

as though the minority had increased and constituted half], and consequently a matter of possible danger to life is treated leniently. And we challenge this:

Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say: “

One who intended to kill this person but killed that person is liable,”

this is

as it is written: “

When men quarrel” [

with one another ], “

and they strike a pregnant woman,”

and her children emerge and there is no disaster [to the woman, who did not die, but merely miscarried], he shall surely be fined [monetary compensation for the fetuses] as the woman’s husband shall impose upon him, and he shall give it through the courts. But if there is a disaster [to the woman, who dies], then you shall give a life for a life [

he who struck her shall be executed].”

And

as Rabbi Elazar said:

The verse that says, “When men quarrel,”

speaks of a quarrel involving acts punishable by death,

that is, one intended to kill the other,

for

it is

written: “

But if there is a disaster, then you shall give a life for a life,”

and if he did not intend to kill at all, according to everyone he is not liable for execution—

and once he intended to kill, it is understandable that he is liable for killing the woman.

But according to Rabbi Shimon,

since he certainly did not intend to kill the woman,

this “

then you shall give a life for a life”

what does he do with it—how can it make him liable for execution? For even if he intended to kill his fellow, as Rabbi Elazar explained, since the blow went to the woman, whom he did not intend to kill, he is exempt!?

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon will interpret what the verse says, “Then you shall give a life for a life,” as meaning that the verse does not intend to make him liable for execution, but to require him to give her heirs

monetary compensation,

the value of the woman’s life—

and this is in accordance with Rabbi,

who interprets the verse in this manner;

as it was taught:

Rabbi says:

The verse that says

“then you shall give a life for a life”

means that he must pay

monetary compensation

for the woman to her heirs.

You say:

The verse intended

“monetary compensation”,

or perhaps

it means

“an actual life,”

and he should be executed; do not say so, because:

The term

“giving”

is stated below,

that is, in this verse, “Then you shall give a life for a life”—

and

“giving” is stated