Sanhedrin 79b — the Talmud in English

Giving"

above is what the verse said: “And there shall be no fatality ... and he shall give according to the adjudication [he shall pay the value of the miscarried fetuses through the court]”—

is what the verse says: ‘And there shall be no fatality... and he shall give according to the judges [he shall pay the value of the fetuses through the court]’"—

Just as there in “giving above,” the verse speaks

of giving

money,

—

so too here—in “giving below”—

money.

Rava said: This Tanna of the school of Hezekiah:

removes [this teaching] from Rabbi’s

words; that is to say: he disagrees with Rabbi, who obligates one in any event to pay money when he intended to kill this person and killed that person, whereas the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah exempts him in this case from monetary payment, because of “he is liable for the greater [punishment].” For although in practice he is not liable for death, it is sufficient that he performed an act that would make him liable for death—had he intended to kill him—in order to exempt him from payment.

And it also removes

as well

from the Rabbis,

that is to say: he also disagrees with the Sages, who impose death when he intended to kill this person and killed that person, whereas the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah exempts him from death.

For the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah:

It is written: “One who strikes an animal shall pay, but one who strikes a person shall be put to death [but he shall not pay money, for he is liable for the greater punishment].” Thus the verse compared

one who strikes a person

[who is exempt from payment] with

one who strikes an animal

[who is liable for payment], in order to derive the exemption from payment from the liability for payment:

Just as with one who strikes an animal, you made no distinction:

between

whether he struck it

unintentionally or

whether he struck it

intentionally—

and

between

whether he struck it

with intent or

whether he struck it

without intent—

Between

whether he struck it

by way of descent

[when he lowered his hand],

or

whether he struck it

by way of ascent

[when he raised his hand and struck it]—

not to exempt him from payment, but to make him liable for payment

in all these cases, even when he acted unintentionally, or without intent, or struck it by way of ascent [for with regard to exile the Torah exempted him

from exile—] So too, in the case of one who strikes a person, you shall make no distinction:

].

So too with one who strikes a person, you shall make no distinction in his case: between

whether he struck him

unintentionally,

for which he is exempt from death,

and intentionally,

for which he is liable to death—

between

whether he struck

with intent and without intent,

as it proceeds to explain.

Between

whether he struck

by way of descent or by way of ascent—

In all these cases, you shall make no distinction in his case:

to make him liable for payment, but to exempt him from payment

in all the mentioned circumstances. And you should not say: The Torah exempted him from payment because “he is liable for the greater [punishment]” only when he did so intentionally, with intent, and by way of descent.

But

what is the meaning of

“without intent”

which the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah said exempts him from payment?

If you say: without intent at all,

then

that is identical with unintentional.

Rather, it is obvious that “without intent,” for which the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah exempted him from payment, means in a case

of

one who has no intent for this person, but for that person—

and it teaches:

Do not distinguish

to make him liable for payment

since he lacks intent,

but to exempt him

from

payment.

Although he lacks intent, we have learned that he is exempt from payment, unlike Rabbi.

And necessarily he is also exempt from death, unlike the Rabbis, for

if he is liable to death,

[if he is liable to death],

what need is there to exempt him from payment?

Would we not know that “he is liable for the greater [punishment]”?

Rather, learn from this

according to the view of the Tanna of the school of Hezekiah:

he is not liable to death, and he is not liable to payment,

unlike the Rabbis and unlike Rabbi.

Mishna:

A murderer who became mixed with others,

and the Gemara will explain what murderer we are dealing with and who those others are with whom he became mixed:

all of them are exempt.

Rabbi Judah says: They bring them into a chamber.

The Mishna further explains:

All those liable to death who became mixed with one another,

all of them

are judged by

the

lightest death

for which one of them was liable.

And if

those to be stoned became mixed with those to be burned,

the Tannaim disagreed as to which death is the lighter one by which all of them will be judged:

Rabbi Shimon says: They are judged

all

by stoning, for burning is more severe

than stoning, and the Mishna says, “they are judged by the lighter.”

And the Sages say: They are judged by burning, for stoning is more severe

than it.

Rabbi Shimon said to them,

the Sages, to prove according to his words that burning is more severe than stoning:

But

if burning were not more severe

than all the liabilities to death,

it would not have been given

[it would not have been given]

to the daughter of a koen who committed adultery

with her husband, whose transgression is severe, for she profanes her father , as the verse says: “And the daughter of a koen, when she profanes herself by committing adultery, she profanes her father; she shall be burned with fire.”

They said to him,

the Sages, to prove according to their words that stoning is more severe than burning:

If stoning were not more severe

than all the liabilities to death,

it would not have been given to one who blasphemes and to one who worships idolatry,

for they stretch out their hands against the fundamental principle.

And if

those to be killed by the sword

[those liable to death by the sword]

became mixed with those to be strangled,

the Tannaim disagreed as to which is the lighter one by which all of them will be judged:

Rabbi Shimon says:

They will all be judged

by the sword,

for strangulation is more severe than it.

And the Sages say:

They will all be judged

by strangulation,

for the sword is more severe than it.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A murderer who became mixed with others, all of them are exempt; Rabbi Judah says: They bring them into a chamber. And the Gemara explains what case we are dealing with and over what they disagreed:

Who are the others,

who are those others with whom the murderer became mixed? And

if you say

that those

others are fit,

that they have no liability to death at all, it is impossible to say so for two reasons:

The first: If so, then

it is obvious

what the Sages said: All of them are exempt, for they will not all be judged to death because of a murderer who became mixed among them.

Furthermore:

Would

Rabbi Judah say in this case,

“They bring them—

all of them together with the fit ones among them—

into a chamber”?

Mnemonic: BSHRK.

He said,

he explained,

Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Shmuel:

Here we are dealing with a murderer whose judgment had not yet been concluded,

still before the court,

who became mixed with other murderers whose judgment had

already

been concluded!

The Rabbis hold: A person’s judgment may be concluded only in his presence,

and even if they all come before the court, since the court does not recognize him, this is not considered in his presence—

Therefore,

since we cannot conclude the judgment of that murderer,

all of them are exempt

because of the one exempt person among them.

And Rabbi Judah

held:

It is also impossible to exempt them entirely

[even to exempt them all from death is impossible],

since

in the end

they are murderers,

all of them.

Therefore: They bring them into a chamber.

Reish Lakish said:

If such a case

with a person,

a murderer,

were the case, everyone

would agree that they are exempt,

and even Rabbi Judah would concede this; our Mishna is not dealing with such a case.

But here

[in our Mishna] we are dealing

with an ox whose judgment had not been concluded

for stoning because it killed a person,

which became mixed with other oxen whose judgments had been concluded

for stoning.

They disagree:

The Rabbis hold:

As is the death of the owners, so is the death of the ox,

for the Torah compared the death of the ox to the death of its owner, as the verse says: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death,”

and

therefore:

The judgment of an ox may be concluded only in its presence—

and therefore,

since one of the oxen had not had its judgment concluded for stoning and we do not recognize it,

all of them are exempt.

And Rabbi Judah holds: They bring them into a chamber.

He said

and raised a difficulty

Rava

both concerning Shmuel's interpretation and concerning Reish Lakish's interpretation: