Sanhedrin 78b — the Talmud in English

“on his staff” [

meaning: in sound health, having recovered completely and relying on his own strength]

“and the assailant shall be absolved”,

“he shall pay only for his loss of work, and shall provide for his complete healing,”

“Could it enter your mind that this” [

victim]

“is walking in the marketplace while this” [

assailant]

“is executed”,

and that the verse had to teach us: “and the assailant shall be absolved”—

“Rather, this refers to one whom they assessed as being destined to die, but whose condition improved from what it had been,”

and they assessed him as likely to recover,

and

even though

afterward his condition worsened and he died,

the verse “and the assailant shall be absolved” came to teach

that he is exempt.

And

we explain, according to

the Sages: What do they derive from this

“and the assailant shall be absolved”?

What do they interpret it to mean?

It teaches that he is kept under guard—

the assailant, after he struck the victim. If the victim dies, we execute the assailant; and if he does not die, “he shall pay only for his loss of work, and shall provide for his complete healing” ; this is the meaning of the verse “and the assailant shall be absolved”: Until the victim went out walking on his staff, the assailant was not absolved, because he was kept under guard so that he would not flee.

And

we explain, according to

Rabbi Neḥemya: From where does he derive the requirement of keeping the assailant under guard,

since he interprets the verse for another matter?

a. It is written [Numbers 15:32–34]: “The children of Israel were in the wilderness, and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat. Those who found him gathering wood brought him to Moses, Aaron, and the entire assembly. They placed him under guard, because it had not been clarified what should be done to him.”

b. It is written [Leviticus 24:10–12]: “The son of an Israelite woman went out—and he was the son of an Egyptian man—among the children of Israel … and the son of the Israelite woman blasphemed the Name and cursed. They brought him to Moses … and they placed him under guard, to clarify for them according to the word of the Lord.”

Rabbi Neḥemya derives

the law of keeping someone under guard

from the wood gatherer,

as they placed him under guard until they knew his judgment.

And we challenge this:

The Sages should also derive from the wood gatherer

the law of keeping someone under guard; why, then, do they need “and the assailant shall be absolved”?

And we answer: Keeping under guard the person who struck another, when we do not know whether the victim will die from his wound, is not comparable to the case of the wood gatherer, because:

The wood gatherer

was known to be

liable to execution [

he was liable for death, since he had desecrated Shabbat, and the Torah had already stated: “Those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death”],

but Moses did not know by which method he should be executed [

by which form of execution one who desecrates Shabbat is put to death]. In such a case, indeed, we have already learned the requirement of keeping him under guard from the wood gatherer—

as opposed to this

assailant, concerning whom we do not know whether the victim will die from his injury,

for

we

do not know

at all

whether he is liable to execution or not [

whether he is liable to death]. Therefore, the verse “and the assailant shall be absolved” was needed to teach that this person too is kept under guard.

But Rabbi Neḥemya,

indeed does not derive the requirement of keeping someone under guard from the wood gatherer, in accordance with the distinction made by the Gemara. Rather,

he derives it from the blasphemer, about whom Moses did not know

Moses

whether he was liable to execution

at all,

and

nevertheless

they placed him under guard.

And the Sages

hold that it is impossible to derive the requirement from the guarding of the

blasphemer, because the guarding of the blasphemer was a temporary emergency ruling,

as there was no legal basis for placing him under guard: Why would they have had reason to doubt whether the blasphemer was liable to death?

The Gemara proves the distinction stated above between the custody of the wood-gatherer, which was only in order to determine by what means he should be executed, and the custody of the blasphemer, concerning whom they did not know at all that he was liable for death:

And the Gemara proves the earlier distinction between guarding the wood gatherer, which was only to determine by which method he should be executed, and guarding the blasphemer, concerning whom they did not know at all whether he was liable to death:

as it was taught in a beraita: Moses our teacher knew that the wood gatherer was liable to death, because it had already been

already

stated,

“Those who desecrate it shall surely be put to death,”

but he did not know by which form of execution he was to be killed,

as it is stated,

“because it had not been clarified

what should be done to him.” From the wording “what should be done to him,” it may be inferred that it was known that an act of execution was required, but they did not know which act it was.

But concerning the blasphemer, it was not stated

“what should be done to him,”

but

only

“to clarify for them according to the word of the Lord.”

This indicates that they did not know at all whether he was subject to an act of execution,

as Moses did not know whether he was liable to death in any way whatsoever or not.

Granted, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, this is why there are

in the Torah

two assessments:

The verse states: “A man strikes his fellow with a stone or with a fist, and he does not die but falls into bed; if he rises … and the assailant shall be absolved, he shall pay only for his loss of work, and shall provide for his complete healing.” The Torah did not need to say “and he does not die”; it could have said: “A man strikes his fellow with a stone or with a fist, and he falls into bed.” The words “and he does not die” are therefore interpreted as an assessment. Similarly, the Torah states: “If he rises and walks outside … and the assailant shall be absolved,” teaching an additional assessment, as explained above:

One

of them teaches about one who

was assessed as destined to die, but recovered,

that the assailant is exempt; one should not say: Since he left the court liable, let us execute him. Rather, the fact that the victim recovered is because the Merciful One took pity on him. Therefore, the verse says “and he does not die,” meaning: “A man strikes … and he does not die [as the assessment predicted, but] falls into bed … he shall pay for his loss of work,” and not death.

And one

of them teaches about one who

was assessed as destined to die, but whose condition improved from what it had been,

and then worsened again, that the assailant is exempt. Therefore, the verse says: “If [after he was assessed as destined to die] he rises and walks outside on his staff [after being assessed as likely to recover], the assailant shall be absolved,” even if meanwhile his condition worsened and he died.

But according to the Sages,

the following difficulty arises:

Why do we need the two assessments

stated by the Torah

at all?

And we answer:

One

of them teaches about one who was

assessed as destined to die, but recovered,

that the assailant is exempt—

And one

of them teaches about one who was

assessed

initially

as likely to recover, but died,

that in this case too the assailant is exempt—

The verse is thus interpreted according to the Sages [opposite Rabbi Neḥemya’s interpretation]: “[If he does not die”—if he was initially assessed as not destined to die, then even if he later dies—]he shall pay for his loss of work,” and not death; and “if [he was initially assessed as destined to die, and afterward] he rises and walks outside [and did not die], he shall pay for his loss of work …,” and not death.

And he does not die [if they initially assessed that he would not die, then even if he subsequently dies] he shall pay for his idleness,” and not death; and “if [they initially assessed him as likely to die, and afterward] he rises and walks outside [and did not die], he shall pay for his idleness...,” and not death.

And Rabbi Neḥemya,

who interprets one of the verses as referring to one assessed as destined to die whose condition improved, would say:

If he was assessed as likely to recover but died, no verse is needed

to teach that the assailant is exempt,

since

he had already

left the court acquitted. This is comparable to one whom the court acquitted, after which someone wished to present an argument that would make him liable: he is not brought back for a new trial, as we learned from the verse, “Do not kill the innocent and the righteous.” Therefore, only one “assessment” remains to be taught: the case of one assessed as destined to die whose condition improved and then worsened again, in which the assailant is exempt. The verse is therefore interpreted unlike the interpretation of the Sages.

and this is comparable to one whom the court acquitted, after which one of the judges sought to declare him liable: the verdict is not reversed, as we learned from the verse, “Do not kill the innocent and the righteous.” If so, only one “assessment” remains, to teach concerning one whom they assessed as likely to die but whose condition improved from what it had been, and then his condition worsened again, that the assailant is exempt; and the verse is expounded unlike the Sages’ exposition.

The Sages taught in a beraita:

If one strikes another, and they assess him as destined to die, but he recovers, they acquit him [

the assailant] from execution. We do not say: Since he left the court liable, let us execute him. Rather, the fact that the victim recovered is because the Merciful One took pity on him, as explained above.

If they assessed him

the court

as destined to die, but his condition improved from what it had been,

the court

reassesses him a second time for monetary liability; and if afterward his condition worsens and he dies, the ruling follows the intermediate assessment

which was only for monetary liability, and they do not make the assailant liable to death.

This is the statement of Rabbi Neḥemya.

And the Sages say: There is no second assessment after an assessment,

meaning: We do not say that since he was assessed a second time as liable only for payment, he is like one who left the court acquitted, and the assailant is no longer liable. Rather, we follow the present outcome, and since the victim’s condition worsened and he died, the assailant is liable to death.

Another beraita taught:

If

they assessed him

the court

as destined to die,

they reassess him

as likely to recover if they see that his condition has improved. We do not say: Since he left the court liable, he must be executed.

if they saw that his condition improved, and we do not say: Since he left the court liable, he must be executed.

But if they initially assessed him

as likely to recover,

even if his condition later worsened,

they do not assess him as destined to die

so as to say, “We made an error in the first assessment, and we will now make the assailant liable.” Since the assailant left the court acquitted, we attribute the worsening to another illness that came upon the victim.

If they initially assessed him

at first

as destined to die, but his condition improved from what it had been,

they reassess him

a second time for monetary liability; and if afterward his condition worsens and he dies,

he is not executed; rather,

he pays compensation for damage and pain to the heirs—

And

from what time does he pay,

that is: At what point do they assess his value if his condition later improves?

From the time he struck him,

they assess how much the victim was worth before the blow and how much he was worth after the blow, before his condition improved. We do not say: Since until now we assessed him as destined to die, and only now we assess him for monetary liability, let us assess how much he was worth before the blow and how much he is worth now, after his condition improved, because that would cause us to deprive the injured party of part of his compensation.

And the anonymous ruling

of this beraita

is according to Rabbi Neḥemya,

as it is clear from it that if the victim’s condition worsened again, the assailant is not executed.

Mishna:

One who

intended to kill an animal,

for whose killing he is exempt—

even if they warned him: “Do not throw the object, because perhaps you will kill the person standing beside the animal, and you will become liable to death,” and he accepted the warning and said: “I know that he is a member of the covenant, and I am acting with this in mind: If I kill him, I will become liable to death,”

and

in the end he indeed

killed the person [

an Israelite]—

or he intended

to kill a gentile,

for whose killing he is exempt,

but killed an Israelite,

even if they warned him and he accepted the warning—

or he intended

to

kill the

nonviable fetuses,

for whose killing he is exempt because they are considered like the dead,

but killed a viable person—

in all these cases, he is

exempt,

because this is a warning based on uncertainty. They warned him, “Do not throw the object, because perhaps you will kill the person,” since perhaps his throw would not strike a person for whose killing he is liable, but one for whose killing he is exempt.

But if he intended to kill this person [for whose killing he is liable] and killed that person, he is liable, because the warning they gave him—“Do not throw it”—was a definite warning: Whether he strikes this person or that person, he will become liable to death.

And likewise if

he intended to strike him on his loins, and it did not have enough to kill him

had indeed struck

on his loins -

And even if they warned him not to throw, for if he throws and it reaches his heart he will be killed, and he indeed accepted the warning -

And

eventually indeed

went

the blow

to his heart, and it had enough to kill him

with this blow that he struck

on his heart, and he died,

this is

exempt,

and because it is “a doubtful warning” that they warned him: “Do not throw, lest it reach his heart.”

And likewise if

he intended to strike him on his heart,